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Abstract 
Background and Purpose 
Progressive cerebellar ataxia is a rare neurological condition characterised by 
uncoordinated movement, and impaired speech articulation. Rehabilitation and 
physiotherapy in particular, form the cornerstone of healthcare intervention. Little 
qualitative research has been undertaken to understand the subjective experience of 
this complex condition. This study explored the experience of progressive cerebellar 
ataxia, physiotherapy and physiotherapy services from the perspective of people living 
with this condition.   
Method 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis underpinned this inductive qualitative enquiry. 
Twelve people with a progressive cerebellar ataxia participated in semi-structured 
interviews. All participants had some experience of physiotherapy. Interviews were 
transcribed. A case by case idiographic analysis was undertaken followed by a cross 
case analysis.  
Findings 
Five super-ordinate themes were identified. ‘The embodied experience of progressive 
cerebellar ataxia’ emphasised the foregrounding of the body, and the disruption of the 
skilful interaction between body and world. ‘Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment 
in public spaces and places’ encapsulated how participants made sense of actual and 
perceived stigma and discrimination. ‘Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex 
juxtaposition’ described participants’ problematic relationships with healthcare 
practitioners and their disease-centric world. ‘Wresting control in the face of uncertain 
and changing forces’ portrayed participants’ attempts to understand and reinterpret their 
condition on their own terms. ‘Exercise: a multifaceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia’ captured the meaning of exercise and physical activity.  
One over-arching theme, ‘Retaining a homelike way of being-in-the-world’, cautiously 
indicated that whilst participants described ‘unhomelike’ lifeworlds (uncomfortable and 
disturbing); they simultaneously held onto, and sometimes realised, the possibility of 
‘homecoming’, for example through the generation of new modes of belonging.  
Conclusion 
This study provided a detailed, phenomenological account of the lived experience of 
progressive cerebellar ataxia. New insights were developed that have the capacity to 
inform not only physiotherapy practice but also other healthcare disciplines. New 
avenues for future research were also identified.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
Progressive cerebellar ataxia is a rare neurological condition for which there is no 
effective disease-modifying intervention (Finsterer, 2009; Klockgether, 2011). Unlike 
other neurological conditions such as multiple sclerosis and stroke, little qualitative 
enquiry has been undertaken to understand the subjective experience of this complex 
condition. Physiotherapy is one of the rehabilitation options offered to people living with 
ataxia, but physiotherapists have limited high quality evidence on which to base their 
interventions (Martin et al. 2009). Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(Smith et al. 2009), this study explored the experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia, 
physiotherapy and physiotherapy services from the perspective of people who live with 
this condition. By investigating a topic largely neglected by previous researchers, and by 
identifying key insights about the meaning of cerebellar ataxia and its impact on the 
everyday lives of people living with this condition, this study offers a distinct and original 
contribution to knowledge in this field. The academic value of this work rests in providing 
empirical data that supports, questions and extends current theorising about the 
experience of long-term illness. It is further argued that the findings of this type of 
enquiry may help healthcare practitioners, such as physiotherapists, more effectively 
address the concerns and priorities of the people who seek their advice and support.  
 
1.1 Ataxia 
 
Ataxia, meaning dis-order, is characterised by incoordination of the limbs and trunk, 
dysarthric speech (impaired clarity and intelligibility), dysphagia (swallow dysfunction) 
and oculomotor dysfunction e.g. double vision, dizziness (Ghez and Thach, 2000; 
Marsden and Harris, 2011). Ataxic motor behaviour is typified by errors in the planning 
and execution of voluntary action, specifically the direction, amplitude, force, timing and 
velocity of movement (Ghez and Thach, 2000). People living with ataxia have difficulty 
adjusting movement in time and space, and adapting to novel or complex environments 
(Morton and Bastian, 2006). All activities of daily living such as talking, reaching and 
walking are affected. Unsteadiness and slurred speech often make it appear as if the 
person with ataxia is drunk (Rothwell, 1994). Non-motor features, in particular cognitive 
impairments (such as working memory and visuospatial processing), are also beginning 
to be understood as part of the clinical picture, but further work is required to detect the 
mechanisms involved and to identify the specific deficits (Strick et al. 2009; Timmann 
and Daum, 2010; O’Halloran et al. 2012).  
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Ataxia is caused by a variety of pathologies associated with either degeneration or 
destruction of parts of the cerebellum and/or its connections with other parts of the 
central nervous system (Ghez and Thach, 2000; Marsden and Harris, 2011). Much 
remains to be understood about the function of the cerebellum but there is broad 
agreement that it plays a crucial role in the adaptive control of motor behaviour 
(Rothwell, 1994; Ghez and Thach, 2000; Strick et al. 2009). Put simply, the cerebellum 
is thought to work subconsciously to compare general motor commands (rough 
blueprints for action) from higher brain centres, with feedback about external 
(environmental) conditions and internal feedback about, for example, the position of the 
limbs and trunk in space. By comparing intended action with real world conditions 
(internal and external), the cerebellum detects errors in the motor plan and indirectly 
generates corrective signals. This fine-tuning adjusts motor activity so that it matches 
external conditions (Rothwell, 1994; Ghez and Thach, 2000). The detailed co-ordination 
and execution of action is therefore left to the cerebellum, sparing higher level control 
and cognitive effort for other functions (Ghez, 1991). For example, when reaching for a 
cup the general motor command for reach and grasp is generated by the higher brain 
centres. Using feedback from the environment (e.g. the size, shape and anticipated 
weight of the cup) and internal feedback (e.g. the position of the arm in space), the 
cerebellum is thought to predict and then, through its connections to motor centres in the 
central nervous system, adjust the direction, amplitude, force, timing and velocity of the 
basic reach and grasp movement pattern, as well as background postural activity, to 
produce an accurate and efficient functional action.  
Disruption of the cerebellar pathways or processing centres that normally detect and 
correct movement errors, and respond to unanticipated perturbations, is thought to 
underlie the inaccurate, inefficient and uncoordinated movement typically observed in 
people living with cerebellar ataxia (Marsden and Harris, 2011). As a result of cerebellar 
dysfunction, the sophisticated processing that normally occurs subconsciously moves 
into the conscious realm where only a rough and effortful approximation of the 
cerebellum’s role can be undertaken (Ghez, 1991). As chapters 2 and 3 will 
demonstrate, very little research has been undertaken to understand what it might be 
like to live with this sort of disordered movement. One of the earliest insights was 
provided by a patient of the neurologist Gordon Holmes in the 1930s. The following 
quotation appeared as the only reference to the personal experience of cerebellar ataxia 
in a paper otherwise wholly concerned with understanding the role of the cerebellum in 
motor control:  
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This person’s taken-for-granted ways of carrying out his everyday activities seem to 
have been disrupted following injury to his cerebellum. What would normally be 
experienced as fluid, automatic and uninterrupted activity, he perceived as deliberate 
and fragmented, dependent upon concentrated effort. Insights of this type, grounded as 
they are in a person’s account of their everyday life, may help healthcare practitioners 
such as physiotherapists develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties faced by 
people living with cerebellar ataxia. However, in 2006, when the present study was in 
the early stages of development, this sort of enquiry and its potential contribution to 
practice was largely overlooked by both clinicians and researchers.     
 
1.1.1 Progressive Cerebellar Ataxia 
 
Ataxia may present as a symptom of several neurological conditions such as multiple 
sclerosis, posterior fossa tumour, stroke, and brain injury (Ghez, 1991; Marsden and 
Harris, 2011). However, the term “progressive cerebellar ataxia” is used to describe a 
complex group of ataxia-dominant, neurodegenerative disorders that are distinct from 
other neurological conditions (Wardle and Robertson, 2007; Klockgether, 2011). It is the 
experience of this type of ataxia, rather than the experience of ataxia as an 
epiphenomenon of another condition, that forms the focus of this study.  
The precise number of progressive cerebellar ataxias is unknown but Klockgether 
(2011) estimated that there were between 50 to 100 different ataxias, each with a 
specific genetic or molecular cause. Classification of the progressive ataxias remains 
imprecise but three main subgroups are currently identified (Klockgether, 2011); first, the 
hereditary ataxias (Friedreich’s ataxia (FRA); the spinocerebellar ataxias (SCA), 
episodic ataxia and other rare types of heredoataxias), second, the non-hereditary 
degenerative ataxias (synonymous with sporadic or idiopathic), and finally, the acquired 
ataxias (e.g. ataxias due to vitamin deficiency or alcoholic degeneration). The acquired 
ataxias generally have a known cause and may be treatable in ways that the other 
progressive ataxias are not. As they are more treatable, these ataxias may be 
experienced differently from the hereditary and non-hereditary ataxias and therefore 
they are not the focus of the present study. A summary of the main clinical features of 
the progressive cerebellar ataxias is presented in Table 1.1. 
‘The movements of my left arm are done subconsciously, but I have to think 
about each movement of the right [affected] arm. I come to a dead stop in 
turning and have to think before I start again.’ (Holmes, 1939:22) 
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Table 1.1 Clinical Features of the Progressive Cerebellar Ataxias 
Hereditary Ataxias 
Idiopathic Ataxias 
Friedreich’s  Ataxia 
Spinocerebellar 
Ataxias 
Episodic Ataxias 
 Progressive gait, limb 
and trunk ataxia 
 Slowly progressive 
ataxia 
 Discrete episodes, 
minutes, hours, days 
 No genetic or other 
known cause 
 Dysarthria  Retinopathy  Ataxia 
 Ataxia of gait and 
stance 
 Sensorimotor 
neuropathy 
 Neuropathy  Vertigo 
 Peripheral nervous 
system involvement 
 Absent deep tendon 
reflexes 
 Spasticity  Dizziness 
 Posterior column 
involvement (sensory) 
 Loss of proprioception 
and vibration sense 
 Dyskinesia, 
dystonia, 
myoclonus, chorea 
 
 Pyramidal tract 
involvement (motor) 
Other features: 
 Hypertrophic 
cardiomyopathy 
 Diabetes 
 Sleep breathing 
disorders 
Other features: 
 Sleep disorders  
 Fatigue 
  
(Data sourced from; Abele et al. 2002; Fogel and Perlman, 2007; Wardle and Robertson, 2007; López-
Bastida et al. 2008; Finsterer, 2009; Pedroso et al. 2010; Brusse et al. 2011; Klockgether, 2011; van Gaalen 
et al. 2011) 
 
The progressive ataxias are categorised as rare diseases because, taken as a whole, 
the prevalence is less than 50/100,000 (European Commission, 2008). Prevalence 
estimates for the progressive ataxias vary across countries and continents (Finsterer, 
2009). Craig et al. (2004) estimated the minimum prevalence of an autosomal dominant 
cerebellar ataxia (SCA6) in the northeast of England as 8/100,000. Muzaimi et al. (2004) 
estimated an amalgamated prevalence for idiopathic, SCA6, FRA and episodic 
progressive ataxias for southeast Wales as 10.2/100,000. Taken together, these UK 
specific data (Craig et al. 2004 and Muzaimi et al. 2004) suggested that the progressive 
cerebellar ataxias, whilst rare, may be more prevalent than other well-known 
neurological conditions. For example, Muzaimi et al. (2004) argued that the prevalence 
of autosomal dominant cerebellar ataxias were more common than conditions such as 
motor neurone disease (6.2/100,000) and Huntingdon’s disease (6.4/100,000). Wardle 
and Robertson (2007) and Klockgether (2011) argued similarly, and suggested that the 
prevalence of progressive late-onset cerebellar ataxia (hereditary and idiopathic) was 
previously underestimated.  
Uncertainty often dominates the diagnostic and genetic testing process, as well as the 
inheritance patterns, of these complex conditions (Schöls et al. 2004; Wardle and 
Robertson, 2007). Furthermore, accurate prognosis regarding life expectancy and 
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disability is difficult to predict at an individual level because insufficient longitudinal 
studies have been conducted (Whaley et al. 2011). Genetic testing is only available for 
the specific diagnosis of some of the progressive ataxias (Schöls et al. 2004), and 
although critical to diagnosis, definitive results may not be available in 50-80% of 
referred cases (Wardle and Robertson, 2007; Finsterer, 2009; Klockgether, 2011). Not 
all genetic tests are available routinely, and testing may require collaboration with 
specialist or research laboratories (Finsterer, 2009).  
Many adults presenting with the signs and symptoms of a progressive ataxia where a 
genetic cause cannot be found are generally diagnosed with idiopathic (sporadic) 
progressive cerebellar ataxia (Klockgether, 2011). In these cases, whilst the underlying 
condition may be hereditary, no tests are available that can identify the specific genetic 
disorder to provide a definitive diagnosis (Abele et al. 2002). Also diagnoses are subject 
to change once the full range of symptoms emerge e.g. in FRA an incorrect diagnosis of 
idiopathic progressive cerebellar ataxia is often given (Dϋrr et al. 1996). Similarly, an 
initial diagnosis of episodic ataxia may be later adjusted to probable or possible FRA or 
multiple systems atrophy (Wardle and Robertson, 2007).  
More than 25 different SCAs have been genetically defined (SCA 1, SCA2, SCA3 etc.) 
and causative mutations have been identified in 19 of them (Klockgether, 2011). One of 
the main features of the spinocerebellar ataxias is the phenomenon of anticipation. This 
genetic trait results in a pattern of inheritance characterised by earlier onset in 
subsequent generations, more severe symptoms and rapid progression (Friedman, 
2011). This feature is particularly prominent in SCA7 where, in extreme cases, affected 
children may die before an affected grandparent becomes symptomatic (Honti and 
Vécsei, 2005; Manto, 2005). For SCAs where the underlying genetic mutation is known 
and where anticipation is likely, precise prediction for age of onset and severity cannot 
be given, rendering genetic counselling particularly difficult (Schöls et al. 2004).  
Therefore, whilst progressive cerebellar ataxia poses high levels of disability and 
uncertainty similar to conditions such as multiple sclerosis, it also carries a genetic 
component that sets it apart from these conditions, as well as other genetic conditions 
that have a more straightforward inheritance pattern. Progressive cerebellar ataxia may 
therefore be experienced differently from many other neurological conditions. Qualitative 
research that remains open to the ways in which these factors may interact and shape 
the subjective experience, may illuminate particular issues that deepen the 
understanding of what it is like to live with this condition. This study, by articulating the 
details of this understanding, and by laying out the evidence on which it is based, may 
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encourage not only physiotherapists but other healthcare practitioners to re-examine 
tacit preconceptions and assumptions about their practice. This new knowledge might 
then be used to tailor practice towards the issues that most concern people living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia.  
 
1.1.2 Medical Treatment and Intervention   
 
No effective disease modifying or other pharmacological treatments have been 
developed which can reverse or cure progressive cerebellar ataxia (Finsterer, 2009; 
Klockgether, 2011). Symptomatic treatments such as acetazolamide have been found to 
reduce the severity and frequency of attacks in episodic ataxia (Jen, 2008), and 
antioxidants such as idebenone, CoQ10 and vitamin E have been shown to improve 
cardiac function, speech and mobility for people with Friedreich’s ataxia (Hart et al. 
2005). However, a phase 3 double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of idebenone failed to 
demonstrate efficacy in FRA (Lynch et al. 2010). Research is on-going and the 
development of effective therapies in the near future seems possible (Finsterer, 2009). 
In the meantime, rehabilitation (occupational therapy, physiotherapy and speech and 
language therapy) remains the cornerstone of what is offered for people living with 
progressive ataxia (Ataxia UK, 2009; Whaley et al. 2011). Physiotherapy, as one of 
these rehabilitation options, is generally understood as having a supporting role for 
people living with long term health conditions. Physiotherapists, for example, aim to 
work in partnership with patients by helping to restore, maintain or improve function and 
movement, and to have a positive effect on quality of life (Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapy, 2012). However, without further research to explore what physiotherapy 
means to people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia, it is unclear what shape this 
supportive role should take and how it might best work over time.   
 
1.2 Exploring the Contexts Underlying the Development of the Research 
Questions 
 
Evidence based practice forms the foundation of modern physiotherapy (Ritchie, 2001) 
and is generally considered to consist of integrating the best research evidence with 
clinical expertise, together with individual patient preference derived from patient-
centred research (Sackett et al. 1996). The researcher was aware from her own 
practice, as a physiotherapist, and from anecdotal reports, that the evidence of 
effectiveness for rehabilitation interventions for people with a progressive cerebellar 
ataxia was sparse. In 2006, when the present study was in the early stages of 
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development, informal discussions with colleagues and rehabilitation practitioners, and a 
preliminary examination of the literature, suggested that the progressive cerebellar 
ataxias were under-researched, both from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, and 
as such there was little in the literature to guide clinical practice.  
From a quantitative perspective, three reviews of the literature (including one by the 
author), published whilst the present study was in progress, demonstrated a lack of high 
quality rehabilitation research for progressive cerebellar ataxia (Cassidy et al. 2009; 
Martin et al. 2009; Marsden and Harris, 2011). There was some evidence that 
physiotherapy had modest effects on gait and trunk control, but as the majority of 
participants in these studies experienced ataxia as part of another condition (such as 
multiple sclerosis, brain injury or cerebellar stroke), the extent to which the findings from 
previous research could be extrapolated to people living with a progressive cerebellar 
ataxia was limited. 
As chapter 3 will demonstrate, little qualitative research has been undertaken with 
people living with cerebellar ataxia in order to understand their experiences and 
priorities, and how they manage ataxia in their everyday lives. In 2006, this lack of 
research represented a significant gap in the literature. This was especially so as the 
focus of Department of Health (DH) policies at the time emphasised the importance of 
patient-centred care, the biopsychosocial model and the re-configuration of services in 
ways which met the needs, expectations and concerns of people living with long term 
conditions (DoH, 2005, 2007; Chartered Society of Physiotherapy, 2005; Tompkins and 
Collins, 2006). Although it could be argued that people living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia might be expected to experience their condition and healthcare services in similar 
ways to people living with other progressive neurological conditions, it was also 
possible, as argued above, that this might not be the case. Progressive cerebellar ataxia 
perhaps has more in common with Huntingdon’s disease, a rare, genetic and 
progressive neurological condition (Bertram and Tanzi, 2005), than with more well-
known and more extensively researched conditions such as multiple sclerosis, 
Parkinson’s disease and stroke. Therefore, whilst it is possible that people living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia may share some concerns and experiences with people 
living with other progressive neurological conditions, there may also be unique and 
nuanced perspectives that have yet to come to light. 
Looking at rehabilitation for people with progressive cerebellar ataxia through the lens of 
evidence based practice suggested an urgent need for further research to be 
undertaken in this field. Several avenues, quantitative or qualitative, seemed to be open. 
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However, whilst the application of findings from both qualitative and quantitative 
research may contribute to well-being, and add to the evidence underlying rehabilitation 
practice, Hammell and Carpenter (2004) argued that quantitative rehabilitation research 
often focused on esoteric problems which had little relevance for practitioners, and failed 
to connect with, or address the real world concerns of, people living with particular 
conditions. For this researcher, the lack of qualitative work which sought to understand 
the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia formed the most significant gap in the evidence. 
For these reasons, and at this early stage in the development of rehabilitation research 
in this field, new work that aimed to understand the day to day concerns, priorities and 
experiences of people living with ataxia (including their experience of physiotherapy) 
seemed to claim precedence over the development of intervention studies and 
resonated most strongly with the interests and motivations of the researcher. This 
rationale matured following informal meetings where the preliminary aims of the present 
study were outlined and discussed with people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia.  
 
1.3 Reflexivity: Explicating the Position and Influence of the Researcher in the 
Research 
 
Reflexivity is seen as an important part of all phenomenological research (Finlay, 2011). 
The reflexive stance taken towards this study resonates not only with Finlay’s (2003a) 
and Shaw’s (2010) concept of hermeneutic reflection but also the reflexive attitude 
embedded within the hermeneutic circle (Smith, 2007; Smith et al. 2009). Hermeneutic 
reflection is a process of self-examination with respect to interpreting, understanding 
and explicating the position and influence of the researcher in the research (Shaw, 
2010). Ultimately this process should revise the researcher’s pre-conceptions about the 
phenomenon under investigation, as well as the initial orientations of the research itself, 
so that the phenomenon can be understood, as far as is possible, in its own terms 
(Finlay, 2003a). Whilst Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) constitutes the 
bracketing of prior experiences within the model of the hermeneutic circle rather than as 
a separate process within phenomenological enquiry (Smith et al. 2009), the stance 
taken towards reflexivity in IPA still has much in common with the model of hermeneutic 
reflection described by Finlay (2003a) and Shaw (2010).  
To briefly explain, the hermeneutic circle refers to a cyclical, rather than linear, process 
of interpretation. The analytic focus is on the participant’s sense making, rather than the 
researcher’s preconceptions (Smith et al. 2009). As described by Smith (2007), the 
researcher starts at one side of the circle, attentive only to his or her own biography and 
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personal understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. The participant is on 
the other side of the circle, fully involved in his or her own world of experience. Before 
moving around the circle to encounter the participant, the researcher attempts to set 
aside or ‘bracket’ (Smith 2007:6), or at least to become more aware of, his or her 
preconceptions in order to adopt an attitude of sensitivity, flexibility and ‘thoughtful 
vigilance’ towards the research participant’s sense making, particularly the unpredicted 
and the unexpected (Dahlberg et al. 2008:97). After engaging with the research 
participant, the researcher returns to the other side of the circle, ‘irretrievably changed 
because of the encounter’ to continue the interpretative process (Smith, 2007:6). As a 
result of the journey round the hermeneutic circle, the researcher is prompted to look at 
and understand the phenomenon in a new light. This openness towards the data 
changes the way in which the researcher understands the full picture, and the role 
played by his or her prior conceptions in interpreting the data. Motivated by new insight, 
the researcher is inspired to undertake a further iterative exploration of the text (Smith et 
al. 2009). A more in-depth explanation is provided in chapter 4, Methodology.  
Considered together, it would seem that hermeneutic reflection (Finlay, 2003a; Shaw, 
2010) and IPA’s explication of the concept of the hermeneutic circle seem to share 
critical features that mark them out as providing compatible models for understanding 
the impact of the researcher on the research. For these reasons, both these models 
were adopted as the theoretical underpinning of the reflexive stance undertaken in the 
present study. Consistent with this approach, critical examples of this process are 
embedded within the thesis to illustrate how reflexivity was used in the context of this 
study.  
 
1.3.1 Initial Reflexive Statement 
 
As reflexivity involves critical self-examination this section is written in the first person. At 
the start of this study, I was unaware how my physiotherapy background (as practitioner 
and lecturer) might have affected the direction, development, and findings of this study. 
Consistent with the phenomenological approach, I used a reflective diary to increase 
self-awareness (Finlay, 2003a). I recorded, as far as possible, my thoughts, anxieties, 
questions and experiences in order to understand how my views as a physiotherapist in 
particular, and a novice qualitative researcher in general, may have shaped data 
collection and analysis. At the start of this study I was firstly concerned and preoccupied 
with my obvious lack of psychology training and the influence this may have on the 
research. Second, these concerns led me to initially reject data that I interpreted as in 
any way relating to biomedicine or motor impairment. To me, this sort of data could not 
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be considered phenomenologically interesting, partly because ataxia related 
impairments were well explained in biomedical terms and also because I was unable to 
see how participants’ descriptions of these impairments would add to the understanding 
of the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia. Critical self-reflection and in-depth 
engagement with the data reconstituted these naïve preconceptions. Examples of this 
process are described in more detail in chapter 5 (Methods) and chapter 6 (the first 
findings chapter). At the early stages of the research process I was less able to examine 
or identify, exploit or critique other tacit assumptions and influences. These prejudices 
and orientations were only worked out during the analysis and writing up of the present 
study through the process of hermeneutic reflection (Finlay, 2003a; Shaw, 2010) and, in 
phenomenological terms, with respect to “the things themselves” (Husserl, 1970 
[1900/1901]:252). These issues are considered in more depth in chapter 11 
(Discussion). 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
This study explored how people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia made sense 
of their condition in the context of their everyday lives and how they perceived 
physiotherapy and physiotherapy services. With respect to these interests, the following 
research questions were formulated and are further defended in the literature review 
(chapters 2 and 3):  
1. What is the meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia for people who live with this 
condition?  
 
2. How do people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia experience healthcare, and 
physiotherapy in particular?  
 
3. What is the meaning of exercise and activity participation for people living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia? 
  
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to an improved understanding of progressive 
cerebellar ataxia by undertaking an in-depth exploration and analysis of the experiences 
of people living with this condition. This overview briefly describes each chapter and 
orientates the reader to the ways in which the thesis is organised.  
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Chapter 1 established that the progressive cerebellar ataxias are rare, long term, 
degenerative conditions associated with particular impairments and healthcare 
experiences that are worthy of further investigation. This chapter offered a background 
context to the development of the research questions. It identified why the experience of 
cerebellar ataxia may differ from other progressive long term neurological conditions, 
and, by doing so, it exposed a gap in understanding, and made a case for undertaking a 
qualitative exploration of the subjective experience of this condition. The contexts in 
which this study was undertaken were introduced. The approaches taken by the 
researcher with respect to reflexivity were addressed and potential analytic issues were 
foregrounded.  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature concerned with understanding the subjective 
experience of chronic illness and identifies the ways in which the findings from this 
extensive body of work were used to inform a sensitive exploratory enquiry into the 
experiences of people living with ataxia. Furthermore, it is argued that the exploration of 
the subjective experience of cerebellar ataxia is capable of making a unique contribution 
to this field. This chapter also makes sense of the different theoretical threads informing 
the academic understanding of long-term illness, and makes a case for undertaking a 
phenomenologically informed enquiry.  
Chapter 3 presents a critical review of literature focussing on understanding progressive 
cerebellar ataxia from the perspectives of people living with this condition. Key emerging 
themes from this body of work are identified and the need for further research in this 
field is established. The specific research questions of the present study are further 
justified and defended.  
Chapter 4 introduces Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis and argues that this 
approach to qualitative enquiry is appropriate for answering the research questions 
articulated in the present study. The theoretical position of IPA is explored in-depth and 
the epistemological and ontological basis of enquiry is discussed and clarified. Ethical 
considerations are also explored with particular reference to interpreting individual 
subjective experiences.  
Chapter 5 is the methods chapter. It details and justifies the methods employed in this 
study in order to answer the research questions. As data analysis is included in this 
chapter, an overview of the superordinate themes is provided in order to present and 
discuss each one separately in the subsequent findings chapters. Chapter 6 focusses 
on the embodied experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia. Chapter 7 explores 
participants’ perceptions of living with disrupted embodiment in public. Chapter 8 
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portrays participant’s accounts of their experiences of healthcare and in particular 
biomedicine. Chapter 9 explores how participants found ways to wrest some sense of 
control over their lives in the face of chronic uncertainty. Chapter 10 looks at 
participants’ perceptions of physiotherapy and exercise, and the contrast in meaning 
between self-selected activities and physiotherapy prescribed exercise.  
Chapter 11 further discusses, synthesises and critically evaluates the overall findings of 
this study, and identifies their unique contribution to knowledge in this discipline. A final 
reflexive overview is also provided. Chapter 12 concludes the thesis and presents the 
implications of this study for academic consideration, further research and practice.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Understanding the Subjective Experience of Long Term Illness: Building a Case 
for Exploring Progressive Cerebellar Ataxia   
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to acknowledge the intellectual history of work 
concerned with understanding the subjective experience of long term illness, and to map 
the main conceptual ideas. Secondly, this chapter aims to identify the principal 
contributions and debates from which to initially develop, and later assess, the adequacy 
and contribution of further empirical work in this field. Specifically, this chapter critically 
reviews chronic illness scholarship. It also continues to make a case for undertaking a 
phenomenological investigation of the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia, 
and for understanding the subjective experience of physiotherapy as one of the few 
rehabilitation options offered to people living with this condition. Whilst aiming to offer a 
critical review of the chronic illness literature, it is not the intention of this chapter to 
anticipate the potential themes of the present study. 
This chapter offers a selective narrative review of the literature. Relevant material was 
appraised and summarised, not with the intention of commenting on methodological 
quality, but to identify and map the findings, theories and ideas that were considered 
germane to the contexts of the present study. A traditional narrative review was 
undertaken because this approach is considered valuable when the intention is to 
integrate and summarise a range of literature, rather than offering new perspectives or 
challenging existing theory, as might be expected from a systematic review (Baumeister 
and Leary, 1997; Pope et al. 2007).  
The researcher’s professional background as a physiotherapist and lecturer in 
physiotherapy inevitably involved exposure to, and knowledge of, chronic illness 
literature. Therefore, it was impossible to approach the literature search without some 
foreknowledge of key texts and papers (Haverkamp and Young, 2007). Following the 
‘berrypicking model’ outlined by Bates (1989:2), and supported more recently by 
Barroso et al. (2003) and Walsh and Downe (2005), the literature search began with just 
a few key texts familiar to the researcher (e.g. Bury, 1991, Charmaz, 1991 and Thomas, 
2007) and developed from these texts to include a variety of sources as various leads 
were followed up, and as thinking shifted and progressed. Adopting a “berrypicking” 
approach meant that each new piece of information altered the trajectory of the search 
and, importantly, the conception of the original query, taking the search in new and 
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unexpected directions. Bates (1989:4) termed this process an ‘evolving search’ and 
likened it to picking blueberries in the forest; a ‘bit-at-a-time’ retrieval process.   
Search strategies included; reviewing work by frequently cited authors (e.g. Mike Bury, 
Sally French, Michael Oliver, Vic Finkelstein and Gareth Williams), following up 
reference lists; checking citation records; specific database searching, and area 
scanning (checking neighbouring work on a particular subject e.g. on a library shelf or in 
electronic records). These methods are recognised by others (e.g. Barroso et al. 2003; 
Greenhalgh and Peacock, 2005; Walsh and Downe, 2005) as appropriate for identifying 
and locating relevant material for literature reviews. As the literature searching process 
was not prospective or linear, the search strategy remained fluid throughout. However, 
reference was made to the following databases as required; Academic Search 
Complete, CINAHL Plus, Google Scholar, PsycINFO, Scopus and Web of Knowledge. 
Search terms included: “lived experience”, “subjective experience”; “chronic illness”, 
“long-term illness”; “physiotherapy”, “physical therapy”, “rehabilitation”; and “impairment”, 
“disability”. Records were prioritised if they offered important insights into the lived 
experience of chronic illness, or the role of physiotherapy, and/or if they helped to place 
the proposed study in context by establishing what was known in the field and by 
identifying gaps, areas of debate or controversy.  
The goal of the process described above was for the researcher to become familiar with 
the scope of work and body of knowledge related to the subjective experience of chronic 
illness in a general sense, without becoming tied to particular theories or models. As 
discussed by Haverkamp and Young (2007), qualitative researchers often set aside 
related work in the field to avoid becoming overly familiar and therefore influenced by 
previously established theories and ideas. This is also an important issue in 
phenomenologically informed research (Finlay, 2011), and is further discussed in the 
following chapter. The literature considered in this chapter was gathered and appraised 
over the course of the study, as part of an on-going process consistent with the 
approach described by Levy and Ellis (2006). Ideas and theories, as they emerged from 
the literature, inevitably influenced the researcher. However, by adopting the 
hermeneutic reflexive approach discussed in chapter one, the researcher endeavoured 
to maintain a sensitive vigilance, and resistance where necessary, towards the ways in 
which previous work may influence the direction, development and findings of the 
present study.  
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As the aim of this study is to explore and understand the lived experience of progressive 
cerebellar ataxia, the chapter begins by critically reviewing research focused on the 
personal and micro-social perspectives of long term illness. Micro-social refers to 
individuals and how they make sense of their social world, their ordinary and actual 
behaviour, or everyday life, for example face to face events and actions, and the 
contexts in which they take place (Bengston et al. 1997). The purpose of discussing 
research directed towards understanding the subjective experience of long term illness 
is to provide a background to the thesis, and to place the present study in context. 
Following this discussion, the macro-social perspectives of living with long-term illness 
are considered. Macro-social refers to social structures: cultural or normative rules or 
practices as they influence experience and behaviour (Bengston et al. 1997). Chronic 
illness is experienced by people who are situated in a particular context shaped by 
cultural and social norms and practices which form the background and texture against 
which their lives are lived and are made meaningful. A body of work encompassed by 
disability studies has drawn attention to disabling, disempowering and oppressive social 
practices. By doing so, this work has articulated the ways in which social systems may 
influence the personal experience of chronic illness. The impact of these macro-social 
structures will not be explicitly explored in the present study but, from a moral as well as 
a human science perspective, when undertaking research of this kind it is important to 
be attuned to the possible ways in which these forces may be perceived to affect the 
lives of participants. The final section of this chapter considers the contested place of 
bodily impairment in chronic illness research and critically reviews the role 
physiotherapists play in supporting people living with long term illness and disability. 
Phenomenology is put forward as a particularly suitable approach for understanding the 
embodied experience of chronic illness, whilst at the same time offering a means of 
attending to the full richness of the lived experience.  
In noting that terms such as chronic illness and disability may be understood in several 
different ways depending on individual perspectives, and may be considered offensive 
when used in particular contexts, convention, where it exists, and usage within 
contemporary academic texts guided the ways in which these terms were used. 
Thomas’ (2007:14) definition of ‘chronic illness’ or ‘chronic disease’ as ‘long term and 
incurable medical conditions’ was followed for the purposes of this chapter. 
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2.2 The Development of Micro-social Perspectives of Chronic Illness  
 
This section traces the emergence of a body of work which explored the subjective 
experience of chronic illness with respect to the micro-social contexts of everyday life. 
Through this research, illness came to be understood from an interpersonal perspective, 
and the subjective impact of illness on individuals and their close relationships began to 
be questioned and explored. By focussing on the person, and not the condition, such a 
move represented a re-imagining of conventional medico-centric ways of understanding 
illness.  
Medico-centric refers to a cure-orientated approach to illness: medical authority, secured 
through expertise in biomedicine, dominates the general understanding of ill health and 
dictates how others should behave (Lupton, 1997). In these contexts, personal 
autonomy is diminished and subjective views, values and experiences of illness are 
generally considered immaterial (Reynolds, 2004). Talcott Parsons’ (1951) influential 
conceptualisation of the “sick role” perhaps best represented the prominent medico-
centric position evident in western society in the 1950s and 1960s. In Parsons’ view 
illness was constituted as a temporary state that exempted individuals from the blame of 
becoming ill, and responsibility from undertaking their usual social roles. At the same 
time, individuals were obliged to try to restore health as soon as possible by seeking 
competent sources of help, and, central to this model, by cooperating with medical 
experts. Illness, by interfering with functional social roles, was considered a form of 
social deviance, and the sick role, played out according to Parsonian principles, 
operated as a socially regulated means of directing this deviance into an acceptable 
process and outcome (Parsons, 1978; SJ Williams, 2005).  
The conventional view of Parsons’ (1951) sociological model of illness generated 
sustained critique over several decades, not least for its paternalistic orientations and for 
classifying illness as deviance, but also for discounting chronic illness, self-
management, the patient’s perspective and contextual factors such as class, age, 
gender and ethnicity (Rier, 2010). As the debates about Parsons’ theory continued, a 
body of influential work unfolded from studies conducted in the mid-1960s and early 
1970s by the sociologists Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser (see for example Glaser 
and Strauss, 1964a, b; 1965a, b). These studies did much to review the problematic 
assumptions inherent in the conception of the sick role, and to reverse the lack of 
interest in the subjective lived experience of illness apparent in Parsons’ (1951) original 
model (particularly chronic illness). By emphasising the micro-social contexts of long 
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term illness, the pivotal role of healthcare as a feature in the lives of people with chronic 
illness was de-emphasised (but not abolished).  
Breaking with sociology tradition by focussing on subjective accounts and life-stories, 
Glaser and Strauss (1965a, b) recorded the vacillations of terminal illness experience. 
This work invalidated traditional Parsonian ideas about passive patients gratefully 
accepting medical or nursing attention. Instead, patients were seen to actively negotiate 
their interactions with healthcare staff; ‘he coaxes, wheedles, bargains, persuades, hints 
and uses other forms of negotiation’ in order to adjust the timing of routines such as 
bathing, eating, taking medication and undergoing treatment (Glaser and Strauss 1965b: 
94). Furthermore, participants in the same study were observed to encounter and 
navigate a succession of junctures marked by unpredictable deterioration or 
improvement in their condition which in turn impacted on their sense of self and their 
social world. Each stage necessitated a re-evaluation of previously successful ways of 
living, as well as the acquisition and deployment of new strategies and essential 
resources. This once again reinforced the un-Parsonian concept of patients as active 
agents in the midst of their illness, and in the approach of their death.  
A few years later, in a highly cited commentary, Strauss (1973) emphasised multiple 
social pressures such as marital stress, role disruption, adjustment and stigmatisation as 
related problems of long term illness. For Strauss (1973:33) chronic illness brought with 
it numerous difficulties that required ‘organisation of effort’ and ‘normalizing’ processes 
across multiple social relationships in order to cope with everyday life. Activities 
focussed on controlling symptoms, preventing or accommodating social isolation, 
modifying interaction and adjusting to change. Strauss (1973) therefore further stressed 
the importance of paying sensitive attention to the micro-social contexts of chronic 
illness, and he continued to dismantle the long-held and privileged position of a purely 
biomedical approach towards understanding long term illness. 
Following on from this early work (Glaser and Strauss, 1965a, b; Strauss, 1973) and its 
emphasis on the social processes integral to living with chronic illness, Corbin and 
Strauss (1985) presented a more contextualised understanding of long term illness 
which made room for, and acknowledged, the specific impact and demands of being ill 
whilst also attending to the social and personal (emotional and psychological) processes 
involved in managing everyday life. Sixty couples (one of each couple living with a 
chronic condition) were interviewed about managing long term illness, and their day to 
day lives. The deployment of effort across multiple domains described by these 
participants led Corbin and Strauss (1985) to understand long term illness as a burden 
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of unending work and care (illness work, personal work and biographical work) which set 
the tone for much research about illness experience in the following decade.  
The findings from Corbin and Strauss’ (1985) study were grounded in the authors’ 
commitment to the concept of illness trajectory. This concept described not only the 
temporal course of chronic illness but also the continued management (work) of illness, 
and the impact of such work on individuals and their relationships with others. Illness 
work involved symptom management and crisis prevention. Personal work included 
relationship management and raising children. Biographical work involved the continual 
or occasional reconstruction of a person’s life, which in turn impinged upon illness work 
and personal work. Holding onto a life worth living was seen as an almost constant effort 
jointly undertaken by the individual themselves and their family members.  
Corbin and Strauss (1985) argued that people living with chronic illness followed an 
uncertain illness trajectory, because everyday life and the type of work needed to 
manage illness and relationships varied from day to day. Carrying out and sustaining an 
acceptable life appeared to demand frequent monitoring and vigorous ingenuity. 
Managing a life with a long term illness was therefore presented as an unpredictable, 
unstable and effortful business necessarily woven in with, and complicating, day to day 
activities, aspirations and relationships. This understanding of long term illness went 
beyond the dominant medical and technical rhetoric of the recent past. It moved the 
perception of long term illness away from the clinical and the abstract, and towards 
understanding the impact of illness on the personal and concrete lives of individuals and 
their micro-social worlds. Nevertheless, the illness as work theory proposed by Corbin 
and Strauss (1985) was not without its critics. Conrad (1987), for example, highlighted 
the risk of over-conceptualising illness experience as work, by suggesting that further 
analysis might show that illness work may hold deeper meaning such as taking control 
and exerting a sense of order and authority over illness. 
In summary, the key message emerging from this body of work is that individuals living 
with long term illness are not the submissive recipients of medical care suggested by 
Parsons (1951), but are perhaps better understood as active agents, managing the 
challenges of illness within the context of an on-going life. These findings may help the 
researcher anticipate issues which also confront people living with a progressive ataxia. 
For example, the researcher may need to attend to the ways in which participants talk 
about how they manage the day to day priorities of life with ataxia and how these 
priorities and ways of coping may vary over time. It may also be important to explore the 
ways in which participants talk about the impact of ataxia on relatives, friends and carers 
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as they contribute to the work and effort involved in forging a meaningful and worthwhile 
life. Conrad’s (1987) arguments also remind the researcher to approach the present 
study with an informed but open mind; with an attitude that prioritises participants’ 
perspectives over and above theories established in the literature, or through the 
researcher’s own experience. 
 
2.2.1 The Dominance of Biography and Narrative 
 
Corbin and Strauss’ (1985) reference to biographical work recalled Bury’s (1982) 
influential conceptualisation of biographical disruption, and the impact of chronic illness 
on the self and identity. Bury (1982) interviewed 30 people living with rheumatoid 
arthritis and intentionally focussed on those with an emerging diagnosis. The findings 
suggested that the onset of arthritis was marked by uncertainty associated with 
disruptions not only to the body (taken-for-granted assumptions about the body and its 
behaviour were questioned), but also with respect to routine activity and the structure of 
everyday life. Plans for the future, social relationships, family life and the usual rules 
governing reciprocity and support were thought to undergo a forceful re-examination in 
the face of long term illness.  
For Bury (1982:169), the meaning of chronic illness was fashioned and negotiated in the 
context of an intense crisis or disruption and involved ‘a fundamental re-thinking of the 
person’s biography and self-concept’. Deliberations about the past with a focus on 
causation, as well as future projections and the possible impact and course of the 
illness, formed the critical substance of this re-examined biography. The extent to which 
individuals could effectively mobilise cognitive and material resources in response to 
their altered situation was thought to be constrained by: individual circumstances 
(personal values, life stage, roles, and interests); economic and social conditions and 
sociocultural constructs (such as causation and blame, stigma, competence and social 
worth). The experience of illness therefore hinged on a person’s ability to draw on 
reserves to actively manage disruption, and to cultivate supportive social networks. 
Importantly, Bury’s (1982) thesis seemed to posit biographical disruption as an 
inevitable consequence of living with a long term condition, a view that dominated 
studies about the everyday experience of chronic illness for well over the next decade 
(Faircloth et al. 2004).  
In the context of ataxia, Bury’s (1982) description of biographical disruption may be 
particularly relevant for those who have idiopathic ataxia, for which there is no known 
cause. Unanticipated symptoms tend to emerge later in life and might trigger similar 
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existential questions about causation and progression described by Bury (1982) above. 
As discussed later in this chapter, the inevitability of biographical disruption was later 
questioned in the literature but Bury’s (1982) argument, that chronic illness is situated 
within a social and personal milieu that contextualises an individual’s experience of long 
term illness, remains valid and relevant to the ways in which the subjective experience 
of ataxia might be understood in the present study.  
Kathy Charmaz’s early work (1983), drawing on interviews with 57 people experiencing 
a variety of severe chronic illness, added theoretical weight to Bury’s (1982) original 
work. Charmaz (1983:168) recounted the ways in which individuals described their 
identity as ‘crumbling away’ as a result of living a restricted life and through enduring 
social isolation and critical judgement. Participants’ concerns lay in their future 
imaginings about the person they saw themselves becoming: a burden to others, 
incapable of fulfilling obligations written into valued relationships; and unable to claim 
identities based on previous roles, activities or interests. Charmaz (1983) articulated a 
fundamentally broader conception of illness that went beyond physical discomfort to 
encompass psychological stress; loss and suffering in everyday life. Lawton (2003) also 
argued that Charmaz’s (1983) study emphasised how facets of illness compounded 
each other, such as the way in which critical appraisal by others prompted withdrawal 
from society, which in turn restricted social activity and the opportunity for affirmation of 
a positive self-image. However, whilst possibly resonating with the experiences of 
people living with less severe long term conditions, the findings of Charmaz’s (1983) 
early work, with its emphasis on suffering and loss of self, may be particular to 
participants who were severely debilitated and/or housebound. In terms of the present 
study, Charmaz’s (1983) work may still have resonance because the isolation described 
by participants seemed to stem from critical social appraisal. As noted in chapter 1, 
people living with progressive ataxia are often judged to be drunk (Rothwell, 1994). 
Negative appraisals about disordered movement and speech may similarly affect people 
living with ataxia which may in turn affect not only their sense of self, but also their 
participation in activities outside the home. 
Taken together, this influential body of work (Glaser and Strauss, 1965a, b; Strauss, 
1973; Bury, 1982; Charmaz, 1983; Corbin and Strauss, 1985) liberated the study of 
chronic illness from the constraints of biomedicine and by doing so perhaps spoke for a 
population whose experiences had been previously overlooked. Nonetheless, as 
conceded by Bury (1991), such insights emerged without due regard to the more 
positive steps taken by individuals to successfully mitigate and cope with living with long 
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term illness. A body of evidence subsequently emphasised that while people with 
chronic illness may face common problems, much of the response to illness depended 
upon the particular circumstances of the individual (Bury et al. 2005) and that for some, 
chronic illness may not be best regarded as a disruptive event in an otherwise 
consistent and unproblematic life. The following section draws on illustrative examples 
from the literature to demonstrate the ways in which Bury’s (1982) conception of 
biographical disruption and Charmaz’s (1983) emphasis on loss of self, suffering, and 
downward illness trajectories have been critically interrogated and enhanced by on-
going research in the field.  
 
2.2.2 Contextualising Biographical Disruption 
 
Soon after Bury’s (1982) conceptualisation of biographical disruption, G Williams (1984) 
proposed a theory of narrative reconstruction which in some ways pre-empted Bury’s 
(1991) interest in examining the ways in which impairment and other disruptions may be 
successfully incorporated into an on-going life. The overall premise of reconstruction, 
built from interviews with 30 people living with long-standing rheumatoid arthritis, 
acknowledged biographical disruption as fundamental to the chronic illness experience, 
but went further by describing the ways in which participants sought to piece together 
key aspects of their biography in order to make sense of their illness within the context 
of their past and present lives. G Williams (1984:197) described this process as ‘an 
attempt to reconstitute and repair ruptures between body, self, and world’ and argued 
that it answered a fundamental need to restore meaning to the present by reconstructing 
the past from the fragmentation produced by chronic illness. The emphasis therefore 
was on repair or recovery of self rather than disruption and loss of self.   
A body of research into the experience of long term conditions (Charmaz, 1991; 1999) 
as well as neurological conditions such as stroke (Becker, 1997) and spinal cord injury 
(Carpenter, 1994; Hammell, 2004), supported G Williams’ (1984) ideas. Illness 
narratives, characterized by the influential work of Zola (1982), Kleinman (1988) and 
Frank (1997), added to the perception that people living with chronic illness made sense 
of their lives by narrating their life story and, by doing so, reconstructed a new sense of 
self. These narrative orientations, embedded in much of the work noted above, offered 
powerful insights into the profound re-thinking undertaken by people living with chronic 
conditions. Storied accounts worked to integrate the disruption of illness into a coherent 
whole and to sustain a sense of biographical continuity. For example, Charmaz 
(1999:372), drawing on interviews with people living with chronic illness, stressed the 
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way in which narrative reconstruction helped them ‘learn new ways of managing life that 
transcend[ed] immediate suffering’. In this way, re-storied biographies created order 
from disorder, and achieved some sense of completeness and acceptance of a changed 
self. These ideas about re-storying a life as an attempt to retain a sense of stability and 
purpose in the face of long term illness, offered a theoretical basis for conceptualizing 
chronic illness and studying it from multiple perspectives and contexts (Hydén, 1997; 
Lawton, 2003). However, the assumptions underlying narrative reconstruction (e.g. that 
narrative reconstruction was inherently restorative) and the inevitability of biographical 
disruption were challenged in subsequent critiques and through empirical research. 
Illustrative examples are discussed below.  
Carricaburu and Pierret (1995) interviewed 42 asymptomatic HIV positive men in order 
to understand the consequences and the meanings ascribed to an HIV positive status 
on everyday life and personal identity. Half the men had haemophilia and were infected 
with HIV through blood transfusion. All participants described re-working their sense of 
identity in the face of HIV infection, but did not describe biographical disruption in the 
same way as Bury (1982). For example, for those haemophilic men who had previously 
rejected the prevalent “normalising” discourse associated with haemophilia at the time, 
and who had already organised their lives around the illness trajectories described 
above (e.g. by refusing to marry or to have children), HIV infection resulted in 
biographical reinforcement and a sense of continuity rather than disruption. However, for 
men who adopted “normalising” strategies to diminish the impact of haemophilia in their 
everyday lives, HIV infection disrupted their taken-for-granted way of understanding their 
illness, and provoked a critical reappraisal of their sense of identity. HIV infection for this 
group of participants resulted in biographical disruption that also entailed biographical 
reinforcement because, by re-thinking their biography, haemophilia came to be seen as 
an essential part of their identities. The findings from this study therefore qualified the 
biographical disruption thesis and signaled the need for a more fine-grained 
understanding of this concept, and its reappraisal as central to chronic illness 
experience.   
In a much quoted study, Pound et al. (1998) found that elderly stroke survivors living in 
the East End of London viewed their stroke as another anticipated hardship in their 
already difficult lives. The stroke was not perceived as a disruptive event because it was 
part of a long established pattern of living through, and with, adversity. Similarly, 
Sanders et al. (2002) found that elderly people living with arthritis incorporated the pain 
and disability associated with this condition into an already imagined old age. The 
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significance and consequences of arthritis were considered part of “normal” aging. 
Likewise, Faircloth et al. (2004) interviewed mostly male participants, over the age of 65 
with several co-morbidities, about their experience of stroke over a twelve month period. 
In this particular group, the disruptive consequences of stroke were minimised with 
respect to what was considered “normal” in the life experience of participants. Stroke 
was understood as simply another component of a person’s ‘biographical flow’ (Faircloth 
et al. 2004:256), an anticipated part of life.  
Carricaburu and Pierret’s (1995) conception of biographical reinforcement, the notion of 
biographical flow (Faircloth et al. 2004), as well as the influential studies conducted by 
Pound et al.(1998) and Sanders et al.(2002), emphasised the adaptive processes 
undertaken by people living with chronic illness and the ways in which illness, which 
may be disruptive in and of itself, may not be narrated into a disrupted biography but 
integrated into a complex, personally meaningful and on-going life-story. Therefore, a 
critical application of the biographical disruption thesis to chronic illness research further 
evinced the importance of attending to the particular context of chronic illness 
experience. Participants in Bury’s (1982) original study considered arthritis as an 
unexpected and unwanted intrusion into their relatively young lives, and as such 
described profoundly disrupted life trajectories. In the studies described above 
(Carricaburu and Pierret, 1995; Pound et al. 1998; Sanders et al. 2002; Faircloth et al. 
2004) age, co-morbidities and the type of illness, as well as social circumstances, 
shaped the chronic illness experience. By doing so, these studies cautioned against an 
uncritical application of biographical disruption as the primary vehicle through which 
illness experience should be understood. 
Although none of the studies discussed above explored the perceptions of people living 
with progressive cerebellar ataxia, some of the findings may be relevant to the contexts 
of the present study. For example, for those who have family members with ataxia, the 
emergence of symptoms may be confirmatory, and act as part of their anticipated 
biographical flow, whereas those who developed symptoms as part of idiopathic ataxia 
may recount a more disrupted life trajectory. Nevertheless, this reviewed work also 
suggested that these experiences are highly contextualised, and therefore difficult to 
predict without undertaking the sort of qualitative enquiry proposed for the present study.     
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2.2.3 The Limits of Narrative  
 
Woods (2011) acknowledged the narrative orientation prevalent in much illness related 
research as playing a significant and important role in illuminating the distinctive 
qualities of a person’s identity, traditionally excluded from biomedical understandings of 
health and illness. However, drawing on Strawson’s (2004) anti-narrative polemic, 
Woods (2011) argued against what she saw as the development of a narrative 
imperative in academic scholarship i.e. that a person’s identity and illness experience 
must be held in linear narrative form, that illness could only be understood within an on-
going story of a person’s life, and that sense making (about illness experience) could 
only be generated through narrative. Woods (2011:76) called for scholars to 
‘denaturalise’ narrative by exploring other ways of understanding illness experience, and 
to resist the taken-for-granted assumption that individuals are naturally able and 
predisposed to adopting a narrative mode of communication, and of typically seeing 
their lives as some sort of unfolding story. Phenomenology, photo-elicitation and 
metaphor were identified as appropriate alternatives for embracing diverse perspectives 
and means of self-expression, and for gaining access to lived experiences that may be 
tentative, incomplete, fragmentary and unstoried. Carel (2011) and Sartwell (2006) 
argued similarly in calling for situating narrative in amongst other, equally valued, modes 
of communicating and understanding subjective experience. Illustrative examples from 
the literature which support this view are discussed below. 
In this first example, Reeve et al. (2010) intentionally set out to explore whether self-
identity was dependent upon the maintenance of a continuous personal narrative - a 
core assumption underlying the biographical model of chronic illness. Reeve et al.(2010) 
critiqued this assumption, and its emphasis on a reflexive-cognitive self, for failing to 
account for embodied and emotional experiences, and as such for providing an 
inadequate reflection of individual lived experience. In this study 19 people with terminal 
cancer who were considered at risk of distress were asked to tell the story of their illness 
in the context of their own lives. Reeve et al.(2010) intentionally looked for examples of 
disruption. Unsurprisingly the participants’ accounts took on narrative form and reflected 
the description of biographical flow put forward by Faircloth et al.(2004), as well as an 
opposing concept termed ‘narrative fracture’ (Reeve et al. 2010:183). Flow referred to 
participants’ orientations towards maintaining continuity of everyday life, rather than 
efforts to maintain a continuous meaningful biography. Illness made this aim difficult to 
achieve, but embodied and emotional work, rather than cognitive reflexive effort, 
sustained narrative flow. Everyday life involved an iterative cycle of expending and 
replenishing physical and emotional energy. Participants focussed on meaningful 
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activities such as “getting on” with doing the housework for example, and recouped 
emotional and physical resources by spending a day in bed or allowing themselves time 
and space to grieve about the difficulties they faced. Physical and emotional exhaustion 
(rather than disruptive events) heralded the onset of biographical fracture, whereby 
everyday activities became unsustainable.  
Reflecting on these findings, and whilst admitting the intellectual currency of 
biographical theory, Reeve et al. (2010) argued that a strict application of the 
biographical narrative/cognitive view of individual illness experience overstated the 
extent to which participants’ accounts were consistent with a model of a reflexive self 
looking for meaning. The authors further argued that the biographical model 
underplayed the contribution of emotional and embodied ways of living with a terminal 
illness which were firmly situated in the here and now of everyday experience. Doing or 
being in a way that was emotionally energising, or which boosted creative responses to 
adversity, was thought to bolster self-agency and resilience, as well as offset the 
negatively charged experiences of living with long term illness (such as isolation, 
depression, loss of identity and role, stigmatization and disruption). However, living with 
a terminal illness, being psychologically close to death, may have limited the extent to 
which participants projected beyond their everyday activities and preoccupations. Reeve 
et al.(2010) suggested that although participants encountered threats to narrative self-
identity, these were usually bracketed off, or put to one side. Therefore these findings 
may be particular to this group of terminally ill participants. However, as discussed 
below, further studies with people living with long term illness, but not terminal illness, 
lend support to the view proposed by Reeve et al.(2010) that engagement in personally 
meaningful activities or ways of being may protect against the illness stressors, 
biographical crises and other depleting consequences of chronic illness identified in 
previous studies (e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 1965a, b; Strauss, 1973; Bury, 1982; 
Charmaz, 1983; Corbin and Strauss, 1985). 
Without diminishing the significance of the deleterious effects of living with chronic 
illness, a body of work has further identified that engaging in physical, social or creative 
activity may have profoundly positive effects on subjective well-being. To illustrate, 
Reynolds and colleagues (Reynolds, 2003; Reynolds and Prior, 2006; Reynolds and 
Lim, 2007; Reynolds and Vivat, 2010 and Reynolds and Prior, 2011) used 
phenomenologically informed methods to deepen the understanding of the beneficial 
role of creative activity. Individuals living with a range of long term conditions (e.g. 
multiple sclerosis, chronic fatigue syndrome, cancer and arthritis) talked about the 
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restorative capacity of art-making, which worked to maintain a familiar sense of self and 
social identity that was not defined by illness. Furthermore, creative occupations 
confirmed on-going capability, increased satisfaction with daily life and also helped to 
resist the harmful and well recognised physical, existential and social corollaries of 
chronic illness. Likewise, physical activity, for example sea kayaking (Taylor and 
McGruder, 1996) and scuba diving (Carin-Levy and Jones, 2007), were valued by 
people living with spinal cord injury for providing novelty and stimulation, but also for 
affording enriched social experiences and for promoting a sense of social competence 
and equality. Similarly, volunteering (Barlow et al. 2005) and engaging in reciprocal 
relationships (Hammell, 2007) fostered opportunities whereby individuals living with 
chronic conditions contributed to the lives of others, which in turn also promoted a sense 
of competence, belonging and self-worth. This sort of work has done much to re-balance 
the negative preoccupations of the early sociology studies, and the reliance on a strictly 
applied biographical or narrative approach to understanding long term illness. 
Furthermore, the application of phenomenological and other qualitative methods opened 
out the understanding of the experience of chronic illness by acknowledging the value of 
emotional and embodied perspectives.  
Critical insights from the work discussed above demonstrated that not all people living 
with a long term condition such as progressive ataxia will recognise that they have a 
story to tell, or will be able to narrate their life experiences in a cognitive-reflexive mode 
(a way of talking or telling subject to normative constraints). Furthermore, Reeve et 
al.(2010) demonstrated that holding onto a valued or preferred self-identity did not 
necessarily hinge on maintaining a discursive self, but in doing and being in ways that 
followed the patterns of everyday life (energising activity punctuated by periods of 
recovery and reflection). Further examples from the literature (e.g. Reynolds and Prior, 
2006) also demonstrated that an appropriately sensitive enquiry would enable 
participants to talk about the things that matter to them, and the enjoyable aspects of 
their lives, without necessarily focussing on “coping” with long term illness (as a 
cognitive reflexive construct) or dwelling disproportionately upon the hardship and 
difficulties of life with chronic illness. These perspectives and arguments were used to 
inform the development and shape of the interviews undertaken within the present 
study, as discussed in more depth in chapter four (Methodology).      
Thus far, this chapter has focussed on research that would fall into Thomas’ (2007) 
categorisation of micro-social experiential studies of chronic illness and disability. Such 
research is typically concerned with individuals and their personal world, an 
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interactionist perspective that, whilst taking subjective experiences seriously, pays less 
attention to the broader political and macro-social forces that impact on the experience 
of long term illness and disability. By contrast, researchers working in the field of 
disability studies have explored the lived experience of illness and disability in order to 
intentionally expose the ways in which social structures and unexamined cultural 
practices (e.g. medical authority derived from Parsonian principles) disable and oppress 
people living with chronic conditions. Without anticipating the findings of the present 
study, the next section of this chapter provides a selective summary of relevant research 
and critique from this substantial body of scholarship, and considers the main arguments 
in the context of the development of the present study.  
 
2.3 Macro-social Perspectives and Disability Studies 
 
Campaigners, commentators and researchers whose work falls into the category of 
disability studies have illuminated and emphasised the impact of disablism in the lives of 
people living with long term illness (Thomas, 2007). The social oppression paradigm, 
first articulated in the 1960s (Hunt, 1966), evolved from an emancipatory movement, 
advanced by disability activists committed to promoting the civil rights and social 
interests of disabled people (Thomas, 2007). This movement hinged on the 
understanding that impairment was not the cause of disability. Instead it was proposed 
that disability was engendered by social oppression, such as the exclusion of people 
with impairments from employment, education and main stream society. This thesis was 
put forward in a ground-breaking manuscript, authored by Vic Finkelstein and Paul Hunt, 
published under the auspices of The Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (1976) and entitled ‘The Fundamental Principles of Disability’. It laid the 
foundations for the development of the social model of disability (Oliver, 1983), 
considered below. Exclusionary mechanisms (social marginalisation and spatial 
segregation) were traced back to the socio-economic developments of the industrial 
revolution (Finkelstein, 1980; Oliver, 1990). In this era, people with impairments were 
commonly separated from those able to contribute to an economic system founded upon 
a physically capable workforce. Deemed incapable of working, impaired individuals were 
often subject to enforced dependency and state control (inadequate state welfare, 
institutionalisation, treatment regimens and medical supervision), a situation that 
persisted throughout most of the twentieth century (Abberley, 2002). Disablist practices, 
and culturally entrenched narratives emphasising social deviancy, were thought to 
further disempower people with impairment and, via internalised oppression (Swain and 
French, 2008; Oliver, 2009), contributed to the articulation of a negative sense of self 
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(Thomas, 2007). The social oppression paradigm also served to remind researchers of 
the ethical dimensions embedded in the process of undertaking research about living 
with chronic illness, such as the risk of doing research “on” disabled people and the long 
history of conducting research that was not grounded in, or relevant to, personal 
experience (Oliver, 2009). 
Working within the social oppression paradigm, Oliver (1983) developed the social 
model of disability as an alternative to the previously dominant individual (medical) 
model and its focus on personal tragedy. Oliver’s (1983) description and later 
elaboration of the social model further endorsed the view that disability was not caused 
by impairment but by social restrictions, or environmental, structural or attitudinal 
barriers (Oliver, 1996), imposed on people with impairment. The social barriers concept 
was subsequently supported by multiple studies conducted across multiple social 
contexts (Thomas, 2007; French and Swain, 2008).   
The importance and significance of the social model of disability was founded upon its 
ability to function as an organisational focus for collective action and, with respect to the 
medical model, for ‘providing an alternative understanding of the experience and reality 
of disability’ (Swain et al. 2003:24). Oliver (2009) explained that the body was 
intentionally left out of the social model because diverse impairments were deemed 
incapable of generating political capital; activists wanted the focus of the movement to 
be on the shared causes of disablism and to distance themselves as far as possible 
from the impairment-led individual (medical) model of disability. The body was arguably 
further pushed to the margins by male dominated theorists and activists who relegated 
impairments and suffering to the realm of the personal and private; a topic not fit for 
public discourse (Thomas, 2007). However, this decision led to criticisms that research 
about chronic illness and disability was ‘strangely disembodied’ (Thomas, 2007:138). 
Despite the substantial gains made by the social model when used as a tool for 
promoting social and political change for disabled people (Oliver, 2009), many 
researchers and commentators (e.g. Swain et al. 2003; Hammell, 2006; French and 
Swain 2008, 2004; Oliver, 2009) argued that the individual (medical) model of disability 
remained dominant and uncontested in health and social care and within contemporary 
rehabilitation practice. The dominance of the medical model of disability provoked 
researchers to explore the ways in which the power and influence exerted by health and 
social care professionals (doctors, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, social 
workers) served to sustain cultural discourses and social stereotypes that framed people 
with impairment as at once, and always, dependent victims in need of care (Thomas, 
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2007). As a result of these endeavours, a considerable body of qualitative research 
(some of which was discussed previously e.g. Taylor and McGruder, 1996; Carin-Levy 
and Jones, 2007; Reynolds and Prior, 2006, 2011) enhanced by researchers and writers 
in the field of disability studies (e.g. Morris, 1992; McBryde Johnson, 2003; French and 
Swain 2004; Oliver, 2009), demonstrated, contrary to the medical model, that for 
disabled people, the necessary requisites for living a life that has meaning and which 
generates a sense of self-worth, included ways of being that give purpose to life, a 
sense of belonging and contributing, and opportunities for exerting choice and control. 
By taking the body, at least in part, out of the picture, this research endorsed the validity 
of the social model of disability and demonstrated that quality of life was not dependent 
upon the presence or absence of impairments, but instead subjective and social factors.  
With reference to the present study, the corpus of work outlined above would suggest 
that qualitative enquiry has to be sensitive to the socio-historical as well as the personal 
and micro-social contexts of individual participants, for example personal experiences of 
stigma, marginalisation and exclusion. Macro-social perspectives of disability also seem 
to problematize physiotherapy and to suggest that physiotherapists’ traditional interest in 
repairing impairment and “normalising” the body (Nicholls and Gibson, 2010) may be 
built on a mistaken premise. As G Williams (1996:200) observed: ‘if the problem is not 
the need of the individual to adapt to the impairment, but rather the complex process of 
negotiating the interactions out of which daily life is created, then the role of professional 
experts as people who do things to the impaired body is clearly limited.’ What 
physiotherapists “do to the ataxic body” is not well understood or based on a significant 
body of evidence, and yet physiotherapy is recommended for people living with 
progressive ataxia (Ataxia UK, 2009). By exploring how people living with progressive 
ataxia experience physiotherapy, the present study might shed light on what, if any, 
aspects of physiotherapy are valued by participants. It may also contribute to the on-
going debate about the place of physiotherapy in the lives of people living with long term 
illness, and, as discussed in more depth below, the extent to which contemporary 
physiotherapy practice may be underpinned by biomedical orientations that perhaps do 
little to address the social dimensions of disability. 
In summary, research and commentary from within the social oppression paradigm 
emphasised the macro-social contexts that worked to marginalise, exclude and disable 
people with chronic illness. The body was problematized and the role that impairments 
played in shaping the lives of people living with chronic illness was reconsidered. The 
work reviewed in this section places the present study within an historical, political, 
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social and, perhaps more importantly, a moral context. It proscribes research that treats 
participants as tragic victims, or as abstract, decontextualized objects of enquiry. 
Instead, the work reviewed above arguably champions the sort of qualitative enquiry 
encouraged by Packer (2011:384) with its focus on ‘concrete people, in specific material 
circumstances’. In undertaking this type of qualitative enquiry, researchers would attend 
to the activities, relationships, aspirations and social structures that give purpose to a life 
lived with chronic illness, as well as the challenges and difficulties that may be faced. 
The extent to which it is possible to privilege the views and experiences of participants, 
to be sensitive to the situations and socio-cultural conditions that constitute individual 
lives, and the reflexive work required in order to do so, is a matter of debate and is 
discussed in detail in chapter 4 (Methodology). The next section argues that 
phenomenological enquiry offers a means by which these complex territories could 
continue to be sensitively negotiated in future research and in particular within the 
present study.  
2.4 Contextualising Impairment: Phenomenological Approaches to Understanding 
Lived Experience 
 
Traditionally, physiotherapists and other rehabilitation professionals, however well 
motivated towards “doing good”, were thought to subscribe to the assumption that 
people with impairments would wish to be treated and cured, or at least to optimise their 
physical function (Hammell, 2006; Thomas, 2007; Andreou, 2010; Nicholls and Gibson, 
2010). By endorsing the medical model in this way, rehabilitation professionals gave 
themselves a mandate to exercise power and authority in people’s lives under the 
auspices of treatment and care (Thomas, 2007). The situation for physiotherapists 
would seem to be particularly problematic in this regard. Nicholls and Gibson (2010:497) 
cogently argued that physiotherapists acquire their professional identity, status and 
financial security ‘because of their expertise in managing health problems that have at 
their core the function and dysfunction of the body.’ Furthermore, physiotherapists’ long 
standing affinity with biomedicine, their profoundly mechanistic understanding of the 
body, and their status as movement scientists, has meant that the body as a 
philosophically complex construct has been ‘almost entirely bypassed’ by the profession 
(Nicholls and Gibson, 2010:497). If the argument stands that impairments are not 
personally disadvantageous, and if quality of life only rests on subjective experience, 
then it would seem that the position of rehabilitation professionals in general and the role 
they play in the lives of people with chronic illness is at risk (G Williams, 1996; Hammell, 
2006).  
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In taking the debate forward, Nicholls and Gibson (2010) suggested that in order to 
sustain the value and purpose of the profession, and to more effectively respond to the 
subjective experiences and multiple dimensions of health and illness (including political 
and social dimensions), physiotherapists should reassess their long held view of the 
primacy of the biological body and instead take on an embodied perspective. According 
to Marcum (2004:312), a phenomenological model of the embodied person ‘reclaims the 
person’s wholeness or integrity especially with reference to the lived context’. An 
embodied understanding of health and illness, and progressive cerebellar ataxia in 
particular, would therefore make room for the social and political dimensions of disability 
and long term illness, whilst also integrating relational perspectives occurring on a 
micro-social level, as well as felt bodily experiences such as pain, suffering and 
impairment.    
Others in the disability movement and in disability studies have spoken similarly. Several 
disability theorists, including feminist voices, argued for retaining an understanding of 
the body that incorporated the physical or impaired body into an integrated model of 
illness and disability (Morris, 1992; Crow, 1996; Hughes and Patterson, 1997; de Wolfe, 
2002 and Thomas, 2007). For example, Crow (1996:58) explained that ‘impairment is 
not always irrelevant, neutral or positive … when pain, fatigue, depression and chronic 
illness are constant facts of life’. De Wolfe (2002:255) similarly argued for ‘a more 
inclusive and diverse movement, which can encompass those whose suffering is 
resistant to social accommodation.’ Thomas (2007) and others (e.g. Kelly and Field, 
1996) have also called for researchers interested in chronic illness experience to 
reintegrate the body into their exploration of the personal, cultural and social contexts of 
illness and disability.  
With respect to the arguments outlined above, impairments are perhaps more properly 
understood as ‘complex bio-social phenomena’, engendered and given meaning within a 
multifaceted social and cultural structure (Thomas, 2007:137). This way of 
understanding the impaired body has much in common with phenomenological 
perspectives which offer an account of the body that admits its experiential as well as its 
social and political significance (G Williams, 1996; Smith et al. 2009; Finlay, 2011). 
These ideas suggest that leaving the body out of research about long term illness or 
disability would risk failing to recognise the ways in which impairment shapes the lives of 
disabled people, and would seem to inevitably lead to an unnecessarily blurred view of a 
phenomenon ostensibly fundamental to understanding the human condition.  
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Exemplars that take a phenomenological view of the body, and therefore explore illness 
experience in ways recognisable and consistent with the views of disability theorists, can 
be found in research using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) and aligned 
approaches in the human sciences. For example Smith et al.(2009) used IPA to explore 
one woman’s experience of the personal meaning and impact of haemodialysis, a life-
saving biomedical intervention for people living with end-stage renal disease. For the 
participant in this study haemodialysis came to mean passivity, loss of control, bodily 
invasion, fear and institutionalisation which ultimately undermined her sense of identity. 
By taking a phenomenological approach, the authors were able to show how these 
findings could be used to alert healthcare practitioners to the ways in which biomedical 
interventions may be interpreted by individuals. It was theorised that haemodialysis, as 
an intervention that necessitates regular and frequent hospital visits and bodily 
penetration to access and clean the blood, may be particularly open to being constituted 
as assaulting and eroding the sense of self. This work was also able to show how an 
individual’s perception of this sort of intervention could be altered by enhancing the 
patient’s sense of control, by involving them in the planning and organisation of their 
care. These ways of humanising medical interventions by questioning cultural norms 
ingrained in healthcare practice could be seen as attending to some, if not all, of the 
issues raised by disability theorists.   
As chapter one outlined, and as the following chapter underlines, the personal meaning 
and significance of ataxia as an embodied phenomenon has not been explored in the 
literature. Doctors and rehabilitation professionals examine people living with ataxia and, 
from this outsider’s view, describe and classify the impairments they observe in 
objective terms. Responses to these biomedically constructed problems are also 
commonly delivered by people who have no experience of impairment themselves, and 
with little guidance on which to base their interventions. What seems to be lacking in the 
approach taken by rehabilitation professionals towards ataxia is, as articulated by Crow 
(1996) in relation to impairment in general, firstly, an understanding that people living 
with ataxia will apply their own meanings to their personal experiences of impairment, 
secondly, that these understandings may alter over time and through changes in 
circumstance and social mores, and thirdly, that understanding how people talk about 
their embodied experiences of ataxia constitutes knowledge that may be used to 
question existing practice and to develop more informed and responsive healthcare. The 
present study, in keeping with the disability theory perspectives described above, sought 
to explore the personal lived experience of progressive ataxia, and to understand the 
significance of the body and the experience of ataxia from a bio-social perspective.  
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2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter explored and critiqued a body of evidence which has contributed to the 
understanding of chronic illness, disability and healthcare from multiple perspectives. 
The evolving, arguably key work in this field was chronologically tracked, starting with 
work emerging from the 1950s. In direct opposition to Parsonian conceptions of the sick 
role (Parsons, 1951), this seam of research concerned itself with understanding 
personal suffering, and the impact of illness and disability on the micro-social worlds of 
individuals and the important people in their lives. Negative experiences and ways of 
living with chronic conditions were commonly described and discussed. A propensity 
towards narrative approaches was identified in these studies, and whilst recognising its 
strengths, this methodology was also critiqued for representing narrative as a universally 
accepted means of articulating and re-framing illness experiences. Phenomenological 
methods were identified as possible alternatives for understanding experiences that may 
be partial, incomplete and unstoried. More recent experiential and phenomenologically 
informed work identified common experiences that contributed to making life meaningful, 
rich and fulfilling in the face of illness and disability. Scholarship within the discipline of 
disability studies illuminated alternative macro-social perspectives, and the development 
of politically and emancipatory oriented research. This work identified the many ways in 
which disabled people were excluded from full participation in everyday life through the 
restrictions imposed by disablist attitudes, cultures and environments. Impairment as a 
contested concept in health and illness research was appraised in light of the arguments 
presented from the perspective of the social oppression paradigm, and through the lens 
of physiotherapy practice. It was acknowledged that the body was perhaps under-
theorised in physiotherapy, and furthermore that the profession’s insistence upon 
viewing illness and disability through a biomedical lens limited the extent to which 
alternative perspectives of illness and disability informed practice. Phenomenologically 
informed research which takes an embodied view of impairment, illness and disability 
was identified as a valid means of exploring the lived experienced of people living with 
long term conditions.  
In conclusion, it would seem that although much research has been conducted in the 
respective fields of chronic illness and disability, and common themes have emerged 
about the experience of living with long term conditions, the lives and voices of people 
living with progressive cerebellar ataxia have been absent from this work. Furthermore, 
the research considered in this chapter favoured, on the whole, either macro 
(political/sociological) or micro (personal) conceptions of human experience. This sort of 
dichotomising of human life, whilst in the past useful and instructive, struggles to survive 
  34 
careful scrutiny. This is because, as this chapter has argued, understanding chronic 
illness requires not only an exploration of the individual, rooted as they are in their 
cognitive, psychological and existential world, but also, simultaneously, a commitment to 
perceiving the underlying social structures that may shape a person’s experience. 
Phenomenologically informed research, with its understanding that the person and the 
world is intertwined (Finlay, 2011) has much to offer in this respect. This chapter has 
therefore started to make a case for adopting phenomenology as an appropriate means 
of sensitively exploring the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia, and for 
developing a contextualised understanding of impairment and embodiment in the 
everyday lives of people living with this condition. Given the researcher’s professional 
affiliations, and interest in understanding how patients experience physiotherapy, 
phenomenology would also seem an appropriate means by which these experiences 
could also be explored in the present study.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Literature Review  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
An initial literature search was undertaken in 2006 (at the start of the project). The 
following electronic databases were examined; CINAHL Plus, AMED and PsycINFO 
using key search terms; ‘ataxia’ AND ‘experience’ OR ‘qualitative’ OR ‘perspective’ OR 
‘physiotherapy’ OR ‘physical therapy’. Using this search strategy no experiential 
accounts or qualitative research about living with ataxia or the experience of 
physiotherapy for people with ataxia were uncovered. As the literature search was 
based on an examination of comprehensive, authoritative and internationally recognised 
sources of published research in diverse fields including; biomedicine, health sciences, 
psychology, physiotherapy and rehabilitation, it suggested that the experience of living 
with a progressive ataxia had not, at that time, been explored or understood from the 
perspective of people living with this condition.  
A further review of the grey literature (The Ataxian, the Ataxia UK quarterly magazine for 
members and the Ataxia UK website) identified one paper (Box et al. 2005) which briefly 
described the experience of two parents caring for children living with Friedreich’s ataxia 
(FRA) and included one short narrative about living with an unidentified cerebellar ataxia 
(discussed in the review below). At the same time as the initial literature search was 
being undertaken, requests from Ataxia UK for first person accounts of living with late 
onset ataxia (Ataxian, 2006) produced a groundswell of interest (Ataxian, 2007) 
culminating in the publication of one short narrative account, one leaflet containing short 
stories about life with ataxia and an information and advice fact sheet for people living 
with this condition (Ataxia UK, 2007a, b, c). Formal discussions with the research 
committee of Ataxia UK further supported the view that there was a latent and urgent 
need to undertake qualitative research which focussed on exploring the lived experience 
of cerebellar ataxia and participants’ perspective of physiotherapy. These discussions 
and the submission of a formal grant application ultimately led to the successful partial 
funding of the present study. The rationale for the study was therefore founded upon the 
need to listen to, heighten awareness of and better understand the personal experience 
of living with a progressive ataxia; critical perspectives that seemed to have been 
overlooked in the academic literature.  
Whilst the initial literature search and subsequent discussions with Ataxia UK (in 2006) 
established a rationale for the present study, the study itself developed over the 
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following five years during which time research in the field of interest expanded and 
progressed in several directions. Most of the literature relevant to the present study 
post-dates the data collection period which occurred during 2007. During the course of 
the study (2006-2012) database searching was repeated at intervals; a final in-depth 
literature search and analysis was conducted in November 2011 (following completion of 
the data analysis) which was again updated in August 2012. This iterative process was 
in keeping with that described by Levy and Ellis (2006) who regarded the literature 
review as an evolving and dynamic endeavour which only ends at the completion of the 
study itself.  
The purpose of the following in-depth review of the literature is to provide an up to date 
critical analysis of work that has been conducted in the field and which has some 
bearing on the present study. The reasons for doing this are twofold. Firstly, the present 
study did not take place in a vacuum. It is important to convey the extent and 
significance of the contemporaneous work to the reader so that the present study can be 
fully situated within the larger body of relevant and, at least in part, simultaneously 
conducted research. Freezing the literature review in 2007 would create an artificial 
environment in which to place this study and would risk distorting both its relevance and 
its contribution. Secondly, this new work that has evolved alongside the present study 
cannot be unread; it will have informed and contextualised the thinking and perspectives 
of the researcher and therefore should be discussed and evaluated in its entirety.   
The in-depth literature review focussed on exploring and understanding the available 
research concerning the lived experience of progressive ataxia. This type of review is 
most closely aligned to the purposes of a critical narrative review rather than a 
systematic review which is usually considered more appropriate for drawing conclusions 
about the effectiveness and efficacy of interventions (Pope et al. 2007; Baumeister and 
Leary, 1997). As noted in the previous chapter, traditional narrative reviews aim to 
summarise, compare and interpret the literature but usually pay little attention to 
methodological quality or to systematically or exhaustively searching for relevant 
evidence (Pope et al. 2007). Critical narrative or second generation reviews, by 
comparison, report search and selection processes, draw together existing knowledge of 
a specified topic and develop research questions by attending to weaknesses, 
problems, inconsistencies and ambiguities in the oeuvre (Pope et al. 2007; Baumeister 
and Leary, 1997). Narrative reviews are also well placed to consider methodological 
diversity, an important issue for IPA research where qualitative as well as quantitative 
work in the field of interest often has to be considered (Smith et al. 2009). The critical 
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narrative review that follows was undertaken with the intention of placing the present 
study in context as well as highlighting the strengths and limitations of previous and 
concurrent work.  
 
3.2 Searching the Literature 
 
A literature search, whose focus lies in identifying work where the borders are not well 
defined and that may cross disciplinary and methodological boundaries, can be a 
complex, time-consuming and resource depleting enterprise (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006; 
Shaw et al. 2004). One of the reasons behind the difficulties in conducting a 
comprehensive qualitative literature search is that the electronic indexing system for 
qualitative research lacks precision: several complex search strategies might be 
required to locate potentially relevant records but within the total sample of identified 
papers there may be very high redundancy (Shaw et al. 2004; Gorecki et al. 2010). 
Whilst the effectiveness and efficiency of search strategies to identify qualitative studies 
still needs to be improved (Noyes et al. 2011) considerable progress has been made in 
the last ten years. Medline introduced the MeSH (Medical Subject Headings) term 
‘qualitative research’ in 2003, complementing CINAHL Plus’ introduction of ‘qualitative 
studies’ in 1998. Furthermore, several index systems and methodological filters have 
been designed (e.g. at the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination) and optimal search 
strategies for finding qualitative research have been identified and tested in the larger 
databases (Wong et al. 2004; McKibbon et al. 2006; Walters et al. 2006 and Wilczynski 
et al. 2007). This latter body of work undertaken by the Hedges Team at McMaster 
University demonstrated that it was possible to reduce search complexity by using 
optimal search strategies whilst retaining comprehensiveness, thus ensuring that very 
few articles were missed. The standard qualitative search strategy available in CINAHL 
was thought to offer the most efficient and effective means of identifying the majority of 
relevant papers (Flemming and Briggs, 2007). However, as none of the main databases 
were infallible in the studies noted above, it remains necessary, for methods-based 
searches, to use multiple databases which should include, as a minimum; EMBASE, 
MEDLINE, CINAHL and PsycINFO (McKibbon et al. 2006).  
As the focus of the literature search was directed towards finding qualitative research 
relevant to the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia, the highly sensitive but less 
complex search strategies advocated by Wong et al. (2004), McKibbon et al. (2006), 
Walters et al. (2006) and Wilczynski et al. (2007) were used as a guide to formulate a 
methods-specific search strategy for each of the main bibliographic databases. A 
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framework was developed to maximise sensitivity (comprehensiveness) over and above 
precision (relevance of identified papers) in the first instance. In addition to these 
searches, a brief examination of published qualitative systematic reviews suggested that 
the following databases should also be searched; Academic Search Complete, AMED, 
the Cochrane Library, Web of Science, ZETOC and SIGLE (System for Information on 
Grey Literature in Europe, 1980-2005). Following Finlay (2011), dissertations and theses 
as well as professional and special interest websites and key journals were also 
searched.  
It was anticipated that, in addition to searching for qualitative studies, mixed method 
studies may also contain relevant information for the present study. Gorecki et al. (2010) 
found that locating qualitative work in mixed methods studies was problematic therefore, 
where feasible, a separate search was conducted using free text or subject headings or 
MeSH specified terms for mixed methods research as proposed by the University of 
Washington (2011).  
Finally, Greenhalgh and Peacock (2005) argued that in situations where the literature 
may be hard to find, additional strategies and informal searches should be used to 
complement traditional methods because database-restricted searches risked omitting 
up to 70% of relevant research. Additional approaches for the present study were also 
informed by the recommendations of Barroso et al. (2003) and Walsh and Downe (2005) 
and included; personal contacts and academic networks, existing knowledge, personal 
resources, serendipitous findings (often whilst looking for something else), and the 
development of new avenues for searching whilst the search unfolded, for example 
through author, citation and reference tracking. 
In summary, a methods-based literature search which focussed on the exploration and 
understanding of lived experience in firstly qualitative research and secondly mixed 
methods research, was combined with the subject-specific search term ‘ataxia’. The 
single operator ‘ataxia’ was considered sufficient as a search term following an 
exploratory search that included combinations of words (e.g. cerebellar ataxia) which 
were found to be redundant. Boolean operators (AND / OR / NOT) and abbreviations for 
plurals were used where necessary. Searches were restricted to work published in 
English, with databases searched from inception to November 2011 (updated to August 
2012), the search field for key words was limited to the abstract, and additional 
strategies as outlined above were used to augment the search. An overview of the 
search strategy is presented in Appendix A1.  
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3.3 Literature Search Results 
 
A total of 3405 papers were identified using the search strategy described above. 
Nineteen papers were selected following abstract review and where necessary by 
reading the full text (Appendix A2). Papers were rejected for many reasons but 
principally because the search was comprehensive rather than precise. For example, 
many papers including “experience” in the title or abstract referred to the experience of 
using specific interventions or tests, or described particular cerebellar ataxias but not 
subjective experiences. Seven papers were identified from database searches, five 
through citation tracking, two whilst looking for something else, two through publication 
searches, and three were found via the grey literature (Appendix B). Studies were 
included if they were concerned with understanding the lived experience of ataxia (using 
any qualitative approach) or through using mixed methods whereby personal 
perspectives, priorities and concerns might be illuminated. Of the 19 selected papers 
68% (n = 13) were published in the last five years (2007-2011) i.e. during the 
development of the present study. The rest (n = 6) were published over a 20 year period 
from 1987 to 2005. As with the preliminary literature search, none of the identified 
literature explored the experience of physiotherapy for people living with ataxia. 
 
3.4 Critical Review of the Literature 
 
Opinion is divided on the value of formal assessment tools for critiquing qualitative 
research. This debate is concerned with the nature of knowledge and whether 
qualitative research intends to meet and therefore can be judged by the same criteria as 
that of quantitative research (Mays and Pope, 2006). Critically it seems that what might 
be considered as some of the most important qualities for assessment are also those 
that are the most difficult to judge (Dixon-Woods et al. 2004). Kuper et al. (2008:687) 
have argued, for example, that the thorough assessment of qualitative research is ‘an 
interpretative act’ that ‘requires informed reflective thought’ rather than the application of 
a simple scoring system. Therefore effective critical review of qualitative studies is 
perhaps less about the rigid application of a set of rules and more about using critical 
appraisal tools to guide the process of interpretation and exploration. The Critical 
Appraisal Skills Tool for qualitative research (CASP) has been developed to critique 
qualitative studies and to assist in developing a critical stance towards the literature 
(http://www.casp-uk.net/). The CASP tool is a widely used instrument (Dixon-Woods et 
al. 2007) which invites the reviewer to consider ten critical questions. The process 
moves the appraiser towards making informed judgements and away from a procedural 
or purely technical assessment. For these reasons the CASP was chosen as a point of 
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reference for the critical review of the papers discussed in this chapter. However, CASP 
is not a definitive guide and only deals with some of the assumptions and principles of 
qualitative research on a broad level. Therefore, where applicable, alternative critical 
appraisal instruments were used to critique other forms of research inquiry, as noted in 
the text.  
The literature review is divided into four sections; autobiographical accounts, subjective 
perspectives derived from the development of measurement scales and systematic 
reviews, quality of life research and qualitative research. The final section takes a 
chronological approach to reflect the development of qualitative inquiry over the last 
twenty five years. None of the work reviewed here specifically looked at the subjective 
experience of living with ataxia from a phenomenological perspective because no such 
work was identified from the literature search. The lack of research in this field supports 
the contention that the present study breaks new ground in this respect. The aim of this 
literature review is to demonstrate that an in-depth, experiential qualitative enquiry of 
progressive cerebellar ataxia is long overdue.  
 
3.4.1 Autobiographical Accounts 
 
For the purpose of this review, autobiographical accounts of illness experience were 
distinguished from first-person research. Finlay (2011) described first-person research 
as personal accounts of lived experience where researchers critically interrogate their 
own experience with the intention of publishing an in-depth analysis of a particular 
feature of their lives. Typically, descriptive and interpretative work is undertaken; authors 
engage in theoretical discussion and aim to uncover new meanings that may provide 
insight not only about their own lives but also the lives of others. Kay Toombs’ (1995; 
2001) work about her own experiences of living with multiple sclerosis could be 
considered an exemplar of this sort of research. Literature searching uncovered no such 
research about the lived experience of ataxia but other types of autobiographical 
accounts were identified. Solicited narratives published in journals or as information 
leaflets published by charitable organisations were classified as forming one type of 
data, and unsolicited online narratives posted on blogs, message boards and 
membership forums formed a second class of data. 
Decisions about whether a literature review should include autobiographical accounts of 
the type uncovered for the present study perhaps hinge on whether this sort of material 
is considered research as defined by the conventions set out in the Frascati Manual 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002). Reference to the 
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Frascati Manual would suggest that autobiographical accounts of this type simply 
represent raw material; work has to be undertaken in the form of research activity in 
order to acquire the new knowledge this material may possess. For example, Seale et 
al. (2010:595) described unsolicited personal narratives posted on the Internet as a 
‘repository of primary data’ suitable for analysis by researchers. Furthermore, a growing 
number of studies about a wide variety of illness experience have exploited the Internet 
as a source of data on which to base research activity (see for example Bylund et al. 
2005: Radin, 2006; van Uden-Kraan et al. 2008; Daker-White et al. 2011). A strict 
application of the Frascati definition would therefore suggest that autobiographical 
accounts (as opposed to first person research) should not be included in a literature 
review because such texts would require analysis before they could be usefully 
incorporated in the overall review. This rule was applied to unsolicited raw data such as 
that found on dedicated online ataxia platforms and forums. However, solicited 
narratives published by charitable organisations or in peer reviewed journals were 
considered as demonstrating a particular view that perhaps warranted further attention. 
Five articles were identified reflecting the voices of 12 people with ataxia and two 
parents of children with ataxia (Drake and Guillory, 2001; Box et al. 2005; Ataxia UK, 
2007a and b, and Brown, 2010). Two were written for readers with a healthcare 
background and were published in peer reviewed journals (Drake and Guillory, 2001 
and Box et al. 2005); the remainder were published for a lay audience. All accounts 
were short (less than 1000 words) and were directed towards raising awareness of the 
progressive ataxias and the role of support groups such as Ataxia UK and the National 
Ataxia Foundation in the US. The accounts emphasised the early experiences of living 
with an ataxia as marked by uncertainty about diagnosis and a lack of understanding of 
the condition itself, both by those affected by ataxia as well as by healthcare 
professionals. In the experience of some authors (e.g. Drake and Guillory, 2001; Box et 
al. 2005) medical professionals emphasised the life diminishing effects of potential 
diagnoses and generally under-valued the role of rehabilitation and other support 
networks. Furthermore, whilst not underplaying negative experiences, all accounts 
stressed the value of maintaining a positive outlook, setting out and achieving personally 
meaningful goals and the role of family members and charitable organisations for 
providing information, peer support and other resources.  
Whilst it could be argued that personal narratives may focus on issues of central 
concern to the authors, at the same time authors are not immune to the powerful social 
and cultural forces that shape other forms of narrative and self-representation. For 
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example, Sandaunet (2008) noted that whilst online forums (for women with breast 
cancer) may in theory offer alternative spaces for marginalised and minority views, there 
remained a tendency to discourage negative or socially undesirable comments and to 
preserve online communications as arenas for successful coping. The same could be 
said of the solicited narratives reviewed here. The message published by or written by 
charitable organisations and their members (sometimes members who held office) was 
generally optimistic. If negative experiences were reported they had, on the whole, been 
overcome, and the focus was on finding benefit from living with ataxia. It is also possible 
that these positive narratives were offered by quite privileged or advantaged people who 
had effective support systems. These narratives whilst interesting in themselves and 
valuable for those looking for information, hope and support, also perhaps left a lot 
unsaid. Qualitative interpretative research, by focussing on the sorts of things that 
provoke reflection and adjustment whilst living with a long term progressive condition, 
might offer a means by which possible gaps in these published narratives could be 
fruitfully explored.  
 
3.4.2 Subjective Perspectives Derived from the Development of Ataxia 
Measurement Scales and Systematic Reviews 
 
Ataxia measurement scales have been developed for formally assessing the impact of 
ataxia on physical function and everyday activity, as well as a means of measuring the 
effectiveness of interventions for reducing ataxia symptoms (Trouillas et al. 1997; Cano 
et al. 2009; Morales Saute et al. 2012). During the literature search several ataxia rating 
scales were identified and examined to see whether the views of people living with 
ataxia had contributed to the development of the scale. It was anticipated that mixed 
method studies would include a qualitative component that elicited the views of people 
with ataxia about what was considered important for measuring the efficacy of an 
intervention. These data might have the potential to illuminate the kinds of problems 
people with ataxia struggled with and to bring these issues to the attention of 
researchers who look to develop interventions to improve life with ataxia. 
Only the Friedreich’s Ataxia Impact Scale (FAIS) incorporated the views of people living 
with ataxia as part of the process of identifying the key domains for measuring the 
impact of ataxia on everyday life (Cano et al. 2009). In this study, 13 people with FRA 
were interviewed but details of the participants, interview schedule and data analysis 
process were not described. Also “expert opinion” (details not provided) and information 
from the literature (details not provided) were used to develop the conceptual framework 
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for the scale. A comparison of the FAIS with other ataxia rating scales (e.g. Trouillas et 
al. 1997; Subramony et al. 2005 and Schmahmann et al. 2009) demonstrated 
commonalities in terms of measuring physical functioning but exceptionally the FAIS 
included other items concerned with mood, self-perception and isolation. For example, 
the isolation domain included questions about giving up on leisure activities, losing 
confidence in going out and difficulty seeing family members; domains and items that 
were overlooked by other measurement scales. The validity of the FAIS would bear 
further scrutiny in terms of the extent to which it touches upon issues significant to 
people living with ataxia. However, Cano et al. (2009) may have identified previously 
under-investigated issues and concerns in the life experience of people living with ataxia 
and this finding in itself would seem to strengthen the case for undertaking further in-
depth qualitative exploration of this topic.  
Serrano-Aguilar et al. (2009) undertook a Delphi survey of people with progressive 
ataxia in order to incorporate their perspectives in the design of a systematic review of 
the effectiveness of interventions for the progressive ataxias. The Delphi survey was 
reported in the same paper as the systematic review. Fifty-three participants, recruited 
via e-mail from patient associations in Spain, were asked in the first Delphi round to 
identify treatments they had used and to share their ataxia-related health problems and 
concerns. In the second round, health related problems were prioritised and in the final 
round ranking was revised in light of the individual ranking and overall ranking identified 
in round two. Using criteria devised to evaluate studies of this type (Sinha et al. 2011) 
the Delphi method used by Serrano-Aguilar et al. (2009) appeared to be 
methodologically sound. For example, critical features such as attrition (none), using 
open questions in the first round, restricting communications to e-mail to reduce 
contamination effects, and a clear description and presentation of the process of ranking 
and consensus were reported by the authors. The findings of the Delphi survey were 
used to inform the search strategy for the systematic review of the effectiveness of 
interventions i.e. the search looked for interventions that addressed concerns raised 
through the Delphi survey. Two important issues were identified from the results of the 
Delphi survey and the subsequent systematic review. Firstly, some of the identified 
problems that emerged from the Delphi survey (e.g. quality of life issues, trouble 
maintaining social relationships, difficulties with activities of daily living and 
psychological concerns such as loss of self-esteem) were not addressed in any of the 
studies evaluated for the systematic review, indicating a significant lack of knowledge 
and consideration of these issues by researchers developing interventions for ataxia. 
Secondly, the majority of participants highly valued rehabilitation whilst understanding 
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that it did not offer a cure. Participants in the Delphi survey viewed rehabilitation as a 
means of improving quality of life, self-esteem, social relationships and participation in 
activities of daily living. In the subsequent systematic review (same paper) only one of 
the twenty five selected studies evaluated the effectiveness of rehabilitation and no 
studies looked at psychological interventions for people living with a progressive ataxia.  
There are some limitations to this work not least the brief presentation of the systematic 
review (for example, details about the question, protocol, search and selection criteria 
and overall evaluation of the selected studies were omitted) but also the potential 
restrictions to generalizability of the empirical Delphi survey given that the sample size 
was modest and restricted to members of patient associations living in Spain. 
Nonetheless, this study emphasised the limited advances that have been made towards 
understanding the subjective experience of the progressive ataxias. Serrano-Aguilar et 
al. (2009) offered useful insights into the concerns of people living with ataxia and the 
limited extent to which these concerns had been addressed by researchers. However, 
as an in-depth exploration of subjective experience was not the primary concern of the 
authors, the understanding of the lived experience of life with ataxia generated by this 
study remained provisional and necessarily lacked the depth and nuance that might be 
uncovered by phenomenological and idiographic approaches.  
 
3.4.3 Quality of Life Research 
 
Few studies have evaluated health related quality of life for people with ataxia. The 
literature search identified four papers that explored this topic (D’Ambrosio et al. 1987; 
Abele and Klockgether, 2007; Wilson et al. 2007 and López-Bastida et al. 2008). The 
original paper in this series (D’Ambrosio et al. 1987) will be discussed first and then the 
three most recent papers will be considered together.  
D’Ambrosio et al. (1987) was the first to explore the influence of impairment and 
disability on quality of life for people living with hereditary ataxia in Northern Italy. A 
questionnaire was sent out to 151 people with ataxia who were identified through 
hospital records. Details were lacking but an unknown number of people living with 
ataxia and their carers developed some of the quality of life questions for the 
questionnaire. These items focussed on; living arrangements (alone, with others, or 
institutional care), mobility (leaving the house, coping with public transport), school or 
work activity, frequency of contact with relatives and friends, the possibility of being 
accompanied by others, and recreational activities. It was unclear how these items were 
selected for inclusion, measured or scored. Furthermore, the disability measure used in 
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the questionnaire was adapted by the researchers from an independence measure for 
elderly people and was therefore unlikely to capture disability issues of specific 
relevance for people living with ataxia. In addition, the list of impairments considered 
relevant to quality of life was not derived from people living with ataxia but from 
impairments commonly observed by the researchers in clinical practice. Severity of 
speaking difficulty was not self-reported but scored by a neurologist and walking 
difficulty was reported by level of assistance required (e.g. walking stick or wheelchair 
use). In this respect the impairments and their significance appeared to be wholly judged 
by researchers or clinicians rather than the respondents themselves. This criticism 
aside, in the absence of an agreed definition of quality of life, the authors took steps to 
identify and then measure their understanding of quality of life for people living with 
ataxia. The main conclusion of this study was that impaired mobility was associated with 
reduced quality of life. However, it was impossible to determine the extent to which the 
content of the questionnaire resonated with the priorities, concerns and perceptions of 
people living with ataxia. Whilst the validity of this work remains questionable and 
difficult to interpret, the study represented an early attempt to involve people with ataxia 
in the research process. Factors that may be relevant to quality of life for people living 
with ataxia were identified; nonetheless the subjective, personal meaning and 
significance of living with ataxia remained unexplored and poorly understood. 
The three most recently published papers (Abele and Klockgether, 2007; Wilson et al. 
2007 and López-Bastida et al. 2008) used generic instruments to measure health 
related quality of life for people living with ataxia; the Medical Outcomes Study 36 Item 
Short Form Health Survey or the Euro-qual 5D. All explored quality of life for a 
progressive ataxia (sporadic progressive ataxia, FRA or SCA). Participants were drawn 
from Germany, Australia or Spain and sample sizes ranged from 22-84 participants. 
Taken together the findings from these studies indicated that people living with a 
progressive ataxia experienced reduced quality of life compared to healthy controls in 
motor domains such as physical functioning as well as non-motor domains such as 
social functioning, role limitation and general health perception. Wilson et al. (2007) also 
presented data that would caution against making simplistic inferences about the effect 
of severity and stage of illness as well as age of onset on quality of life. For example, 
individuals with mild impairment rated their quality of life similar to those with severe 
impairment, suggesting that ataxia had a significant impact on quality of life from 
symptom onset or conversely, that people learned to adjust their strategies and/or 
priorities over time as symptoms worsened. Participants with moderate impairment 
reported poorer general health, lower vitality and poorer emotional function in 
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comparison to those with severe impairments. The authors also found that mid-stage 
disease should be considered a turbulent time often experienced as a difficult period of 
transition and increasing dependency. Further, Wilson et al. (2007) established that 
whilst mental health improved with disease duration, late onset was associated with 
poorer quality of life, suggesting that participants may have experienced difficulty in 
adapting to long term progressive illness having lived a long life without illness.   
The work described above offered new insights into quality of life issues for people living 
with ataxia and perhaps indicates the complexity of the adjustment process. However, 
research in stroke care has shown that generic quality of life instruments may lack 
specificity and may be unable to discriminate clinically important differences (Williams et 
al. 1999). Similar concerns prompted the call for the development of condition-specific 
and patient based measures capable of providing further knowledge and understanding 
about the impact of ataxia on quality of life (Wilson et al. 2007; López-Bastida et al. 
2008). Further qualitative research should perhaps be undertaken in the first instance as 
an initial step towards developing more responsive and meaningful quality of life 
measures for people living with ataxia.  
 
3.4.4 Qualitative Research 
 
Interest in understanding the lives and concerns of people living with cerebellar 
dysfunction seems to have gone through a renaissance after a lengthy hiatus following 
original contributions made in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In total, seven qualitative 
papers were identified from the literature search that aimed to develop an in-depth 
understanding of different aspects of living with ataxia. This final section of the literature 
review critically discusses these papers, and starts by exploring the pioneering 
ethnographic work of Marie Boutté (1987, 1990 and 1992) before moving on to critically 
evaluate the remaining four papers, all published between 2009 and 2011.  
Marie Boutté (1987, 1990 and 1992), in what appears to be the first study to consider 
cerebellar ataxia from a qualitative perspective, undertook an ethnographic comparative 
analysis of two separate cultural groups within which lived a population of people with 
Machado-Joseph disease (MJD/SCA3). The contrasting communities central to Boutté’s 
work were a small interdependent island population in the Azorean Archipelago and 
what she described as a relatively anonymous population of Azorean-Portuguese 
ancestry in northern California. MJD is a dominantly inherited progressive ataxia first 
described in biomedical terms in 1972 (Nakano et al. 1972). The condition also bears a 
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long folk-history encompassing traditional beliefs about causality and meaning which 
stretches back to the mid-1800s (Boutté, 1987).  
In the first of her three papers Boutté (1987) explored the meaning and configuration of 
stigma in the two communities. She reported the findings from 70 interviews conducted 
with a range of key informants, including people living with MJD but also family 
members, friends, doctors and community leaders. These multiple voices were used to 
good effect to create a vivid cultural portrait of the two communities and the people who 
lived there. Looking specifically at stigma and referring explicitly to Goffman’s (1963) 
seminal work, Boutté suggested that the overall configuration of stigma was similar 
between the two communities but the difference lay in the weight each type of stigma 
carried in the two settings.  
In the Azores, folk understandings were emphasised. Here MJD was labelled as a moral 
flaw symbolically linked with deviant sexual behaviour. People living with MJD were 
seen as a threat to the island’s limited resources because they were (erroneously) 
understood as having an excessive number of children all of whom, in the islanders’ 
view, carried the risk of MJD. It was commonly believed that these children would 
become physically dependent, unable to work and, because of their care needs, would 
further deplete the number of farm labourers available for the type of work critical to 
sustaining the local economy. In response to these beliefs, the islanders adopted 
containment and confinement strategies through proscribing marriage and espousing 
eugenic ideologies such as the sterilisation of people with MJD. In California, the “moral 
flaw” associated with the “stumbling disease” was placed in a more general stigmatising 
category related to inebriation. People with MJD were subsumed into a broader class of 
people tainted with the label of alcohol abuse or dependency which appeared to carry 
less weight than the labelling used in the Azores in response to the same stigmatising 
typology. Furthermore, Boutté described what she saw as greater opportunities to 
mitigate stigmatising labels in the United States when compared to the situation in the 
Azores, e.g. by self-labelling with a non-hereditary disorder such as multiple sclerosis. 
Such options were not available to those in the Azores who, by living in a less 
anonymous community, were effectively labelled and treated as “deviant” from birth.  
Boutté’s second and third papers (1990, 1992) were directed towards understanding the 
subjective experience and cultural construction of genetic threat in the context of the 
family and the communities in which the families lived. The first of these papers explored 
the perspectives of participants in the northern Californian setting who were at risk but 
yet to manifest symptoms of MJD. Of the 20 people interviewed 18 were at risk of 
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developing MJD and were therefore able to provide a personal and particularised 
account of the lived experience of genetic risk. In reporting the findings Boutté identified 
how personal and cultural beliefs became intermingled with objective biomedical 
information to produce a multidimensional and mutable conception of risk which was 
only weakly associated with statistical probability. Family dynamics varied and did not 
lend themselves to the development of simple predictive models that might anticipate 
behaviours in response to disclosure of risk. In this cultural setting personal and folk-
beliefs about genetic threat were not fundamentally altered by the newly emerging 
biomedical evidence of risk. Boutté emphasised that the logic associated with genetic 
testing (biomedicine) carried with it objective assumptions about risk. These 
assumptions did not hold true when brought up against subjective needs and real life 
concerns about the meaning of risk or a positive or negative test in the context of 
individual lives. In other words, participants’ perception of genetic threat was only 
partially informed by advances in biomedicine, and previously held beliefs continued to 
shape their understanding of their hereditary risk. 
Boutté’s final paper in the series (1992) maintained the focus on understanding genetic 
threat but from the Azorean perspective. The findings conveyed the ways in which 
perceived genetic threat shaped family dynamics and identities as well as kinship 
networks and interactions with the larger island community. Persistent folk models 
unchanged by biomedical advances continued to inform the islanders’ understanding of 
MJD. Syphilis and incest were cited most frequently as underlying causative factors. 
People living with MJD were therefore denied status, became the subject of gossip and, 
in this paternalistic society, women continued to be encouraged by medical and social 
service representatives to be sterilised. As a “family disease”, people at risk of or living 
with MJD were treated similarly; both threatened the social status of the family and 
kinship relations. Women in particular who were no longer able to fulfil traditional roles 
(running the home, caring for children as well as working on the farm) were resented for 
being an additional burden of care, shamed for not being able to participate in expected 
reciprocities (between and within kinships) and were blamed for impoverishing the 
nuclear family and diminishing its status within the island community. The meanings 
ascribed to MJD and the behaviours adopted towards those living with or at risk of MJD 
appeared entrenched and efforts to organise support groups along similar lines to those 
set up in the US foundered due to lack of community support and ineffective, poorly 
resourced and fragmented social services.  
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As befits an ethnographic study, Boutté immersed herself in the local culture; she 
carried out extended observations of day to day life in the two communities in addition to 
conducting in-depth interviews in the either Portuguese or English. However, with only 
four of the 62 quotations in the three papers coming from people living with MJD there 
was little focus on the personal lived experience of this type of ataxia. Furthermore, it 
seemed that of the people with MJD who were interviewed only about half agreed to be 
tape recorded. Hand-written notes raise questions about the completeness and 
accuracy of the record (Creswell, 2007) and may also account for the relative lack of 
direct quotations about the subjective experience of MJD in Boutté’s work. In addition, 
perhaps reflecting the time in which these papers were published, as well as journal 
word count restrictions, there was little detail provided about the process of analysis. 
Contemporaneous criteria for “good” ethnography valued careful fieldwork (Spindler and 
Spindler, 1987) and seemed to pay less attention to analysis, reflexivity and the position 
of the researcher in the research; essential criteria by current standards (Creswell, 
2007) but absent from Boutté’s work. Therefore it was difficult to judge how the data 
were analysed and the extent to which Boutté’s own cultural references were brought to 
bear upon the data collection and analysis of the presented findings.  
Despite its shortcomings, Boutté’s (1997) work demonstrated the powerful influence that 
stigma and perceived genetic threat may exercise in small communities. The findings 
from these three studies were highly situated to the cultures, values, beliefs and 
language of both the setting and the epoch. They told little of the personal lived 
experience of MJD but conveyed an insightful, if at times disturbing, picture of its 
symbolic meaning and the ways in which the two cultural groups behaved towards, 
classified and responded to people living with or at risk of developing this condition. 
Nonetheless, Boutté conducted her study over twenty five years ago, much of the 
biomedical framework has moved on rapidly and in the intervening period cultural beliefs 
and contexts may have changed. Ataxia could be lived and experienced very differently 
in twenty first century UK compared to the late twentieth century perspective of people 
living in the US and the Azores. This would suggest that aspects of Boutté’s work could 
be usefully updated and placed within a UK context. Furthermore, as the personal 
perspective of living with MJD was only partially addressed in Boutté’s work, research 
which attends more closely to personal meaning and significance would perhaps provide 
a voice for those who live with MJD or similar ataxic conditions. 
Having considered Boutté’s work in depth, this section now moves on to critically review 
the more recent contributions to qualitative research in this field. Walshe and Miller 
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(2011) conducted in-depth interviews to explore the experience of living with dysarthria 
and to develop an understanding of the impact of dysarthria on psychosocial function. Of 
the 11 participants, four were living with dysarthria as a result of cerebellar dysfunction. 
Although not forming the majority of the sample, 54% of the quotations used to illustrate 
the findings were derived from participants with cerebellar dysarthria. Furthermore, the 
experiences of people living with cerebellar dysarthria were represented in each of the 
emergent themes. It is suggested therefore that the findings from this study might 
provide some insight into the particular experiences of people living with dysarthria as a 
result of cerebellar dysfunction.  
Theoretical sampling was used to select potential participants so that a range of people 
of different ages and with a variety of neurological conditions as well as severity and 
experience of dysarthria (those concerned about their dysarthria as well as those who 
reported no concerns) were recruited. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
Framework Analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994) was used to analyse the data. The 
decision to use Framework Analysis rather than perhaps a more appropriate 
phenomenological approach was not discussed in the paper. Nonetheless, the findings 
were grounded in the participants’ accounts and several quotations were used to 
illustrate each theme. Readers were therefore able to judge and thereby have some 
confidence in the credibility of the findings. An independent observer coded a sample of 
the transcripts to reduce bias, similar findings were reported which were said to provide 
a measure of reliability and verification of the first indexing process. No further details 
were supplied about data analysis or the means by which the two authors achieved 
consensus.  
Walshe and Miller (2011) argued that the key findings of their work specifically 
highlighted that the impact of dysarthria did not relate in any straight forward way to the 
severity of impairment and was highly individualised. The particularised experience of 
individuals was stressed as the locus operandi for clinical practice and it was here that 
the inclusion of people for whom dysarthria was not reported as problematic worked 
well: similar experiences were interpreted and made meaningful and significant in 
different ways depending on individual perspectives. However, a more in-depth 
exploration of participants’ experiences could have been achieved if a 
phenomenological approach had been taken. For example, further attention could be 
paid to particularised accounts to develop a better understanding of the embodied 
experience of dysarthria (specifically – as noted by the authors – to further explore the 
interrelated nature of dysarthria and other physical impairments and their joint impact on 
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psychosocial function) and the impact of dysarthria on a person’s sense of identity. 
Despite these shortcomings, the authors achieved their objectives and presented 
common themes identified by the majority of participants: reduced confidence and 
feelings of inadequacy, a heightened awareness of the assumptions and negative 
evaluations of others, and the development of strategies to manage or overcome 
communication barriers. Whilst recognising the limitations of the study, the authors 
identified appropriate areas for intervention, stressing the importance of psychosocial as 
well as impairment based approaches to dysarthria. Overall the authors identified that 
dysarthria impacted on multiple dimensions of experience. Whilst these findings may 
hold some relevance for people living with cerebellar ataxia, Walshe and Miller (2011) 
provided only a glimpse into the broader experience of living with this complex condition, 
a glimpse that would perhaps lend itself to a fuller phenomenological exploration.  
As discussed in the introductory chapter, advances in molecular genetics have enabled 
the development of DNA tests to detect gene mutations responsible for some late-onset 
neurodegenerative conditions. International protocols have been developed to establish 
standards for counselling services for people undergoing pre-symptomatic or predictive 
testing for conditions such as hereditary ataxia and Huntingdon’s disease (see for 
example Goizet et al. 2002; Smith et al. 2002; Paneque et al. 2007 and Cruz Mariño et 
al. 2011). However, little work has been carried out to understand the experience of 
diagnostic DNA testing for individuals who already have symptoms of neurogenetic 
conditions. In response to the lack of qualitative research on this topic, Hess et al. 
(2009), in what appears to be the first study of this type in this field, explored the 
meaning of actual or potential DNA testing and the experience of the familial, social and 
economic implications of genetic tests for people living with the signs of Huntingdon’s 
disease (HD) or genetic ataxia. In-depth interviews with 27 participants (13 with ataxia) 
recruited from neurology clinics in Southern California were undertaken.  
A critical analysis of Hess et al. (2009) identified a number of methodological issues 
primarily concerned with the extent to which the experiences of individuals were 
explored and the ways in which the data were analysed and reported. For example, 
content analysis was undertaken on the transcribed accounts to identify patterns and 
key topics, no further information was provided to determine how this work was 
undertaken, information was also lacking about how the four themes presented in the 
findings were identified and the extent to which each participant contributed to each 
theme. Furthermore, the authors described using a case study approach to understand 
how genetic information was evaluated with reference to disease progression and work 
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status but no further information was provided about how this case study was 
undertaken or incorporated in the findings. Nine quotations were used to illustrate all 
themes, only one of these was from a participant living with ataxia. Observational data 
from 27 neurology clinic consultations were also collected for this study but no details 
were provided as to how these data were included in the analysis or development of the 
findings.  
Despite these methodological concerns, this study was the first to explore the meaning 
of DNA testing for people with hereditary ataxia and provided some useful insights into 
this complex topic. The authors reported that genetic testing was viewed in a positive 
light for most participants because it represented a welcome end to years of living with 
diagnostic uncertainty and tiresome consultations, and the start of gaining some sense 
of control over their condition. However, the authors reported that unambiguous 
information about the purpose and implications of each test was rarely provided and 
misunderstandings about the value of a positive test were commonly reported. 
Participants assumed that, once diagnosed, a treatment would be available that could 
slow down or stop illness progression. Furthermore participants were unaware that a 
negative test result excluding one type of genetic disorder did not necessarily eliminate 
other progressive hereditary conditions. Genetic counselling did not form part of the pre- 
or post- testing process for the majority of participants. Facing an unexpected genetic 
condition without the sort of preparation offered through specialised genetic counsellors 
left many participants who lacked a known family history of the illness ill-equipped to 
cope with the personal, family and social consequences of a positive test. In contrast, for 
participants with previously diagnosed family members, individual circumstances 
impacted on their responses to a positive test which ranged from relative acceptance to 
extreme distress. The findings suggested that participants were better placed to cope 
with a definitive diagnosis if they had experienced symptoms for several years, were 
able to access effective support systems, were retired and already had children. 
Although Hess et al. (2009) tell little of the specific experiences of people living with 
ataxia, this paper provided another glimpse into issues that would seem to be significant 
for people living with this condition. Nonetheless, HD differs from cerebellar ataxia 
particularly with reference to the psychiatric and cognitive disorders that significantly 
impair social and occupational function and often herald the first signs of HD (Leroi et al. 
2002). The impact of a positive test result for people diagnosed with HD may possibly be 
more distressing or have more immediate consequences than for people living with 
ataxia. In addition, HD can be confirmed by a repeat blood test (Huntingdon’s Disease 
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Collaborative Research Group, 1993) whereas DNA testing is only available for some of 
the ataxia subtypes (Tan and Ashizawa, 2001; Paulson, 2002; Schöls et al. 2004; 
Finsterer, 2009). This would suggest that although there may be similarities between HD 
and progressive cerebellar ataxia, the situation is not the same and this would question 
the validity of exploring the experience of genetic testing for both conditions at the same 
time.   
In the penultimate paper discussed in this review, White et al. (2010) argued that little 
was known about the psychological or psychosocial effects of Friedreich’s ataxia (FRA); 
specifically the transitional life events brought about or altered by FRA and the impact of 
these events on an individual’s life experience. Semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken with 42 adults with FRA (18-65 years) about their perceptions of transitional 
life events. Participants were recruited from membership groups for people with ataxia 
or neurogenetic conditions. Data were analysed using Template Analysis (Crabtree and 
Miller, 1992), a third of the transcripts were coded by a second analyst and good inter-
coder reliability was demonstrated, no further information was provided about the 
development of themes. Perspectives from both genders were equally represented and 
a sufficient number of quotations were used in the presentation of findings for the reader 
to have confidence in the claims made by the authors. The authors acknowledged the 
selection bias inherent in their sample and indicated limitations regarding generalisability 
of the findings. One criticism levelled at this study concerns the limited way in which the 
researchers examined their own role in data collection and analysis and the potential 
influence their reading of the data may have brought to the findings. Furthermore, 
readers were unable to access the interview schedule either within the paper or via 
electronic supplements to the published data, it was therefore impossible to judge the 
extent to which the interview was participant-focussed rather than researcher-driven. 
The findings of this study suggested firstly, that FRA altered developmentally-related life 
transitions such as dating, marriage, parenting and occupation. Secondly, a series of 
temporal transitions corresponding to clinical progression of the signs and symptoms of 
FRA also characterised the experience. Symptoms recognition was identified as one of 
these significant temporal transitions and was considered more significant than 
diagnosis. Impaired mobility status and fear of falling formed a further transitional event 
that was commonly accompanied by actual or perceived stigma which in turn challenged 
participants’ sense of identity and self-esteem. Finally, the transition represented by the 
use of assistive walking devices and wheelchairs progressed from initially representing 
diminished independence and further stigmatisation to being seen as a means of 
  54 
promoting freedom and self-sufficiency. Overall FRA magnified the significance and 
increased the complexity of commonly experienced transitional life events.  
Unique to the body of work reviewed thus far, the authors argued that people living with 
FRA faced an almost continual adjustment to change and experienced only limited 
periods of stability compared to those who live without progressive illness. 
Recommendations were made for genetic counselling to prepare patients for significant 
transitions, to support the development and preservation of self-identity and to restore 
meaning and control in the face of living with a progressive condition. Whilst these 
recommendations may be relevant for genetic counsellors (reflecting the professional 
interests of the authors) they also seemed salient for all healthcare professionals who 
may encounter people coping with the physical and psychological consequences of 
FRA. White et al. (2010) therefore extended the understanding of the impact of 
transitional life events for people living with FRA and supported the findings of Wilson et 
al. (2007). As White et al. (2010) focussed specifically on the experience of people living 
with FRA, their work could perhaps be usefully extended to look at whether people with 
other types of progressive ataxia face similar issues. 
In the final paper reviewed in this section, Daker-White et al. (2011) focussed on  the 
experience of the diagnostic process for people living with a progressive ataxia. This 
study examined data derived from international English language Internet discussion 
forums created specifically for people living with ataxia. The majority of data was drawn 
from the US (50%) and the UK (40%) over an unknown period of time, and was 
estimated to represent communications of varying length from just over one hundred 
individuals. The authors argued that because progressive ataxia is a rare condition, 
internet data served as a useful proxy for data gathered in an interview situation; the 
assumption being that participants would be difficult to recruit and may prefer to use 
Internet forums as a means of communicating with others. With reference to Robinson 
(2001), the authors further argued that unsolicited internet narratives offered a rich 
source of qualitative data and provided insights that would not be elicited from face-to-
face interviews. Both arguments would bear further scrutiny before discussing the 
findings of this study.  
Seale et al. (2010) conducted a comparative analysis of the characteristics of qualitative 
research interviews (alongside video recording for healthtalkonline.org) and archived 
Internet discussion forum postings and e-mail queries, to evaluate their usefulness as 
data sources about the experience of illness (namely breast cancer, prostate cancer and 
teenage sexual health problems). The findings suggested that participants in each 
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format (interview or online) had radically different orientations. Those in the interviews 
constructed a narrative that was oriented towards the past and present, whereas those 
who participated in Internet communication were orientated towards the immediate 
future. Seale et al. (2010:600) claimed that participants who posted on the Internet were 
‘doing their illness in the here and now’ as they exchanged technical (biomedical) and 
practical information and support, whereas those who were interviewed ‘enacted’ their 
experiences through reflection and ‘narrative self-construction’. The authors identified 
however, that the apparent focus on past events may have been an artefact of 
producing data for healthtalkonline.org; interview participants were asked to tell their 
stories, an approach that might be expected to prompt reflection through narrative 
reconstruction. In addition, whilst the researchers found that disclosure of sensitive 
topics was facilitated through the anonymity provided by Internet forums, they also 
conceded that interviews conducted by skilful and experienced practitioners were also 
capable of eliciting rich, contextualised descriptions that were not found in the fragments 
of experience offered on the Internet (Seale et al. 2010). Overall, the findings from this 
study seemed to suggest that interviews and on line forums offered very different data 
which reflected the distinct intentions and contexts of the participants in each setting. It 
would be naïve to suggest that unsolicited online data offers unproblematic and 
transparent access to experiential narratives and therefore the assertion that data 
gathered from internet forums offer a valid proxy for qualitative interviewing could be 
disputed.  
Returning to Daker-White et al. (2011), and in light of the critique that could be levelled 
at its original premise (online data as substitute for interview data), it was noted that the 
authors considered some of the limitations of the methods used in this study, in 
particular the inability to probe themes more deeply, the likelihood of the sample 
representing the views of those who experienced a problematic diagnostic process, as 
well as the ethically questionable approach of covertly collecting data without consent 
(issues discussed in-depth by Seale et al. 2010 and O’Brien and Clark, 2012). Similar to 
the findings described by Hess et al. (2009), Daker-White et al. (2011) detailed a 
lengthy, wearisome and frustrating process of diagnosis; the importance placed on 
having a definitive diagnosis and of putting an end to contested illness identities. In 
particular, Daker-White et al. (2011) called attention to the participants’ understanding of 
a diagnosis of idiopathic ataxia as being equivalent to no diagnosis at all. The authors 
pointed out that most people (nearly two-thirds) who posted comments had an ataxia of 
no known origin. This “non-diagnosis” seemed to compound the sense of uncertainty 
reflected in their posts and prompted a critical evaluation of the expert status of medical 
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practitioners. Daker-White et al. (2011) further argued that at a certain point in the 
diagnostic process participants underwent a shift in perspective. Instead of focussing on 
finding a cause for their particular ataxia and a definitive diagnosis, they turned towards 
finding ways of living with ataxia. However, as some forums were searched specifically 
for posts about diagnosis rather than learning to live with ataxia, the authors admitted 
that this was a tentative argument that required further investigation.  
In addition to the findings discussed above, the study also illustrated that unknowingly 
passing on a genetic condition was a troubling and on-going concern. Powell et al. 
(2010) reported similar findings in their investigation of the impact of patents on access 
and referral to genetic testing for spinocerebellar ataxia. This paper is not discussed in 
detail in this review because its emphasis was on the effect and cost of genetic testing 
patents in the US rather than subjective experiences. Nonetheless, in support of the 
findings of Daker-White et al. (2011), the authors further emphasised the complex and 
troubling emotions associated with both positive and negative test results as well as the 
importance placed on putting an end to uncertainty. Taken together, the findings from 
Hess et al. (2009), Powell et al. (2010) and Daker-White et al. (2011) seemed to point 
towards an emerging picture. The intermingling of folk understandings with biomedicine 
as a culturally constructed way of understanding ataxia, as put forward by Boutté (1992), 
may have been replaced by a stronger biomedical orientation characterised by 
uncertainty and misunderstandings about the new genetics. Rather than providing 
clarity, the complex and often uncertain diagnostic process seemed in all three papers 
reviewed above to fall short of providing the answers that people with ataxia were 
looking for.  
In summary, Daker-White et al. (2011) failed to fully discuss their theoretical orientation 
towards the data used in this study (i.e. whether the analysis was informed by realist or 
constructivist perspectives) as well as the limitations of carrying out an experiential 
analysis on data that might have been particularly concerned with the “here and now” 
(Searle et al. 2010). Whilst this work is not fundamentally flawed, it lacks the contextual 
contouring that usually accompanies interview studies which, in addition, not only offer a 
means of eliciting richer accounts but also the opportunity to explore different moments 
in time of significance to participants. Daker-White (2011:132) acknowledged that this 
study represented only the first step towards understanding the utility of diagnostic 
testing for people with ataxia and stressed that a clearer understanding of these 
complex issues would only emerge when ‘the lens is moved away from the diagnosis 
process to the illness and healthcare experience more generally.’ This judgement of 
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their own work also perhaps reflects the limitations of the rather fragmentary work that 
has been undertaken to date in this field and lays the foundation for a more in-depth 
exploration of the lives and experiences of people living with a progressive ataxia.    
 
3.5 Summary  
 
This review of the literature explored a rather disparate body of work published between 
1987-2011 which, in itself, has made some progress towards understanding how people 
encounter and make sense of in their lives with ataxia. Solicited personal narratives 
(Drake and Guillory, 2001; Box et al. 2005; Ataxia UK, 2007a and b, and Brown, 2010) 
focussed primarily on the diagnostic process and, in general, broadcast a rather 
optimistic picture. This somewhat partial view provoked critical questions about what 
had been left out of these possibly quite privileged accounts which in turn strengthened 
the call for further qualitative research in this field. Qualitative work undertaken as part of 
larger quantitative studies (Cano et al. 2009 and Serrano-Aguilar, 2009) identified that 
most intervention based studies did not attend to issues and concerns identified by 
people with ataxia. Without further research to develop a fuller understanding of what 
matters to people with ataxia, there is a risk that intervention based studies will continue 
to be researcher-focussed and as such abstracted from the everyday lives and concerns 
of people living with ataxia. Working from different but complementary perspectives, 
Wilson et al. (2007) and White et al. (2010) provided novel insights about the impact of 
transitional events on the lives of people living with FRA. This work cautioned against 
making simple inferences about the significance and meaning of commonly collected 
clinical data (such as age, symptom severity and years since onset) and, by doing so, 
perhaps strengthened the case for undertaking in-depth qualitative work in this field.  
Boutté’s original ethnographic study (1987, 1990 and 1992) provided the fullest and 
most contextualised account of the meaning and significance of MJD however, the 
subjective experiences of people living with this condition were not well represented in 
the data or the discussion of the findings. Walshe’s and Miller’s (2011) study about the 
impact of dysarthria on psychosocial function afforded a small glimpse into the issues, 
concerns and burdens associated with managing communication difficulties in public 
and private. The experiences of people with ataxia were under-reported in the published 
account, and as the focus was on dysarthria, the impact of other impairments was left 
unexplored and incompletely understood. Hess et al. (2009) presented findings that also 
offered just a small glimpse into the challenges and complexities of living with a 
condition that carries genetic and diagnostic uncertainties (HD and genetic ataxia). 
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However, as HD and the genetic ataxias are different conditions, with quite separate 
illness trajectories and expectations, it is argued here that they should perhaps be 
treated separately in future research. In this way the particular issues associated with 
genetic testing for each of the conditions might be more thoroughly understood. Finally, 
the review of Daker-White et al. (2011) raised concerns about the treatment of online 
discussion forums as equivalent to the sort of experiential data that might be collected 
via in-depth interviewing. Nonetheless, this work identified similar concerns to Hess et 
al. (2011) and Powell et al. (2010) about the arduous process connected with the 
diagnosis of progressive cerebellar ataxia. Further qualitative research that aims to 
explore the impact and meaning of the diagnostic process for people living with a 
progressive ataxia may be well placed to shed further light on what seems to be a 
significant issue for people living with this condition. 
Taken together the reviewed work perhaps provides just fragments of insight and 
understanding about this complex condition. None of the qualitative studies were 
phenomenological in their orientation and therefore none of the authors approached 
their work with the intention of understanding life with ataxia in a phenomenological 
sense. In other words, there was no attempt to make the ‘special effort’ required to 
understand the perspectives and contexts of another person’s experience (Gadamer, 
2004 [1960]:304). Therefore, although the majority of the work reviewed in this chapter 
was published whilst the present study was in progress, the lived experience of ataxia 
remained only faintly illuminated. In particular, from this author’s perspective, the 
absence of any examination of the embodied experience of ataxia and healthcare in 
general signified an important gap about what is known and understood about this 
condition. Thus, the case could be made for undertaking further qualitative research 
about the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia. Phenomenological enquiry 
would offer a means of going beyond what is ordinarily understood about life with ataxia, 
not only in terms of exploring the lived body but also in terms of gaining an in-depth, 
nuanced and finely grained appreciation of individuals and their world; a perspective that 
seems to have been neglected in previous work.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In summary, the key emerging themes from this review of the literature seem to indicate 
uncertainty and confusion about the diagnostic process and genetic testing. 
Furthermore, unlike other long term conditions (as discussed in chapter 2), the 
experience of healthcare more generally for people living with progressive cerebellar 
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ataxia has yet to be explored in any depth. Primarily negative psychosocial implications 
and the life diminishing aspects of cerebellar ataxia were also emphasised in the 
literature discussed above. White et al. (2010) perhaps offered the most nuanced and 
in-depth exploration of FRA. These authors called attention to the co-existence and 
added complexity of condition-specific transitional events (such as the emergence of 
symptoms, or the use of assistive walking devices) and developmental life events (e.g. 
dating, starting work) in shaping the experience of people living with FRA and 
particularly highlighted instability as a significant feature of life with this condition. 
Nonetheless, the literature concerned with exploring and understanding life with 
progressive ataxia has produced just fragments of insight, glimpses into the lived 
experiences of this complex and rare condition. Therefore it is argued here that further 
research designed to explore the subjective experience of people living with progressive 
ataxia is long overdue. Phenomenological work, directed towards understanding the 
lives of individuals in the fullness of the contexts that are meaningful to them would 
enhance previous work in this field. An idiographic approach has the potential to reach 
to the deeper meaning of individuals’ experiences whilst connecting with that which may 
be shared (Smith et al. 2009). Such work may therefore speak for the general as well as 
the particular and by doing so prompt others to consider the possible implications for 
their own work (Johnson, 1997). This latter point, the potential for theoretical 
generalisability, formed an important strand in the development of this study. It is the 
reason why the research questions focussed not only on the lived experience of 
progressive ataxia but also the experiences of healthcare, and physiotherapy and 
physiotherapy services in particular.  
 
3.7 Research Questions 
 
The arguments presented in this chapter have continued to build a case for 
understanding more about the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia. Thus 
the research questions introduced in chapter 1 have been further justified in this and the 
preceding chapter and have been defended with respect to gaps identified in the 
literature.  
1. What is the meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia for people who live with this 
condition?  
 
2. How do people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia experience healthcare, and 
physiotherapy in particular?  
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3. What is the meaning of exercise and activity participation for people living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia?  
 
The following chapter details the methodological approach taken towards designing and 
carrying out this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  61 
Chapter 4 
 
Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and argues that 
IPA is an appropriate method for answering the research questions identified for this 
study.  
Unlike research into other progressive neurological conditions, ataxia has been almost 
exclusively understood from a biomedical and quantitative perspective. As chapter 3 
demonstrated, when this study commenced in 2006, only limited qualitative work had 
been undertaken about people’s experiences of living with cerebellar ataxia. From this 
rather unsatisfactory position, further research in this field could have proceeded in 
several directions (either quantitative or qualitative). However, for this researcher, it was 
the absence of an insider’s view of the experience of living with ataxia that was most 
compelling. Further quantitative rehabilitation research undertaken without consideration 
of the multidimensional perspectives of a person’s experience of a health condition 
might be ill informed and potentially compromised by narrow and underdeveloped ideas 
(Mattingly, 1993; Shepard et al. 1993; Kearney, 2001; Curry et al. 2009). It would also 
be out of step with current guidance to consider patients’ views (for example the UK 
based Research for Patient Benefit Programme, National Institute for Health Research, 
2008). For these reasons an inductive, qualitative approach to addressing the research 
questions seemed to be a valid and relevant starting point for further research in this 
field.  
This chapter firstly introduces IPA and places the present study within this evolving field 
of qualitative enquiry. The main content of this chapter sets out to justify IPA as an 
appropriate methodology for exploring the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia. It does 
this by explaining the theoretical underpinnings of IPA in some depth. The ethical 
dimension of investigating and interpreting another person’s experience is then briefly 
considered before moving on to clarifying IPA’s epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. Other phenomenological methods are considered within the later sections 
and the reasons for not adopting these approaches are discussed.  
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4.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
 
IPA is a qualitative research methodology oriented towards exploring and understanding 
how people make sense of particular life experiences (Smith et al. 2009). IPA’s 
understanding of an experience in this sense is aligned to Dilthey’s definition of an 
experience as a ‘comprehensive unit’, something of significance, a part or parts of a life 
connected by a common meaning (1976 [1910]:210). IPA typically explores the things 
that matter to people in their lives, events for example that provoke reflection and 
emotional or psychological adjustment (Eatough and Smith, 2008). IPA research is 
therefore specifically interested in ‘lived experience’; everyday life and what it is like 
when a part or parts of that life take on particular meaning (Smith et al. 2009:1).  
Consistent with other phenomenological approaches, IPA understands that subjective 
experience or consciousness is directed out into the world. In other words, individuals 
are always conscious of something (Smith et al. 2009). The phenomenological term for 
this is intentionality (Husserl, 2001 [1921]). For example, individuals may love, fear, 
think, perceive, remember or judge but there is always an intentional object associated 
with this act; people fear something, think about something, and remember something in 
their world of experience (Zahavi, 2003). IPA concerns itself with all aspects of this lived 
experience ‘from an individual’s wishes, desires, feelings, motivations, belief systems 
through to how these manifest themselves or not in behaviour and action’ (Eatough and 
Smith, 2008:181). IPA therefore involves the detailed examination of peoples’ lives; their 
day to day experiences, how they have made sense of those experiences and the 
meanings they attach to them (Smith, 2004; Smith et al. 2009). The findings from such 
research may illuminate particular facets of human existence that in the everyday flow of 
life are normally taken-for-granted. These include the embodied, sociocultural, temporal, 
spatial and intersubjective contexts that constitute a person’s experience of the world, 
known phenomenologically as the ‘lifeworld’ (Finlay, 2011:19). 
Ultimately, IPA aims to do research that is ‘experience-close’ (Smith et al. 2009:33).  
Researchers seek to provide a multidimensional understanding of a person’s lived 
experience that goes beyond an everyday or common sense awareness. The findings 
from IPA research are therefore highly nuanced and offer a fine grained analysis that 
can be used to contextualise existing quantitative research, to inform understanding of 
novel or under-researched topics or, in their own right, to provoke a reappraisal of what 
is considered known about a specified phenomenon (Smith et al. 2009). 
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4.3 Theoretical Perspectives of IPA 
 
The key theoretical perspectives of IPA are; phenomenology, interpretation 
(hermeneutics) and idiography (Smith, 2004, 2007; Smith et al. 2009). These features 
are not unique to IPA, but the way in which they have been combined and the specific 
emphases and techniques used within the method identify IPA as an affiliated but 
distinct approach in the field of phenomenological enquiry (Smith, 2004; Smith et al. 
2009). This next section discusses these three foundational components and highlights 
their relevance to the present study.  
 
4.3.1 Phenomenology  
 
Phenomenology is both a philosophy and a set of research methods concerned with 
exploring and understanding human experience (Langdridge, 2007). Phenomenology 
develops knowledge through the study of phenomena; things or events in everyday life. 
‘Things’ are understood, as far as possible, in the way they appear, or in 
phenomenological terms, the way they are ‘given’ to the experiencing person (Zahavi, 
2003:12). A phenomenologist is interested in how a phenomenon is experienced, the 
manner in which it is experienced, rather than looking towards explanations of what 
constitutes the phenomenon (Cox, 2008).  
Phenomenological philosophy has gone through several elaborations as successive 
philosophers have engaged with it, interpreted it and taken it in different directions. 
Phenomenology is therefore best considered a movement rather than a prescribed 
method or system (Moran, 2000). Similarly, phenomenological research, whilst retaining 
a fundamental interest in human experience, has also developed in several directions 
depending upon the particular philosophical approach underpinning the inquiry 
(Creswell, 2007). 
IPA’s reading of phenomenology is anchored to the work of four major philosophical 
figures; Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre (Smith et al. 2009). This next 
section briefly sketches out the critical thought of these key authors, explores how their 
perspectives have been incorporated within IPA, and identifies their particular relevance 
to this study.  
4.3.1.1 Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
The contemporary understanding of phenomenology emerged from the work of the 
German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), (Moran, 2000). Husserl’s work is of 
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significance to IPA because it established the importance of a careful and methodical 
focus on human lived experience (Smith et al. 2009). Producing his most influential work 
in the early decades of the Twentieth century, Husserl argued that the prevalent 
positivist tone of scientific enquiry failed to address fundamental questions about the 
meaning of human existence (Dahlberg et al. 2008; Moran, 2000): 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Husserl, scientific and objective views of the world were abstracted from 
ordinary (lived) experience, and therefore provided a distorted and impoverished 
understanding not only of the world but also of the experience of humans in the world 
(Moran, 2000; Dahlberg at al. 2008).  
For Husserl, knowledge not grounded in subjective experience was absurd or 
meaningless (Husserl, 1982 [1913]). He did not deny the importance of objective 
knowledge, but argued that “things” in the world (abstract and concrete) were always 
experienced by a perceiving subject, and from a particular perspective or point of view. 
These perceptions were necessarily influenced by scientific and lay concepts such as 
hypotheses, expectations and assumptions (Rennie, 1999; Moran, 2000). In this sense, 
Husserl argued that reality, or things in the world, did not “speak for themselves” but 
were articulated or made possible by an experiencing subject (Husserl, 1970 [1954]). 
Therefore rather than artificially removing the human perspective, Husserl argued that if 
the world was to be understood it must include an understanding of the relation between 
human beings and their world (Moran, 2000; Dahlberg et al. 2008).  
In other words, human consciousness allows there to be a world in the first place, not 
because consciousness creates the world but because it makes the world meaningful. 
Knowledge of something (including logical or scientific knowledge) is therefore 
presupposed in consciousness and, for Husserl, the only way to understand a particular 
phenomenon was to set aside (or bracket) the distorting and inhibiting influences of the 
natural suppositions of everyday life or everyday consciousness (Moran, 2000). These 
assumptions are what Husserl termed the natural attitude, the conventional view of the 
world and other scientific, philosophical and cultural ways of understanding human 
existence (Husserl, 1970 [1954]). Husserl’s position in this respect is neatly summed up 
by Zahavi (2003:45) ‘We keep the attitude (in order to be able to investigate it) but we 
‘… this science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the questions 
which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the 
most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human 
existence’ (Husserl, 1970 [1954]:6).    
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bracket its validity’. Put differently, knowledge is not achieved by abandoning what we 
think we know but by taking a different attitude towards it; adopting a phenomenological 
attitude rather than a natural attitude.  
Husserl therefore advocated phenomenology firstly as a means of going beyond what 
theoretical (scientific) conceptions and everyday taken-for-granted assumptions of the 
world were capable of explaining or understanding, and secondly as a means of 
securing the lifeworld of human existence as the foundational core for all science and all 
knowledge (Rennie, 1999; Moran, 2000; Dahlberg et al. 2008). For Husserl, lifeworld 
refers to the taken-for-granted ‘structure’ of the world of ordinary experience: the ‘simple, 
straightforward and ongoing life’ (Husserl, 1970 [1954]:139,144).  
Husserl’s aim was to access the pure essence of human experience, the content of 
consciousness itself (Moran, 2000). He developed a way of looking at the things of 
experience called the epoché. This is the process that brackets out or suspends the 
unquestioned and inauthentic acceptance of everyday experience, and, via a series of 
steps called the reduction(s), permits access to the experiential content of 
consciousness (Husserl, 1927; Moran, 2000; Zahavi, 2003). It seems that Husserl chose 
the word ‘reduction’ carefully, not simply to give a label to the conceptual process he 
described but also because it was derived from the Latin reducere, meaning ‘to lead 
back to’ (Moran, 2000:146; Zahavi, 2003:46). Husserl’s objective was to ‘go back to the 
things themselves’ (Husserl, 2001 [1913]:168), i.e. the experiential content of 
consciousness without the distorting influence of conventional understanding (Moran, 
2000; Zahavi, 2003). The epoché and the reduction(s) led the way back to, or recalled, 
the things of experience by inhibiting ‘every judgemental drawing-in of the world’ 
(Husserl, 1927:4). Husserl (1970 [1954]:144) argued that this special kind of 
phenomenological reflection ‘breaks through the normality of straightforward living’. He 
further reasoned that if a person was able to identify the essential structures of their own 
experience by using this method, then a progression of the reduction might lead to an 
understanding that could transcend the individual and go on to identify the general 
structures of consciousness itself (Moran, 2000). 
 
It should be noted that the prevalent view of Husserl’s interest as being directed towards 
understanding consciousness from a purely disembodied and unworldly perspective 
appears outdated (Zahavi, 2003; Larkin et al. 2006) and it is not the intention of this 
outline to propagate this reading of Husserl’s work. Zahavi (2003:46) carefully argued 
that Husserl’s epoché and the reductions should not be considered as a turning inwards 
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towards a transcendental consciousness, an act of introspection, but as an opening out, 
an ‘expansion’ of the field of research. Husserl was interested in consciousness 
because for him it was only in consciousness that something could appear, and only by 
reflecting upon the way something appears to consciousness, without prejudice, would it 
be possible to understand what it is to know something, a way of knowing that is 
normally obscured by the natural attitude. The epoché changes the way in which a 
person approaches reality rather than excluding reality from the field of research 
(Zahavi, 2003). A phenomenological investigation should therefore open up a new way 
of experiencing and theorizing that is not constrained by commonsensical ways of 
seeing the world.  
In contrast to Husserl’s focus on consciousness, IPA seeks, perhaps more concretely, to 
understand particular experiences as embedded in the lifeworlds of particular individuals 
and only cautiously makes more general claims (Smith et al. 1995; Smith and Osborn, 
2008; Smith et al. 2009). Despite the attenuation of the scope of the phenomenological 
project as envisioned by Husserl, his ideas continue to inform contemporary 
phenomenological enquiry and IPA in particular. Husserl established the importance of 
phenomenology as a means of restoring the human perspective to scientific enquiry and 
identified human experience as a rich and genuine source of knowledge. Furthermore, 
Husserl’s concept of the epoché forms a critical concept for phenomenological health 
research (Finlay, 2008, 1999). The way in which these projects are carried out and even 
the feasibility of bracketing in its Husserlian sense continues to be a matter of debate 
(LeVasseur, 2003; Gearing, 2004; Finlay, 2008, 2011). However, the importance of 
developing and acknowledging an awareness of, and reflecting upon, one’s own 
assumptions and habitual ways of thinking continues to be a central concern of IPA and 
of phenomenologically informed enquiry more generally (Finlay, 1999, 2008, 2011; 
Smith et al. 2009, Shaw, 2010). In this regard, IPA should perhaps be understood as a 
careful and rigorous research enterprise undertaken with reference to Husserl’s ideas 
about reflecting upon prior understandings, rather than using his exact “methods” or 
ultimate aims (Smith et al. 2009). 
With reference to this study, Husserl’s work, as interpreted through IPA, provides a 
conceptual argument for the exploration of personal experience as a means of 
developing knowledge and understanding of a particular phenomenon. The 
phenomenon of interest for this study is cerebellar ataxia as understood from the 
perspective of people who live with this condition. As such, an exploration of ataxia as a 
phenomenon of human experience, undertaken with respect to Husserl’s orientation 
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towards the careful examination of experience in the way that it occurs, retains the 
Husserlian perspective of IPA and should help to shed light on and develop knowledge 
about this phenomenon.   
 
4.3.1.2 Heideggerian Phenomenology 
 
Heidegger (1889-1976) changed the direction of phenomenology with his most famous 
work, ‘Being and Time’ (1962 [1927]). This work signalled a move away from Husserl’s 
interest in consciousness towards the question of being. Heidegger was interested in the 
meaning of being, what it is to be human; the fundamental nature of human being or 
human existence (Moran, 2000; Gorner, 2007).  
Heidegger’s view was that humans are already thrown into, or caught up in, a world full 
of things, culture, people and language and cannot be meaningfully separated from this 
context or choose to opt out to see things from a different perspective (Moran, 2000; 
Larkin et al. 2006). For Heidegger, human being is ‘Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]:8), 
translated as there-being or human-being-in-a-situation (Becker, 1992; Moran, 2000). 
The running together of the words here stresses the connectedness of human, being 
and world. Critically, and of significance to IPA and its aim to understand people and 
their experiences, Heidegger proposed that existence is not a thing out there in the 
world, some “thing” called existence in a general sense, rather, it is always somebody’s 
existence, personal and owned (Becker, 1992; Moran, 2000). Heidegger’s term ‘facticity’ 
expresses this fundamental situatedness of human being, described by Moran 
(2000:223) as ‘the particular, concrete, inescapably contingent, yet worldly involved 
aspect of human existence’. Phenomenological enquiry faithful to Heidegger’s ideas, 
such as IPA, should therefore carefully take account of particular people and the 
particular contexts and situations with which they are engaged (Becker, 1992; Smith et 
al. 2009).  
Facticity also speaks to IPA more specifically than simply in terms of understanding that 
individuals are individuals-in-context. According to Heidegger, individuals have choices, 
i.e. they can respond to their facticity in a number of ways, although the range of options 
is not unlimited (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]:13). What seems critical is that Dasein has 
these possibilities; it makes decisions, and chooses its way of being (Inwood, 2000; 
Gorner, 2007). Dasein’s being therefore, unlike other entities in the world, ‘is an issue’ 
for it (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]:181); it has concerns, it questions its existence, worries 
about its decisions and wonders what to do next (Inwood, 2000; Moran, 2000). 
Heidegger (1962 [1927]:183) calls this basic condition of Dasein ‘care’. This is a 
  68 
collective term that speaks for Dasein’s insertion in the world (thrownness), its 
interrelatedness (concern), as well as its temporality; always projecting into the future 
(thinking about what to do next) with respect to the past (Inwood, 2000; Gorner, 2007).  
Taking account of Heidegger’s concept of care and the worldliness of Dasein, IPA 
should therefore be oriented towards understanding the particular cares and concerns of 
an individual. Researchers should try to attend to the things and the people that 
individuals are actively engaged with (events, worries, the things they dwell on) and how 
these colour their particular situation in the world and the meaning it holds, in other 
words how these orientations help to reveal their particular being-in-the-world (Larkin et 
al. 2006; Smith et al. 2009). This is not a straightforward process; it asks the researcher 
to find out about someone through understanding the context of their life (Larkin et al. 
2006) and therefore connects Heidegger’s phenomenology to its hermeneutic 
orientation (discussed below with reference to the interpretative stance of IPA). The 
relevance for this study is that the researcher should allow participants to dwell upon the 
things that are important to them, the things they care about, rather than trying to lead 
them in a pre-determined direction that may hold little meaning for the individuals 
themselves. For example, with reference to the present study, the researcher had to re-
examine encultured interests and assumptions established through her profession as a 
physiotherapist in order to connect with and understand the particular concerns and 
perspectives of the participants. 
 
4.3.1.3 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
 
The French psychologist and philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) aligned 
himself with Husserl’s rather than Heidegger’s phenomenology but like Heidegger, he 
extended the Husserlian perspective to include a contextualised and situated 
phenomenology which also reinterpreted Husserl’s conception of the living body (Moran, 
2000; Carman, 2008). Merleau-Ponty emphasised human embodiment as central to 
human experience, and the complex intertwining of body, self and world as the way in 
which human beings encounter and understand the world (Moran, 2000; Carman, 2008; 
Morris, 2008a).  
For Merleau-Ponty, body and world (material and social) are integrated and embedded; 
‘Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 
[1945]:235). This means that human existence or the human condition cannot be 
understood or experienced as if from the outside, as if human experience is in some 
sense bodiless and detached (Carman, 2008): ‘there is no inner man, man is in the 
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world and only in the world does he know himself’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:xii). 
Heidegger argued that being in the world is always understood as somebody’s being in 
the world (Matthews, 2006). However, Merleau-Ponty emphasised that it is always 
somebody’s embodied being in the world because for him ‘The body is the vehicle of 
being in the world’ (2002 [1945]:94). It is this contact and communication with the world, 
through one’s own body, which results in there being a world of meaning (Matthews, 
2006). This is because, according to Merleau-Ponty, the world is ‘lived’ through the 
body; ‘The world is not what I think, but what I live through’ (2002 [1945]: xviii). The 
world is understood in the first instance though the body and because of this it is already 
meaningful before it is thought about and reflected upon (Reynolds, 2005; Morris, 
2008a).  
Research undertaken with respect to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, understands the 
world not as some abstract concept, something that is merely thought about, but as 
something that is wholly and bodily experienced (Matthews, 2006). Merleau-Ponty’s 
work seems to suggest that any change to the way in which the body interacts with and 
encounters the world would alter the way in which that person makes sense of 
themselves and their world (Morris, 2008a; Rothfield, 2008). Therefore, without pre-
judging, it might be important in the present study to attend to the ways in which the 
participants speak about their bodily experiences of ataxia, how they make sense of 
these experiences and what this may reveal about their being in the world. 
 
4.3.1.4 Sartre’s Phenomenology 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905-1980) publication of ‘Being and Nothingness’ (2003 [1943]) 
developed the existential orientation of phenomenology as originally put forward by 
Heidegger (Moran, 2000). For Sartre, human nature is not fixed; it is about becoming, 
coming into being, away from the past, and always projecting towards the future (Cox, 
2008). In this sense, the self is always being formed or reshaped, it is not an entity to be 
discovered fully fledged but is always in the making. Because human existence is not 
about being as an established thing but about becoming, people face choices about 
their lives and what they want to become (Cox, 2008). In Sartre’s words, human beings 
‘are condemned to be free’ (2003 [1943]:462). This freedom to make choices about 
one’s life carries responsibility and operates in relation to a person’s individual, social 
and cultural situation (Moran, 2000). For Sartre, there is both ‘freedom and facticity’ 
(Manser, 1966:129). To phrase it differently, human engagement in the world is 
personally situated and inevitably attended by relations with others who are also in the 
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world and who also have their own projects which challenge and shape the experience 
of other individuals. This stress on human existence as being qualified by other people 
and social relationships remains one of Sartre’s main contributions to phenomenology 
(Smith et al. 2009).  
Sartre’s work therefore speaks to IPA by emphasising how a particular phenomenon 
might influence a person’s projects and relationships with others and their sense of 
existential freedom, their sense of being a person-in-the-making. Researchers who are 
attentive to the projects and people that concern individuals, and their responses to the 
choices they face, might therefore be in a position to illuminate relevant and meaningful 
aspects of their participants’ being-in-the-world that might otherwise remain hidden. In 
the present study therefore, it might be important to pay attention to the way in which 
participants talk about their encounters with others such as physiotherapists and the 
impact this may have on their lives.  
In summary, IPA is connected to the core principles of phenomenology through paying 
respectful attention to a person’s direct experience. Individuals are encouraged to dwell 
upon a significant, concrete experience whilst researchers are encouraged to be open to 
the claims and concerns identified by each participant. IPA researchers also articulate 
phenomenological concepts through their understanding that experience is not only 
individually embodied, situated, and based on personal biographies, but is context 
dependent and contingent upon relationships with others, coloured and shaped by 
society and culture (Eatough and Smith, 2008; Smith et al. 2009). IPA does not reveal 
an inner experience. What becomes known is only possible by understanding the 
person-in-context, the things that matter to them in the world (Larkin et al. 2006). The 
researcher’s role is to try to make sense of this complex data, to uncover meaning, 
whilst avoiding over-hasty recourse to generalisations and reference to a priori 
concepts, categories or theories. This is a complex process which for IPA involves 
phenomenological description but also interpretation. The interpretative stance of IPA is 
discussed next.  
4.3.2 Interpretation (Hermeneutics)  
 
Hermeneutics is defined as the theory and practice of the interpretation of the meaning 
of texts (Rennie, 1999). The interpretative orientation of IPA draws on the theoretical 
perspectives of three hermeneutic theorists; Heidegger, Schleiermacher and Gadamer 
(Larkin et al. 2006; Smith, 2007; Smith et al. 2009). The intention here is not to produce 
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a potted biography of these philosophers but to demonstrate the relevance of their work 
to IPA and in particular to this study.  
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) was a theologian and philosopher concerned with the 
interpretation of religious texts (Bowie, 1998). He proposed that a detailed and thorough 
interpretation of a text, directed towards both a linguistic analysis (looking underneath 
years of incremental accretion to reveal the original meaning of the script), as well as a 
psychological analysis (looking at what was said and how it was said), would reveal the 
meaning of the text whilst at the same time revealing something of the (un)intentional 
motivations of the original author, that is meaning beyond the immediate claims of the 
individual (Moran, 2000; Smith et al. 2009). The psychological analysis which seems to 
have a clear resonance with IPA was founded upon two interconnected methods: firstly, 
the ‘divinatory’ method where the analyst ‘transforms oneself into the other person, and 
tries to understand the individual element directly’ and secondly, the comparative 
method where the analyst understands ‘the person to be understood as something 
universal and then finds the individual aspect by comparison with other things included 
in the same universal.’ Both methods are interrelated; the first method depends on ‘the 
fact that every person, besides being an individual themself, has a receptivity for all 
other people’ which also rests on understanding that ‘everyone carries a minimum of 
everyone else within themself, and divination is consequently excited by comparison 
with oneself’ (Schleiermacher, 1998 [1810]:92-93).  
IPA’s reading of Schleiermacher suggests researchers cannot claim to know another 
person through pure intuition (e.g. through contemplation from a distance) but that it is 
possible to get psychologically close to another’s lived experience by empathically trying 
to stand in their shoes (the divinatory method) and by identifying similarities with 
themselves, but by also looking for differences (the comparative method), (Smith et al. 
2009). What Schleiermacher described as ‘receptivity’ (1998 [1810]:93) provides the 
starting off point for understanding the experience of another. Put in other words, human 
beings have a pre-reflective, practical or common sense understanding of what it is to 
be human which provides the context and foundation for gaining access to the meaning 
of another person’s experience (Packer, 1985).   
 
The interpretative process is not straight forward, it is dynamic, and as initially discussed 
in chapter 1, what emerges (in research terms) is a co-construction built by the ebb and 
flow between the participant and the researcher. A dual interpretation takes place; the 
participant makes sense of a phenomenon in their own terms by explaining and 
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interpreting their own experience, and further elaborations may be offered in response to 
further questions. Smith and Osborn (2003:51) used the term ‘double hermeneutic’ to 
emphasise the two interpretations involved; the first is the participant’s meaning-making 
(interpreting their own experience), the second is the researcher’s sense-making 
(interpreting the participant’s account), (Smith et al. 2009). The circularity of the process 
(questioning, uncovering meaning, and further questioning), involved in interpreting and 
understanding a phenomenon is the hermeneutic circle (Moran, 2000; Smith, 2007; 
Smith et al. 2009). The journey round the hermeneutic circle is driven by evolving 
hermeneutic questions. The final analysed account should offer a layered analysis of the 
phenomenon; firstly a descriptive, phenomenological level which conveys an empathic 
understanding of the experience, the emic position, and secondly a probing, more 
critical analysis based on the deeper interpretative work of the researcher, the etic 
position, which seeks to make sense of the participant’s account (Smith, 2004; Reid et 
al. 2005; Eatough and Smith, 2008; Larkin et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2009).  
For Schleiermacher interpretation was an ‘infinite task’ (Bowie, 1998: xxx), perhaps best 
explained in the following extract:  
 
 “the image of the whole becomes more complete via the understanding of the 
particular and the particular is more and more completely understood the more one gets 
an overall view of the whole” (Schleiermacher, 1998 [1810]:232). 
 
Schleiermacher’s position in terms of bringing together the whole (understanding the 
context of a text) as well as the part (understanding the author) has a contemporary 
resonance for IPA (Smith, 2007; Smith et al. 2009). Data analysis proceeds in a 
somewhat linear fashion but it is also necessarily circular and iterative, recognising that 
‘one must continually slip back to what came earlier’ (Schleiermacher, 1998 [1810]:232). 
Within the hermeneutic circle researchers revisit the parts or instances that make up the 
whole and revisit the whole or the overview to understand the part. This part-whole 
analytic process occurs at multiple levels, from the level of a word to a sentence, up to 
the level of a single account, to the complete corpus (Smith, 2007; Smith et al. 2009).  
 
The double layered hermeneutic analysis resonates with the classical hermeneutics of 
Schleiermacher but it is applied within a postmodern context. As noted by Smith (2007), 
Schleiermacher interpreted public documents, which were written at an historical 
distance from and therefore in the absence of the interpreter. Hermeneutics as applied 
to IPA is concerned with personal texts that are co-constructed by the research 
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participant and the researcher, in the present-day, and usually face to face. Meaning 
therefore unfolds during the construction as well as during the analysis of these “texts”. 
The analysis in this respect is not timeless, it is embedded in the participant’s and the 
researcher’s current position (Larkin et al. 2006). 
Building upon Schleiermacher’s theories of interpretation, Heidegger fused his 
understanding of phenomenology with the theories of hermeneutics. Heidegger’s 
position was that human existence is utterly and indissolubly bound up in the world, a 
world of people, things, language, relationships and culture. Therefore it is impossible 
for anyone (researcher or participant for example) to opt to transcend or disconnect from 
these indelible facets of their lives in order to reveal some fundamental truth about lived 
experience or the nature of being (Larkin et al. 2006). In this respect, all enquiry starts 
from the enquirer’s perspective, from the basis of their experience.  
Heidegger (1962 [1927]:150) explained that interpretation is grounded in prior 
experience (‘fore-having’). The process of interpretation unveils, cuts into or exposes 
something the interpreter was already partially aware of (‘fore-sight’). Whatever is held 
in our fore-having and revealed through fore-sight is assigned meaning on the basis that 
it was already anticipated or grasped in advance, in a ‘fore-conception’. Therefore, for 
Heidegger, there is no presuppositionless starting point because whenever something is 
interpreted as something it is grounded upon fore-having, fore-sight and fore-
conception; it is always in some way ‘fore-given’ (Macquarrie and Robinson, 1962:192). 
Put another way, researchers, in this sense, cannot interpret another person’s 
experience of a phenomenon without bringing in something of themselves, without 
drawing on their own resources (Packer, 2011). 
Rather than setting aside or bracketing preconceptions and assumptions in advance of 
an enquiry, IPA researchers work from a Heideggerian perspective by trying to identify 
their basic understandings of a particular phenomenon but acknowledge that an 
awareness of these fore-conceptions may not come to light until work has started in the 
interview or the analysis, i.e. until the phenomenon has started to emerge (Smith et al. 
2009). IPA researchers are therefore urged to adopt a ‘sensitive and responsive’ 
approach to data collection and analysis that allows the researcher’s preconceptions to 
be prodded and adjusted by the data (Larkin et al. 2006:108). Careful attention to the 
cares and concerns of the participant creates a dynamic or cyclical form of bracketing 
(somewhat akin to the more familiar processes involved in reflective practice) which 
occurs as part of the research process (Smith et al. 2009). In this respect, whilst it may 
be possible to bracket scientific and theoretical assumptions about the topic of interest, 
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even these assumptions may only emerge to consciousness once a researcher has 
started to engage with the data.  
IPA researchers therefore understand that all questioning and interpretation carries 
assumptions based on prior experience that govern the extent of what can be disclosed. 
Consequently the phenomenon can never disclose itself in its entirety and interpretative 
work is required to understand the meaning of the (partial) disclosure (Packer, 1985; 
Moran, 2000). For IPA researchers this means that what is captured of another’s 
experience using IPA will always be indicative and provisional rather than absolute and 
definitive because the researchers themselves, however hard they try, cannot 
completely escape the contextual basis of their own experience, and neither can they 
completely immerse themselves in the life of another person (Larkin et al. 2006). 
Ultimately a rich and nuanced understanding of the phenomenon should be revealed, 
based on interpretative effort but a perfect understanding of the essence of the 
experience will always remain hidden.  
Gadamer (1900-2002) made a significant contribution to the contemporary 
understanding of hermeneutics with his major work, Truth and Method (1960). 
Gadamer’s perspectives were aligned with those of Heidegger and re-emphasised the 
lived experience of the interpreter as both a way into the text as well as a hindrance to 
understanding: 
 
 “A person who is trying to understand is exposed to distraction from fore-
meanings that are not borne out by the things themselves. Working out appropriate 
projections, anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed ‘by the things’ themselves, is the 
constant task of understanding’ (Gadamer, 2004 [1960]:270). 
 
The interpreter’s fore-meanings may be identified in advance or may only emerge 
through the process of interpretation. As meaning emerges through interpretative effort, 
these fore-meanings or prejudices are adjusted prompting new questions to be asked of 
the text which ‘open up possibilities of meaning’ and in turn new meanings may emerge 
(Gadamer, 2004 [1960]:368). For Gadamer, prejudices, based on historical and 
sociocultural traditions, form part of the structure of human experience and cannot be 
simply shaken off in an attempt to arrive at a presuppositionless starting point. Instead, 
prejudices are the jumping off point where, through engaging in dialogue, pre-
judgements emerge and the process of understanding gets underway (Moran, 2000).  
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For IPA researchers, Gadamer’s view, as outlined here, not only describes what might 
happen during the analytic process i.e. how the analytic process might work itself out 
(Smith et al. 2009) but it also affirms the potential value of identifying and working with 
pre-understandings. For example, through working with a participant’s data a 
physiotherapist-researcher may need to question a common sense but naïve view that 
walking aids promote well-being for a person with ataxia because they are designed to 
reduce impairment and promote safe ambulation. Gadamer (2004 [1960]:304) might 
describe this questioning process as the testing of prejudices in the search for ‘a 
superior breadth of vision’ that overcomes the researcher’s own particularity. However, 
Gadamer also recognises that it is impossible to see everything. The visible horizon 
(what can be seen) is realised from a particular vantage point defined, at least at first, by 
the prejudices carried by the interpreter (Packer, 2011).  
In summary, IPA declares its interpretivist stance by claiming affinity with the 
hermeneutic traditions articulated by Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. IPA 
acknowledges that gaining access to another person’s lived experience is possible but 
not straight forward and never fully realised. The final account is a construction built by 
the researcher and participant(s). The authenticity of this, at least in part, relies upon the 
researcher’s effort, skill and determination to reflexively learn from the data. The extent 
to which this can be accomplished and how it can be evaluated is discussed in more 
depth in the following methods chapter.  
 
4.3.3 Idiographic Inquiry 
 
As with much qualitative research IPA is committed to an idiographic approach. 
Idiography is concerned with the particular, the distinct experiences of particular people 
and the particular contexts in which those experiences occur (Smith et al. 1995; Eatough 
and Smith, 2008; Smith et al. 2009). Working from an idiographic stance means that 
individuals should be understood ‘in-relation-to phenomenon’ and not as isolated entities 
in and of themselves (Smith et al. 2009:29, emphasis in the original); put another way, 
the aim should be to understand the particular ‘in the fullness of whatever contexts are 
relevant’ (Sandelowski, 1996:526).  
 
Consistent with the idiographic approach, small samples are commonly advocated 
(Smith and Osborn, 2008; Smith et al. 2009). This approach is not only practical in terms 
of the analytic work involved but also enables the detail and the depth of each 
experiential account to be made as visible as possible to the reader. The case is central 
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to the inquiry; the researcher attempts to understand each person as a unique being-in-
the-world whose cares and concerns are never going to be precisely the same as any 
one else’s (Allport, 1962). Therefore findings from each case are set aside (as far as 
possible), through a dynamic form of bracketing within the hermeneutic circle, in order to 
maintain sensitivity to each person’s distinct story (Smith et al. 2009). During the final 
cross-case analysis the researcher attempts to remain faithful to individual accounts 
through illustrating the particular lifeworld of participants who have recounted their 
experiences whilst also illustrating more general themes (Smith and Eatough, 2006). In 
this way a picture is built up of the general as well as the particular experiences of 
individuals (Smith and Osborn, 2008). This facility for highlighting unique perspectives 
as well as shared experiences is one of the cornerstones of IPA (Smith, 2004, Smith 
and Osborn, 2008). 
 
4.4 The Ethical Dimension of Phenomenological Hermeneutics  
 
Smith et al (2009:37) summarised the co-dependency of hermeneutics and 
phenomenology as articulated in IPA as follows; ‘Without the phenomenology, there 
would be nothing to interpret, without the hermeneutics, the phenomenon would not be 
seen.’ IPA researchers do not attempt to produce an objective or definitive account of a 
phenomenon and only claim to access a version of the experience as the participant 
makes sense of it through their narrative account (Smith and Osborn, 2008). 
Researchers would never claim to fully understand another person because there will 
always be a difference in thinking, a gap, between the speaker and the listener which 
can never be fully resolved (Schleiermacher, 1998 [1810]). Packer (1985:1089) has 
perhaps best articulated the limits of the extent to which researchers are capable of fully 
grasping the experience of another:  
 
 ‘understanding is not seen as a “searchlight” that scans over a field of potential 
knowledge but rather as a kind of appreciation that is necessarily partial (in both senses of 
the word: incomplete and with its own point of view)’.  
 
Layers of resistance are met by the researcher in analysing the narrative; hidden 
meanings, metaphorical references, linguistic signals. Particular temporal circumstances 
also influence what is glimpsed and understood (Smith, 2007). At the same time, the 
researcher’s own resources and experiences, what Smith (2004:45) refers to as the 
‘biographical presence’ of the researcher, are needed to make sense of what is said and 
yet this biography also provides another layer of resistance. This creates a dynamic 
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tension throughout the research process. In order to work this out, researchers make 
use of their own contexts as sources of insight whilst being (or trying to be) explicit about 
the influence of their perspectives on the analysis and interpretation of the narrative 
(Finlay, 2008). However, the researcher’s preconceptions may not be clear at first and 
only come to light through further engagement with the text and a willingness to reflect 
(Smith et al. 2009).  
The hermeneutic circle is therefore a powerful means of engaging with the things of 
experience but it may require considerable interpretative effort. Packer (1985:1091) 
described ‘returning to the object of inquiry again and again, each time with an 
increased understanding and a more complete interpretative account’. This effort not 
only refers to the commitment to the iterative process but also the need for an on-going 
reflexive awareness of the interpreter’s position in relation to the data. Researchers’ 
decisions about what constitutes the “best” hermeneutic questions and the most 
appropriate analysis carry implications. Tappan (1997) advised researchers to be 
mindful of the ethical dimension of this interpretative work and the inherent power that 
comes with the possibility of shaping and distorting the perception of another’s lived 
experience. It is not simply a case of telling another person’s story or of allowing the 
“things” to show themselves as themselves because, as discussed previously, by 
attempting to understand the meaning of a text the researcher’s own values, biases and 
assumptions come into play. Tappan (1997) urges researchers to be attentive to the 
inherent power in defining the “right” interpretation, so as not to unintentionally 
disrespect participants who hope their lives will be understood. Packer (1985:1092) 
suggested that hermeneutic analysis should aim to be ‘subtle and complex, intellectually 
satisfying’ (for the reader and the researcher), whilst embracing ambiguity and opacity. 
This seems to be an appropriate aspiration for the sort of work entailed by the present 
study and cautions against the production of an uncluttered perhaps artificially neat 
analysis that does not do justice to the participants’ lifeworlds.   
 
4.5 Clarification of the Epistemological and Ontological Perspective of IPA 
 
The present study is connected to IPA’s fundamental theoretical perspectives because it 
seeks to develop knowledge inductively on the basis of empathically understanding the 
experiences of people-in-context (the epistemological and phenomenological stance) 
and, via a more questioning hermeneutic, it expects the data to reveal multiple 
perspectives which are not independent of the researcher (ontological and interpretivist 
stance).  
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Similar in some ways to the development of grounded theory (Pawluch and Neiterman, 
2010), IPA as a relatively new approach to qualitative research continues to expound its 
theoretical position and to clarify where it stands with reference to other approaches to 
qualitative inquiry. Whilst prioritising the phenomenological and interpretivist stance of 
IPA, several authors have clarified the relationship between these and the fundamental 
ontological assumptions underpinning IPA (Smith, 1996; Reid et al. 2005; Larkin et al. 
2006; Smith and Osborn, 2008; Eatough and Smith, 2008; Smith et al. 2009). What 
these accounts share, in terms of ontology, is a declaration of IPA’s affinity with 
symbolic interactionism or soft social constructionism, which consistently places IPA 
somewhere in the middle ground between realism and relativism. Of these authors, 
Larkin et al (2006) perhaps offered the deepest consideration of both the 
epistemological and ontological stance of IPA and how these positions contribute to a 
considered understanding of phenomenology and hermeneutics.  
Larkin et al (2006) used the term ‘contextualist’ to describe and unite IPA’s 
epistemological and ontological position. Contextualism is characterised by a 
commitment to ‘exploring, describing, interpreting and situating the means by which our 
participants make sense of their experiences’ (Larkin et al. 2006:110). This 
conceptualisation best captures the epistemological orientation of IPA which is 
concerned with developing knowledge and understanding people-in-context but it does 
not fully address the ontological position.  
Larkin et al (2006:110) specifically described the ontological stance of IPA as ‘minimal 
hermeneutic realism’ with reference to Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger’s 
understanding of reality (Dreyfus, 1995:254). IPA’s commitment to Heidegger, and 
Heidegger’s position as a hermeneutic phenomenologist, suggests that his work may 
well provide the best steer for understanding the ontological position of IPA. Larkin et al 
(2006) explained that Heidegger was a realist in that he accepted that things exist, that 
these things are real and would exist even if humans did not. This realism is minimal 
because the question about the independent existence of things only occurs because 
people exist and ask the question. Heidegger’s position with respect to reality was 
interpretivist because meaning does not belong to the object. As Dahlberg et al. (2008) 
suggested, meaning is not something with independent existence that can simply be 
happened upon; meaning is made in the encounter. Put another way, the things of 
experience are real but the meaning of a particular thing (e.g. this desk, this illness) is 
not transparent or invariable. People make sense of things through their engagement 
with them and as ‘sense-making creatures’ they impose meaning on their experiences 
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which is perspectival or individually situated (Smith et al. 2009). This means that if 
objective reality is understood as being constituted through intellectual or subjective 
sense-making then what a participant recounts in an interview reveals something very 
real about the phenomenon of interest (Larkin et al. 2006). IPA recognises the complex 
relationship between what people think, what they say and what they do, but assumes 
that the participant’s account is at least in part a reflection of what they think about the 
topic of interest (Smith, 2007; Eatough and Smith 2008). IPA therefore holds that an 
individual’s account reflects something of their subjective experience, and provides a 
genuine portal to their experiential world, however, this position does not suggest that 
access to this world of experience is unproblematic. 
In comparison to IPA, interviews conducted for discourse analysis (a method of inquiry 
similar to IPA but with stronger social constructivist claims) are not taken as a means of 
accessing people’s psychological and social worlds (Coyle, 2006). Rather than 
focussing on an individual’s involvement in a particular context, discourse analysts focus 
on understanding the structure of the context and how linguistic resources have been 
used to construct a version of events (Marshall, 1994; Coyle, 2006; Smith et al. 2009). 
So whilst IPA may share an interest with discourse analysis in understanding how 
experience is immersed in context, IPA’s concern lies at the level of the individual and 
their personal involvement in the context whereas discourse analysts’ interest lies in the 
language (Smith et al. 2009; Kelly, 2010). IPA’s orientation fits more closely to the aims 
of the present study and its interest in learning about the individual experience of people 
living with ataxia. Its stance towards developing an in-depth, fine grained understanding 
of the lives of a few individuals with ataxia also takes the present study away from the 
more macro-level analysis as conceptualised via grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Pawluch and Neiterman, 2010).  
The ontological and epistemological position described above is consistent with the 
researcher’s personal affinity with Engel’s (1977) biopsychosocial model of clinical 
practice. Using this model, clinicians pay attention to the reality of a person’s symptoms 
but also considers it essential to effective healthcare to understand a person’s subjective 
experiences and to situate the condition within their personal and social world (Borrell-
Carrió et al. 2004). This position seems to share common ground with the lifeworld 
perspective of human science research as articulated by Dahlberg et al (2008) and 
connects with the fundamental orientation of IPA (Reid et al. 2005).   
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4.6 A Comparison of IPA with Other Forms of Phenomenological Inquiry 
 
The difference between affiliated but separate approaches towards phenomenological 
inquiry has been described by Smith et al (2009:200) as a little ‘fuzzy’. With the intention 
of positioning this study clearly within the IPA stable of phenomenological enquiry, and 
without intending to diminish the value of other work, this next section briefly explicates 
the present study’s position with respect to four other significant phenomenological 
approaches, Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenology (1995), Ashworth’s descriptive 
phenomenology (2003); Dahlberg et al’s (2008) reflective lifeworld research and van 
Manen’s (1990) hermeneutic phenomenology.  
Giorgi’s (1995) descriptive phenomenology claims a Husserlian orientation and through 
this an emphasis on consciousness. It is aligned with other descriptive 
phenomenologies such as those outlined by Moustakas (1994) and, like this approach it 
is primarily concerned with developing a general description of the structure of the 
phenomenon, for example the invariant or essential constituents of the process of 
learning to drive (Giorgi, 1995). In contrast, the present study is not primarily concerned 
with understanding the invariant features of the lived experience of progressive 
cerebellar ataxia. Trying to uncover its invariant features seems a little premature 
without firstly getting a sense of the texture and the detail of the cares and concerns that 
particularise individuals’ lives. An idiographic approach allows the research to go deeply 
into an individual’s world, engaging with the ‘messy and chaotic’ aspects of life (Eatough 
and Smith, 2008:183) in the hope of bringing out the texture and nuance that leads to a 
more informed understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. The present 
study will undoubtedly uncover commonalities but in keeping with IPA’s core principles it 
will intentionally seek divergence as well as convergence and will retain IPA’s 
commitment to understanding individual experience first and foremost and will only 
cautiously make more general claims. 
Ashworth’s descriptive phenomenology (2003), also known as the Sheffield School, is 
aligned with Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenology (Langdridge, 2007). Ashworth’s stance 
is strongly idiographic and unlike much descriptive phenomenology it does not attempt 
to identify the invariant features of the phenomenon but to reveal differences as well as 
some sense of the commonalities, should these emerge during data analysis (Ashworth, 
2003). The Sheffield School also differs from other forms of descriptive phenomenology 
by using seven ‘fractions of the lifeworld’ to interrogate the data (selfhood, sociality, 
embodiment, temporality, spatiality, project and discourse), (Ashworth, 2003:147). 
These fractions are broadly based on the work of the phenomenological philosophers 
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discussed earlier in this chapter but with a strong emphasis on Merleau-Ponty. Ashworth 
(2003) described a fluid, heuristic analytic process in which some of the fractions may 
be more resonant than others in a particular analysis and where researchers are free to 
use only some fractions if others are deemed irrelevant. However, this particular 
approach to phenomenological enquiry was not chosen for the present study because 
the aim of this study is to focus on and be fully open to the experiential perspectives of 
the participants themselves. Attempting to fit their lifeworld concerns to pre-defined and 
academically constructed categories, however loosely and retrospectively applied, 
would seem to threaten the prioritisation of the participants’ perspectives as framed 
within the research question and as articulated with reference to the researcher’s 
grounding in the biopsychosocial model of clinical practice.  
Reflective lifeworld research (Dahlberg et al. 2008) seems to be closely aligned to the 
philosophical orientations of IPA. Like IPA, it claims phenomenological and hermeneutic 
roots and identifies Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer as key influences. 
However, whilst retaining a hermeneutic orientation, reflective lifeworld research 
combines a Husserlian search for essences with a particular form of bracketing called 
‘bridling’ (Dahlberg et al 2008:129). This form of bracketing works to restrain 
understanding by slowing down the evolving interpretation as it emerges in front of the 
researcher to allow the phenomenon to show itself as far as possible as itself, before it 
is tied down to a specific interpretation (Dahlberg et al. 2008). Finlay (2011:128) has 
argued that this particular phenomenological approach has, in recent years, become 
closely affiliated with a humanising philosophy called ‘lifeworld-led care’. This emphasis 
was not evident at the start of the present study in 2006 and therefore its possible 
relevance as an appropriate methodology for understanding the lived experience of 
progressive cerebellar ataxia could not be anticipated.   
Finally, van Manen’s (1990) hermeneutic phenomenology is also closely aligned to IPA 
(Langdridge, 2007; Smith et al. 2009) and, on first reading, it is difficult to see what 
separates these two approaches. van Manen’s primary interest in the experience of 
practice (health care and teaching), and his deeper consideration of Gadamer’s interest 
in language suggest quite nuanced differences (Langdridge, 2007). However, and 
perhaps more critical to the present study, Langdridge (2007) highlights van Manen’s 
(1990) flexible approach to data collection which permits the researcher to contribute 
his/her own perspectives to the encounter as well as to approach analysis using similar 
structures of the lifeworld described by Ashworth (2003). The intentional contribution of 
the interviewer’s own views during data collection, rather than working out fore-
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conceptions as part of the hermeneutic process, would seem to run counter to the 
intentions of the present study. IPA’s commitment to ‘allowing participants to tell their 
own story, in their own words’ (Smith et al. 1997:68) seems to fit the aims of the present 
study more closely. Furthermore hermeneutic phenomenologists skilfully exploit literary, 
philosophical, theoretical and reflexive perspectives, taking phenomenology into the 
realms of poetic or aesthetic forms (Finlay, 2011). Good IPA is similarly deeply 
interpretative (Smith et al. 2009) but it does not seem to make the same claims for 
literary, metaphorical and artistic expression. For these reasons hermeneutic 
phenomenology was not adopted for this study. 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presented IPA as an appropriate means of addressing the research 
questions articulated in the present study. Its theoretical position was explored in depth 
and the epistemological and ontological basis of enquiry was discussed and clarified. 
The decision to select IPA instead of alternative and related methods of 
phenomenological inquiry was justified. Two important issues were raised in this chapter 
for the first time; ethical considerations and the grounds on which a judgement might be 
made about the quality of analysis and reported findings. These issues are explored in 
more depth in the following chapter which details and discusses the methods involved in 
using IPA to answer the research questions.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Method 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter details and justifies the methods employed in this study and discusses 
pertinent ethical issues and the ways in which quality and rigour have been addressed. 
 
5.2 Research Questions 
 
This study aimed to conduct an in-depth exploration of the lived experience of 
progressive cerebellar ataxia. The enquiry focussed on understanding how people living 
with progressive cerebellar ataxia made sense of their condition in the context of their 
everyday lives and how they perceived exercise, physiotherapy and physiotherapy 
services. By using an inductive approach which prioritised the perspectives of the 
participants’ experiences, via in-depth interviews, it was hoped that the subjective 
meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia could be interrogated and elucidated. This 
study employed IPA (Smith et al. 2009) to explore the following research questions:  
1. What is the meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia for people who live with this 
condition?  
2. How do people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia experience healthcare, and 
physiotherapy in particular?  
3. What is the meaning of exercise and activity participation for people living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia?  
 
5.3 Research Ethics Considerations 
 
NHS approval was not required for this study because participants were not drawn from 
NHS sources (http://www.nres.nhs.uk/applications/approval-requirements/). This study 
was approved by the School of Health Sciences and Social Care Research Ethics 
Committee, Brunel University (Appendix Ca). Only minor revisions were required to the 
original application for approval.  
Research ethics approval was originally given for conducting focus groups with people 
living with ataxia and, separately, with physiotherapists working with people living with 
ataxia. This second part of the approved study (qualitative work with physiotherapists) is 
not part of the work presented in this thesis. It is noted here for clarity, as it is mentioned 
in the participant information sheet (Appendix D). As part of the recruitment process, 
potential participants were informed of the aims and purpose of the study (via the 
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participant information sheet) and, via e-mail or telephone, opportunities were provided 
to ask questions. During recruitment, although interest in the study was high, it emerged 
that potential participants were located in all areas of the UK, and as such it proved 
impossible to convene focus groups as originally planned. This issue was discussed 
with potential participants who informally suggested that they would still be interested in 
the study if in-depth interviews were used instead of focus groups. An amendment 
request was therefore submitted to the Research Ethics Committee to conduct in-depth 
interviews instead of focus groups. The consent form was altered to reflect the change 
in data collection method (Appendix E). The amendments were approved (Appendix 
Cb), and the recruitment process continued as described in section 5.4.  
Following recruitment, as part of the introductory conversation before the interview, the 
aims of the study were reiterated, the broad scope of the interview outlined, anonymity 
and voluntary participation confirmed, right to withdraw without detriment established, 
further questions answered and consent forms signed. Ataxia UK leaflets were taken to 
all interviews as a source of further information and support. As the differences between 
spoken and written language and the potential for offending participants through sending 
them raw data are well recognised (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) individual transcripts 
and the final narrative accounts were not circulated to the participants in this study. 
However, as part of the research ethics approval, summaries of the main findings which 
contained some anonymised direct quotations were circulated to all participants. The 
summarised findings were well received and did not raise any concerns. The following 
discussion briefly contextualises and discusses a few of the particular ethical issues 
inherent in the present study.  
The aim of this study, to understand the meaning of living with ataxia, was a serious 
undertaking; participants were asked to reflect on an enduring, uncertain and intensely 
personal lived experience. Attending to the potential ethical issues inherent in procuring 
and reporting these experiences required an understanding of ethical responsibilities 
which transcended the procedures formally embedded in research ethics approval 
processes. In other words, research ethics approval did not mean that ethical dilemmas 
had been “fixed”, rather that problem areas had been flagged for on-going consideration 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).  
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:61) argued that proper ethical conduct is dependent upon 
the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom or phronesis, ‘the intellectual virtue of 
recognising and responding to what is most important in a situation’. This does not mean 
that ethical principles are abandoned rather that ethical salience is situation-specific i.e. 
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the point at which an issue becomes morally relevant is determined by context not 
through recourse to universal principles or rules. Principles based guidance provides a 
framework for ethical research conduct but only helps the researcher anticipate 
problems in a general sense. Much therefore depends on the researcher’s ability to 
judge interacting moral, ethical and epistemic dilemmas which emerge through concrete 
human interaction (e.g. in the interview situation).  
Through reflexive activity which focused on understanding situated ethical dilemmas, 
reasoning processes and actions, this researcher learned better ways of recognising 
and responding to ethical issues apparent in the present study. For example, as the 
researcher was a physiotherapist it was possible that potential participants might believe 
the study would offer some form of therapeutic intervention; a particular problem in 
health research (Stark and Hedgecoe, 2010). The Participant Information Sheet and 
subsequent conversations with participants stressed that interventions would not be 
offered as part of this study, nevertheless this did not stop participants asking for advice 
and reassurance not only about physiotherapy but also about medical and other 
personal issues. The researcher directed participants to other sources of support for 
concerns outside her area of expertise. However, it felt morally and professionally wrong 
to withhold information that could potentially reduce anxiety and distress. An example of 
the sort of ethical dilemma which arose in the present study is provided in Box 5.1 (pp. 
86).   
The view that qualitative research is in some way inherently ethical because it seeks to 
understand human experience and action in an empathetic and meaningful way has 
been refuted in the literature (see for example Punch, 1998; Brinkmann and Kvale, 
2005). Seeking to provide vulnerable people with a voice in research is complicated not 
simply by issues of consent and autonomy but also by undeclared “qualifiers” such as 
‘narrative competence’ (Kirkevold and Bergland, 2007:71). As discussed in chapter 2 
(Understanding the Subjective Experience of Long Term Illness) although participants 
were not asked to “tell their story”, there was an unacknowledged expectation in this 
study that participants would be able to talk about and reflect upon their experiences in a 
detailed and coherent fashion. Although the majority of participants in the present study 
needed little help in providing in-depth narratives about what life was like with ataxia, 
one or two struggled. Julia, for example, asked the researcher to ‘ask me questions’ to 
prompt her and to help continue her narrative. Joan required some reassurance that her 
contribution was valid and valued; she asked ‘Is that a good enough answer?’ In this 
situation the researcher worked within the interview to support participants to find their 
  86 
voice, by reassuring them that their views were important and by using their words to 
help develop avenues for further discussion.  
 
Box 5.1: Research Ethics Vignette 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paying careful attention to the concerns of participants and prioritising their perspectives 
over and above those of the researcher is intrinsic to doing “good” IPA (Smith et al. 
2009). In research ethics terms, genuine responsiveness and sensitivity to participants’ 
concerns minimises the risk of offence and misinterpretation. According to Shotter 
(2005:103) inattentive or careless researchers disrespect not only their dealings with 
participants but at a deeper level they offend and disturb the ‘very being’ of the person 
involved. Vulnerable participants, (like Joan and Julia) may feel unable to fully express 
themselves, and risk turning the problem inwards; ‘Is there something wrong with me?’ 
(Shotter, 2005:103). The researcher in the present study therefore understood that she 
had moral and ethical responsibilities not to ignore the ‘involvement obligations’ 
One participant (Stella) asked the researcher to make sense of a letter that had been written by her 
consultant and sent to her as part of the practice of copying patients in to all correspondence. This 
letter was not written in lay language and the participant was frustrated and anxious about not 
understanding what had been written about her and her particular problems. Whilst suggesting that 
the participant might perhaps ask her GP for help, the researcher did explain most of the contents of 
the letter in a way that Stella could understand.  
Stella made the request in the latter stages of the interview. It could be suggested that during the 
time that had elapsed since meeting the researcher for the first time and tentatively introducing the 
letter, Stella had decided to trust the researcher with this information. Similarly, the researcher had 
learned a lot about Stella, her interests and troubles. Although Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) 
suggested that researchers who are unaware of the contexts and perspectives of research 
participants’ lives should refrain from activity which could be interpreted as therapeutic, the 
researcher in this case felt that she had a good understanding of Stella’s concerns and therefore used 
her stock of knowledge from this particular interview to make a decision and to offer an explanation. 
However, the same decision might not be taken if a similar situation arose with a different participant 
because the context would differ. The danger with qualitative interviews is that through building 
trust a participant may disclose personal details that they may later regret (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009). This did not seem to be the case with Stella’s interview, it appeared that she had thought 
about the letter beforehand (it was ready to hand) and then decided, after talking to the researcher 
for some time, to introduce the letter and talk about it in the context of the interview.    
From an epistemic perspective the researcher later considered whether the episode described above 
could or should be used as “data” within the study. Decision making was informed by considering the 
section of data as part of the whole of Stella’s interview and Stella’s interview as a part of the whole 
study, and finally the extent to which her particular experiences contributed to the overall gestalt. As 
Stella’s concerns were shared by other participants it seemed appropriate to include this data 
(offered within the context of a recorded interview) within the overall findings.   
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(Goffman, 1967:115) inherent in the interview situation but also acting throughout data 
analysis and writing up. Through thinking about and understanding the interactional 
nature of the interview and the power that researchers hold to honestly reflect as well as 
to distort another’s lived experience (Tappan, 1997), this researcher learned to carefully 
attend to the ethical dimensions at play in the interview situation and the research 
process as a whole, whilst attempting to respectfully portray the lives of the people 
involved in this study.  
 
5.4 Recruitment Procedures 
 
Following Brunel University, School of Health Sciences and Social Care (SHSSC) 
Research Ethics Committee approval, Ataxia UK agreed to facilitate a national 
recruitment strategy. Ataxia UK is a charitable organisation that offers support to its 
members and funds research into progressive cerebellar ataxia (www.ataxia.org.uk). Its 
membership includes people living with progressive ataxia as part of an inherited or 
idiopathic condition, but excludes those with cerebellar impairments resulting from 
trauma, or as part of another condition such as multiple sclerosis or stroke. Ataxia UK 
did not have a formal research ethics review process and accepted the judgement of the 
School Research Ethics Committee. 
The aims and objectives of the study were presented to members of Ataxia UK at their 
annual conference. Flyers requesting volunteers were also handed out to those who 
requested further information (Appendix F). Concurrently, the flyer was given to the co-
ordinator of the local branches of Ataxia UK to distribute to the Chair of each branch. 
The flyer was also posted on the Ataxia UK website and placed in the Ataxian; a 
magazine distributed quarterly to all members of Ataxia UK. As noted above, all those 
who were interested in participating were asked to contact the researcher for written 
information and a consent form (Appendices D and E). Telephone conversations or e-
mail exchanges provided further details about the study and a means of answering 
questions for those who requested clarification. The recruitment process lasted 
approximately eight weeks.  
An approach was also made to a NHS specialist ataxia centre to ask whether it would 
be possible to recruit participants from the outpatient clinic. The request was declined 
because the clinicians and patients were already involved in research. The lead clinician 
argued that further requests for participation in new projects (patients) and support with 
recruitment (staff) would overburden both groups.  
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5.5 Participants 
 
Small samples are commonly used in IPA studies because it is only possible to do in-
depth, fine grained analysis on accounts from a small number of participants and for 
further reasons explored in the previous chapter (Smith, 2004, Smith and Osborn, 2008; 
Smith et al. 2009). Small numbers facilitate the depth of enquiry required to do justice to 
the richness and the complexity of human lived experience. In accordance with the 
commitment to an idiographic approach and the emphasis on understanding the 
perspectives of a particular group of participants, no attempt was made to obtain a 
representative, heterogeneous sample of participants. The aim in IPA is to recruit a 
small homogenous sample for whom the research question is significant and meaningful 
(Smith et al. 2009; Smith and Osborn, 2008). Therefore purposive sampling is usually 
advocated. Purposive sampling involves the recruitment of participants who have certain 
features or characteristics which lend themselves to a detailed exploration of the issues 
the researcher wishes to interrogate; these may be socio-demographic features or 
specific behaviours or experiences (Ritchie et al. 2003). In purposive sampling, 
decisions about the sample should be informed by the aims of the study and the existing 
knowledge or theory about the field of study (Ritchie et al. 2003). This approach differs 
from the traditional quantitative notion that generating a random or representative 
sample is necessary for meaningful statistical analysis (Mays and Pope, 1995).  
As the focus of this study was the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia and 
not ataxia as experienced as part of another condition such as multiple sclerosis or 
stroke, recruitment was intentionally limited to people who were living with a progressive 
cerebellar ataxia. However, as the progressive ataxias are rare conditions upon which 
there had been relatively little previous research, the sample could not be informed by 
existing knowledge, theories or hypotheses specific to these conditions. Thus the 
sample was purposive in that the type of ataxia was specified and ataxia due to other 
conditions was excluded. Beyond these constraints a pragmatic approach was taken to 
recruit key informants who were interested in participating and who had experience 
relevant to this study.   
To be included in the study, participants also had to be 18 years old or over. This was 
because in addition to posing ethical and methodological challenges particular to their 
status, the experiences, views and perspectives of children and young people were 
expected to differ from those of an adult population (Einarsdóttir, 2007). Some 
experience of physiotherapy was required in order to explore the second aim of the 
study but the extent of the experience was not defined. This is because although people 
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living with ataxia may generally be offered physiotherapy, the content, purpose, duration 
and frequency of this service is not well defined. Therefore excluding potential 
participants who had less than six weeks of physiotherapy, for example, may have 
overly constrained the sample and closed off the opportunity to explore the meaning of 
physiotherapy in whatever form it had been experienced. For the purposes of this study, 
limited as well as extensive experience of physiotherapy were equally valued. 
Participants were considered for inclusion if they had been diagnosed with one of the 
progressive ataxias for more than six months. In keeping with aligned research (e.g. 
Murray, 2004; Reynolds and Prior, 2003; Thompson et al. 2002) the decision was taken 
to select participants who were not in the earliest stages of grief or shock immediately 
following the diagnosis of a long term condition. In line with other work (e.g. Reynolds et 
al. 2008) participants’ reports of their diagnosis was accepted without further medical 
confirmation. Apart from requesting that potential participants were fluent in English, no 
further features or characteristics were used to define the sample. Following Brunel 
University SHSSC Research Ethics Committee guidance, and with permission, GPs 
were informed of their patient’s participation.  
Initially 27 people with ataxia expressed an interest in participating in the study. 
Following provision of the information sheet 15 declined to participate or did not contact 
the researcher again. Following further telephone conversations and e-mail exchanges, 
12 people with cerebellar ataxia were recruited to the study. Although larger than 
commonly advocated this remains an appropriate sample size for IPA (Smith et al. 
2009) and, as discussed in the previous chapter, is consistent with its idiographic 
orientation. Demographic information about the participants is presented in Table 5.1 
(pp. 90).  Names have been changed and certain personal details have been blurred to 
protect anonymity.  
Participants lived in England (widespread locations) and were aged between 31 and 73 
years. All participants had been diagnosed with a progressive ataxia, although not all 
participants had a definitive diagnosis. Time since diagnosis with a progressive type of 
ataxia ranged from a minimum one year to a maximum 23 years. Most participants had 
lived with symptoms, if not a definitive diagnosis, for over ten years, some for much 
longer. Five participants lived alone, six lived with their partner, four of whom also lived 
with dependent children. Harry lived at home with his parents. All participants lived 
independently except for Bill whose wife was his full-time carer.  
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Table 5.1: Participant Demographic Information  
 
Anonymised 
Name  
(marital status) 
Age Type of Ataxia Time since onset Occupation Interview 
Setting 
Ted     
(married) 
Early 
40s 
Late onset Friedreich’s 
ataxia 
About a year Financial services Work 
Harry     
(single) 
Early 
30s 
Friedreich’s ataxia 
(diagnosed in 
adulthood) 
Since late childhood Software consultant Home 
Joan 
(divorced) 
Early 
70s 
Working diagnosis of 
episodic ataxia 
Uncertain but not 
more than 15 years 
Retired civil servant Home 
Susan 
(married) 
Mid 
60s 
Cerebellar 
degeneration 
Uncertain but not 
more than 15 years 
Retired housewife Home 
Scott     
(single) 
Early 
40s 
Cerebellar ataxia, no 
definitive diagnosis 
6 years 
Retired military 
personnel  (ill health) 
Ataxia UK 
HQ 
Graham 
(single) 
Early 
40s 
Cerebellar ataxia, no 
definitive diagnosis 
Many years but more 
significant symptoms 
over last decade 
Unemployed       
(looking for work) 
Ataxia UK 
HQ 
Hugh   
(married) 
Early 
50s 
SCA 6 
Many years but 
diagnosed in 2004 
Administrator Home 
Stella 
(separated) 
Mid 
50s 
Cerebellar ataxia, no 
definitive diagnosis 
Uncertain but not 
more than 15 years 
Retired Home 
Bill     
(married) 
Late 
50s 
Cerebellar ataxia, no 
definitive diagnosis 
Symptoms for many 
years, diagnosed 13 
years 
Retired counsellor         
(ill health) 
Home 
Toby   
(married) 
Mid 
50s 
Idiopathic cerebellar 
ataxia 
4 years 
Retired semi-skilled 
manual worker             
(ill health) 
Home 
Julia 
(unknown, 
lives alone) 
Late 
60s 
SCA 6 22 years 
Retired service industry 
worker 
Home 
Jim     
(married) 
Late 
40s 
Cerebellar ataxia 23 years Administrative manager 
Ataxia UK 
HQ 
 
5.6. Development of the Interview Guide 
 
The most common approach to collecting data suitable for IPA is through an in-depth 
semi-structured interview which usually lasts for an hour or more (Smith et al. 2009; 
Smith and Osborn, 2008). This flexible data collection tool allows a detailed exploration 
of the phenomenon of interest. The researcher is able to pursue salient topics as they 
emerge in the account and to modify questions in light of participants’ responses (Smith 
and Osborn, 2008). Consistent with the epistemological assumptions underlying IPA, 
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knowledge and understanding of a participant’s lifeworld is developed from first-hand 
information gathered through time spent in the field with the participant (Smith and 
Osborn, 2008). This means of data collection allows the researcher to “get close” to that 
which is being studied, facilitating as far as possible entrance to the psychological and 
social world of the participant, helping the researcher understand, or get a sense of, 
what it is like to experience the phenomenon. In this way the relationship between 
interviewee and interviewer is seen as collaborative and interdependent; both share the 
responsibility for the direction the interview takes but as far as possible the participant 
should lead the way (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Packer, 2011). This approach is 
consistent with Heideggerian phenomenology which has at its core an aim to provide the 
maximum opportunity for the subject to reveal itself ‘as itself’ (Larkin et al. 2006:108). It 
is therefore important that the interview is structured to facilitate rapport-building 
between the researcher and the participant and to give a strong sense of control to the 
interviewee (Smith and Osborn, 2008).  
In developing the interview schedule for the present study, previous work concerned 
with understanding the lived experience of long term conditions and other published IPA 
studies and texts (e.g. Reynolds and Prior, 2003; Smith and Osborn, 2003; Dean et al. 
2006; Smith and Eatough, 2006) were reviewed to gain an understanding of the scope 
and sort of questions that might be useful in this type of research. The purpose of the 
literature review in IPA is to learn about the phenomenon of interest and to identify a gap 
in what is known about the particular topic but the literature is not subsequently used to 
inform data collection in a rigid way (Smith et al. 2009; Smith, 1999). The researcher 
therefore starts with some understanding of the area of interest, and some questions, 
but unlike quantitative research, existing literature is not used to develop hypotheses 
which are then supported or rejected by the findings of a study.  
An interview guide or schedule ensures that the researcher has mapped the area 
considered important to cover in the interview, and that careful consideration is given to 
potentially difficult topics and the placement of sensitive questions (Smith et al. 2009; 
Smith and Osborn, 2008). In the present study a broad set of questions was firstly 
constructed as a frame of reference for what was then the intended focus group 
(Appendix Ga).  
Once a general idea about the shape of the interview schedule was agreed with peers 
and supervisors, a first draft of the interview guide was developed by the researcher and 
reviewed by the supervisors (Appendix Gb). A second draft was developed in response 
to further comments, reconsidered priorities and re-ordering of questions (Appendix Gc). 
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The initial draft clearly reflected the researcher’s interest in physiotherapy; the 
restructuring of the interview questions (and the subsequent prioritisation of the 
participants’ concerns and interests during data analysis) documents how this thinking 
changed as the study evolved.  
Figure 5.1 (pp. 93) demonstrates how funnelling (recommended by Smith et al. 2009 
and Smith and Osborn, 2008) was built into the final draft of the interview schedule to 
elicit general views about the experience of living with ataxia as well as responses to 
more specific questions about the possible effects of ataxia. Questions which explored 
the participant’s experience of physiotherapy and exercise then followed, once again 
moving from the general to the particular. At this stage the interview guide looked very 
structured and detailed but after the first interview it was used more flexibly (discussed 
below). In keeping with the theoretical orientations of IPA, the interview questions were 
created to facilitate a particular type of conversation (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) 
grounded in a ‘heuristic framework’ which was directed towards finding out or 
uncovering experiential understandings of the topic of interest (Flowers et al. 2000:288). 
In this way the interview guide represented possible paths on a journey of discovery 
rather than clear signposts for the direction of travel. 
Prompts were also built into the interview guide. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) suggested 
that follow up questions are critical to the interview process to develop more detailed or 
participant-led responses but are more often than not constructed on the spot, in direct 
response to what has just been said. In addition silence or simply general 
encouragement (nodding or non-specific articulations such as ‘hm, mm …’) was 
considered just as important as verbal communication in fostering elaborations or more 
in-depth consideration of the topic. So, whilst prompts were scripted into the interview 
guide, in practice the prompts used were usually re-phrasings or amplifications of the 
initial question.  
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Figure 5.1 Semi-structured Interview Guide Demonstrating Funnelling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the researcher developed more confidence and experience at interviewing, follow up 
questions as well as periods of silence were used more naturally or intuitively to gently 
nudge the participant towards providing a richer account. This transition is consistent 
with Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) view that as interviewers become more skilful in their 
craft they move away from an initial heavy reliance on the interview guide and instead 
use their sensibility for what feels right in the moment to help them decide what to do 
Funnelling 
1) Could you tell me why you were interested in being involved in 
this study? 
2) How would you describe what living with ataxia is like if you 
were talking to someone who knew very little about ataxia? 
3) Can you describe (in more detail) how ataxia has affected your 
day to day activities, the things that are important to you? 
4) Can you tell me about some of the day to day activities that 
give you particular satisfaction? 
5) Have you needed to change the way you do these things 
because of ataxia? 
6) If so in what ways? 
7) Have you taken up any new roles or activities (since the ataxia 
started)? 
8) Have any groups or organisations, people or experiences been 
helpful or unhelpful in supporting you do the things that are 
important to you? 
 
We are now going to move from activities in your daily life that are 
important to you to your physical activity and physiotherapy. 
9) What’s the first thing that comes into your mind when you hear 
the word physiotherapy? 
10) Can you tell me about the process of being referred to 
physiotherapy? 
11) Could you describe the kinds of things you’ve done in 
physiotherapy? 
12) Did anything about physiotherapy surprise you? 
13) What has physiotherapy done for you? 
14) What was most supportive? 
15) Could you tell me about any other sort of exercise that you’ve 
found helpful? 
16) Is there anything about having ataxia that stops you exercising 
or participating in activities that are important to you? 
General experiences 
of ataxia 
 
 
 
 
Moving to more 
specific experiences 
and understandings 
 
 
 
Transition towards 
physiotherapy 
General questions 
about physiotherapy 
 
 
Specific questions 
about physiotherapy 
and physical activity 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring alt rnatives 
to physiotherapy 
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next. The pilot interview (see below) helped in the development of this process. De-
briefing questions were included at the end of the interview by asking if the participant 
had anything further to add. This approach provided space for the participant to raise 
issues that might have concerned them during the interview and also helped to dispel 
any tension or anxiety that the participant may have encountered in talking about very 
personal experiences (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Further opportunities for discussion 
were offered once the recorder was switched off. If new and relevant topics were 
discussed at this point the participant was asked if handwritten notes could be taken. 
Switching the recording device back on seemed too intrusive when the purpose of de-
briefing was to prioritise and discuss the participant’s concerns and perspectives about 
their experience of the interview. 
 
5.7 Data Collection 
 
Interviews were offered in participants’ homes, at their workplace or a local community 
facility such as the Ataxia UK offices or public libraries. Although home might be 
considered ecologically valid in terms of conducting IPA i.e. by providing the researcher 
with an opportunity to meet the participant in context, home can be problematic for 
confidential interviews if others are present or if mobility problems make tidying up 
difficult. Therefore in recognition of the potential concerns of participants in this regard 
alternative venues were offered. As the interviewer was working unaccompanied, lone 
working policies were also used to minimise risk (Appendix H).  
 
5.8 Pilot Interview 
 
In IPA research, although considerable work goes into the development of the semi-
structured interview guide in terms of organisation, wording and placement of sensitive 
topics, it is not expected or encouraged that interview questions are applied rigidly or in 
a specified sequence. The reason for this is because an unbending adherence to the 
interview guide could block the emergence of unexpected topics which directly reflect 
the interests and particular concerns of the participant (Smith and Osborn, 2008). The 
researcher is expected to explore these topics “on the hoof” so that a richer account 
emerges from the interview than could be anticipated in advance. In order to be this 
flexible in an interview situation, the researcher has to be familiar with the interview 
guide to enable movement between topics in response to the interests of the 
participants. Smith et al (2009) and Smith and Osborn (2008) advised memorising the 
interview schedule in advance to facilitate this process. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, the researcher requires a certain level of confidence and experience with the 
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interview process in order to facilitate a smooth transition between questions that will not 
necessarily follow the planned order, and to omit questions that are not relevant for 
particular participants without worrying about not covering the ground. The pilot 
interview was directed towards achieving this sort of fluency and flexibility. 
The following aims were developed for the pilot interview: 
To try out the draft interview guide and to identify problems with its construction and use 
in the field.  
To provide the researcher with an opportunity to practice interviewing and using the 
interview guide. 
To give feedback to the researcher about interview technique. 
The first person who responded to the recruitment material and who consented to 
participate was interviewed for the pilot interview. This was Ted, in his early 40s, he 
worked in financial services and he was diagnosed, a year before the interview, with late 
onset progressive cerebellar ataxia. Ted was interviewed at his place of work. The 
interview schedule was memorised and followed as far as possible, reference to a paper 
copy was made where necessary. The interview was recorded using a digital voice 
recorder and transcribed. Careful scrutiny of the interview transcript (researcher and 
supervisor), the questions and responses, demonstrated that the researcher required 
expert feedback from her supervisor to hone her interview technique. Figure 5.2 (pp. 
96), an extract from the pilot interview transcript, demonstrates several issues with the 
questions asked by the researcher.  
A close look at Figure 5.2 (pp. 96) suggested firstly that the researcher missed an 
opportunity to explore fatigue in more depth. Follow up questions could have prompted 
Ted to explain what he meant by ‘you end up making problems’. The researcher could 
have asked Ted to explain what these ‘problems’ were, why he found it difficult to relax 
and what he meant by ‘a continual circle’. Also it might have been useful to find out who 
said that Ted was not leaving work early enough, he might have been hinting here about 
his family or perhaps concerned work colleagues, or even his own opinion. The final 
question ‘Is that because you’re more tired?’ is a leading question, a pause would have 
been useful to allow Ted more time to consider his answer, a better question would have 
been ‘In what ways does it make a difference to your home life?’ This may have 
prompted Ted to provide a more expansive answer. 
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Figure 5.2: An Extract from the Pilot Interview Interview Transcript 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a physiotherapist the researcher had over fifteen years of clinical experience which 
included interviewing patients as part of standard assessment and treatment 
procedures. However, having experienced a predominantly biomedical training at 
undergraduate level and having a quantitative research background at Masters level, it 
was not surprising perhaps to find qualitative interviewing a difficult skill to master 
initially. The clinical situation is directed towards a quick and highly directed “subjective” 
assessment (interview) designed to identify key problems and to prioritise areas for 
immediate “objective” (physical), time limited examination. Open questions and prompts 
such as ‘How do you feel about that?’ are not necessarily part of a physiotherapist’s 
currency, particularly on first meeting a patient. In this context the clinical interview could 
be understood as a means of ‘knowledge collection’, the clinician as ‘miner’ digging 
down for objective facts which bear little or nothing of the person who uncovers them 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009:48).  
The problems that this researcher encountered in developing a less directive 
interviewing style were mirrored by those of another physiotherapist who conducted a 
study using IPA (Dean et al. 2006). In a similar way to Sarah Dean, it took practice and 
expert feedback for this researcher to develop effective interview skills necessary for the 
Ted: One of the problems with ataxia is when you’re tired you tend to be more unsteady. […] 
it’s sort of self-defeating because when you’re tired you end up making problems, you can’t 
really relax, it’s just a continual circle. 
Interviewer: Have you developed any strategies to cope with that? Have you changed 
anything in your life to help you manage that? 
Ted: Try to leave work earlier  
Interviewer: Mmm 
Ted: Some people say not early enough, but it is earlier than I used to. 
Interviewer: Okay. And has that made a difference? 
Ted: It makes a difference to home life, yes. 
Interviewer: Yeah. Is that because you’re less tired?  
 
Ted: Um … yes. 
  97 
present study. With practice, the researcher moved away from being oriented towards 
‘knowledge collection’ and towards ‘knowledge construction’, the interviewer as 
‘traveller’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009:48). In this analogy, the interviewer is understood 
as taking a journey where s/he falls into conversation with others who, in response to 
the traveller’s questions, talk about their lives. The traveller makes sense of and 
interprets these stories by retelling them to others. New knowledge is formulated in 
these stories but the traveller or interviewer also changes by learning to look afresh at 
previously taken-for-granted understandings of the world. This well-known metaphor 
works well with Smith’s (2007) explication of the hermeneutic circle. Here, too, the 
researcher-interviewer travels; moving round the hermeneutic circle in the interview and 
when working with the data back at base, using hermeneutic questions to work out 
preconceptions, prioritising new knowledge, developing further questions and thereby 
eliciting a richer understanding of the phenomenon of interest.  
Reviewing the transcript from the first interview showed that the researcher had difficulty 
using the interview guide flexibly, tended to ask closed as well as leading questions, 
rather than hermeneutic questions, and at times failed to probe potentially interesting or 
emerging issues. In addition to being a novice at this sort of interviewing and finding it 
difficult, it is also possible that the researcher was still in clinical mode, troubled by 
feelings about being overly intrusive and therefore resisting entering the client’s 
lifeworld. It is possible that in this early interview the researcher was struggling to forge a 
researcher identity whilst trying to resist the natural inclinations of a dominant therapist 
identity. The researcher’s lack of confidence and experience in this type of interviewing 
did not perhaps initially facilitate full engagement with the interview process. The 
following extract from fieldwork diary notes reflects this discomfort: ‘Probing for deeper 
answers felt intrusive. It didn’t feel right. Felt I had nothing to offer in return.’  
The problems described here are not uncommon and possibly stem from needing to find 
a ‘comfortable research persona’ (Smith et al. 2009:67). Careful review of the first 
transcript enabled the researcher to reflect on her interview style and listening skills. 
Phrases such as ‘Can you tell me more about that?’, ‘In what ways …?’, ‘Can you add to 
that?’, ‘How did you feel about that?’ were identified as means of assisting this process 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Smith et al. 2009). No changes were made to the interview 
guide as a result of the first interview. Despite the problems encountered in this 
interview, relevant and important features unique to Ted’s circumstances emerged and 
the themes that were later developed from this interview foreshadowed some of those 
that were to emerge in the interviews with other participants. Therefore the pilot 
interview data were incorporated into the main study. 
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In keeping with the view that research interviews are pragmatic enterprises and that 
proficiency can be learnt through practice (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009), the researcher 
developed a better understanding of the interview process overtime and became more 
skilful at sensitively tuning into important and interesting topics. As the researcher 
became more experienced and confident in this type of interviewing the opening 
question was able to be used as a jumping off point for the rest of the interview, and 
there was less dependence on following the question format as presented in the 
interview guide. Fieldwork diary notes made after the second interview reflect this belief: 
‘Happy to let him speak, didn’t use the interview guide very much, hoped that the ‘ground’ was 
in my head. Didn’t cover all the areas but I think that’s ok, got a good picture.’ (Fieldwork 
diary entry, May 2007) 
A longer extract from Hugh’s interview is included in Appendix I to demonstrate 
improvements in interview technique and the extent to which Hugh, rather than the 
researcher, shaped the interview.  
This section accounted for the development of the interview guide and indicated how the 
researcher improved her interview technique through reflexive analysis and practice in 
the field. In this sense the pilot interview achieved its aims and it was appropriate at this 
stage to move on to the main study.  
 
5.9 Data Recording and Transcription 
 
IPA is embedded within the philosophical assumption that individuals experience the 
same phenomenon differently i.e. that there are multiple realities of, in this case, the 
experience of living with ataxia. IPA intentionally reports these multiple realities by using 
multiple quotations of the actual words of participants and by presenting the differences 
and as well as the similarities of experience both within and across individuals (Smith et 
al. 2009). Therefore the interviews in this study were captured using a digital voice 
recorder and a high quality microphone. All participants were interviewed individually 
except for Graham and Scott who, following their preference, were interviewed together 
(discussed below). The interviews lasted approximately an hour (mean 67 minutes; 
range 53-104 minutes) and resulted in 12.3 hours of recorded data. Data collection took 
3 months (May-August 2007). Field notes were made as soon after the interview as 
possible. These notes were incorporated into a reflexive diary which recorded the 
researcher’s immediate thoughts and feelings about the interview and, as identified in 
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chapter 1 (Introduction), acted as a chronological resource and a way of mapping the 
development of these thoughts, tentative analyses and preoccupations over time.  
Each MP3 file was downloaded and sent via secure data transfer to an independent 
transcriber who produced word files containing the transcription of each interview. Notes 
written when the recorder was switched off were added to the word document of the 
transcribed interview. Transcription was at the semantic level; all the words spoken, 
including false starts, pauses, laughter and any other significant events that occurred 
during the interview. A more detailed transcription such as that used for conversation 
analysis is not recommended for research conducted in the IPA tradition (Smith et al. 
2009). This is because for IPA the emphasis is on the meaning of the content whereas 
for conversation analysis the interest lies in analysing the structural aspects of naturally 
occurring verbal interaction (Drew, 2003). Following transcription, each account was 
listened to several times to start the process of immersing the researcher in the data. 
Changes were made to the transcript where necessary to correct mis-transcription of 
technical words and indistinct articulations that only became clear through repeated 
listening. Identifiable information was fully anonymised and pseudonyms were allocated 
to each participant.  
 
5.10 Data Analysis 
 
Consistent with its phenomenological and interpretative roots, IPA aims to provide a rich 
account of a person’s experience which goes beyond first level description and attempts 
to do justice to the person in their entirety (Smith and Osborn, 2003). IPA does not aim 
to produce an objective or definitive account and does not make any claims about being 
able to directly access a person’s experience, only to access an account of the 
experience as the participant makes sense of it during the interview (Smith et al. 2009; 
Smith and Osborn, 2008). The resulting narrative is thought to be revealing, important 
and of value, not because it lays bare the essence of a particular phenomenon, which 
would be impossible from a Heideggerian perspective (Finlay, 2003a), but because the 
stories people tell themselves and others about their lives say something about their 
constructed but uniquely situated identities (Smith, 2003). The meanings derived from 
this purposeful talk are wholly context-dependent and are not meant to create broadly 
applicable knowledge. The analysis aims to illuminate an ‘insider’s perspective’ (Conrad, 
1987:2) but this is inherently difficult and can never be fully realised (Smith and Osborn, 
2008).  
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Furthermore, participants may have trouble expressing themselves and their 
experiences and they may choose to avoid revisiting sensitive or painful topics. The 
focus of the analysis therefore is not simply on content but also on unravelling complex 
metaphorical references, hidden meanings and unintentional leaking of information. 
Furthermore, as discussed previously (chapters 1 and 4), the researcher’s own 
conceptions (ideas, imaginings), what Smith (2004:45) refers to as the ‘biographical 
presence’ of the researcher, are needed to make sense of what is said. This sort of 
enquiry and analysis requires a firm reflexive stance not simply to help the researcher 
unravel his/her own pre-understandings but to allow participants to ‘reveal themselves 
through acts that frustrate the researcher’s preconceived ideas’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009:243, emphasis added).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Finlay (2008) has likened the tension involved in this 
interpretative process to a complex dance where the researcher carefully negotiates, 
through improvised steps, a path that identifies assumptions and brackets them off 
whilst at the same time using them creatively to develop further hermeneutic questions 
that remain faithful to the phenomenon itself. This complex intertwining of bracketing 
and reflexivity is closely connected to the way in which the hermeneutic circle works in 
IPA (Smith, 2008). The understanding of the interview as a dynamic and co-constructed 
event is therefore taken forward into the data analysis process. Knowledge is built 
through the conversational and relational dimensions created between the researcher 
and the participant in the interview and subsequently between the researcher and the 
text (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).  
Data analysis was therefore guided by an attitude of openness and a willingness to 
dwell in the data, consistent with the approach taken towards data collection. The focus 
remained on participants’ attempts to make sense of their experience (Smith et al. 
2009). In practice, the researcher closely followed the guidelines set out in Smith and 
Osborn (2008) and Smith et al (2009). Whilst this approach to analysis may seem 
formulaic, the primary purpose of the staged progression is to facilitate a sustained 
engagement with the text. The process may appear linear when written up but the 
researcher intentionally sets out to develop an iterative relationship with the data; 
moving back and forth between different levels of the analysis of each case, and across 
cases and levels in the later stages, building familiarity with the text to ensure that the 
findings are grounded in the data.  
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5.10.1 Developing Themes from the First Case 
 
The manuscript was prepared for analysis by numbering each line and page of 
transcription, and by creating wide margins and a short line of central text. The transcript 
was closely read several times to develop as much familiarity as possible at this early 
stage, and the left hand margin of the transcript was used to document interesting or 
significant statements. Smith and Osborn (2008) have described this phase as close to 
a free textual analysis, there are no rules about what should be written down; it might be 
an interesting phrase, or linguistic device, a summary of a piece of text, a preliminary 
interpretation or initial thoughts. The researcher may comment upon similarities in the 
text, as well as contradictions and ambiguities.  
The second phase of the analysis involved re-reading the text several times and 
documenting emerging themes in the right hand margin. Concise phrases were used 
that tried to capture the essence of what was said, focusing on what seemed to be 
important. The themes are not definitive at this stage, but should be at a higher level of 
abstraction than the impressions written in the left hand margin (Smith and Osborn, 
2008).  
The third stage of analysis involved collating all the potential themes from the right hand 
margin in chronological order as they emerged in the original transcript. Connections 
were identified across themes and similar themes were clustered together (subordinate 
themes). Superordinate themes which best captured the subordinate themes and the 
most strongly emerging experiences were finally developed and identified. In 
accordance with Smith and Osborn (2008) themes were based on their ability to 
illuminate the experience rather than on their frequency or prevalence within the data. 
Each subordinate theme was tagged to demonstrate where the theme could be found in 
the account therefore maintaining the link between the data and the analysis. In this 
way, the researcher was constantly checking the interpretation with the raw material of 
the transcript, making sure that the sense making of the researcher was grounded in 
what the participant actually said. Primacy throughout remained with the data.  
Consonant with the commitment to an idiographic approach, the final stage of the 
analysis involved the translation of the themes into a narrative account, using verbatim 
extracts to trace and support the analytic process. By remaining faithful to the individual, 
the final narrative account should stand alone. Subsequent analyses from different 
participants about the same phenomenon should not be artificially manufactured to align 
with the perspectives or experiences of other participants or to fit a particular formula for 
analysis that worked with a previous account. In this way, the researcher upholds the 
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commitment in the idiographic approach, to speak of individual existence rather than 
incidence, and to look for similarities as well as differences in individuals’ experiences 
(Smith et al 2009; Smith, 1999; Smith et al. 1995).  
The narrative account should realise the hermeneutic stance taken in IPA studies. The 
empathetic hermeneutic is concerned with identifying with or developing a sensitive 
understanding of the character and nature of the experience. The aim here is to 
describe the participant’s world, to convey what the experience is like; the emic position. 
This interpretation is followed by a more critical stance, the questioning hermeneutic, 
where the researcher probes the text, looking for hidden meaning, unintentional 
commentary and motivations; the etic position (Reid et al. 2005; Larkin et al. 2006). The 
interpretations made in this stage of the analysis are ones that participants are unlikely 
to have foreseen or acknowledged themselves (Smith and Osborn, 2008).  
An example of the process described above is presented in Appendix J. It demonstrates 
how the analysis was undertaken and illustrates the development of the superordinate 
themes for one participant, Jim, and how these were incorporated, albeit, in a slightly 
different format, into the overall master super-ordinate themes for this study. 
 
5.10.2 Continuing the Analysis with Other Cases 
 
In keeping with the commitment to the idiographic stance of IPA, each individual 
transcript was analysed in the same way before moving on to examine the next case. 
Smith and Osborn (2003) suggested that subsequent cases could be analysed using the 
themes of the first case as a guide or by analysing each case from scratch. More recent 
work has however articulated a stronger commitment to an idiographic approach (e.g. 
Smith et al. 2009), therefore in this study each case was analysed afresh. Emerging 
themes from each case were not explicitly referred to during the analysis of each 
subsequent case. However, the researcher was unlikely to be able to fully disregard the 
findings of previous analyses, and in accordance with Smith et al (2009) an attempt was 
made to set aside the impressions that had emerged from the previous case(s). Early 
difficulties with this process (for example the researcher’s strong preconceptions about 
the relative unimportance of participants’ accounts of their symptoms) are described in 
more depth in chapter 6 (The Embodied Experience of Living with Progressive 
Cerebellar Ataxia). However, new topics emerged by preserving an attitude of openness 
and by paying careful attention to each transcript in its own right.  
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5.10.3 Analysis of the Joint Interview 
 
Whilst paired interviewing is uncommon in IPA, it is not unique to this study (see 
Macleod et al. (2002) and McIntyre and Reynolds (2012) as examples where more than 
one participant was interviewed at a time). Conducting an interview with two people 
simultaneously obviously creates a socially complex situation that requires skilful 
facilitation by the researcher (Smith et al. 2009). The joint interview in the present study 
occurred in response to Graham’s and Scott’s preference to be interviewed with another 
person living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia. The joint interview was undertaken 
just over halfway through the data collection period.  
During data collection the researcher took care to ensure, if it did not happen naturally, 
that each participant had the opportunity to offer their views. For example comments 
such as ‘How about you Graham?’ and ‘Graham you’re nodding there?’ helped bring in 
the other participant if one of them had been dominant for a while. On the whole, 
though, the participants developed a conversational style that required only limited input 
from the researcher, for example Scott continued the thread developed by Graham; ‘I 
could say that I find similar’, or Graham provided his own example of a topic raised by 
Scott; ‘Yeah, I’d agree with that’. The two participants were also not afraid to disagree; 
for example Graham clearly stated how his symptoms differed from Scott’s. In response 
to a direct question about whether Graham had a similar experience he said ‘Not really. I 
don’t’ and then continued to explain how his experiences differed.  
Data analysis for this interview proceeded in a similar way to that undertaken with the 
other participants. In keeping with the commitment to understanding the unique 
perspectives of the participants, each account was analysed individually, focussing 
primarily on the intrapersonal data rather than the interpersonal data. Subordinate and 
superordinate themes were separately developed for each of these two participants. 
However, with reference to Smith (2004), the accounts were analysed a second time to 
look at how the two participants interacted and whether this influenced the data. This 
analysis demonstrated that interactions between the two participants helped to amplify 
or develop ideas, and there were a few occasions where the participants engaged in 
collaborative sense-making (e.g. Graham: ‘That’s it! Yeah, that’s good,’ in response to 
an elaborate example provided by Scott).  
 
5.10.4 Cross-Case Analysis 
 
Unlike the case-by-case analysis, the cross-case analysis involved overt referral to all 
cases looking for differences as well as similarities, identifying patterns, re-working and 
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renaming themes as a deeper understanding of the data developed (Smith et al. 2009). 
In practice, this involved drawing on the narrative summaries, the lists of subthemes and 
superordinate themes for each participant, as well as revisiting the original transcripts 
and identifying the richest and most illuminating quotations to support the development 
of super-ordinate themes for the whole group. Five final or master super-ordinate 
themes were developed and these represented the key emerging themes for the corpus. 
These master themes are presented in Table 5.2 (pp. 105). Subthemes are nested in 
each super-ordinate theme. The master super-ordinate themes are presented here to 
give an overarching perspective on the findings.  
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Table 5.2 Final Super-ordinate Themes and Subthemes 
Theme Super-ordinate Theme Description Subthemes Description 
1 
‘I was like a pinball, I 
was bounced off this 
wall, went to that wall’ 
(Toby) 
The embodied experience of 
living with progressive 
cerebellar ataxia 
‘Everything is uncoordinated’ (Bill) Disrupted embodiment 
‘It’s like you’re trying to avoid hitting them but 
you’re actually going towards them’ (Scott) 
Disrupted embodiment: agency and 
cognition 
‘It just takes that much out of you physically 
and mentally, just totally shot’ (Toby) 
Fatigue and cognitive overload: 
disturbing consequences of disrupted 
embodiment 
2 
‘I don’t want to seem 
handicapped in any 
way’ (Stella) 
Identity, stigma and disrupted 
embodiment in public spaces 
and places 
‘I won’t do things that might cause offence’ 
(Julia) 
Unwilling focus on stigmatising forces 
‘I wouldn’t go outside […] with a stick’ (Stella) Rejection of stigma symbols 
‘I’m being put to one side really’ (Hugh) The discrediting world of work 
‘[He] holds me by the scruff of the collar’ 
(Julia) 
Family who stereotype/judge 
3 
‘The cerebellum should 
be a tight cauliflower 
and mine was two sticks 
of celery’ (Julia) 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a 
complex juxtaposition 
‘I go and see the neurologist and I get 
another adjective, but I don’t actually get a 
definitive answer’ (Graham) 
Making sense of ataxia through a 
medicalised lens 
‘I think my brother’s got it’ (Hugh) Ataxia in the family 
4 
‘Whenever it gives you 
a problem find a way 
round it, or fix it, you 
know’ (Harry) 
Wresting control in the face of 
uncertain and changing forces 
‘You’re not on your own’ (Scott) Seeking out information and drawing 
support from informed others 
‘Focus on what you can do, not what you 
can’t do’ (Toby) 
Taking a stand: personal philosophies 
for living with ataxia 
‘When I do something, I do it in bite size’ 
(Scott) 
Finding ways to preserve valued roles 
and interests 
5 
‘It makes me feel better 
that I’m actually doing 
something’ (Ted) 
Exercise: a multifaceted 
contributor to managing life 
with ataxia 
‘it does make you feel good and you’ve got 
an awful lot of control over things’ (Scott) 
Exercise as a means of seeking control 
and sustaining a positive sense of self 
‘You get about 6 weeks and then you’re 
discharged and sent home to do your 
exercises on your own’ (Stella) 
Physiotherapy – at times overly one-
dimensional and inexpertly focussed 
on the impaired body  
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Recurrence across cases was measured in keeping with good IPA practice for larger 
samples (Smith et al. 2009). Each of the five super-ordinate themes was present in at least 8 
of the 12 accounts; this was considered sufficient to classify each theme as recurrent 
(presented in Table 5.3, pp. 107). 
At this stage it was considered that the most important elements of each participant’s 
account had been captured and organised and although there are no formal means of 
measuring or identifying when an analysis is good enough or complete (Smith et al. 2009), it 
felt as if a coherent and in-depth analysis of the lived experience of progressive cerebellar 
ataxia had been elucidated for this group of participants. Therefore a final interpretative 
narrative was written using extended quotations from participants to introduce, analyse and 
discuss each master theme. Although these are the common themes, unique experiences 
(supported by direct quotations) are discussed in-depth in the narrative account of each 
master theme. Consistent with IPA (Smith et al. 2009) and qualitative analysis and writing 
more generally (Dickie, 2003) data analysis and interpretation continued even at this late 
stage. Each of the five super-ordinate themes is presented in detail in the following chapters 
and discussed with reference to the extant literature. Although this is perhaps uncommon (to 
present the findings and discuss them with reference to the literature in the same chapter) it 
is not unheard of and it is not considered inappropriate for IPA research as long as the 
idiographic orientation is followed, and the findings and the discussion are grounded in 
participants’ accounts (Smith et al. 2009). 
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Table 5.3 Indication of Prevalence for Each Participant for Each Super-ordinate Theme and Associated Sub-themes 
Participant 
Super-ordinate Theme 
1 Embodiment (n=12) 
Super-ordinate Theme 
2 Stigma (n=8) 
Super-ordinate Theme 3 
Biomedicine (n=12) 
Super-ordinate Theme 4 
Control (n=11) 
Super-ordinate Theme 5 
Exercise (n=12) 
Total 
Subthemes (3) Subthemes (4) Subthemes (2) Subthemes (3) Subthemes (2) n=14 
Bill 
      
              8 
Stella 
      
              9 
Harry 
      
              12 
Ted 
      
              4 
Scott 
      
              10 
Toby 
      
              10 
Graham 
      
              10 
Julia 
      
              11 
Joan 
      
              8 
Jim 
      
              9 
Susan 
      
              11 
Hugh 
      
              9 
 108 
 
5.11 Judging the Rigour and Quality of IPA  
 
Data analysis in IPA attends to an underlying method but is shaped by the interpretative 
work carried out by the researcher at each stage (Smith and Osborn, 2008). The data 
presented should support the claims made by the researcher but it is unlikely that an 
independent analyst would identify exactly the same themes in exactly the same way. 
Working from a Heideggerian perspective, phenomenologists understand that different 
analysts would interpret a particular phenomenon using personal contexts and 
experiences and therefore the emphases and precise articulations of the findings would 
differ (Finlay, 2002).  
As noted in chapter 3 (Literature Review) there are many ways to judge the quality of 
qualitative research and the debate continues about which terms to use to describe 
quality, what constitutes quality and how it should be evaluated (see for example Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985; Elliott et al. 1999; Spencer et al. 2003; Dixon-Woods et al. 2004; 
Yardley, 2000; 2008 and Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Although the debate is on-going, 
some sort of consensus seems to have been reached about how qualitative health 
research should be judged. The thrust of the argument is marked by a move away from 
advocating simplistic tick box approaches which are incapable of capturing the 
complexity of much qualitative work (Spencer et al. 2003), and in themselves do little to 
guarantee rigour (Barbour, 2001). Constructs traditionally allied to quantitative research 
that are less meaningful in the qualitative paradigm, such as objectivity, reliability, 
validity and representative samples, have on the whole been replaced, or at least 
refashioned, by quality indicators that are more consistent with the philosophical 
constructs underpinning qualitative inquiry (see for example Yardley, 2000; Spencer et 
al. 2003; Madill et al. 2000). Furthermore, these criteria seem to be best judged in a 
process oriented rather than an outcome oriented way (Morse et al. 2002; Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009). Yardley’s (2000, 2008) four key dimensions for evaluating qualitative 
health research seem to capture the majority of what is considered important in judging 
the quality of qualitative research. These quality dimensions are; sensitivity to context, 
commitment and rigour, transparency and coherence, and impact and importance. 
Smith’s (2011a, b) IPA-specific criteria are appropriate for judging the particular qualities 
or flaws of the present study. It is the principles derived from both Yardley (2000, 2008) 
and Smith (2011a, b) that have been attended to in this study. The extent to which these 
principles have been upheld is discussed in chapter 11 (Discussion). 
 
 
 
 109 
 
5.12 Summary 
 
This chapter presented an overview of the procedures undertaken in order to answer the 
research questions. In an effort to be as transparent as possible the data analysis 
process was explained in detail and, with reference to appendices, the process of 
analysis from raw data to fully worked-up master super-ordinate themes was 
demonstrated. Each of the following chapters (6-10) present and discuss the five master 
super-ordinate themes which constitute the main findings for this study.  
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Chapter 6  
 
Super-ordinate Theme 1 
 
‘I was like a pinball, I was bounced off this wall, went to that wall’ (Toby) 
 
Description: The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar ataxia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Unlike much phenomenological research where the body is absent (Habermann, 1996; 
Finlay, 2006), the bodily experience of living with ataxia claimed prominence in this 
study. The phenomenological perspective afforded a person-centred view of 
embodiment not usually admitted by a traditional biomedical orientation. Participants’ 
accounts revealed novel and richly textured ways of understanding ataxia as an 
embodied phenomenon. The body was an insistent presence in participants’ accounts of 
their everyday lives and, rather than being ‘swallowed up’ in the execution of tasks and 
postures (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:115), their bodies took on a new significance, 
becoming contingent in all the participants’ activities and projects. This theme offers a 
detailed account of the bodily experience of living with ataxia and the meaning this held 
for participants in this study. 
Data analysis was not a straight forward process. Initially, the analysis was informed 
entirely from the perspective of the physiotherapist-researcher. The data discussed in 
this theme were at first dismissed as “not phenomenological” and stored in a file labelled 
“symptoms”. The researcher unintentionally analysed the data through a 
physiotherapist’s lens and in doing so perhaps demonstrated the difficulty, particularly 
for a novice researcher in this field, to prioritise and foreground participants’ 
perspectives over and above those of the researcher. At the time, (i.e. during the initial 
processes of the analysis) it seemed entirely appropriate to decontextualise participants’ 
accounts, even going so far as to classify “symptoms” under familiar biomedical 
subheadings such as dysarthria, dysynergia and dysmetria.  
A small insight, the indescribable experience of living with ataxia, seemed to offer a way 
into the data which led to the development of more informed hermeneutic questions as 
the analysis progressed. Participants seemed to find it difficult to communicate and 
frame their experiences in ways that could be easily understood by others. Careful and 
repeated readings of the text provoked a reappraisal of the preliminary analysis and 
drew the researcher’s attention to the abundant use of figurative language embedded in 
participants’ accounts. Metaphors and similes seemed to help participants articulate 
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particular aspects of their experiences that seemed difficult to put into words and worked 
to draw the researcher into the participants’ world. Visualising and exploring participants’ 
descriptions through movement enabled the researcher to engage more deeply with the 
text. Previously taken-for-granted assumptions about “symptoms” began to be seen in a 
new way and, by dwelling in the data, it became possible to re-imagine ataxia within the 
context of the participants’ embodied lived experience.  
Radley (1993) argued that metaphors work not only through direct comparison of how 
one thing is similar to another, but also (and this is what helped push the analysis of this 
data to a deeper, more hermeneutic level), through illustrating how ‘one aspect of the 
experience is invigorated by another’ (Radley, 1993:112, emphasis added). Toby, for 
example, by comparing the way he moved to the near random trajectory of the ball in a 
pinball machine, concisely and powerfully expressed the loss of agency he experienced 
as part of living with ataxia. The pinball reference pushed the researcher away from 
understanding Toby’s chaotic movement as another example of disordered walking, and 
towards a deeper analysis that came closer to a more critical understanding of the 
impact of disordered walking on Toby’s sense of self.    
Extracts from all participants are discussed and presented in this theme. Some extracts 
are discussed in more detail (e.g. Bill, Toby and Stella) and were selected because they 
were particularly powerful and articulate expressions of the theme, but extracts from the 
accounts of the other participants have also been used to illustrate the extent of the 
shared experience. This theme is divided into three sub-themes. The first is concerned 
with disrupted embodiment. The second discusses the impact this had on participants’ 
sense of agency and cognition, and the third focusses on fatigue and cognitive overload. 
 
6.2 Disrupted Embodiment: ‘Everything is uncoordinated’ (Bill) 
 
Starting with Bill, he was asked to talk about what living with ataxia was like: 
 
‘It’s like kind of everything is uncoordinated. The frustration of a thing making perfect 
sense when you say it in your head, but by the time it emerges from your mouth it’s kind 
of clumsy and awkward and … the same with moving about. It’s awkward, ungainly and 
painful and … you can’t do things quickly or arrogantly or whatever. Everything’s kind of 
thick, knobbly and ungainly, uncoordinated, clumsy and just … it’s almost like being 
drunk all the time, except you aren’t. […] I’ve kind of lived with it for a long time really, 
over 20 years. So it’s kind of difficult to think of what it was like not to have it. But the 
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other thing, when you see people kind of moving about you think ‘How do they do that, 
isn’t that clever’. You know stand up and you don’t fall over and you move.’  
 
An empathic reading of this extract suggested, at first, that ataxia was experienced as 
primarily a physical phenomenon. Bill’s account highlighted well known impairments 
associated with ataxia: uncoordinated movement; ‘almost like being drunk all the time’ 
and dysarthria; ‘by the time it emerges from your mouth it’s kind of clumsy and 
awkward’. The pauses in Bill’s account seemed to signal his difficulty in explaining what 
it was like to live with this complex condition. In the end he seemed to run out of words, 
the use of ‘just …’ emphasised his struggle to explain. Finally he resorted to a “catch-all” 
description ‘almost like being drunk all the time’ which fails to fully account for his 
experiences; ‘except you aren’t’. The majority of participants (seven) used this phrase or 
similar at some point in their account to describe problems with balance, coordination 
and / or speech (Table 6.1). The phrase could be simply understood as a convenient 
short hand to describe symptoms that are almost beyond ordinary experience in a way 
that is familiar to others. However, the pause in Bill’s account may also signal a 
reluctance to describe himself in these terms because of the discrediting undertones 
associated with being drunk. 
Table 6.1 Disrupted Embodiment: ‘Like being drunk’ (n = 7) 
 
 
Participant 
 
Extract Page: line number 
Ted ‘Basically I feel like half-drunk most of the time’ 1:16 
Harry 
‘It’s like being drunk all the time with no cause for being 
drunk’ 
2:4 
Bill ‘It’s almost like being drunk all the time, except you aren’t’ 4:34 
Toby ‘It’s like being permanently drunk’  7:15 
Jim ‘You look like you’re drunk’  14:12 
Julia ‘I look and sound drunk’ 10:9 
Graham ‘Looks like I’m completely drunk obviously’ 7:31 
 
Staying with Bill and the phenomenological description, the above extract seemed to 
suggest that he had lost the sense of his comfortably familiar body; ‘It’s awkward, 
ungainly and painful’, ‘thick, knobbly’. Bill no longer moved or experienced his body as 
he once did. Picturing Bill, it seemed that his speech as well as his movement were 
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somewhat inept. He lacked fluency (‘awkward, ungainly’) and finesse (‘thick, knobbly’). 
Stella also seemed to experience something similar:  
 
‘I don’t flow as normal people do, you know. There’s a hesitancy there and when I’m 
going off the pavement I sort of make a big effort about it’.  
 
Although this extract depicts a certain tentativeness that is absent from Bill’s account, 
Stella’s ‘big effort’ and her disrupted ‘flow’ seem to echo Bill’s sense of clumsiness and 
loss of arrogance. Both accounts hinted regretfully towards a time when moving about 
was effortless and unremarkable, and spoke of a once natural poise and bodily bearing 
that had been profoundly disturbed. For Bill and Stella, the experience of living with 
cerebellar ataxia seemed to have challenged what they had previously, perhaps 
subconsciously, understood about their body and its interaction with the world.  
There was also a suggestion in these extracts of a loss of rapport between Bill and 
Stella and their surroundings; the world seemed to pose troubling obstacles that had to 
be carefully negotiated. Bill found his interactions in the world clumsy and awkward, and 
Stella rather than focussing on the activity that entailed getting off the kerb (e.g. going to 
the bank), had to think about coping with the kerb itself as a thing to be safely 
manoeuvred. The catch-all phrase ‘like being drunk’ might therefore not only portray the 
way in which Bill’s and Stella’s natural poise and bearing was disturbed by ataxia, but 
might also capture the way in which the environment seemed to assail rather than 
accommodate their intentional projects.  
For Bill in particular, there was an impression in his narrative that the physical 
experience of ataxia was of existential moment, it was ‘looming large’; what was once 
taken for granted is now problematic and occupies his attention. His once dependable 
body now betrays and constrains him and this robs him of certain existential 
possibilities. Bill compared himself and his own ‘clumsy and awkward’ attempts at 
moving with the ease at which the people around him seemed to move. He watched 
other people in wonder; ‘when you see people kind of moving about you think ‘How do 
they do that, isn’t that clever’’. His words resonate strongly with those of Toombs when 
describing her experiences of living with multiple sclerosis (1995:16):  
 
 
 
 
‘I now perceive normal movement to be an extraordinary achievement. I catch 
myself watching students running across campus, or colleagues taking the stairs 
two-at-a-time, and I marvel at their effortless ability to do so.’ 
 
 114 
 
With reference to Merleau-Ponty (1962 [1945]), Toombs (1995:16) explained this 
phenomenon in terms of an inability to ‘re-imagine’ walking, and suggested that it 
signalled a long term transformation of bodily intentionality. According to Merleau-Ponty 
(1964:117), we understand what we have the potential to do by observing other people, 
because ‘they are themes of possible activity for my own body’. Through comparison of 
herself with others, Toombs understood that her legs were ‘no longer open to the 
possibility’ of walking (1995:16). It seemed for Bill, as someone who walked by using a 
walking frame indoors and who used a wheelchair outside, that the possibility of walking 
was also closed off for him, the effortless action of others reminded him of what he no 
longer had the potential to do. Bill had lived with ataxia for many years and he was living 
with a comparable degree of physical limitation to that described by Toombs in her 
account. There was also a small hint of this phenomenon (i.e. comparing oneself with 
the effortless action of others) in Stella’s account where she referred to not being able to 
‘flow’ as ‘normal people do’.  
All the other participants (ten) talked about a qualitative change in their corporeal selves 
that resonated with Bill and Stella’s experiences (Table 6.2 pp.115). These accounts 
spoke of an altered body that, like Bill’s ‘thick’ and ‘knobbly’, perhaps signalled a change 
in the way the participants understood and identified with their body. The participants 
focussed on particular body parts which felt odd or distorted (Harry’s ‘rusty’ hands, 
Stella’s ‘lead’ legs and Toby’s ‘jelly’ like knees). Joan and Susan described a sort of 
rigidity or stiffness which made them feel like a ‘tin man’, ‘tin soldier’ or ‘matchstick man’. 
Toby explained that he felt ‘wide at the top like a pivot’, and like ‘the top half wasn’t 
connected to the bottom half’. In addition to the distorted shape, the reference to a pivot 
brings with it an impression of instability, as well as images of spinning and loss of 
control. For Toby the sense of bodily distortion was so profound that when he saw his 
physiotherapist he asked; ‘can you give me something to do that’ll tie my middle up?’ 
Julia also described a disconcerting experience; ‘my head was a fishbowl with the water 
slopping’. Again, there is the impression of loss of control; the water was spilling over 
the edge of the bowl, but also a disturbing sense of bodily transformation; Julia’s head 
had become a fishbowl.  
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Table 6.2 Qualitative Changes to the Corporeal Self (n = 12) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Toby ‘Felt like my top half wasn’t connected to my bottom half; felt like jelly’ 5:19 
Joan ‘Like a tin soldier; the top doesn’t belong to the bottom’     Post interview note 
Stella ‘This inability to walk straight and confidently’ 9:3 
Susan ‘You just sort of feel like a match stick man or tin man’  11:29 
Bill ‘Everything’s kind of thick, knobbly and ungainly’ 4:32 
Hugh ‘Like Bambi, couldn’t balance’ 1:25 
Ted ‘You feel that you’re going to fall over’ 1:33 
Julia ‘My head was a fish bowl with the water slopping’ 14:18 
Graham ‘I shake so much’ 11:23 
Scott ‘My balance completely being disrupted’ 2:6 
Jim  
‘The biggest thing day to day is just balance and coordination, in that 
basically I’ve got none’ 
14:5 
Harry ‘They [hips and hands] feel rusty’ 14:3 
 
 
Despite the unsettling and peculiar experiences described here, there was still a sense 
of body ownership in these accounts. The participants’ bodies were experienced as 
different from their pre-ataxia selves; they were remarked upon and attended to 
however, the body still belonged to the participants albeit in a less familiar form. For Bill, 
however, it seemed in his experience of ataxia that nothing was untouched: ‘everything’s 
kind of thick, knobbly and ungainly, uncoordinated, clumsy’ (emphasis added). Bill might 
have been referring not only to his corporeal self here but also to his interactions in the 
world – all of his projects and plans had been disturbed and disrupted. This may reflect 
the length of time Bill had lived with ataxia and the extent of his disability.  
At first the majority of participants (nine) found these changes to their normally taken for 
granted body quite baffling (Table 6.3 pp.116). The sense of bodily disorder and 
decomposition of movement felt strange and inexplicable; symptoms seemed to come 
out of the blue, ‘for no apparent reason’ (Joan and Jim) which seemed either 
unaccountable, ‘I thought I was going mad’ (Julia, and also Bill) or were attributed, at 
least at first, to something else; ‘I thought it was to do with my feet’ (Susan). Most 
participants spoke about the unsettling experience of not being in full control of their 
actions with respect to their early experiences of ataxia. This is perhaps understandable 
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in that their new way of moving and being, even if they experienced only “mild” 
symptoms, would signify a considerable and enduring departure from what they had 
previously understood about their “normal” embodied activity.  
 
Table 6.3 Bodily Disruptions: Strange and Inexplicable (n = 9) 
 
Participant Extract Page: line number 
Julia ‘I really thought I was going mad’ 14:21 
Bill ‘What a relief […] It’s not madness’ 12:36 
Stella ‘I thought well that’s strange!’ 9:27 
Joan ‘My legs just gave way for no apparent reason whatsoever’ 5:16 
Hugh ‘My balance was gone!’ 2:17 
Toby ‘Really strange’ 8:16 
Jim ‘I’d just fall down for no apparent reason’ 12:32 
Susan ‘I thought it was to do with my feet’ 4:23 
Scott ‘It’s quite strange’ 7:39 
 
Over time, and following on from these initially quite bewildering experiences, it seemed 
that the participants learned to incorporate and manage their somewhat uncooperative 
and burdensome bodies within a process of on-going adjustment. This was perhaps 
exemplified by Harry, who had the most experience of adapting to life with ataxia; ‘You 
evolve, you evolve to suit where you’re at.’ However, even Ted, who had only been 
diagnosed for just over a year talked about learning to accommodate his unpredictable 
and unstable body; 
 
‘It’s still quite variable but generally I […] ensure I’ve got my balance, rather than trying 
to do everything at one go […] so you break down tasks and so you’re slower in doing 
tasks.’ 
 
Whilst Ted’s example might seem to simply describe a common sense approach to 
coping with this newly unbalanced and uncoordinated self, all participants spoke in 
similar terms, of learning to live with their changing bodies (Table 6.4 pp.117). 
Importantly, it seemed that although the way they lived with their body had changed, and 
for some it was radically different from what they had previously known, their bodies still 
belonged to them. There was no sense in these accounts of bodily rejection or alienation 
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common to other accounts of the lived experience of similar neurological conditions (for 
example Toombs, 1993; Finlay, 2003b; Bramley and Eatough, 2005). The body, 
although strange and unpredictable, was still their ‘vehicle for being in the world’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:94) and as such, and although often by extraordinary 
means, it had to be accommodated and managed in order to accomplish the wide range 
of activities and projects of interest to the participants.  
 
Table 6.4 Accommodating a Changed Corporeal Self (n = 12) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Joan ‘I’m learning to manage it better’ 3:29 
Harry ‘Whenever it gives you a problem find a way round it’ 3:8 
Susan ‘It’s just a matter of steadying myself and not going too fast’ 2:9 
Stella ‘I can lose my footing very easily. So I’ve just got to pace myself’ 13:2 
Hugh 
‘I cut the grass […] by holding onto the lawn mower […] sort of like 
I know where the ground is, sort of acts like a counterbalance’ 
10:32 
Ted ‘I do find that holding onto a pram does aid with my walking’ 8:22 
Scott 
‘Always make sure there’s three points of contact anywhere 
around so I’m not going to go flying too fast’ 
9:8 
Bill 
‘When you do move, go and gather lots of things, to do three jobs 
at once’ 
6:4 
Julia 
‘I’ve had to learn to slow down. […] I try not to do things 
impetuously’ 
1:35 
Toby 
‘Stand for maybe 30 seconds to let my muscles take the weight of 
my body and then go’ 
10:34 
Jim 
‘[Loss of balance] is something you can manage and something 
you can live with’ 
14:7 
Graham 
‘What I’m learning, if you like, is what I can do, what I need to do 
to try and stop me […] hurting myself or other people’ 
8:16 
 
In summary, Bill’s and Stella’s accounts and the accompanying extracts from other 
participants began to convey the way in which bodily identity, this sense of having a 
physical self that is proper to one’s self and characteristically one’s own, might be 
disrupted by the experiential consequences of living with ataxia. The participants’ bodies 
certainly did not feel quite right and lacked the easy and skilful interaction with the world 
that, under normal circumstances, is taken for granted. However, there was no sense in 
these accounts that the body was ever anything other than “me”, a different sort of “me” 
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perhaps but nonetheless still owned and belonging to the participants. This next section 
further explores the phenomenon of identity and ownership of the body in ataxia with 
particular reference to the participants’ sense of agency and cognition. 
   
6.3 Disrupted Embodiment: Agency and Cognition 
 
Like Bill and Stella, the majority of participants (eight) described an effortful and 
uncoordinated way of moving that seemed to disrupt their sense of being the agent of 
their own actions (Table 6.5 pp. 119). Hugh and Joan for example both talked of 
‘staggering’ and ‘lurching’ around, Graham described trying to avoid someone but 
ultimately overbalancing and giving them a ‘bump’ and likewise Julia described herself 
as ‘unpredictable’. Scott recounted the following common occurrence which perhaps 
best captured this phenomenon:  
‘When I’m walking towards people along a footpath and they’re walking towards me but 
are obviously not going to hit me, I find subconsciously I go towards them. I don’t know 
why. It’s like you’re trying to avoid hitting them but you’re actually going towards them.’ 
Here, it seems clear that Scott has a sense of ownership of his actions (he is the one 
moving and he is the author of his own movement) but he described a diminished sense 
of agency; he does not have a strong sense of being in control and he finds it difficult to 
understand or explain (‘I don’t know why’). The usual correspondence between intention 
and action seemed to have become unhinged in this example and this was echoed in 
other accounts (‘lurching’, ‘staggering’, ‘unpredictable’). Put differently, Scott found that 
conscious effort (willing his body to avoid bumping into other pedestrians) was an 
inadequate substitute for loss of bodily control; ‘subconsciously I go towards them’. A 
straightforward activity usually involving little conscious attention seemed to have been 
transformed into a challenging ordeal. Similar to Bill and Stella, Scott’s relationship with 
his surrounding environment has also perhaps changed; the coherence that usually 
typifies the relationship between a person and their environment seemed to be breaking 
down. Scott had started to see the world as a real threat to his intentional actions and 
projects, and spoke of weighing up whether or not to do certain activities in light of the 
perceived threat (‘you’re assessing things which you can do or are going to be not so 
good for you’), in Graham’s words, to find out whether activities lie in his ‘comfort zone’ 
or not.  
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Table 6.5 Disrupted Sense of Agency (n = 8) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Joan 
‘My upper and lower body do not seem connected at all […] I’m 
lurching around’ 
2:41 
Harry 
‘You’ve got to say in your mind ‘stop at that point, stop at that’ if 
you leave it to your automatic stuff it would be […] you know’ 
9:23 
Susan 
‘You don’t know where you’re going to put your foot down and you 
need concentration’ 
3:15 
Stella ‘You can easily sort of veer to the side and bump into things’ 9:4 
Graham 
‘If I consciously have to step over […] I tend to go sort of too far or 
not quite far enough’ 
8:36 
Scott 
‘Consciously always trying to assess your feet, that you’re not 
going to trip or kick into something’ 
9:14 
Julia ‘My mind will but my hands won’t’ 7:5 
Toby ‘You’re trying to stop your body going this way and that way’  7:24 
 
Toby’s description of his visual and balance impairments provided a further illustrative 
example of this loss of agency and altered relationship with the immediate environment. 
In this first extract, Toby recounts the following vivid experience: (there is also a hint of a 
stigma issue here which is discussed in detail in chapter 7) 
   
‘And I could not … particularly if people were behind me, walking behind me, that tends 
to make me worse … but I was like a pinball, I was bounced off this wall, went to that 
wall, I could not walk in a straight line down that corridor […] Really strange.’ 
 
In this next extract Toby tried to explain what it was like to have his particular visual 
impairment: 
 
‘It does effect your eyesight when you’re walking … I’ve said this to somebody before … 
but you know a tank, say a Chieftain tank, you know the gun, they have the gyroscope 
so the tank can be going over all the terrain, you know up and down, but the gun stays 
constantly positioned on the target with the gyroscope, well that’s what it used to be like 
when I was walking, that my eyes, looking ahead, I could be walking over terrain that 
was up, down, uneven, whatever, but my eyes would stay like the gun, constantly level. 
[…] But now it’s like if you move over bumpy ground your eyes aren’t locked, so your 
eyes are all over the place, yeah?’ 
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A close reading of Toby’s account communicates firstly the sense of a body no longer 
fully under his control; the reference to the pinball is powerful here, signifying violent or 
turbulent changes in direction and a sense of disorder or powerlessness similar to 
Joan’s ‘haywire’ and balance going ‘crazy’, and Toby’s own description of feeling like a 
‘pivot’. The reference to the gyroscope and the Chieftain tank perhaps heightens the 
feeling of loss of control; something that was previously as dependable and as 
unassailable as a Chieftain tank, eyes locked and level, had now broken down, ‘eyes all 
over the place’.  
Taking the analysis a bit further, it seems that the repetition of ‘And I could not’, ‘I could 
not walk down that corridor’, reveals the cognitive effort involved in trying to navigate the 
corridor. It seems that despite his best attempts Toby was unable to bring his walking 
back under control, a phenomenon he described as, ‘Really strange’. This phrase not 
only recaptures the unfamiliar body previously evident in Bill’s and Stella’s account: this 
is not Toby, but also the unnerving experience of not completely being in control despite 
his best mental or intellectual efforts. The powerlessness of the mind over the body is 
reinforced here, as it was in Scott’s account (‘It’s like you’re trying to avoid hitting them 
but you’re actually going towards them’). It is therefore not surprising that dual tasking 
(e.g. walking and being aware of other pedestrians) is so difficult, an issue discussed in 
more depth later in this chapter.  
Pushing the interpretation further and with reference to the cognitive effort, Toby’s 
account could perhaps support Kirmayer’s (1992:336) view that neurological dysfunction 
disrupts not only the ‘content’ of thought but also its ‘form’. For Toby walking has 
become something that he has to think about (new content), but it is also an unfamiliar 
type of thinking (new form); Toby has to construct and control his walking through 
cognitive effort and he has to think about how his body negotiates space. Later in his 
account Toby talked of having to 'physically tense your muscles up in your mind’ which 
best captures this new way of thinking and new way of producing movement and which 
was evident in over half of the participants’ accounts (Table 6.6 pp. 121). In the above 
example, Toby’s account would suggest that his natural way of being in the world had 
been transformed, walking is now “thought about walking”, and what he experiences is 
an artificial construction of walking built through conscious effort which would feel very 
strange.  
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Table 6.6 New Ways of Thinking, New Ways of Moving (n = 7) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Stella 
‘The brain comes into this a lot really. And if I can master this you 
know …’ 
6:1 
Harry ‘Teach your brain to take it over’ 9:29 
Susan 
‘The constant concentration of thinking where you’re going to put 
your foot and where that puts your balance’ 
3:18 
Hugh 
‘You’re concentrating so much on your walking, like you can’t 
enjoy your walk […] if you try to look to the side or look back you 
lose your balance and fall over’  
19:30 
Graham 
‘You’re desperate not to go to the left for example so you tend to 
overcompensate by going to the right, and that causes you know a 
different problem’ 
7:45 
Julia ‘My mind has to slow down to my body’s pace’ 1:35 
Toby ‘Physically tense up your muscles in your mind’ 7:25 
 
What also emerged in these accounts was the concept of space as “thought about 
space”. Bill, Stella and the majority of the participants already hinted at this phenomenon 
when they referred to ataxia as ‘like being drunk all the time’ (Harry), an experience that 
possibly pointed towards an understanding of the surrounding environment as 
hazardous, as something to be carefully negotiated. Toby’s account of the corridor and 
awareness of other features of the environment strengthen the claim that ataxia, in 
addition to bringing the body into consciousness also brings “lived space” into the realm 
of what is thought about when thinking about moving. Graham’s account lends further 
support to this claim. He was asked to talk about how ataxia had affected activities in his 
day to day life: 
‘Well just how you get around, how you actually interact with that at home. You tend to 
make compromises in what you were doing, so for example getting out of bed. You 
know how far the wall is all of a sudden because quite often you stand up and you start 
falling over. So you grab hold of the wall or fall back on the bed or things like that. So 
that’s part of what makes it a little bit difficult to go somewhere that’s new, cos you don’t 
know where you can put your hand down and that sort of thing. […] An office 
environment it’s fairly stable, you know, it doesn’t tend to move about very much, so 
that’s all right […] but crossing the shop floor is horrendous, so I don’t do that any more.’  
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In this extract Graham is acutely aware of the layout of space at home and at work. He 
has identified what for him are stable and unstable environments and steers clear of 
anything that is too unpredictable where he might put himself and others at risk. 
Visualising Graham at work and at home it seems as if he moves almost as if he is blind, 
groping for hand holds that will help him move safely through space, critically aware that 
any misstep could lead to a fall. There is a striking similarity here with Sack’s (1985) 
account of Christina, a woman with a rare and severe proprioceptive impairment which 
resulted in a type of sensory ataxia. She explained her lack of proprioception as follows: 
 
 ‘This ‘proprioception’ is like the eyes of the body, the way the body sees  
itself. And if it goes, as it’s gone with me, it’s like the body’s blind. My body  
can’t see if it’s lost its eyes, right?’ (Sacks, 1985:46 original emphasis) 
 
Graham spoke mostly about experiences that would suggest that he had significantly 
impaired proprioception and this is perhaps why there is such resonance between these 
two accounts. Graham described interacting with space as if he was blind, more 
accurately perhaps, as if his unpredictable body was sightless (‘I tend to go too far or not 
quite far enough’), and as a result space emerged as something that required an 
unusual amount of attention, as an entity to take account of and contend with in 
everyday life. 
These accounts lend support to the earlier understanding of ataxia as a phenomenon 
that disrupts the sense of self. Not only is there a diminished sense of having a body 
that is comfortably “me” but also, a sense of a body that can no longer be fully controlled 
by “me”. In this sense, the participants’ experiences revealed an ambiguous relationship 
between the mind and the body in ataxia. The accounts spoke of a heightened 
awareness of the body as a corporeal entity that operated in the world in new and 
somewhat extraordinary ways whilst still being “me”. At the same time, participants 
referred to the mind and consciousness as if it was something that might have power 
over the body but in their experience it was able to assume very little control. 
Furthermore, the emergence of the body brought with it the emergence of space as 
“thought about space”, an awareness of the environment as conditional, capable of 
derailing or at least constraining valued projects and tasks.  
So what seemed to surface in these accounts was not only a heightened awareness of 
the corporeal body but also an emergence of the conscious mind as a somewhat limited 
means of controlling the body. This loss of agency did not simply involve the body but 
also the way in which the body negotiated the environment. There was an awareness of 
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space as potentially hostile to participants’ on-going activities in the world and an 
understanding that negotiating even the most familiar of environments required an 
inordinate amount of attention. However, rather than rejecting the body it seems that the 
participants used what resources were available to them (effort, determination, re-
learning, re-thinking) to accommodate (make room for, as well as to adapt, adjust and 
assist) their body and, by doing so, continued to involve themselves in the world, as best 
they could. 
 
6.4 Fatigue and Cognitive Overload: Disturbing Consequences of Disrupted 
Embodiment 
Participants’ attempts to harness cognitive resources to try to achieve a sense of 
corporeal mastery were hugely effortful. The attentional demands which were required 
to help deal with this bodily disruption, having to concentrate ‘twice as hard’ on everyday 
tasks (Harry), were extremely fatiguing; 
‘That’s one thing, you lose your automatic bits … it’s fine if you teach your brain to take it 
over. But again, you’ll wear yourself out really quickly’ (Harry). 
Here, Harry clearly describes how he has lost the subconscious control of movement, 
his ‘automatic bits’. Harry has tried to train himself to consciously take control of what 
would normally be constituted subconsciously and automatically, but he is rapidly 
fatigued by the effort involved, limiting the extent to which he can pursue his projects 
and tasks; ‘You burn out quicker, have a small energy band.’  Similar feelings of 
overwhelming fatigue were recounted by the majority of participants (nine), see Table 
6.7 (pp. 124).  
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Table 6.7 Overwhelming Fatigue (n = 9) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Joan ‘Exhaustion beyond normal tiredness’ 5:8 
Harry ‘You burn out quicker, you have a small energy band’ 2:12 
Susan ‘I’m tired all the time it’s just a way of life’ 4:14 
Hugh 
‘I get very tired […] If I do a length or two [swimming] that’s me 
shattered’ 
12:8 
Ted 
‘When you’re tired you end up making problems […] it’s just a 
continual circle’ 
4:6 
Graham ‘If I’m tired one day, I’ll be tired for several days afterwards’ 2:28 
Julia 
‘I went to bed and almost for a day and a half […] because I knew 
I couldn’t go on at that rate’ 
8:19 
Scott ‘You are fairly knackered, you’re debilitated in various forms’ 5:19 
Toby 
‘It just takes that much out of you physically and mentally, just 
totally shot’ 
7:18 
 
 
Most participants, except Jim and Stella, spoke freely of their experiences of fatigue and 
offered extensive explanations of what this sort of fatigue was like, stressing a profound 
loss of energy; ‘It’s like extreme fatigue, yeah, not just tired’, ‘I liken it to a battery – I 
start going down’, ‘totally shot’ (Toby). However, in contrast to most participants, Jim 
and Stella only talked about fatigue when prompted by the researcher. Stella explained 
her fatigue in terms of ageing;  
‘I get tired now more than I used to when I was younger, but I think that’s the ageing 
thing really more than anything. If I have my granddaughter for more than a few hours 
that kills me. […] She’s very lively, you know, on the go all the time, oh dear me … and 
I’m glad to hand her back. But no, I wouldn’t say so, I wouldn’t say I tired very easily. I’ve 
got a lot of stamina really and I suppose it’s built up over the years.’  
This way of explaining her symptoms might be an attribution issue, a way of normalising. 
Stella was very fit and active previously (‘because I used to be so active I find it very 
hard’), she may find fatigue a slightly discrediting experience that is more acceptable to 
her framed within the normal tiredness of ageing and looking after grandchildren. 
However, she simply might not experience the same kind of fatigue as other 
participants. Similar issues were raised by Jim and Graham. Jim seemed to reluctantly 
acknowledge that his fatigue might be to do with ataxia but he preferred to frame it 
within the more normal bounds of overwork and a busy lifestyle: (as with Toby’s earlier 
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extract, there is also a hint of a stigma issue here which is discussed in detail in chapter 
7)   
‘But yeah, it’s difficult, you do feel tired. But part of you thinks well it’s work, it’s age … 
it’s everything else you’re trying to cope with. And trying to say yes I’ve got ataxia, that is 
a prime concern … or a prime cause … it’s difficult.’  
Graham also placed feeling ‘tired’ and ‘listless’ within a narrative of long hours working 
with computers and he was not sure whether this was ‘ordinary or whether that’s, you 
know, brought on by the ataxia’.  
There was certainly some unwillingness to admit the impact of fatigue in these three 
accounts. As with Stella, reframing might be a means of normalising, keeping what 
could be a significant and troubling symptom, something that could get worse, away 
from being associated with ataxia. Kept in the world of work and grandchildren fatigue is 
in a more manageable place, where in theory it could be controlled, for example if less 
time was spent at work or with the grandchildren. For the majority of participants 
however, fatigue was experienced as part and parcel of living with ataxia and was 
intertwined with trying to manage and attend to the associated physical symptoms; 
collectively these efforts formed the backdrop against which life had to be organised, 
adjusted and at times constrained.  
In addition to fatigue, two participants found that having to focus on tasks and activities 
that had previously been managed at an automatic level involved a heightened 
awareness of cognitive processes and fragile cognitive capacities. There were hints of 
this phenomenon in three other accounts (Table 6.8 pp. 127) but Julia and Toby 
perhaps captured the experience of cognitive overload most clearly. Firstly Toby:  
‘I don’t seem to be able to handle inputs … like when I go swimming I have to pick a 
relatively quiet time because I can’t handle all these audio inputs, visual inputs, trying to 
remember how many lengths I’ve done, trying to coordinate my hands and legs and 
breathing, and it’s just too much, it’s like the computer crashes, yeah?’ 
Having to concentrate on activities that would usually be managed subconsciously 
(breathing, coordinating arm and leg movements), Toby found that he was unable to 
screen out stimuli that would normally be on the periphery of his awareness. Audio and 
visual inputs somehow find their way into consciousness and distract Toby from his 
efforts to co-ordinate his swim stroke and remember the number of completed lengths. It 
seems that, for Toby, the cognitive effort required to manage previously automatic 
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activity has, at the same time, reduced his ability to filter out other, normally innocuous, 
stimuli. Both important and insignificant stimuli seem to draw his attention and eventually 
overwhelm him (‘the computer crashes’). Julia recounted a similar experience: 
‘… I guess one thing that I can’t plan is that sudden noises make me jump, and if I’m not 
in a position where I can hold onto something I will fall.  So if a car toots …’ 
For Julia, the meaning and significance of the sound of a car horn has changed. Instead 
of understanding it as a signal that something might be happening in the road, it now 
carries a direct and personal significance, meaning “Hold on!” or “Keep steady!” A car 
beeping its horn is sufficient to disrupt Julia’s ability to concentrate on staying upright. 
Although startling, it would be unusual to fall over on hearing a car horn, however, if 
Julia has all her attention trained on standing up then one additional input may do just 
enough, as with Toby, to draw her attention away from keeping her balance and cause 
her to fall.  
Julia’s account of the car horn suggested that carefully constructed physical 
competencies can, at any moment, be completely destroyed by the smallest distraction 
or oversight. For Julia this means that she has to carefully monitor even the most basic 
activities. In this next extract Julia talked about making a cup of tea:   
‘…if I make a drink I put the cup in the sink or on the draining board, because I don’t 
want hot things being loose. And I no longer do two things at once. My mind will but my 
hands won’t. […] So I have to not get frustrated but try and control what I am doing with 
my movements and things. Mentally instead of automatically.’ 
Julia perhaps best captures the hyper-vigilance that seems to accompany coping with 
ataxia in everyday life. She can no longer assume that her hands will automatically carry 
out her planned activity. Julia’s hands are now part of her conscious awareness and 
require her full attention, so much so that she is no longer able to manage doing more 
than one task at a time. There is also a hint here of the vigilance required not only in the 
execution of a task in real time but also the planning that needs to go on ahead of time, 
Julia continues: 
‘My mind has had to slow down to my body’s pace, that I now … I try not to do things 
impetuously, I try to stop before I turn, just plan ahead really’.  
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For Julia, routine tasks like washing up and crossing a room require her full attention 
and forward planning, even the sound of the door bell can disrupt her carefully 
rehearsed strategies. Like Toby, Julia describes a clear sense of awareness of cognitive 
process and the extent to which her cognitive capacity is limited by having to attend to 
her corporeal self.  
Table 6.8 Cognitive Overload (n = 5) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Hugh 
‘By concentrating on the stick you can’t think of two things. So 
you’re trying to walk at the same time […] you can’t do it’ 
11:13 
Hugh 
‘I can’t put a camera around my neck, the swaying … my brain’s 
reacting to it and I end up falling over’  
11:25 
Toby  
‘… particularly if people were behind me, walking behind me, that 
tends to make me worse’ 
8:10 
Susan 
‘I can’t think of doing things like carrying and walking at the same 
time’ 
7:3 
Julia 
‘It’s more and more activity and noise around me […] which I find 
tiring’  
8:9 
Scott 
‘When I’m walking towards people along a footpath and they’re 
walking towards me but are obviously not going to hit me, I find 
subconsciously I go towards them’ 
7:34 
 
 
In summary, this section points towards an understanding of ataxia as a phenomenon 
that changes the content and form of thought, perhaps exemplified by Harry’s attempt to 
‘teach your brain to take it over’ and Toby’s experience of having to 'physically tense 
your muscles up in your mind’. Living with ataxia seems to entail new ways of thinking; 
harnessing cognitive effort not simply to achieve some semblance of “normal” 
movement but also as a means of recovering a sense of self through reclaiming bodily 
agency. However, fatigue and cognitive overload also seem to be common and 
disruptive corollaries of this new and seemingly permanent shift in the participants’ way 
of thinking and being, and in themselves pose further challenges to contend with and 
manage.  
Concrete experience of the contingency of embodiment and the conditions that this 
particular ataxic embodiment placed on intentional activity seemed to not only project 
the body into consciousness but also to call attention to the mind as a possible resource 
for controlling the body. However, instead of the mind taking over from the body, 
participants described new ways of moving, doing and coping with the world in which the 
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mind and body worked together as optimally as possible. In this sense neither the mind 
nor the body had primacy; both were qualified by ataxia.  
 
6.5 Summary 
 
Participants’ accounts of the physical effects of ataxia were striking and provided a 
nuanced understanding of the embodied experience of living with ataxia. Bill’s account 
offered a way into understanding the experience of ataxia as more than just a collection 
of interacting physical impairments. A close examination of Bill’s and of the other 
participants’ accounts shed light on the phenomenon of ataxia and helped reveal the 
body-as-lived. For the majority of participants, the embodied experience of ataxia was 
one of a once familiar body that had become (to a greater or lesser extent) 
uncontrollable, unreliable and unpredictable. All participants were engaged in a process 
of trying to manage and accommodate their disordered body and, as part of this 
process, their body emerged into consciousness as something to be thought about and 
taken into account for even the smallest and most automatic of tasks. For most, unless 
carefully managed, this effort drained cognitive resources to the point of exhaustion and 
compromised participation in valued activities.  
An initial focus on the bodily experience of living with ataxia led to new ways of 
understanding participants’ symptoms and impairments but also, acting heuristically, 
provided a way into understanding other aspects of the participants’ lived experience 
that had been fundamentally altered through living with ataxia. Living with ataxia 
seemed to entail a heightened awareness of not only the body but also the production of 
movement, the mind and the immediate environment (kerbs, corridors, and people) that 
seemed very different from “normal” intentional activity. Bodily changes interacted with 
and modified the participants’ understanding of their bodily identity, and their 
understanding of lived space. These concepts; corporeality and spatiality, have been 
identified as fundamental structures of the lifeworld (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]; van 
Manen, 1998; Ashworth, 2003; Langdridge, 2007) and are common themes in 
phenomenological enquiry. Their presence in this analysis is therefore not unexpected 
but these themes emerged directly from the participants’ narratives and were not used a 
priori to direct or influence the analysis.  
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6.6 Discussion 
 
6.6.1 The Emergence of the Body in Ataxia 
The participants in this study seem to have lost the sense of their body as ‘experientially 
absent’ (Gallagher, 2005:147). Instead of body parts being known only through their role 
in intentional activity, peripheral to consciousness (e.g. legs for walking across a room, 
arms for reaching for a glass), body parts emerged into consciousness in a modified and 
disintegrated way (‘jelly’ like knees, ‘rusty’ hands, ‘lead’ legs, ‘eyes all over the place’); 
as out of shape (‘thick, knobbly’) and distorted (‘like a pivot’). The body was clearly 
identified in the participants’ accounts in corporeal form, often understood or described 
in terms of its instrumentality. Joan and Susan for example drew on mechanistic 
descriptions (‘match stick man’, ‘tin soldier’) which conveyed the body as object and in 
particular as machine. Joan also described herself in terms of a faulty machine: ‘I do find 
that I malfunction to a very large extent’, and there are obvious parallels here with 
Toby’s comparison to a Chieftain tank. So rather than being surpassed or silent (Sartre, 
2003 [1943]), the body, in these accounts, took on a new kind of presence and 
encroached upon conscious awareness. 
The participants’ accounts resonate with the perspectives of Gallagher (1986) and 
Toussaint (1976) who suggested that the body becomes object-like when it is 
encountered as an obstacle which frustrates one’s intentional projects: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under normal circumstances, intentionality and physical capability are in “lock-step”, the 
body is naturally and automatically invested in intentional activity without conscious 
awareness. According to Marcel (1951) disrupted embodiment, creates a gap between 
intention and action, and rather than instantaneously and skilfully fitting together, the 
harmonious arrangement between the body and intentionality breaks down and it is at 
this point, as it was for Joan and Toby and the majority of the participants in the study, 
that the instrumentality of the body emerges.  
This emergence of the body in consciousness is not unique to the lived experience of 
cerebellar ataxia, and has been described in the literature with reference to the lived 
‘On all such occasions when my body lacks the dexterity to execute my intentions, it 
gets in the way. When my body becomes an obstacle to overcome, rather than the 
smooth embodiment of my intentionality, we have an instance of what I prefer to 
call the phenomenon of the body or the body as object.’ (Toussaint, 1976:176)  
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experience of other neurological conditions such as sensory ataxia (Sacks, 1985; 
Gallagher, 2005); multiple sclerosis (Toombs, 1993; Finlay, 2003b); Parkinson’s disease 
(Habermann, 1996; Fox, 2003; Bramley and Eatough, 2005; Sunvisson et al. 2009) and 
brain injury (Howes et al. 2005). However, the way in which the body emerged in the 
accounts of participants in this study seemed to differ from some of the literature cited 
above and in other published work concerned with understanding human embodiment 
and the body in illness (Sartre, 2003 [1943]; Zaner, 1981; Leder, 1990).  
 
6.6.2 The Emergence of the Body as Object and Alien in Illness 
 
Toombs (1988; 1992; 1993; 1995; 2001) wrote extensively about the body in illness, 
specifically in terms of living with a progressive neurological condition. By drawing on 
the work of Sartre (2003 [1943]) and Zaner (1981), and through exploring her own 
experiences of living with multiple sclerosis, Toombs (1993:70) claimed that the body is 
objectified in illness and ‘necessarily accompanied by feelings of both alienation from 
and unwilling identification with the body’ (emphasis added). This conceptualisation of 
the body resonates with the accounts of the participants in this study in terms of making 
sense of the disrupted body as object and dysfunctional machine. However, it seems to 
diverge somewhat from their particular experiences. The body in ataxia did not seem to 
be experienced as radically alien to the self nor did the participants seem to lack 
empathy with their embodied selves as suggested by Toombs and her ‘unwilling 
identification’ with her body.  
Zaner’s (1981:54) original conceptualisation of the body as ‘alien presence’ is part of a 
larger body of work that attempted to come to an understanding of the body in human 
experience. Zaner emphasised the experience of the “otherness” of one’s own body as 
an inherent part of normal human embodiment. Zaner explained that whilst the body in 
ordinary experience is ‘inescapably implicating, hidden and chilling’ it is simultaneously 
‘familiar, intimate, enabling and accustomed’ (1981:54). The body as it is usually lived is 
at the same time familiar and strange; intimate and alien; mine yet other, Zaner thus 
states; ‘we are continually flirting with paradoxical expressions in an effort to tell truly the 
character of embodiment […] No sooner does one feel tempted to say ‘I am my body’ 
than one realizes that ‘I am yet not my body’’ (1981:54, original emphasis). In this way 
Zaner (1981) goes beyond Sartre’s phenomenology of the body (2003 [1943]:355) by 
more clearly identifying the ambiguity of the body and, in his view, the fundamental alien 
presence of the body in everyday experience. 
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Toombs (1992; 1993) took Zaner’s conceptualisation of the lived body in health and 
transposed it to help make sense of the situation of the body in illness. By exploring her 
own experience of living with MS, Toombs (1993, 2001) suggested that in illness more 
than in health, the unknown processes and events of the alien body are explicitly 
exposed. Toombs’ view has some resonance with Leder’s (1990) work which was 
concerned with the experience of pain and other states such as pregnancy that alter the 
ways in which the body functions. Leder (1990) proposed that, under normal 
circumstances the body is ‘recessive’ (1990:36) but the body in pain emerges as ‘alien 
presence’ (1990:73, 77, 91) in a bad or ill way, hence ‘dys-appearance’, and as such the 
body is experienced as ‘away, apart from the self’ (1990:87). Similar to Zaner’s 
conception of the body, for Leder the body in health is experienced as ‘alien-as-
forgotten’ and in illness as a ‘sharp and searing presence threatening the self’ (1990:91), 
suggesting perhaps alien-as-remembered. So although there is a degree of conceptual 
consensus here about the way in which the body is lived in health and illness, the 
empirical evidence for experiencing the body as alien might bear further scrutiny. Zaner 
(1981) for example restricted his comments to the way in which the body is experienced 
in health, and Leder (1990) focussed primarily on the body in pain. However, Toombs 
(1992; 1993) drew on her own experience of living with MS for many years and in her 
experience it is clear that she felt alienated from her body. There may be particular 
reasons located in the lived experience of MS as to why this might be the case.  
Multiple sclerosis often entails sudden relapses which may lead to significant functional 
losses and profound sensory changes (Compston et al. 2005). These relapses are 
unpredictable, the ‘Sword of Damocles’ constantly threatening an inevitable fate (Finlay, 
2003b:165). For Toombs (1992), the expectation of bodily disruption became a normal 
part of her daily life; she believed that she lived with a body that would ultimately betray 
her, a fate from which she could not flee. In her experience of MS, the sense of bodily 
alienation was particularly resonant in the numerous ways in which her body let her 
down and in the humiliating way in which bladder and bowel dysfunction further 
alienated her body from her sense of self. In this way it is possible to see, as suggested 
here by Toombs but also by Finlay (2003b), how the body in MS could be understood as 
seemingly alien, as a malevolent force which may, at some point of its own making, take 
over the body completely.  
Cerebellar ataxia, in contrast to MS, is not characterised by sudden and potentially 
devastating relapses that are typical of the most common form of MS. The body in 
ataxia seems to be experienced primarily as an encumbrance; it is awkward, ungainly 
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and frustrates intentional activities. It is in itself incredibly wearing but nonetheless it still 
belongs to the self. There was little if any sense in participants’ accounts that their 
bodies carried the same threat or such intense feelings of alienation as described by 
Toombs (1988; 1992; 1993) or Finlay (2003b). 
In Finlay’s (2003b) idiographic account of the early experience of being diagnosed with 
MS, she described the following experience where the participant, Ann, seemed to have 
lost all proprioception in her right arm; ‘It had a life of its own … And it just used to fall off 
things … it would just suddenly come up like this and it was very strange’ (Finlay, 
2003b:163). The objectification of the arm here is clear (‘it’), but what seems important 
to the interpreted account is the completely involuntary nature of the moving arm, it 
seems to move by itself. In this sense (and in contrast to the participants in the present 
study) Ann seems to have lost all sense of agency and ownership. Finlay (2003b:167) 
interpreted this extract as being indicative of bodily alienation: ‘It feels out of her control, 
as if an alien infiltration has arbitrarily taken over’.  
Gallagher (2005) documented the experiences of Ian who had a rare and severe 
proprioceptive impairment which resulted in a type of sensory ataxia (not the kind of 
ataxia as experienced by the participants in this study). Ian had no proprioceptive sense 
of posture or of limb position, resulting in a complete loss of postural and motor control. 
In the acute stages of his illness he was unable to compensate for the deficit by using 
vision, and consequently ‘the felt sense of his own body as his own and as under his 
control had disappeared’ (Gallagher, 2005:51, original emphasis). Gallagher (2005:56) 
explained that Ian experienced a ‘loss of embodiment’ or ‘alienation’ from his body in 
these early days and weeks which were linked to his sense of ownership of his body. As 
he learned to use vision to compensate for the proprioceptive loss and to regain bodily 
control, his sense of ownership of his body returned and the sense of alienation 
diminished.  
What seems important to the sense of alienation identified in these two accounts is the 
total loss of control, perhaps best expressed by Marcel: 
 
 
 
In the above accounts, where there is total loss of control in which the body or a 
particular body part seems to take on a life of its own, or is infiltrated by something that 
‘If I lose all control of my body due to some illness or injury, it would cease to 
be my body and in a sense it would be meaningful to say ‘I am no longer 
myself’’ (Marcel, 1950:14, emphasis added). 
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seems other than the self, the understanding of the body as alien seems to be borne out 
and it emerges as a very real and disturbing part of living with a particular illness or 
condition. However, participants in the present study did not experience their bodies or 
even part of their bodies moving completely involuntarily, action was imperfectly 
executed but was nonetheless always part of a willed, voluntary movement. Therefore in 
comparison to the cases described by Gallagher (2005) and Finlay (2003b), participants 
in the present study seemed to retain their sense of bodily ownership and although 
disrupted, the sense of agency, of being in control of their limbs, was never totally 
destroyed.  
In an unusual example of what is more commonly experienced as alien hand syndrome 
(Brainin et al. 2007), Sacks (1985:55) described a phenomenon where a man who 
seemed to have suffered a stroke fell out of bed because he believed that his leg was a 
‘counterfeit’ of his own leg. He tried to throw the imposter leg out of bed but as it was in 
fact his own leg he obviously followed it and fell out of bed with it. Still a rare 
phenomenon, this syndrome occurs following a particular type of stroke that involves a 
disruption of cortico-subcortical circuits whereby limb movement becomes detached 
from motor planning and execution (Brainin et al. 2007). Much like the previous 
examples concerned with proprioceptive loss, the involved limb seems to take on a life 
of its own. Here the sense of belonging is completely disrupted and it can be seen how 
in this instance the body may be understood as alien to the self. However, this is not the 
kind of phenomenon that the participants in this study described or experienced.   
In a single case account of the lived experience of Parkinson’s disease (PD), Bramley 
and Eatough (2005) also identified an example of the phenomenon of the body as alien. 
However, this only occurred under particular circumstances when the drugs used to 
control rigidity and bradykinesia took effect, what are known as “on” periods. The result 
was an artificially produced and excessive amount of movement described as ‘extreme 
involuntary movement (facial and torso twisting and limb jerking)’ (2005:227). The 
similarity here with the previous accounts is that this movement took place involuntarily. 
It was as if the body had a life of its own, synthetically instigated by the drugs, 
something outside and alien to the self.  
In contrast, in Michael J Fox’s account of his life with PD (Fox, 2003), he described his 
off periods (when the medication was not working and the symptoms of PD were most 
profound) as a time when the disease had ‘complete authority over my physical being.’ 
He continued ‘I am utterly in its possession’ (2003:256). It is in this instance that his 
experience of his bodily self could be interpreted and understood as alien, overrun and 
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invaded by PD. When the drugs take effect, the freedom of movement he reclaimed, 
albeit accompanied by involuntary spasms and tics similar to that described by Bramley 
and Eatough (2005), are entirely welcomed as his ‘body’s way of celebrating the reunion 
of mind and motion’ (Fox, 2003:259-260). In a further study, Sunvisson et al (2009) 
identified ways in which people with PD learned to accommodate both the off and the on 
periods. For example, Mary learned to adapt to ‘what she felt her body wanted’, she 
followed, and almost seemed to embrace, the vagaries of whichever embodied state she 
experienced at the time, whether ‘on’ or ‘off’ (Sunvisson et al. 2009:245). 
These accounts lend support to the idea that the body is not inevitably experienced as 
alien as a consequence of living with a neurological condition. Where a limb or the body 
seems to take on a life of its own (e.g. where proprioception is particularly impaired or in 
certain kinds of stroke) or where the body seems to be especially under threat or 
humiliated by a particular disease (e.g. in MS) there may be a stronger tendency 
towards alienation. However, for the most part, it seems that it is the particular 
circumstances of individuals that shape how the body is experienced and understood as 
part of living with a neurological condition.  
There is no doubt that illness engenders a form of embodiment that differs from that of 
everyday experience. However, the accounts of participants in this study seem to 
support the view that rather than necessarily posing a threat to the lived body or 
objectifying it, illness ‘qualifies’ human embodiment (Rothfield, 2008:222). In other 
words, illness brings about a certain kind of embodiment, but not a form of embodiment 
where the body is inevitably understood as object (Sartre, 2003 [1943]; Toombs, 1993), 
alien (Zaner, 1981; Toombs, 1993) or dys-appeared (Leder, 1990). Rather, each 
condition, as Leder (1990:81) also explained, ‘is characterised by its idiosyncratic motifs 
of disruption’.  
The type of embodiment described by Rothfield (2008) seems to capture Merleau-
Ponty’s (2002 [1945]) perspective of the body and how it is lived in ordinary experience. 
Illness, and ataxia in particular, brings with it a fundamentally altered way of being-in-
the-world which calls for new ways of doing things that may be radically different to 
“normal”. It is this understanding of the body in illness, an understanding that resists 
absolutes and dichotomous categorisations that seems to resonate most strongly with 
the accounts of the participants in this study. This way of understanding the body and 
the body in illness underlines the importance of careful and detailed enquiry into a wide 
range of conditions and illnesses, including progressive cerebellar ataxia. Slotting what 
has been traditionally understood about the experience of a particular condition (e.g. 
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progressive cerebellar ataxia) alongside another similarly labelled condition (e.g. MS) 
risks representing one experience as another, and may lead to false assumptions and 
misunderstandings. 
 
6.6.3 The Emergence of the Mind in Ataxia 
 
6.6.3.1 Movement as “Thought About” Movement 
 
The lived experience of cerebellar ataxia entailed thinking about movement in a way that 
was very different to the participants’ pre-reflective and skilful ways of moving 
remembered from a time when ataxia had little or no impact on their lives. Unlike 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of a body that is always with us, always in the right place 
and ahead of our conscious thoughts (2002 [1945]:108), it seems that participants in this 
study had to look out for their body, make sure it was with them and lead it towards the 
movement’s completion. Stella provided a further example of this phenomenon:  
‘If I try to rush, that’s when it’s difficult for me. Because my limbs won’t move fast 
enough for my head, my head’s going through the door but my limbs … […] won’t move 
as fast.’  
Normally, action is faster than the sort of consciousness that would be required to 
monitor action; in Gallagher’s terms (2005:237), action happens ‘before you know it’. 
However, Stella understands that even for ordinary, everyday activity, because her body 
no longer anticipates her actions, she has to slow her movements down to “thinking 
speed” in order to safely negotiate her environment. When she is in a hurry she almost 
forgets that she needs to consciously think about moving. In her ‘head’ she is already 
through the door but in reality she knows that she has to go back to retrieve her body 
and attend to it so that she can safely negotiate the door without falling. Stella’s body no 
longer “thinks” for itself as it would have done before she had ataxia.   
Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1945]:159) claimed, with reference to motility, that 
‘Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of an ‘I think that’ but of an ‘I can’.’ This 
claim is central to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and has a distinct relevance to the 
interpretation of the accounts of participants in this study. Merleau-Ponty does not deny 
the mind; rather he enhances the understanding of the body by also allowing it to think 
(Reynolds, 2005). By accommodating itself with the least amount of effort to its 
environment, the body seeks equilibrium (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:177) and thus 
manages to avoid the wild fluctuations that would disturb bodily stability and necessitate 
conscious monitoring and control (Reynolds, 2005). Disruption of the subconscious 
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habits underpinning “normal” movement brings the body into consciousness as 
something to be dealt with and thought about. However, ‘bodily intelligence’, as the 
name would suggest, is not held in the mind, rather, as Merleau-Ponty explains with 
reference to typing, it is ‘in the hands’ (2002 [1945]:166). It is only through bodily effort 
and not through detached cognitive effort that we “know” i.e. that we are capable of 
skilful coping. In other words, ‘[w]e have a feel for the kinds of balance and posture that 
afford us a correct and proper view of the world, and that feel is neither the buzz and 
hum of sensation nor the rationality of deliberate thought’ (Carman, 2008:110-111, 
original emphasis). Intentional activity brought about by an “I think” therefore is 
experienced as a very different way of being when compared to a fully functioning body 
sustained by body-habits.  
Similar to the participants’ accounts in this study, it seems that people living with other 
neurological conditions such as Parkinson’s disease (Habermann, 1996; Sunvisson et 
al. 2009) and conditions such as dyspraxia (Blijlevens et al. 2009) and visuospatial 
agnosia (Lampinen and Tham, 2003) also have to think about moving in a way that is 
unfamiliar to how they moved previously. The phenomenon of having to think about 
movement then is not uncommon for people living with neurological conditions. 
However, the way in which the movement is thought about and the sense people make 
of this seems to differ depending on the particular condition and its specific effects on 
motor control. This study shows something new in this respect. The participants in this 
study have added new emphases and have helped to reveal subtle differences in the 
interactions of the mind and body in illness. For example, adults with dyspraxia seem to 
find the particular ways in which their body lets them down as an embarrassment, as a 
failure of the self (Blijlevens et al. 2009). Not simply unable to accomplish activities 
learned in childhood such as dressing, but seemingly to have forgotten how, implicated 
the body and the self as useless. In ways similar to the experience of the body in ataxia, 
people with Parkinson’s disease also seemed to understand their bodies as out of 
control and uncooperative (Habermann, 1996). However, the lived experience of 
Parkinson’s disease is also complicated by the effects of the drugs and the on and off 
periods which are understood in very different ways depending on individual 
circumstances (Sunvisson et al. 2009). People with visuospatial agnosia found that their 
sense of self was in many ways deeply disrupted because previously automatic and un-
thought about actions had been rendered impossible or required exceptional cognitive 
effort (Lampinen and Tham, 2003). 
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Living with progressive cerebellar ataxia, as recounted by the participants in this study, 
involved a disruption of skilful coping that is particular to ataxic embodiment. There are 
elements of this disrupted motility that are shared with other neurological conditions 
particularly with respect to loss of control. However, this study reveals that it is the loss 
of the optimal bodily attitudes that normally provide the grip on the world and from which 
experience is integrated and secured (Carman, 2008) that seems particular to life with 
ataxia. In ataxia, the mutual dependence or empathy between self and world seems to 
break down as the ability to anticipate and incorporate the environment in action fails. As 
a result, the world becomes observed in a newly conscious way, kerbs, doors, walls and 
passersby hold the attention, attempts are made to bring the body under control, and 
effort is expended in trying to maintain equilibrium. The world seems to pose risks and 
dangers that can only be avoided through an exhausting kind of vigilance that for some 
leaves little room to cope with other tasks and distractions.     
 
6.6.3.2 Cognitive Overload and Fatigue 
 
Four participants described experiences where they became aware of cognitive 
overload during everyday activities. Although this phenomenon was only identified in 
these four accounts it seemed to be particularly meaningful for the participants who 
described it. Toby, for example, had to make sure that he minimised distractions whilst 
he was carrying out complex tasks like swimming, and Julia had to be aware of potential 
risks to her balance caused by unanticipated distractions which threatened her 
attentional capacity. What seemed to be described in these accounts were difficulties 
associated with dual-tasking and managing finite attentional resources.  
Cognitive problems associated with cerebellar ataxia form the basis for much 
controversial discussion (Schmahmann, 1998, 2010; Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006; 
Bellebaum and Daum, 2007; Haarmeier and Thier, 2007). Whilst some authors conclude 
that there is at best only weak evidence to support a role for the cerebellum in cognition 
(Glickstein and Doron, 2008) or attention (Haarmeier and Thier, 2007), others contend 
that the cerebellum has an established role in cognitive function (Schmahmann, 1998; 
2010; Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006). However, the most appropriate methodology for 
discerning valid conclusions about the role of the cerebellum in cognition is yet to be 
agreed and remains a matter of debate (Bellebaum and Daum, 2007; Haarmeier and 
Thier, 2007; Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006; Timmann and Daum, 2007).  
Schmahmann is perhaps the most prominent of those who support a role for the 
cerebellum in cognition (Schmahmann, 1998, 2010; Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006). 
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By drawing on case study and laboratory based work from people with a wide range of 
cerebellar dysfunction Schmahmann suggested that the cerebellum not only acts to 
optimise motor control but optimises performance according to context across a number 
of behavioural domains. He suggested specifically that cerebellar dysfunction could be 
implicated in problems with mental flexibility, multitasking, visuospatial organisation, 
linguistic processing and mood (Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006). Whilst his views 
remain somewhat controversial and the anatomical details and methodological 
challenges still need to be addressed, Timmann and Daum (2007) suggested that there 
does seem to be converging evidence in support of cerebellar involvement in cognitive 
processing, chiefly in terms of verbal working memory which may have some bearing on 
performance in other complex cognitive tasks.  
It is tempting to suggest that Schmahmann’s understanding of the role of the cerebellum 
in executive function may have some bearing on the experiences reported by Toby and 
Julia, i.e. that cerebellar ataxia impairs the cognitive function of the cerebellum as well 
as its role in motor control. On the other hand, dysfunction of the cerebellum may simply 
result in poor execution of the cerebellum’s role in motor control so much so that the 
cerebral cortex is required to provide oversight to motor functions that would normally be 
the responsibility of the cerebellum. The cerebellum specialises in controlling automatic 
movements that involve multiple joints and muscles in such numbers that it is impossible 
to consciously think about each element and its contribution to movement control 
(Thatch, 2007). Failure of the cerebellum would simply ask more of the cerebrum than it 
is capable of taking on at a conscious level, and might therefore result in the cognitive 
overload experienced by the participants in this study.  
Toby and Julia’s experiences lend some real world weight to theories that have been 
principally investigated in the laboratory and clinic and which might benefit from further 
phenomenological enquiry. In this way, the effect of fatigue could also be explored, a 
factor that seems to be overlooked in the literature concerned with the cognitive function 
of the cerebellum and the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia. The majority of 
participants in this study suffered with extreme fatigue that curtailed meaningful activity 
and full participation in their social world. The fatigue experienced by people living with 
ataxia in itself would benefit from further investigation along similar lines to that 
conducted into the experience of fatigue in multiple sclerosis (e.g. Hadjimichael et al. 
2008 and Kos et al. 2008).  
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6.6.4 The Emergence of Space in Ataxia 
 
Ordinarily, to reiterate Merleau-Ponty’s position (1945 [2002]), we have an immediate 
and concrete sense of ourselves and an intuitive sense of our personal space that is 
built up through established repertoires of behaviour. We may have a conscious 
appreciation of geometry, vectors and planes of movement but it is not this 
understanding of space that is used when we go about our everyday activities. For 
example, we perceive distances as reachable, within arms length, or walkable, we 
understand edges as corners to walk around, depth as kerbs and steps to be stepped 
down, and openings as affording passage. Rather than living in geometric space, our 
body, in Merleau-Ponty’s words ‘inhabits’ (2002 [1945]:161) a practical or lived space 
i.e. our bearings are taken with reference to what it is we want to do, with reference to 
our motor intentionality (Morris, 2008a). In other words our usual orientation to space is 
pre-verbal and minimises cognitive effort. In illness and injury this understanding of the 
lived body and lived space is thought to breakdown as the capacity to integrate self and 
world becomes problematic (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]). This was particularly the case 
in the experiential narratives of participants in this study, highlighted with reference to 
Bill, Toby, Stella and Graham. Not only had their bodies become part of the content of 
their thoughts but also the immediate environment had emerged from relative anonymity 
to become something to contend with, to actively negotiate. This understanding of space 
and the immediate environment refers not only to locomotor space (for example Stella 
and the kerb, and Toby and the corridor) but also the immediate body-space negotiated 
by Bill, getting food onto the fork, coordinating the movement of his hand towards his 
mouth, timing this activity with his attempts at joining the conversation:  
‘…the big frustration is not being able to eat and speak at the same time’  
It is not easy to reveal a person’s relationship with space because it is concealed and 
subsumed in their everyday actions (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:117). Movement is 
ordinarily orientated to body-centred co-ordinates and pragmatic spatial references that 
are outside conscious awareness (Gallagher, 2005). Under ordinary circumstances the 
body makes sense of stimulation and organises movement with reference to the body’s 
practical intentions (Gallagher, 2005). This meeting and organising happens on the 
margins of consciousness. For example, it would be impossible to convey how people 
negotiate kerbs, avoid each other in a crowd, walk on uneven ground or as with Bill 
manage to chew, swallow and speak all at the same time.  
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Space therefore is not encountered passively nor, like movement, is it configured in the 
mind: ‘movement is not thought about movement, bodily space is not space thought of 
or represented’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:159). This statement does not deny the 
existence of spatial or cognitive maps, rather it emphasises that in action such maps are 
not passive or simply theoretical representations of space. Merleau-Ponty seemed to 
anticipate an understanding of lived space consistent with the more contemporary ideas 
of embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002; Cowart, 2005). For Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1945]), 
we are not merely “in” space but we move through it. In order to negotiate space we 
construct a practical understanding of it using only features of the environment relevant 
to the task (Morris, 2008a). This means that the environment is represented, and 
understood in sensorimotor terms, as a kind of spatial-motor schema embedded in 
action, rather than in abstract or purely geometric terms (Cowart, 2005). The functional 
significance of the spatial-motor schema is that only the salient features of lived space 
are represented, permitting individuals to interpret their environment quickly without the 
need for time consuming processing of irrelevant information. Such “on-line” bodily 
intelligent action is particularly important in activities such as walking which require 
continuous updating in response to changes in environmental conditions, such as those 
that involve encounters with other people (Wilson, 2002). Not only does this save time 
but by using a sensorimotor representation of space rather than a representation that 
faithfully mirrors all the features of the environment, (the relevant as well as the 
irrelevant), the body is able to make sense of its environment through something it is 
already familiar with: itself and its interactions with the world (Cowart, 2005). Therefore, 
Cowart (2005) argues, if sensorimotor capacities determine how the world is 
experienced, impairment of these capacities (such as in ataxia) will fundamentally alter 
how an individual interacts with their world.  
Returning to Stella, for example, rather than her body being the ‘first co-ordinate’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:115) the anchor between her body and the situation of her 
body, her sense of “here” had to be cognitively reappraised as attention was directed 
towards the position of her body in relation to other positions and external co-ordinates 
(‘going through the door’ or ‘going off the pavement’). In this sense, as suggested by 
Toombs (1988) with reference to her own experience of MS, spatiality constricts to the 
immediate parameters of direct concern to the task being undertaken. At the same time, 
thinking about space slows Stella down, she has to go back for her body, (‘my limbs 
don’t move fast enough for my head’). For Toby, the corridors at work assault his 
progress as he is unable to call up or “meet” the particular body style invited by the 
spatial configuration of the corridor. Toby not only experiences his body as disrupted, he 
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also experiences a disruption of the easy communion with the environment that he 
would previously have taken for granted. Again, in this situation, as suggested by 
Toombs (1988) functional space takes on a problematic character.  
This disruption of lived space is also seen in other conditions. For example in 
visuospatial agnosia the world is encountered in new and unfamiliar ways, it is perceived 
as an obstacle to one’s intentions rather than as comprising tools and objects that 
facilitate functional activity (Lampinen and Tham, 2003). This experience differs from 
that described by the participants in this study in that people with visuospatial agnosia 
fail to recognise features of their home; objects in particular are no longer incorporated 
into ways of doing things, which makes people with this condition feel anxious and 
bewildered in everyday settings (Lampinen and Tham, 2003). People living with ataxia 
seem to have a similar sense of having difficulty in being able to cope with their 
surroundings, but this is more to do with the loss of skilful interaction not because they 
are unable to recognise objects and places for what they are.  
The findings discussed here cautiously suggest, with reference to the particular 
experiences of the participants, that ataxia should be understood as more than a 
physical imposition. Living with ataxia disrupts the normally smooth way in which the 
body encounters the lived environment, and renders it problematic, hostile and therefore 
obstructive to participating in the world on one’s own terms.   
 
6.7 Conclusion: The Interaction of Body, Mind and Space in the Lived Experience 
of Cerebellar Ataxia 
 
What seems to be forthcoming from the detailed analysis presented here, is that in living 
with ataxia not only had the participants lost the sense of their bodies as anonymous 
and peripheral to consciousness, but they had also acquired a heightened awareness of 
cognitive processes and the fragile capacities of the mind, and in doing so had lost their 
unreflexive grip on the world. Participants recounted experiences in which formerly 
spontaneous, subconscious habits of the body were not easily, accurately or efficiently 
replicated via deliberate cognitive planning or indeed even readily constituted in thought. 
Their bodies no longer fully operated at a subconscious level and, however hard they 
tried it seemed that their conscious mind was unable to compensate for this loss of 
bodily intelligence. The physical environment emerged as something to contend with 
and thought-fully navigate in a way that contrasted with their previous experiences. 
Nonetheless, although their body and their way of being in the world was in many ways 
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very different from their previous way of life, the majority of participants did not reject 
their body or understand it as something alien to the self. This marks a significant new 
finding. The consequences of living with this particular ataxic embodiment were 
significant and debilitating. Participants talked about the effect of fatigue on their lives 
and the way in which this curtailed and circumscribed what they were able to plan for 
and achieve in their daily lives. This aspect of living with ataxia is under-explored in the 
literature and is worthy of further study.  
This analysis focussed heavily on the embodied experience of ataxia which is an 
important and overlooked aspect of this condition. However, significant features of 
participants’ lives have been intentionally set aside in the presentation and discussion of 
this theme, particularly those concerned with living with ataxia in public. The next 
chapter focuses on participants’ accounts of their social world, and provides a detailed 
discussion of the social significance of living with disrupted embodiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 143 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Super-ordinate Theme 2 
 
‘I don’t want to seem handicapped in any way’ (Stella) 
 
Description: Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public spaces and 
places 
            
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the participants’ experiences of living with a problematic self in 
public. The analysis and discussion develop a contextualised, experiential 
understanding of the significance of this particular form of disrupted embodiment in 
public. Dividing these two themes into public and personal realms remains somewhat 
artificial but functions to present the data in a more coherent fashion than would 
otherwise be possible.  
The understanding of public space used in this chapter takes its definition from Seamon 
(1980:161) as ‘lived-space’, the ‘spaces, places and environments in which a person 
typically lives and dwells’. A local geographical world made up of, for instance; high 
streets, offices, supermarkets, cafés and the doctor’s surgery. These are places of 
everyday life intimately connected with personal expression and impression 
management (Goffman, 1959). This chapter attempts to privilege and make sense of the 
participants’ lived experience of stigma. It aims to convey what it is like to be in the 
complex situation of actively constructing a personal identity, whilst at the same being 
an unwilling focus of stigmatising forces that contribute to an individual’s lived reality 
(Osyerman and Swim, 2001). Yang et al (2007:1530) characterised stigma as rooted in 
intersubjective space and as threatening the ‘lived value’ of what matters most in a 
person’s local world. It is this view of stigma that best captures the stance taken with 
respect to understanding and analysing the stigma experiences of participants in this 
study.  
The majority of participants (eight) spoke about the lived experience of ataxia in terms 
that suggested that it was a discreditable way of being in the world. The personal and 
social significance of disrupted embodiment unfolded in a number of different contexts. 
The quotations offered in Table 7.1 demonstrate the different ways in which participants 
talked about stigmatising experiences or concerns. Participants’ accounts seemed to 
suggest that bodily disruption and incapacity invited critical scrutiny and disclosure of the 
self as socially improper and / or as harbouring a characteristic that was in some way 
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undesirable or diminishing. Participants differed in the ways in which they responded to 
stigmatising situations, therefore, where possible and in keeping with Smith’s (2011a, b) 
arguments about quality in IPA, several examples from each participant have been 
included in Table 7.1 (pp. 145) to demonstrate this range and diversity.  
This theme is constructed and presented using the accounts of five participants starting 
with Jim, and followed by Stella, Susan, Julia and Harry. Extracts from these participants 
were chosen because they were particularly powerful and most clearly conveyed what 
was shared as well as the individual diversity within this theme. Each account is 
presented in detail because participants offered a slightly different dimension of 
experience based on their individually situated perspectives. Looking carefully to 
differentiate the subtle variability across individual texts retains the idiographic 
commitment underlying the methodological focus of this study. The narratives do 
however share some common ground, and therefore similarities as well as differences 
have been considered and discussed. Extracts from the other participants have been 
used to indicate the extent to which experiences are shared across the corpus.  
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Table 7.1 Ataxia as a Discreditable Way of Being in the World (n = 8)  
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
An Unwilling Focus of Stigmatising Forces  
Jim 
‘You can realise very simply there are loads of pairs of eyes going chu-
chu-chu – looking at you and thinking ‘What’s wrong with him?’’ 
14:31 
Stella ‘If I think people are watching me I just freeze and my legs won’t work’ 5:38 
Stella 
‘Well of course he was watching me and so were two other people so I 
couldn’t walk very well.’ 
6:18 
Stella ‘You know I don’t want to seem to be handicapped in anyway.’ 6:35 
Stella ‘I don’t flow as normal people do.’ 6:42 
Susan ‘I don’t like to go into the social situation where I feel I’m being judged.’  7:25 
Susan 
‘I’m sure they look at me and think ‘Well you’ve forgotten your stick and 
you’re walking alright.’ And I just don’t want that sort of judgement. I find it 
easier not to socialise and I can manage without socialising really.’ 
8:1 
Julia ‘Because I don’t want to seem odd in public it makes me very cautious.’ 7:28 
Julia ‘I won’t do things that might cause offence.’ 7:34 
Julia 
‘I have to make sure I don’t have alcohol on my breath if people help me 
out because they’ll assume.’ 
10:11 
Bill 
‘You get used to being looked at, and you think well it would be nice to do 
things anonymously and not be the character in the wheelchair that 
everybody looks at.’ 
5:3 
Harry 
‘As you go round the pool they all move around, opposite end. I don’t 
know if they all think it’s catching.’ 
22:27 
Toby 
‘Particularly if people were behind me, walking behind me, because I’m 
aware that someone’s behind me that tends to make me worse.’ 
8:10 
Rejection of Stigma Symbols 
Jim 
‘Something so obvious as a walking stick, it’s just a visible sign to 
everybody – yes I am definitely different.’  
14:48 
Stella ‘I wouldn’t go outside in the street with a stick.’ 6:30 
Harry 
‘You’re equal to everybody else. When you’re out there [participating in 
aeronautical sports] nobody can see the wheelchair.’ 
5:20 
Harry ‘I’ve always wanted to have a bike, fit in with the guys.’ 3:15 
 The Discrediting World of Work   
Jim 
‘I went from feeling part of the [team, at work] to just … well you’re still 
part of the [team], but ‘you’re here because you’re disabled, and we’re 
going to keep an eye on you, wrap you in cotton wool.’’ 
5:6 
Toby 
‘And the managing director proceeded to say […] ‘we’ve decided you can 
no longer do your job’ […] And I said ‘But why? I’ve given you no cause 
for concern’.’ 
4:1 
Harry 
‘And they didn’t have a ramp into the new building. So for a year I was 
bumped up and down the stairs.’  
28:19 
Hugh 
‘I’ve got a computer [at work], that’s a state, it’s got a [really small screen], 
it’s not very good, not big enough, I’ve asked for a bigger screen but I 
haven’t got that […] basically I’m being put to one side really, […] they 
seem to be making it harder for me.’ 
17:36 
 It’s not only Strangers who Stereotype or Judge  
Susan 
‘My daughter doesn’t leave them [the grandchildren] with me very often. 
And I wonder if she thinks I can cope.’ 
8:23 
Julia 
‘Whenever we cross the road he [Julia’s son] always holds me by the 
scruff of the collar. I say to him ‘Have you any idea how that makes me 
feel?’’ 
11:20 
 
 
7.2 Jim 
 
The following offers a detailed examination of Jim’s account. Jim had lived with 
cerebellar ataxia for over twenty years. He spoke at length about his experiences and 
the complex ways in which he chose to confront, as well as come to terms with, what 
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might be understood as a discreditable condition. At the time of the interview he was in 
his late forties, working full time and living with his wife and two teenage children. He 
was able to walk independently indoors and outside although outdoor mobility was 
becoming problematic. In this first extract Jim was asked to talk about how ataxia 
affected him physically: 
‘I’m aware that my general gait when I’m walking makes you look like you’re drunk […] 
which causes problems, just generally when you’re out, when you’re out shopping or 
you’re just out walking. And yeah, sometimes you do stumble and fall down. It isn’t a 
problem for me, but I’m aware that other people because of their preconceived ideas 
about it probably think ‘Christ, he’s had too much to drink’ or ‘What is he doing?’ Which 
again I try to look on the positive side, what people think doesn’t affect me. But it does 
make me very upset and slightly angry when you’re with your family, because people do 
make hurtful comments. You can see people’s eyes just burning holes through your 
back. But again I’ve learnt to deal with it and you become hard skinned and hard nosed 
… but for my wife and kids, it’s sometimes difficult to accept. […] So me at work um … 
part of my job involves working in big offices […] and when you walk about there or 
when you’re talking to somebody you can realise very simply there are loads of pairs of 
eyes going chu-chu-chu – looking at you and thinking ‘What’s wrong with him?’ I think 
that is probably the biggest problem that anybody with I suppose any disability has 
coming to terms with it, accepting that you are different.’  
A phenomenological reading of this passage might suggest that it is Jim’s emotional 
experience and not his physical experience that is foregrounded. The visibility of the 
symptoms of ataxia in the public domain and the connotations of drunkenness draw 
unwanted attention in the form of the “stare” which is a continual reminder of difference. 
The stare is powerful; it burns holes in his back and penetrates him - ‘chu-chu-chu’, (this 
sound effect was accompanied by a stabbing gesture). He describes feeling angry, 
upset and hurt by what he perceives as a public judgement of him as ‘wrong’ and 
‘different’. So, although physically the ataxia unbalances him and causes him to fall, 
what concerns him most are his assumptions about other people’s responses and 
beliefs about what this disordered walking signifies about him. In this sense ataxia could 
be understood as a stigmatising condition: disordered walking as a visible and 
undesirable characteristic of ataxia draws unwanted attention. This in turn provokes 
feelings of distress or shame arising from the consciousness of something in one’s own 
behaviour that is in someway discreditable or offensive to others.  
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Jim’s interpretation of his status as ‘different’ resonates with the experiences of people 
living with other movement disorders, such as Tourette Syndrome (Davis et al.2004), 
Parkinson’s disease (Bramley and Eatough, 2005) and multiple sclerosis (Grytten and 
Måseide, 2006). These findings correspond with Goffman’s (1963) original formulation of 
stigma which referred to an ‘undesired differentness’ (p15), ‘an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting’ (p13) which works to reduce an individual ‘from a whole and usual person 
to a tainted, discounted one’ (p12). In this model, the stigma is located within an 
individual, it is a difference, a ‘mark or sign’ that signifies the bearer as deviant or flawed 
(Jones et al.1984:5) or devalued (Crocker et al.1998), but the stigmatized social identity 
only comes into being in local social contexts. For Goffman (1963:12) stigma therefore 
creates a discrepancy between a ‘virtual social identity’ that is inherently spoiled (how 
the person is understood by society; an identity ascribed by others) and an ‘actual social 
identity’ (who the person really is).  
Jim seems to assume that his virtual social identity is marked by two diminishing labels, 
possible intoxication (‘Christ, he’s had too much to drink’) and inappropriate bodily 
formulations and actions at work (‘What’s wrong with him?’). Alcoholism, the associated 
dependency and particularly the blameworthiness linked to what might be understood as 
an irrational behaviour, ranks close to the bottom of acceptance hierarchies of different 
illnesses and disabilities (Dear et al.1997). A person who appears visibly drunk is also 
likely to suffer social exclusion because other people (especially work colleagues) would 
consider it “wrong” to appear in public in this condition (Room, 2005:148). Bodily 
disorder in itself is also thought to signify a lack of control or untidiness that is not well 
tolerated in Western society (Yardley, 1997). Davis et al (2004:105) suggested that 
people with salient physical differences, like Jim, are commonly labelled and understood 
by others as being ‘irrational and disordered users of public space’. This socially 
constructed conception of what sort of behaviour is accepted in shared environments 
may have particular relevance for Jim, and others living with ataxia. It may represent a 
stereotype threat, the fear that as “members” of a particular group (e.g. alcoholic, 
physically impaired) their actions may in some way confirm the stereotype associated 
with the group (Steele and Aronson, 1995).  
Physical incompetence, unpredictability, and possible intoxication breaches widely held 
beliefs about what is acceptable in public environments. Understanding himself as 
different and stereotyped in this way might suggest that Jim not only accepts this frame 
of reference but he may also believe it is part of his actual identity. Internalising the 
beliefs associated with a particular stigma draws on ‘self-schema’ theory whereby 
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individuals build an understanding of the self that is based on stigma which then 
assumes a position of importance within the self-concept (Jones et al.1984:115). From a 
social model of disability perspective this devalued sense of self could be understood as 
a form of internalized oppression (Thomas, 2007; Swain and French, 2008; Oliver, 
2009). Jim might also have a high ‘stigma consciousness’ (Pinel, 1999:115). He seems 
to expect to be judged on the basis of his membership of a devalued group and appears 
to be on high alert for signs that he is being appraised in a negative way instead of being 
judged on personal merit. This in turn may limit the ways in which he is able to 
overcome his assumed status. However, this analysis is just the first step in trying to 
understand how Jim makes sense of and responds to significant events that take place 
in public space and, as discussed below, it only represents one dimension of what 
appears to be important and interacting elements of Jim’s lifeworld.  
At a more hermeneutic level the above extract might suggest that Jim is engaged in an 
existential struggle to determine what meanings he foregrounds. On the one hand, he 
tries to minimise the stigmatising consequences of living with ataxia (‘It isn’t a problem 
for me’, ‘what people think doesn’t affect me’, ‘you become hard skinned and hard-
nosed’), yet on the other hand, in public, he seems to be confronted with experiences 
that challenge this perspective and he describes strong emotional responses even whilst 
claiming indifference. One reading of this interpretation might suggest that Jim is 
engaged in cognitive work in an attempt to contain what is in fact uncontainable and at 
large. However, it seems that what is constructed through this self-talk is fragile; 
although Jim tells himself that the ataxia is no big deal and not his problem, what is 
revealed in his experience in the world – his practical engagement in the world – is the 
opposite. It is, he believes, a big deal to others; people attend to it and judge him by it. 
Jim’s account suggests that coping with stigma is never a “done deal”. Managing stigma 
experiences seems to be a dynamic and on-going process intertwined with coping with 
other aspects of living with ataxia in his personal and social world. Sociological 
approaches to stigma understand difference as a socially created phenomenon, the 
product of a particular social situation, determined by a variety of factors that are not 
within the power of one person to constrain (Dear et al.1997; Major and O’Brien, 2005). 
In one sense, Jim seems to have understood this broader conceptualisation. Through 
serendipitous means, Jim engaged with disability rights advocates. He supported others 
living with ataxia and informed the public in general about disability issues. Jim had also 
met and become friends with a work colleague who was also trying to make sense of 
her own discriminated status. Gaining an understanding of disability rights appears to 
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help some individuals to cope with stigma (Ablon, 2002) and these experiences seemed 
to provide Jim with a clear philosophy and an affirming rhetoric which he might use to 
reframe his sense of self;  
‘I think ‘Well it isn’t my problem, it’s your problem.’ And if my speech or balance or 
anything else causes any inconvenience, if I fall down, well I’m used to it, it’s not a 
problem to me. If it offends anyone else, if it troubles them – that’s their problem.’ 
Jim seems to be engaged in ‘cognitive restructuring’, a voluntary coping process 
described by Miller and Kaiser (2001:81) as a response to stigma-related stress that 
involves changing the meaning of a particular situation or experience by devaluing the 
emphasis others put on a specific attribute or behaviour. Jim spoke of making a 
‘conscious decision’ to adopt ‘a whole different philosophy’ and now considers himself a 
‘bit of an ataxia zealot’. His enthusiasm here has an almost religious quality (or at least 
that is the metaphor he is using) which perhaps reflects Jim’s firmly held beliefs about 
the importance of what he is doing. It may also be a sign of his need to protect or rescue 
others from the protracted and difficult experiences that he went through and, it seems, 
is still living through. Making a strategic decision to take a stand and to talk about 
personal experiences in public settings, so called “broadcasting”, is thought to be self-
affirming because it cultivates a sense of power over the condition and the stigma itself 
(Corrigan et al.2009). Jim therefore seems to be engaged in actively constructing a 
more positive and valued identity than the virtual identity shaped by his stigma 
experiences. However, as noted above, this is an uncertain enterprise. In this next 
extract Jim described how he feels about using a walking stick: 
‘I should use a walking stick, I’ve got one in my bag, but I’m still coming to terms myself 
with the fact that I need to use it, being seen to be using it … which is more about my 
own preconceptions and image I suppose. And I’m aware, I guess, longer term … if it 
does get worse you could end up in a wheelchair but it’s just something personally I find 
it very difficult to consider […] You’re self conscious anyway, which can create its own 
problems but having something so obvious as a walking stick, it’s just a visible sign to 
everybody – yes I am definitely different. […] because rather than use a walking stick I’d 
just hold onto [my wife’s] hand or use [my children] as a walking stick.’ 
Here Jim refers to the visibility of a stick; ‘being seen to be using it’, ‘having something 
so obvious as a walking stick’, ‘it’s just a visible sign to everyone’; he seems to see 
himself through other people’s eyes and through them he formulates walking with a stick 
in negative terms; being ‘different’. But perhaps at a deeper level this passage touches 
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on Goffman’s (1963) ideas about containment and concealment of stigmatised identities. 
Jim acknowledges that he needs a stick but has not come to terms with this yet. 
Although he carries a stick in his bag, it appears that using it would also perhaps be an 
admission of something that he is not ready to accept; a visible sign that the ataxia is 
looming large and cannot be kept in check in the public domain. It might be important to 
recognise that Jim seems to be in a period of transition; moving from independent 
walking to walking with a stick. Jim seems to be in flux, not only physically but also in the 
sense of understanding what this change in physical capability might mean. He is not 
reconciled with what he understands through his own experience (‘still coming to terms 
with the fact’) and this creates what could be understood as a cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957). Walking with a stick provides further confirmation that ataxia is now a 
problem for Jim and therefore serves to deconstruct his attempts to play down its 
significance. He engages in normalising behaviours, using his family as proxy-sticks to 
help him walk rather than using the stick itself. These behaviours may help sustain a 
sense of self that is “normal”, he is “normal enough” to be in a relationship and may also 
fulfil a need to present a “normal” self to others (Radley, 1993). The walking stick might 
also be considered a stigma symbol; it serves as a signal of difference to others. The 
stick may be regarded as an artefact that symbolises a group identity that sits 
uncomfortably with Jim. However, more importantly, the walking stick and the almost 
unbearable thought of becoming a wheelchair user (he switched from ‘I’ to ‘you’ at this 
point in the narrative, a sign perhaps that he is not ready to accept this prospect) cast a 
shadow over the present, projecting Jim into a possible future that he is not yet ready to 
face.  
In this sense Jim seems to be coping with multiple identity threats, not simply a virtual 
identity constructed through stigmatising experiences but also threats to his identity 
based on assumptions and fears about his future self. Markus and Nurius (1986) 
introduced the concept of possible selves as formulations of a particular self-image 
constructed from individually relevant sociocultural and historical contexts and 
immediate social experiences. Possible selves can be hoped for or feared. Dominance 
of one possible self-concept over another (the ‘working self-concept’) is determined by 
an individual’s response to an event or situation; if these experiences are negative, the 
working self-concept will be oriented towards negative (or feared) possible selves. If 
these conceptions are particularly powerful, in terms of their ability to define the self, 
then they can become ‘chronically accessible’ as the default view that a person has of 
himself or herself (Markus and Nurius, 1986:957). Jim sometimes seems to have the 
energy and resources to confront some of these threats to his self-image, for example 
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by holding onto and forging a preferred identity, an independent and competent self who 
also has much to offer others who face similar difficulties. However, it seems that what 
he fears most, his possible future self, is chronically accessible and creeps into his lived 
world even though he tries to block it out. For Jim, even though he describes himself as 
an ‘ataxia zealot’ and he seems to know about the social model of disability, these are 
salient fears. These examples provided further insights about the kinds of issues Jim 
was grappling with and his possible difficulties with cognitive dissonance. Major and 
O’Brien (2005) posit that identity threat occurs when an individual appraises stigma-
relevant stressors as potentially harmful to their social identity and as surpassing 
available coping resources. Jim’s experience suggests that identity threat is a dynamic 
and unfolding concept that occurs in conjunction with other threats to psychological and 
emotional well-being. 
Interpretative work therefore cautiously suggests that stigma could be identified as a 
concern within Jim’s account. Perceiving himself as separate and different could be 
understood as reflecting a negative socially constructed view of physical impairment. 
These perceptions may reflect Scambler’s (1998:1054) ideas about ‘felt’ stigma, or fear 
of discrimination, but also ‘enacted’ stigma or actual discrimination (‘because people do 
make hurtful comments’). It seems that Jim has internalised a view that frames 
disordered walking as undesirable and possibly shameful and this is inferred through his 
encounters with others. In order for the internalisation to work there must be at least 
some agreement between the self and others that the difference is inherently 
undesirable (Coleman, 1986). Jim’s on-going efforts to keep the ataxia from looming 
large could be understood as a means of resisting the perceived stigma associated with 
disordered walking but also, in a more existential sense, as a means of keeping the 
ataxia and its longer term implications at bay. For Jim, ‘Accepting that you are different’, 
is an undertaking that is closely woven into other aspects of living with a long term 
progressive condition. The stigma associated with disordered walking cannot be 
disconnected from or dealt with separately from his other existential concerns (such as 
the looming wheelchair). It is another phenomenon that threatens the things he values 
most and therefore, as suggested by Yang et al (2007:1528), the stigma serves to 
‘intensify the sense that life is uncertain, dangerous and hazardous.’ This might explain 
why Jim may find it difficult to consistently resist the damaging effects of what he 
perceives as stigma related events. Furthermore, Jim’s account has revealed that in 
spite of having what appears to be an intellectual understanding of the social model of 
disability, this sort of cognitive knowing has not relieved him of his emotional wrestle 
with feelings of difference and discreditation. Grappling with the inconsistency between 
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what he “knows” and what he understands from his own experience, seems to support 
the interpretation that Jim lives with an enduring sense of cognitive dissonance and 
unrelieved psychological discomfort.    
 
7.3. Stella  
 
The following extract is taken from Stella’s account, and is used to demonstrate the 
extent of the shared theme but also the subtle differences involved in her interpretations 
of her experiences. Stella was in later mid-life; she was retired and lived alone. Stella 
had lived with ataxia for over ten years. 
Stella: ‘I have this nervous thing as well, this is another phobia. If I think people are 
watching me I just freeze and my legs won’t work.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Okay’ 
Stella: ‘And for a moment I can’t move my legs. And then I gradually sort of stumble 
about and then once I’m over that initial nervousness … so the head is very … the brain 
comes into this a lot really.’ 
Stella seemed to share similar concerns with Jim and may have had a similarly high 
‘stigma consciousness’ (Pinel, 1999:115). However, Stella’s responses were uniquely 
situated in that public scrutiny, ‘If I think people are watching me’, effectively paralysed 
her, ‘I just freeze and my legs won’t work’. From a phenomenological perspective, it 
seemed that Stella had also come to understand that walking disclosed something about 
her that others considered discreditable, i.e. that she was in some way personally 
responsible for her stigmatised status, a form of internalised oppression. People may not 
actually stand in judgement of her and she may only ‘think’ that she is being watched, 
but for Stella even just the thought of being watched had a profound effect. This is not 
uncommon. Knowledge about widely recognised stereotypes and their possible 
relevance to an individual can change behaviour even in the absence of potential 
stigmatisers (Major and O’Brien, 2005).  
Momentary “freezing” could also be understood as a means of temporarily resisting what 
Stella anticipates as a harsh and potentially overwhelming public appraisal. Yang et al 
(2007:1531) suggested that stigma may have ‘psychobiological manifestations’, in the 
sense that what Stella described is not simply a socially constructed phenomenon but is 
the actual ‘embodiment of a sociosomatic process’. “Freezing” in this sense could be 
understood as the bodily manifestation of an involuntary stigma coping strategy (Miller 
and Kaiser, 2001). A brief paralysis, or disengagement from the situation, might give 
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Stella pause, a short-lived hiatus where she can shore up her resources, bolstering 
herself to withstand and manage her disrupted embodiment.  
Stella may “freeze” because she is also concerned about and possibly fears confirming 
her stigmatised status. Stigmatised people who are unable to regulate intrusive thoughts 
about manifesting stereotyped behaviours may be less able to resist their deleterious 
effects (Miller and Kaiser, 2001). Schmader et al.(2008) suggested that people who 
demonstrate hyper-vigilant responses to stereotype threat seem to have difficulty 
resolving competing cognitions based on trying to forge a positive link between self and 
place whilst at the same time resisting negative links. This contest may overly burden 
executive function, even for tasks such as walking that are usually managed 
automatically. In this sense Stella may “freeze” simply because processing the sort of 
threat posed by the stigma depletes cognitive resources (Klein and Boals, 2001) and 
these resources may already be diminished by the cognitive effort involved in walking 
(as discussed in the previous chapter). Therefore it seems that both the disordered 
walking and “freezing” are problematical for Stella.  
At a more hermeneutic level, the pauses in the above extract seem to signify that Stella 
found it difficult to account for “freezing”. Trying to make sense of it, she gives it a name; 
‘nervous thing’, ‘phobia’, ‘nervousness’, but this does not seem to capture what it is she 
experiences. She continues to search for a better explanation; ‘head’, ‘brain’, but direct 
access to the meaning of this experience seems to be just beyond words. Later in her 
account it emerged that Stella had described this problem to her consultant who gave it 
a diagnosis: ‘phobia’. Stella seems to struggle with phobia as a valid interpretation of her 
experiences, perhaps because of the implication that it is in some way irrational. Such 
labelling might suggest to Stella that she should be able to resist and ultimately 
overcome this particular problem. Returning to Goffman’s (1963) terms, Stella may 
therefore have a problematic virtual social identity: a stigmatised identity and a medically 
constructed phobic identity.  
So Stella, like Jim, has difficulty walking and she also has difficulties with self-
consciousness in public. It seems that Stella assumes that she bears a stigma, and as 
with Jim, Stella infers that her disordered walking will draw critical appraisal. “Freezing” 
further complicates this picture; it carries a diagnosis which in itself is pejorative. Stella 
may also feel responsible for this behaviour, as if the ‘phobia’ is her fault. Unlike Jim, 
Stella did not talk about disability rights and there was no evidence in Stella’s account of 
the sort of cognitive re-structuring evident in Jim’s narrative. This may have adverse 
consequences for Stella because this type of voluntary coping mechanism is thought to 
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have protective effects through promoting psychological adaption (Miller and Kaiser, 
2001). One further extract from Stella’s account adds another layer to this analysis: 
‘I wouldn’t go outside in the street with a stick. I make myself [walk without the stick] … 
because I want to be able to be free as long as I can. Now whether that’s the right 
attitude I don’t know. But I suppose it’s pride in a way isn’t it? […] You know I don’t want 
to seem to be handicapped in anyway.’  
As with Jim, the walking stick is an additional signal of difference that is assumed to 
attract unwanted attention and critical appraisal from others. Stella does not want to be 
seen using a walking stick for fear of being judged as ‘handicapped’. Being seen in this 
way is diminishing for Stella. She explains this in terms of ‘pride’. It seems that Stella 
walks without a stick in a deliberate attempt to maintain her personal dignity, her sense 
of self. Drawing on Yang et al (2007), what seems most at stake here is Stella’s positive 
sense of self; the idea of being ‘handicapped’ subverts this preferred identity. Stella also 
frames the walking stick itself as dis-abling; it is almost as if the stick in some way 
tethers her, limiting her freedom and independence. There is also a temporal quality to 
this passage; ‘I want to be free as long as I can’, the walking stick seems to prompt 
Stella to anticipate the time when she will no longer have the freedom to choose 
whether to use it or not. Again, possibly at a period of transition, the landscape of 
Stella’s being-in-the-world seems to shift as a seemingly inevitable but unpredictable 
decline is foregrounded.  
In both these extracts Stella seems to anticipate the scrutiny of others as shameful and 
demeaning. Stella’s episodes of paralysis and her rejection of the walking stick could be 
understood as a way of resisting disclosure of what she assumes or fears is an 
imperfect self. Refusing to use a walking stick may also fulfil an important need to retain 
an existential sense of personal freedom and control in the face of potentially 
inescapable and progressive disability. There are similarities with Jim’s account, 
particularly with reference to inferred stigma brought upon by disordered walking which 
is further complicated by the introduction of a walking stick. Both accounts also reveal a 
temporal orientation to do with keeping a possible future self, one who is both more 
impaired and dependent, in the “not yet” rather than the “already” realm of personal 
experience.  
People, like Stella, who are unable to tune out every day stresses that arise from 
assumed prejudice, may find it difficult to overcome this sort of chronic strain if their 
coping mechanisms are unsuccessful (Miller and Kaiser, 2001). The sort of coping 
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mechanism Stella described, whether voluntary or involuntary, seemed to focus on 
avoiding negative consequences rather than promoting more optimistic outcomes. Over 
time these sorts of strategies are thought to be psychologically depleting (Shih, 2004). 
Jim, by comparison, seemed to have a strong sense of injustice and adopted an active, 
more empowered response to stigma, at least on a cognitive or explicit level. This 
approach perhaps helped to deconstruct his virtual identity and, although by no means 
straightforward, could act to replenish his sense of self, especially over the longer term 
(Shih, 2004). Jim’s more confrontational stance, his sense of righteous anger, as well as 
his advocacy role and group identity seems to fit with a model of stress response that is 
more likely to develop resilience (Shih, 2004) and personal empowerment (Corrigan et 
al.2009), and may also work by externalising through attributing blame to others instead 
of himself (Major and O’Brien, 2005). Stella, on the other hand, seems to have more 
difficulty, at least in the short term, in actively resisting her stigmatised status. She is a 
member of a support group but finds it difficult to get to meetings, and possibly lacks the 
supportive networks that are thought to be important in sustaining or helping to 
reconstruct a valued sense of self. 
 
7.4. Susan 
 
Here, an extract from Susan’s account is introduced which has a slightly different quality 
from the accounts considered so far. Susan was in later mid-life, retired and lived with 
her husband. She had lived with ataxia for many years but was not certain about the 
date of onset or diagnosis. Like Stella and Jim, Susan talked about a social situation 
where she anticipated unfavourable scrutiny and disapproval not because her 
disordered gait as such drew attention, but because it was inconsistent and perhaps not 
“bad enough” to be accepted by others;  
‘My social life now tends to be on the computer – e-mails to people with ataxia. I don’t 
like to go into the social situation where I feel I’m being judged. So I’ve got a bit of an 
inferiority complex really so I don’t like to go out. I don’t like to be in family gatherings 
cos I feel so unsure of myself. […] I just feel that people are judging me. You know if I 
want to get up and go to the Ladies I think people are going to watch me. Because 
they’ve heard that I’ve got ataxia and they think ‘Why does she need a stick?’ or you 
know … ‘She doesn’t seem that bad’. Just I don’t want to be judged. Cos sometimes I 
forget it and I’m sure they look at me and think ‘well you’ve forgotten your stick and 
you’re walking all right’. And I just don’t want that sort of judgement. I find it easier not to 
socialise and I can manage without socialising really.’    
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Here, as with Jim and Stella, there is a concern about being watched, ‘I think people are 
going to watch me’, and about critical appraisal, ‘being judged’. For Susan, it seems she 
assumed that people, particularly extended family, pass judgement not necessarily 
about her disordered walking but about the legitimacy of her condition. She inferred that 
fluctuating disability perhaps lacked credibility. Susan did not always need a walking 
stick; she could manage if she was not too tired or if she could reach for furniture for 
support. Susan seemed to assume that this inconsistency was misunderstood by people 
who knew about the ataxia, ‘She doesn’t seem that bad’ and like Jim, she ascribed 
behaviours (e.g. hostile stares) and expressions (critical voices) to these “others” who 
she believed stood in judgement of her. In this sense Susan, like Jim and Stella, might 
have a high stigma consciousness. Rather than face delegitimation, Susan has taken 
what seems to be the rather drastic step of withdrawing from most face to face 
encounters with others. Similar to Jim, Susan engages in self-talk; ‘I find it easier not to 
socialise and I can manage without socialising really’, possibly as a means of justifying 
or minimising the possible negative consequences associated with retreating from social 
interactions.  
Escaping to a private world where “rule breaking” is more readily tolerated has also 
been recognised as a stigma avoidance strategy used by people living with Parkinson’s 
disease (Nijhof, 1995). Disengagement from physical and social domains in which one’s 
self-esteem is threatened is a recognised voluntary coping mechanism (Miller and 
Kaiser, 2001; Major and O’Brien, 2005). Physical withdrawal or avoidance often 
coincides with membership of self-help groups that are unlikely to reinforce a devalued 
status (Pinel, 1999). Susan does have a social life but it is confined to her closest 
relationships and other people with ataxia via the internet or support groups. Susan may 
feel safe in these environments and free from people who, she feels, would ordinarily 
disapprove of or censure her (‘everybody there’s not going to judge me’). Furthermore, 
as Susan is an active member of this group, she believes other members are ‘grateful’ 
for the work she does on its behalf. This positive feedback, the sense that she is making 
a valued contribution, may in turn give Susan a stronger sense of self-worth. Susan 
therefore differs from Jim and Stella because she has opted to limit her social 
interactions to her closest family and other people who live with the same condition. 
Goffman (1963:31) refers to these as ‘sympathetic others’ or the ‘wise’, people who 
reinforce acceptance and put others at their ease.  
On first reading, Susan’s strategy of disengagement through avoidance might be 
considered as a passive and unhelpful means of reducing personally diminishing 
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experiences. Looking closely at the words Susan uses in the earlier extract (‘I find it 
easier not to socialise and I can manage without socialising really’) suggests that she 
has perhaps settled for making do, rather than actually making a positive and concrete 
decision about withdrawing from most aspects of public life. However, by simply 
focussing on what she considers most important, her ‘core lived values’ (Yang et 
al.2007:1530), Susan may in fact be enacting Croker and Major’s (1989:616) concept of 
enhancing self-esteem by ‘selectively devaluing’ dimensions of her experience in which 
she feels poorly judged, and focussing on what matters most (her family and helping 
others in similar circumstances). Miller and Kaiser (2001) suggested that although 
disengagement coping strategies may result in quite negative outcomes for some (e.g. 
failure to achieve goals in other valued settings), it might be inappropriate to stop people 
from using this type of stigma management strategy. For Susan, avoiding people who 
make her feel inferior, and seeking out those who enhance her self-esteem may be a 
personally suitable strategy, especially if she is unlikely to gain anything positive from 
these other encounters.  
Unfortunately, this is not a stable or uncomplicated position; it does not seem to confer 
immunity from stigma in perpetuity, nor does it completely protect Susan from the 
harmful feelings associated with living with what she assumes is a stigmatised status. 
For example, Susan says that she has ‘got a bit of an inferiority complex’, which perhaps 
points towards feelings of personal inadequacy and self-doubt in the present that seem 
to stem from interactions with others in the past. These feelings may be strongly 
reinforced if her sense of self is threatened in places where she thinks she should feel 
most protected, for example at home. The following extract suggests perhaps that this is 
the case: ‘My daughter doesn’t leave them [the grandchildren] with me very often. And I 
wonder if she thinks I can cope.’ A theme of distrust from close others continues with 
this example. For Susan, it seems that her body cannot be trusted to be consistently 
impaired or unimpaired, and Susan cannot be trusted to look after the grandchildren. 
Such beliefs could be particularly devastating or pernicious especially because family 
members maybe the most frequently encountered, strongly connected and valued 
“others” for people living with discreditable conditions (Ablon et al.2002; Lee et al.2005).   
Susan also differs in comparison to Stella and Jim because she did not perceive the 
walking stick as a stigma symbol. Susan claimed: ‘the stick has really been my greatest 
benefit’, without the stick Susan feels that she is ‘toddling, walking a silly walk’ but if she 
uses the stick or simply takes her time and thinks about moving then she can ‘usually 
carry on the same as anybody else’ or ‘like there was nothing wrong with me at all’. In 
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this sense the walking stick could be understood as enabling, or as allowing her to ‘pass’ 
(Goffman, 1963:95) so that her disordered walking does not draw unwanted attention. 
Social comparison, measuring herself against others, suggests to Susan that her 
walking is discreditable, ‘silly’, possibly childish, in other words that she is not a 
competent adult. The walking stick corrects this difference and offers a means of fitting 
in. “Passing” in this sense, actively constructs a virtual identity which is more in keeping 
with Susan’s actual and preferred identity. The situation is complicated however, 
because in less challenging environments, Susan can cope without the stick. 
Inconsistent use of a walking aid, she believes, breaks the rules governing social 
behaviour and it is on this rule breaking rather than on her disordered walking or use of 
a walking stick where she feels she is judged.  
For Jim and Stella, interaction in public spaces and places provoked critical self-
appraisal, turning the same standards against themselves that others have used (or are 
assumed to have used) to judge them. Susan also infers harsh judgement for having a 
disability that (she assumes) lacks credibility. In this next example, Julia also seems to 
carry an assumption that her social behaviour is in some way unacceptable.  
 
7.5. Julia 
 
Julia was in later midlife, retired and lived alone. Julia had lived with ataxia for over 
twenty years. The following quotation from Julia’s account connects with the previous 
examples but extends the experiential understanding of what it might be like to live with 
disordered movement in a public space by drawing on a slightly different dimension of 
experience;   
‘… because I don’t want to seem odd in public it makes me very cautious, very slow in 
what I’m doing. When biscuits are passed round I don’t take them because of crumbs, 
and I drink water when I’m anywhere else, because I don’t want to spill things on other 
people’s floors. Perhaps as I grew up you considered other people, but you were still 
independent. I’m much less … I won’t do things that might cause offence …’ 
The above quotation has some resonance with Stella’s and Susan’s accounts and 
seems to share the same concerns about infringing commonly accepted rules of 
behaviour in public that have been identified as salient for people living with Parkinson’s 
disease (Nijhof, 1995). Julia differed from Stella and Susan though because she 
seemed to hold a belief that she had a moral responsibility not to offend other people. 
This strong sense of propriety was instilled in childhood (‘as I grew up you considered 
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other people’) and possibly constitutes a deeply ingrained way of understanding the 
world. Julia’s disordered movement and its potential consequences might no longer 
meet her own high standards of socially acceptable behaviour. Rather than claiming 
indifference like Jim, Julia seemed to find “motor impropriety” personally unacceptable 
or even disrespectful if left unchecked, and she seemed to assume that others would 
too. Julia therefore used self-censoring strategies to reduce the risk of transgressing her 
own and, she assumed, others’ codes of behaviour, and to perhaps help preserve a 
more morally acceptable sense of self. As suggested by Goffman (1963:125) Julia’s 
strategy could be understood as a way of ‘covering’. Julia adopts a presentation of 
herself that is congruent with social norms and expectations. Covering behaviour is 
thought to reduce tension in a social situation where the stigma is already apparent, to 
make it easier to overlook the stigma and to sustain natural or spontaneous involvement 
with the stigmatised (Goffman, 1963). The same strategy is seen in the following 
quotation, the circumstances of which perhaps reinforce Julia’s view that her behaviour 
in social situations matters: 
‘I have to make sure I don’t have alcohol on my breath if people help me out because 
they’ll assume […] Well, often people say you should take more water with it, but only 
joking. It’s not meant offensively. And I guess in shops, sometimes some people get 
anxious. They’re anxious when you’re not clear because they don’t know why.’ 
These encounters and everyday discourses reinforce Julia’s beliefs about the validity of 
socially constructed rules of behaviour. Not all rules count but, as discussed previously 
with reference to Jim’s account, breaking specific rules about alcohol consumption in the 
wrong place, and at the wrong time, does seem to matter. According to Miller and Myers 
(1998) people like Julia could be understood as using compensation strategies to 
overcome the mismatch between available skills and social demands. As long as the 
level of prejudice is not too high (where it is assumed that prejudice would occur 
regardless of compensatory skill and effort) and the compensation has a reasonable 
chance of being effective, then potentially difficult social contexts can be safely 
negotiated and negative outcomes (‘I don’t want to seem odd in public’) avoided. In this 
sense, Julia’s strategies could be understood to work against the stigma by meeting her 
perceived obligations to safeguard the ‘moral order’ (Keusch et al.2006:526) and, in a 
similar way to Stella, by resisting disclosure of an imperfect self. 
Taking the analysis one step further, it is possible to suggest that applying and 
maintaining the sort of self-surveillance Julia describes could be quite wearing and 
potentially quite restricting in terms of accepting invitations or participating in activities 
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outside her home. These sorts of behaviours, conforming to and adapting to the 
assumed expectations of non-disabled people, are also considered a form of social 
oppression (Reeve, 2002). By engaging in behaviours that control the presentation of 
the self in public, Julia is also demonstrating a coping strategy that is well recognised in 
the literature; primary-control coping. Although this type of compensatory behaviour may 
be effective in helping people achieve meaningful goals, it seems that it is not without 
cost (Miller and Kaiser, 2001). As her ataxia progresses, this strict application of rules 
that are assumed to govern social acceptability could place limits on the range and 
extent to which Julia is able to meaningfully participate in collective activities, and the 
degree to which she can derive a sense of satisfaction from these encounters. 
Furthermore, these self-monitoring strategies would seem to involve the same sort of 
conscious attention that Julia (and others) recounted with reference to the exhausting 
effects of managing disordered movement, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
DeJordy (2008) argued that impression management (such as that described by Julia) 
demands constant vigilance and is consequently cognitively taxing. Stigma management 
might therefore be understood as an additional contributing factor to the overwhelming 
fatigue described by the majority of participants in this study. This is because 
presentation of a publically acceptable self seems to entail on-going effortful self-
monitoring and / or long-term emotional investment. 
Consonant with Susan’s experiences, close family members also seemed to sabotage 
Julia’s efforts to reduce the salience of her perceived stigma. Julia’s son for example 
seemed to reinforce feelings of inadequacy or incompetence:  
‘Whenever we cross the road he always holds me by the scruff of the collar. I say to him 
‘Have you any idea how that makes me feel?’  
What Julia describes here seems particularly demeaning as she is commandeered and 
propelled across the road against her will. According to Watermeyer and Swartz 
(2008:604) Julia’s son’s actions might suggest an anxiety borne from a sense of needing 
to do something to help or rescue when faced with a another person’s impairments 
which is then managed through an unsolicited ‘doing response’. Although Julia almost 
laughs off this incident and possibly does not fully communicate the hurt involved, she 
could also in this instance be acting to shield her son from the potentially harsh 
judgement of the researcher. Julia’s son’s actions however, may represent an incursion 
into Julia’s bodily and psychological boundaries that are strongly indicative of the 
oppression inherent in the social relations of people living with disability (Watermeyer 
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and Swartz, 2008). Such behaviour, particularly from a family member may be 
particularly wounding (Ablon et al.2002; Lee et al.2005).  
 
7.6 Harry: Discrediting Experiences at Work 
 
Places of work are constituted by embodied action with others and are contingent upon 
interpersonal relations in local social and cultural worlds. Four of the five participants 
who worked, recounted discrediting experiences that would suggest that their employers 
treated them differently (and unfavourably) because of ataxia (Table 7.1, p145). Jim for 
example talked about being singled out as different because of an assigned special 
status (‘wrap you in cotton wool’), a status that Jim actively resisted. Hugh felt 
marginalised (‘I’m being put to one side really’) and pressurised at work (‘they try their 
best to snow me under so that I’d leave’). However, it was Harry’s account that perhaps 
most clearly communicated the complex undercurrents at play in the work setting.  
Harry was in his early thirties, he had worked full time for the same company for just 
over ten years and was a full-time wheelchair user. When asked how important work 
was in the context of the rest of his life, Harry responded: 
‘Basically, I work … I work a hell of a lot. I don’t take a lunch break, you know. I take 
pride in my work. I just do it to death really. And every time I go on holiday it [work] just 
tends to fall apart. It’s quite enjoyable to watch, you know. Oh I am needed! (laughs) But 
they won’t say that. […] I’m always there if they need somebody to help […] Yeah, so 
because … it’s really weird, because these people need help […] because they need 
help you feel in a different position. They’re actually asking a disabled person for help. 
So through that, people at work don’t see me as disabled. Which … that’s what I want to 
be seen as, you know, normal bloke in a wheelchair.’  
Harry seems to perceive work as a place where he can be counted alongside everyone 
else, where his physical impairments are irrelevant and where, in his eyes, he has 
achieved a position of respect. Work in this sense validates his preferred identity ‘normal 
bloke in a wheelchair’, and subverts any sense that he is a victim in need of special 
treatment or help. Working long hours and always being available might be understood 
as contributing to identity management, weakening a disabled identity whilst projecting a 
more acceptable identity as perhaps a workaholic (‘I just do it to death really’) or 
dependable employee (‘I’m always there’). However, Harry’s account also revealed a 
more complex picture: 
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Harry: ‘it’s funny cos they’ve always treated me the same as all the others, and now 
because I’ve started having to have different things … well run out of steam […] And 
they don’t accept change very well. Flexible working. My big boss said ‘I’m not 
condoning flexible working, I’m not having people taking time off’, stuff like this. ‘But we’ll 
make an exception for you’.’  
Interviewer: ‘How did you feel about that?’ 
Harry: ‘I basically had to … well I took it and just went with it. […] They’re fantastic 
people, don’t get me wrong, but … they get confused sometimes. It’s like they don’t 
have much money and we had to work somewhere else for a year until a new place was 
found and built. So for a year I was bumped up and down the stairs. But … yeah. I 
tackled the big boss about it, and he said ‘Oh yeah, we’re saving money for the new 
building.’ And they put in a lift for me in the new building, so fair enough. So I could get 
everywhere in the new building which … he thought made it ok for this portakabin, yeah. 
And it’s difficult isn’t it? You don’t want to like say, you know. For 100 quid or whatever 
we could have quite a nice … [ramp].’   
Harry’s account of his experiences at work seems to suggest quite a conflicted position: 
‘They’re fantastic people, don’t get me wrong, but…’ What he says suggests that he 
holds his employers in high esteem and the only obvious criticism against his employers 
in the passage quoted above is that they get ‘confused’ or ‘run out of steam’ or ‘don’t 
accept change very well’. However, the subtext, what Harry tells of his experiences, 
reveals something more threatening. It seems as if Harry’s perceptions of the 
organisation’s values and commitment to him as an employee have shifted. It is almost 
as if Harry has to collude with the discriminatory practices he described, accepting short-
term punishment (not providing a ramp or lift) for longer-term gain (‘they put in a lift for 
me in the new building’). The first person reference here is interesting, suggesting 
perhaps that Harry perceived that the lift was only installed for his benefit, emphasising 
the special favour inherent in the phrase ‘we’ll make an exception for you’. Repetition of 
‘big boss’ also seems to convey a sense of subordination, as if Harry had no choice but 
to accept this special status. Later in his account, Harry revealed that although the lift 
materialised, he was unable to access the room where the IT equipment was stored (‘I 
can’t even get the wheelchair into the room’), and elsewhere computer equipment was 
put out of his reach. He laughed this off; ‘But it just means I can do less work (laughs)’ 
perhaps to deflect the researcher from probing further about what he felt about this 
situation. 
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So whilst Harry worked to bolster a preferred identity at work, powerful others 
undermined him by conferring special status, giving him help not offered to others, 
making sure that he knew that he was treated differently and by making life difficult in a 
very practical sense. Harry’s long working hours take on another meaning when viewed 
in this context. Perhaps he felt he had no choice in this professional domain but to work 
long hours and to conform as a model employee; ‘well I took it and just went with it.’  
DeJordy (2008) argued (with referenced to stigma in the work place) that organisations, 
through developing relationships with employees over time, carry expectations about 
how these relationships should develop. In this sense, Harry’s working self-concept 
(Markus and Nurius, 1986) or his preferred identity, what he valued most and what was 
at stake at work, appeared both threatened and compromised by the experiences he 
described, and the expectations embedded in the relationship he had developed with his 
employer. Therefore, Harry might accept what would be intolerable outside the 
workplace because it enabled him to hold onto what mattered most; an identity as a 
‘normal bloke in a wheelchair’ (with a full time job). The workplace could therefore be 
seen for Harry as a particular public domain where compromises and discrimination had 
to be accepted in order to sustain a preferred sense of self.  
 
7.7 Summary 
 
Coleman, (1986) argued that stereotyping discounts individuality by placing people into 
categories which instantly devalues them. Jim, Stella, Susan, Julia and Harry resisted 
this sort of out-grouping and all participants identified in Table 7.1 (p145) took steps to 
reduce the impact of stigma, and to challenge Goffman’s (1963) concept of stigma as 
“master status”. The analysis offered here supports other work (Scott and Miller, 1986; 
Miller and Kaiser, 2001; Oyserman and Swim, 2001; Shih, 2004; Major and O’Brien, 
2005) which suggests that responses to stigma are multi-faceted, dynamic, situation-
specific and interact with other dimensions of living with a progressive long term 
condition in both time and place.  
Four participants expressed little or no concern about stigma (Graham, Scott, Joan and 
Ted). Many facets of their lifeworlds may have created or reflected such positive 
attitudes towards the social self. Certainly, basic sociodemographic variables such as 
gender and age appeared unrelated to the experience of stigma (see appendix N) with 
three of the eight male participants not describing experiences of stigma and one of the 
four women. Stigma was described by participants across the whole age range of those 
interviewed (see appendix N). Complex facets of the lifeworld such as employment 
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context, and the influence of certain powerful others in their social contexts, may have 
been far more influential. For example, accounting for divergent experiences, Ted, who 
also worked, did not report stigma. Ted’s work environment, a large financial services 
corporation, may enact anti-discrimination policies more effectively and may have better 
staff training compared to the smaller firm employing Harry, who did describe stigma. 
Also as a larger company, Ted’s firm may have employed more disabled people who 
had a stronger collective voice than perhaps Harry’s solitary voice. Ted’s senior position 
may also have conferred some protection from the discrediting behaviour of others. 
Joan had retired before her symptoms developed and at the time of the interview lived in 
her own flat in a retirement complex. Although Joan compared herself unfavourably with 
older and more able others in terms of her physical capacity, it seemed that her 
particular social context, where people might be expected to need help or to use walking 
aids, may also have created a less stigmatising environment. Graham and Scott were 
not working at the time of the interview and this may have influenced the contexts they 
drew upon during the discussion. As they were interviewed together it could be 
suggested that this created an uncomfortable situation where difficult issues like stigma 
could not be addressed. However, both participants recounted what might be 
considered distressing and painful experiences during the interview that would refute 
this theory. Also, unlike Joan and Ted, there was no evidence in the accounts to suggest 
that either Scott or Graham lived in particularly favourable circumstances which might 
protect them from stigmatising experiences. Therefore, whilst it is difficult to explore an 
absence, it seems that Ted’s and Joan’s social situation may have been different 
enough to account for their more positive experiences, whereas for Scott and Graham 
there were no clear differences to account for the lack of reference to stigma in their 
accounts.  
 
7.8 Discussion 
 
An impression of this theme and its significance surfaced quite early on in the analytic 
process of individual accounts. Poignant incidents or particular decisions that distanced 
participants from the company of others clearly stood out as saying something important 
about the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia. For example, Julia’s 
decision to restrict her social behaviours so as not to ‘cause offence’ had a powerful 
impact on the researcher during analysis and prompted further hermeneutic questions 
about the social implications of living with ataxia. Insights from more subtle or complex 
references to stigma were found in other accounts but only became apparent after 
working with the text over a longer period. Stella’s description of walking in public (‘If I 
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think people are watching me I just freeze and my legs won’t work’), is perhaps another 
good example. Here, insight about problematic public appearance surfaced only after 
working through the researcher’s initial biomedical assumptions about Stella’s problems 
with walking.  
 
The findings reported in this chapter are new with respect to enriching the understanding 
of the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia and yet resonate with other 
studies of people living with movement disorders such as Parkinson’s disease (Bramley 
and Eatough, 2008; Nijhof, 1995) and multiple sclerosis (Grytten and Måseide, 2005, 
2006; Toombs, 1995) as well as aligned conditions such as Tourette syndrome (Davis et 
al.2004). However, these findings are the first to detail stigmatising experiences as 
described by people living with ataxia and to particularise experiences across a number 
of social situations. Participants’ accounts revealed a complex interaction between 
stigma, identity and existential concerns which emphasised the embedded and 
contextualised nature of their lived experience. These findings therefore also reinforce 
the views of several authors who stressed the importance of closely studying stigma 
from the perspective of stigmatised individuals (Miller and Kaiser, 2001; Keusch et 
al.2006; Kleinman and Hall-Clifford, 2009). 
The findings reported here connect with those of Boutté (1987) who conducted the only 
other study to explore stigma among people living with Machado-Joseph disease 
(SCA3). As discussed in chapter 3, Boutté (1987) interviewed key informants in two 
distinct cultural settings; a small island in the Azores and an area of California known to 
have a high immigrant population of people from the Azores. Both cultural groups 
reported stigmatising attitudes and behaviours directed towards individuals with “The 
Stumbling Disease”. American participants reported stigmatising behaviours that were 
similar to participants in the present study, but particularly emphasised the stereotyping 
and social labelling concerned with apparent intoxication (with alcohol or drugs). 
However, the ways in which the stigma was mitigated differed in two ways from the 
present findings. Firstly, interviewees in America perceived so called ‘stigma symbols’ 
(Goffman, 1963:114) such as walking sticks as beneficial rather than stigmatising 
because they worked to confirm a preferred disabled identity rather than a discredited 
drunk identity. Secondly, in encounters with others, people with ataxia described 
themselves as having a different neurological condition, such as MS, to resist the ‘tribal 
stigma’ described by Goffman (1963:14) that attends Machado-Joseph disease. By 
contrast, key informants in the Azores identified stigmatising behaviours which were far 
removed from those reported by the participants in the present study. This was because 
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public intoxication was not a stigmatised category in Azorean culture and also because 
there was a well-established folk model of the condition which differed from the UK and 
US context which was no less diminishing, and was in fact deeply discriminatory. 
Although Boutté conducted her study over 25 years ago, this cross-cultural comparison 
helps to illustrate that the findings of the present study may be highly location- and 
culture- specific. 
The understanding of stigma discussed in this chapter is drawn from intense idiographic 
analysis of individual accounts. This analysis does not intend to play down the influence 
of external oppressive forces or to portray the participants in this study as helpless or 
passive victims, or to illustrate the stigmatising experiences discussed in this chapter as 
simply a “personal tragedy” (Scambler, 2006). It was also not the intention of this 
analysis to create a stigmatised status or stereotype such as “disordered walking” or 
“disrupted embodiment” which may have worked to irrevocably label the participants in 
this study and to situate the stigma within the individual. Dear et al (1997) suggested 
that they knew of no terminology that was non-stigmatising when discussing disability. A 
pragmatic decision was therefore taken to use words that best described the 
phenomenon of interest whilst focussing on getting to grips with understanding the 
participants’ experiential world. In keeping with Yang et al (2007:1532), what seemed to 
matter most in the participants’ ‘lived engagements’ was the desire to be understood on 
their own terms and to preserve an acceptable and valued sense of self that was not 
defined by ataxia.  
The fundamental power of a dominant group who make individuals feel diminished and 
devalued was realised in the narratives of the participants in this study. Powerful others 
(family members, Julia’s son and Susan’s daughter-in-law, work colleagues and 
managers as well as total strangers) were encountered in the intersubjective spaces of 
everyday activity and everyday environments. The behaviours adopted and described 
by participants in response to these experiences resonated with Goffman’s (1963) ideas 
about passing and covering, and Scambler’s (1998) concept of felt stigma; surveillance 
by the other (the stare or gaze) and self-surveillance or internalised oppression. These 
conceptions have been subsequently critiqued by authors writing from the perspective of 
the social model of disability (e.g. Reeve, 2002; Scambler, 2004; Thomas, 2010) for 
focussing on the individual and for not identifying the broader psycho-emotional 
dimension of disablism within which these behaviours operate and come into being. 
Reeve (2002), for example, argued that individuals who respond to stigma by passing or 
covering, struggle to challenge the underlying disablism because it operates at a 
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subconscious level. In this context, passing or covering and self-surveillance are seen 
as a form of disability denial in the sense that these behaviours unwittingly “buy into” the 
hegemony of established social “norms”. Reeve (2002:503) further argued that ‘coming 
out’ as a disabled person and embracing a positive disabled identity would help to 
mitigate stigma by overcoming internalised oppression. However, Jim’s experiences, 
and those of the other participants discussed in this chapter, would suggest that 
adopting behaviours that resist psycho-emotional disablism is not a straight forward or 
pain free process.  
Jim, for example, was the only participant who had actively engaged in the disability 
movement and he drew on this discourse in his narrative. Using arguments familiar to 
disability activists, Jim talked about reframing his sense of self and at least claimed a 
positive disabled identity. However, the idiographic analysis demonstrated that this 
positive sense of self was by no means secure. Jim’s reconstructed identity was in flux 
throughout his account and shifted with respect to his particular circumstances and 
existential concerns. Therefore Jim’s experiences would suggest that simply adopting or 
becoming familiar with the disability movement might not automatically secure protection 
against stigma, or re-frame an individual’s sense of self in a permanent way. Jim 
reported adopting both passing and covering behaviours at critical periods in his life, and 
still felt hurt and angered by what he assumed were pejorative responses to his 
disordered walking. Jim’s account therefore suggested that stressful experiences may 
disrupt the capacity to retain a sense of agency and autonomy, and to preserve a 
positive sense of self despite an awareness of the emancipatory philosophy embedded 
in the aspirations of the disability movement. In this respect, Scambler’s (1998) and 
Goffman’s (1963) ideas about stigma and the behavioural responses adopted to cope 
with the effects remain valid but, as argued by authors in the field of disability studies, 
should be understood not simply at the level of the individual but also within the larger 
contexts of the social oppression paradigm.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
The analysis presented in this chapter cautiously points towards an understanding that 
living with progressive cerebellar ataxia may, for some individuals, involve a problematic 
disclosure of the self and “socially incompetent behaviours” which echo the experiences 
and concerns of people living with other neurological conditions. For some people these 
experiences may take on a particular significance and meaning at times of transition 
(e.g. periods of deterioration). Forging a positive social identity at work also seemed to 
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add to the burden of living with ataxia. Further, the analysis revealed that people with 
ataxia may engage in behaviours designed to resist the negative consequences of 
ataxia and to preserve a more satisfactory sense of self. For some, these behaviours 
had deleterious effects in terms of reducing activities and reinforcing social stereotypes 
whilst for others, positive and affirming behaviours were difficult to sustain in the midst of 
looming existential crises. These findings were revealing because even though the 
behaviours and strategies were not uncomplicated in themselves, they were also, at 
times, wrapped up with efforts to contain and protect the self from the worrying concerns 
of living with a progressive long term condition. In this respect, the findings presented 
and discussed in this chapter suggest that ataxia should not be understood as “simply” a 
physical disorder. It should (in similar ways to Parkinson’s disease) be understood as a 
located illness (Nijhof, 1995) situated, experienced and managed in the inter-subjective 
spaces and places that formulate an individual’s local social world, where, according to 
Sartre, ‘one’s sense of one’s self is at stake’ (Moran, 2000:355). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 169 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Super-ordinate Theme 3 
 
‘The cerebellum should be a tight cauliflower and mine was two sticks of celery’ 
(Julia) 
 
Description: Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This super-ordinate theme describes the participants’ involvement in a disease-centric 
world; it portrays the meeting of the lifeworld with the world of biomedicine. This theme 
intends to demonstrate that for participants in this study, these worlds are simply 
juxtaposed. They come alongside but the biomedical world, in trying to overcome the 
distinct horizons of its own perspectives, seems at best to achieve a naïve assimilation 
of the participants’ world and at worst a somewhat careless disregard. The extract used 
in the title of this theme refers to the analogy employed by medical practitioners to 
explain the results of Julia’s MRI scan. Although stripped of context, this short phrase 
points towards the difficulty participants recounted in making sense of biomedical 
information. Julia was left nonplussed by this description. It perhaps conveyed a 
worrying picture of the cerebellum unfurling, but the real meaning of this and the 
implications for Julia, what this meant for her in her world, remained hidden and 
uncertain. The lay terminology could be seen as an attempt to create an intersection of 
meaning between the biomedical world and Julia’s life world, similar to overlapping 
circles in a Venn diagram or Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ of understanding (2004 
[1975]:305) but the intended meaning remained hidden and left Julia more rather than 
less confused about what was happening to her.  
Two subthemes convey the overarching theme in detail. The first subtheme draws 
attention to the participants’ experience of testing and diagnosis. The participants 
described a decontextualised self, where healthcare professionals appeared to see 
them purely in terms of examinations, assessments, results and ultimately, if possible, 
diagnosis. This subtheme also captures the discrediting experiences that, for some, 
accompanied this process, as well as the uncertainty and tortuous nature of the journey 
into and through this particular world.  
The second subtheme identifies the genetic component of the progressive ataxias as an 
issue for participants in this study. The majority of participants alluded to or directly 
addressed existential concerns about genetic inheritance and transmission. Participants, 
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on the whole, did not seem to make a clear distinction between diagnostic testing and 
genetic testing. Some participants also voiced reservations about the value of genetic 
testing for a condition where there is no cure or effective treatment. This subject was not 
an intentional focus of the main study and is worthy of deeper investigation in its own 
right, however, it is perhaps not surprising that participants’ narratives in some way 
attended to a topic that, for most, carried a heavy significance.  
Whilst the description of this master theme appears linear (tracing a path from initial 
consultations, testing, through to diagnosis), the participants described a rather more 
complex and iterative involvement with the world of biomedicine. The majority of 
accounts pointed towards the need to establish and maintain on-going relationships with 
healthcare professionals which operated almost exclusively within a biomedical 
framework. Participants described, for example, actively working to sustain partnerships 
often at considerable personal cost, in order to gain valued information and resources 
such as further diagnostic tests but also advice about how to best manage their 
condition. The majority of participants (n = 9) portrayed an uneasy dependency on 
healthcare practitioners and through interpreting their accounts, the researcher gained 
glimpses of a complex paradox. Investigations and consultations were recounted as 
bewildering, and at times humiliating or frustrating experiences. At the end of these 
encounters participants reported feeling stuck, no further forward in understanding or 
making sense of their condition. At the same time they felt compelled to revisit this world 
and to seek further testing or advice. The following analysis and later discussion depicts 
this complex relationship which seemed to form an important cornerstone of the lived 
experience of the majority of participants.  
Quotations from the majority of participants (n = 9) have been used to illustrate the 
theme and to demonstrate the extent of the shared experiences. Shorter extracts, in the 
text or accompanying tables, support the primary quotations. Divergent experiences and 
interpretations have been indicated.  
 
8.2 Subtheme 1  
 
‘I go and see the neurologist and I get another adjective, but I don’t actually get a 
definitive answer’ (Graham) 
 
Description: Making sense of ataxia through a medicalised lens 
 
This subtheme focuses on a world of diagnostic tests, medical terminology, 
examinations and assessments as understood and interpreted by participants in this 
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study. It describes and discusses the participants’ initial and continuing search for 
information, certainty and meaning.  
Nine participants either had a “working” diagnosis or did not have a more definitive 
diagnosis beyond idiopathic cerebellar ataxia (type unspecified) or cerebellar 
degeneration. Three had concrete diagnoses, Hugh and Julia (SCA6), and Harry 
(Friedreich’s ataxia). Table 8.1 shows that the majority of participants (n = 9) had lived 
with symptoms of ataxia for many years before receiving either a provisional or firm 
diagnosis. For the majority of participants, uncertainty about what was wrong and 
particularly what this might mean was knitted into their lifeworld and formed a powerful 
back drop for much of their narratives. This sort of uncertainty was a commonly reported 
experience, regardless of whether the path to diagnosis was relatively smooth or, more 
often, complicated and prolonged. 
 
Table 8.1 The Tortuous Path Toward Diagnosis (n = 9) 
 
 
With reference to Table 8.1 and to account for the divergent experience of the three 
remaining participants, Ted, through private healthcare, was referred to a consultant 
without delay and received a diagnosis of late onset cerebellar ataxia within twelve 
months of onset; Jim did not talk about the details of the events leading up to his 
diagnosis but as other members of his family had the same condition, it is possible that 
as a result, Jim felt that his diagnosis was uncomplicated. Julia was diagnosed relatively 
quickly, nonetheless the process was not described as unproblematic. Her experiences 
Participant Narrative of the Path to Diagnosis (interviewed in 2007) 
Bill  
1985 referred to neurologist, 1994 diagnosed with cerebellar ataxia, type 
unknown, pursuing further investigations at time of interview 
Toby 
Symptoms for many years, 2000 referred to neurologist, 2003 diagnosed with 
cerebellar ataxia, type unknown, no further investigations, diagnosed 
‘idiopathic’ 
Joan 
1999 referred to neurologist, 2003 working diagnosis of episodic ataxia, 
investigations on-going 
Harry Childhood onset, diagnosed with Friedreich’s ataxia in his early 30s 
Susan 
Uncertain date of diagnosis, diagnosed cerebellar degeneration, pursuing 
further investigations 
Stella 
1996 diagnosed with cerebellar ataxia, type unknown, pursuing further 
investigations 
Hugh 
10 years from referral to diagnosis with SCA6, genetic details uncertain, not 
pursuing further investigations 
Scott 
2001 symptom onset, diagnosed cerebellar ataxia (specific date not known), 
type unknown, investigations on-going 
Graham 
Always had symptoms, 1994 diagnosed with cerebellar ataxia, type unknown, 
investigations on-going 
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mirrored to some extent those of others and are discussed below. Most narratives (n = 
10) communicated a deep sense of frustration and abandonment with what was 
perceived as a lack of knowledge and understanding from healthcare professionals 
(Table 8.2).  
Table 8.2 Frustration and Abandonment: An Experience of Biomedicine (n = 10) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Harry ‘If you keep your head down they won’t try. They won’t offer any help’ 23:33 
Stella ‘So much ignorance about this particular thing’ 2:23 
Stella 
‘They think it could be this but they don’t know. […] They don’t know 
what else to do with me really’ 
3:9 
Ted ‘Not had any advice, it’s just sorting it out for ourselves’ 3:6 
Toby ‘[GP said] ‘It’s no good coming to me […] I don’t know anything about it’’ 25:21 
Scott ‘They haven’t got a clue’ 16:27 
Jim ‘Nobody seemed to care about it or consider it’ 5:22 
Jim ‘There was no support, no nothing’ 7:9 
Bill ‘Here we go again someone else has never heard of it’ 11:5 
Bill  ‘We just paddle our own canoe’ 9:2 
Susan 
‘If they say ‘I don’t want to see you anymore’, I say that I am entitled to 
see you again’ 
5:27 
Graham 
‘With the neurology department, it’s quite … it seems to me I have to 
justify actually being there’ 
15:17 
Graham 
‘The neurology department aren’t really … don’t really give me the 
impression they really know what ataxia is’ 
15:35 
Hugh ‘I wasn’t getting much help’ 2:29 
 
Julia’s journey to diagnosis provided a way into understanding participants’ encounters 
with biomedicine and is offered here as an introduction to this subtheme. Julia spoke 
about several problematic consultations with her GP which involved repeated diagnoses 
of labyrinthitis and reassurance that there was ‘nothing to worry about’. The experience 
was portrayed as incredibly distressing; ‘I thought I was going mad’. She explained; ‘I 
kept being dizzy. And kept being diagnosed with labyrinthitis […] my head was a 
fishbowl with the water slopping and I’d have to stand still until the water stopped’. The 
repetition of ‘kept’, and the image of Julia’s head actually becoming a fishbowl with her 
eyes and her brain sloshing about inside, communicated a strong sense of bewilderment 
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and spoke for the precarious position she seemed to find herself in. The eventual 
diagnosis, appeared to re-anchor Julia by calming her existential turmoil; ‘although there 
was nothing they could do, the fact that I knew what was happening relieved a lot of 
anxiety’.  
Two other participants (Toby and Joan) recounted similar experiences to those 
described by Julia where they considered that specialist referral was only achieved 
through their own determined persistence. The following extract is taken from Toby’s 
account:  
Toby: ‘I noticed that my knees were like jelly, like trembling. I went to my doctor’s and 
asked about this, but never really got any explanation […] I kept going to my GP [and 
explained that] just occasionally I’d overbalance. So I asked my GP if he could explain 
this and he gave me tablets for vertigo. I took them for a week and they didn’t make any 
difference whatsoever. […] So this continued over the next seven years … and the 
symptoms of that overbalancing got worse, and the last time I went on my own […] I 
went and I said ‘I’m sure this can’t be normal’. He did neurological tests […] and couldn’t 
come up with any explanation. Yeah?’  
Interviewer: ‘Yeah.’  
Toby: ‘So a year on, I’d got worse than that and I asked my wife to come with me to the 
doctor’s to give some credence to my story. Because it was as if the doctor didn’t 
believe or wasn’t listening to what I was trying to tell him. I noticed when my feet were 
direct together it was worse, as if my body was wide at the top, like a pivot yeah? […] He 
tested me and he subsequently said ‘You seem quite bad’, he says ‘you ought to have 
come before’. And my wife said ‘But he’s been coming for the last seven years saying 
something’s not right’’.  
This passage illuminates Toby’s experiences in two important ways. Firstly, it is possible 
to picture Toby here, doggedly visiting the surgery, patiently describing his problems 
from his direct experience (‘jelly’, ‘trembling’, ‘overbalance’, ‘like a pivot’). Toby’s journey 
towards diagnosis was portrayed as an arduous quest replete with seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles which blocked his path. He repeatedly asked for an 
explanation of what was happening to him (‘I went to my doctor’s’, ‘I kept going to my 
GP’, ‘this continued over the next seven years’). From Toby’s perspective, the GP 
resisted engaging in meaningful dialogue – ‘[he] wasn’t listening’ – and as such declined 
to enter the frame of reference or horizon of experience that was most meaningful to 
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Toby. Not only this but from Toby’s perspective the GP might have doubted that there 
was something “really” wrong (‘as if the doctor didn’t believe’, ‘[I took my wife along to] 
give some credence to my story’). 
Secondly, the GP seemed firmly situated in the biomedical world, administering 
‘neurological tests’ but not really listening to Toby. It might be assumed here (at least 
from Toby’s perspective) that the GP’s knowledge was constructed using the objective 
body as source, as it was measured and observed, and that these data were prioritised 
over and above that of Toby’s previously discounted subjective account: ‘He tested me 
and he subsequently said ‘You seem quite bad’.’ Here, it seems that Toby understood 
that it was the data that took precedence and was attended to, leaving him with the 
impression that his story, the personal experience that he took to the surgery, as 
opposed to his “data”, was overlooked or even disbelieved.  
This brief vignette resonates with Julia’s experiences but also captures a phenomenon 
conceptualised as the reluctance of one communication partner to move from a 
preferred (biomedical) lifeworld into the lifeworld of another, the patient. In this situation, 
objective data (test results) are “real” and are prioritised over and above the less 
tangible, distinctly human and personally situated story of the patient. Characterised by 
an unwillingness to engage with patients in and on their own terms, this type of 
communication style has been identified as a particular feature of medical consultations 
for people presenting with long term physical symptoms (Barry et al. 2001).  
Joan recounted similar difficulties to those described by Toby and Julia. Joan 
experienced fluctuating symptoms and described going to great lengths to ‘create an 
episode’ for her doctors to observe. With the help of her family, she had made a digital 
recording of herself which her doctor had been unable to watch. Therefore neither her 
consultant nor her GP had actually seen her ‘malfunction’ (Joan). At first Joan’s GP 
diagnosed ‘normal ageing process’, which made her ‘a bit angry’. However, Joan 
persisted and was referred to a specialist who eventually diagnosed probable episodic 
ataxia. As with Julia, giving it a name, acknowledging that there “really” was something 
wrong, provided Joan with some relief from her frustration and distress. She explained:  
‘Symptoms have become so spasmodic and erratic; I have felt such a bore and such a 
fraud, especially in the hospital. […] I now know that I can try to explain how bad it 
actually is, because when I saw [my consultant] I got this not firm diagnosis but 
recognition perhaps.’ 
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Without a diagnosis Joan felt ‘a fraud’. Her symptoms were unpredictable and, from the 
perspective of healthcare professionals, unobservable. Living without a diagnosis, 
understanding that others might consider not only her account of her illness as a sham, 
but by implication perhaps other parts of her life too, Joan was effectively silenced, 
unable to speak of her very real suffering. A diagnosis, albeit provisional, seemed to 
confer veracity and plausibility (‘recognition’), in other words it confirmed to Joan and 
told others that the problem was “real”. An official label therefore gave Joan permission 
to talk (‘I now know that I can try to explain how bad it actually is’) without risking 
censure or disbelief. However, Joan suspected that her GP continued to doubt the 
working diagnosis; ‘he thinks there’s no such thing as ataxia wrong with me’ because he 
had never seen Joan ‘malfunction’.   
Although Julia’s type of ataxia is well described in the literature, it is unlikely that her GP 
would have been familiar with the progressive ataxias. Also given that she had no 
known family history and that it only emerged later that her brother had the same 
symptoms, the GP had little to work with and perhaps pragmatically opted for the more 
common diagnosis of labyrinthitis. Joan’s and Toby’s conditions were rather 
complicated; Joan’s because of its episodic nature and Toby’s because it may have 
been masked, at least at first, by a completely separate illness. Given the relative rarity 
of cerebellar ataxia, it is not surprising that the participants’ GPs were perhaps slow to 
request a specialist opinion. Looking at these accounts from a realist perspective may 
indeed suggest some shortcomings in the way in which GPs responded to these 
participants’ problems. Nonetheless, from the participants’ accounts, it seemed that GPs 
resisted entering the lifeworld of these three participants, leaving them with the feeling 
that they were disbelieved or at least not taken seriously. Making an attempt to 
understand the participants’ subjective experiences may have done much to alleviate 
what was (and still was, at least for Joan) a prolonged and distressing part of their lives.   
The above accounts have drawn attention to the difficult process described by three 
participants in accessing specialist health care, in particular referral to medical 
consultants. It also provided insight into the stress attached to these discrediting 
encounters and the uncertainty that accompanied living with an undiagnosed condition. 
The next section of this subtheme focuses on the participants’ accounts of their 
experiences once they were referred to specialist services. As the following exchange 
shows, this was not necessarily straight forward and was often just the beginning of a 
long and frustrating process which carried with it a heavy psychological toll. The 
outcome of these encounters (usually a provisional diagnosis) often did little to alleviate 
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the uncertainty and did not necessarily provide the information or understanding that 
participants seemed to seek. A lengthy extract from Stella’s account perhaps captured 
this most clearly:  
Stella: ‘I saw [my first consultant] for two or three years and then he discharged me. I 
moved from [one consultant] to the [next] and again I felt that I needed to be involved 
with the specialist so I went to my GP again, he referred me to the local hospital and 
again I was with that specialist for about three years. He eventually … the first diagnosis 
was … I can’t pronounce this … spironella … the first … they didn’t know what type of 
ataxia it was […] The second diagnosis, he felt it could be [something else] and from 
there I saw him for a few years and then he discharged me. So again, after a lapse of 
time, and reading various information which stated that you should never be discharged 
because of new things coming up, I went back to my GP and got him to [re-] refer me. 
So at the moment I’m now with [this] consultant. He had very little time with me because 
he was very busy, so you know I didn’t have much time with him this time.’  
Researcher: ‘How did you feel when those first consultants discharged you?’ 
Stella: ‘Um … a bit helpless really. Um … you’re floundering about in the dark and you 
haven’t any contact, you know to sort of help you. It’s a very difficult thing to describe 
really because you find that there’s so much ignorance about this particular thing and it’s 
just one long battle. Sorry I’m getting … [tearful].’ 
[After a break] 
Stella: ‘Oh dear me, yes. So … that’s the story really. So yes, I did feel let down I 
suppose when the consultant said, you know, ‘go away’. And the first consultant … you 
see the second consultant, then this [other] thing had come up …’ 
Researcher: ‘Yeah.’ 
Stella: ‘… so if I hadn’t have pushed myself forward to see somebody again, I wouldn’t 
have known about that.’  
With echoes of Julia’s, Toby’s and Joan’s earlier accounts, Stella related a moving story 
of single-minded determination in the face of painful and repeated rejection; she also 
touched on several threads common to the other participants’ accounts.  
Firstly, Stella projected two contrasting and intertwined images in the above extract. She 
described feelings of vulnerability (‘floundering about in the dark’, ‘helpless’) and 
isolation (‘you haven’t any contact’); she seemed powerless and downtrodden by events 
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outside her control. The reference to the ‘dark’ added a sense of fear, desperation and 
anxiety to this scene. Revisiting these devastating events eventually overwhelmed her. 
The pauses and the switch in subject from ‘I’ to ‘you’ when Stella talked about her most 
painful experiences may have been used to deflect further questions. Within this 
narrative Stella also drew on metaphors of conflict (‘one long battle’). Having armed 
herself with knowledge (‘reading various information which stated that you should never 
be discharged’) and with great effort, she pitted herself into battle, ‘pushed myself 
forward’. It is possible through these images to almost visualise the strength of Stella’s 
resolve as a new self; a kind of heroic warrior contrasting strongly with the image of her 
formerly diminished self. However, the echo of this former self still reverberated through 
this passage serving as a reminder that the strong Stella might be fragile and prey to 
further assault. This interpretation is cautiously suggested because it is grounded in 
Stella’s use of the present tense; ‘there’s so much ignorance about this particular thing 
and it’s just one long battle’; in other words, there still is so much ignorance and it still is 
one long battle.  
Stepping back from the emotional impact of Stella’s words, it is also possible to attend to 
a broader subtext in this narrative. As Butler (2002:45) explained with reference to 
Foucault, language ‘expresses and enacts the authority of those who are empowered to 
use it’. Stella is ‘discharged’ three times. Discharged is a word used by healthcare 
professionals, the military and the judiciary, people who traditionally hold a position of 
high status. Stella seemed to interpret this to mean that she was dismissed with the full 
weight of a higher authority, effectively told to ‘go away’. Medical specialists were 
portrayed in Stella’s account as powerful gatekeepers who frustrated her attempts to 
seek knowledge and understanding, and ultimately to make some sense of her 
condition. The following quotation lends weight to this interpretation. Stella had asked to 
be copied into the correspondence between her GP and consultant but rather than 
offering illumination, the letters were a source of further frustration:   
Stella: ‘… got a letter … here we are. Ah, neurological examination … there, I can’t say 
that … ‘reveals broken pursuit … but no evidence of nystagmus’. So broken pursuit is 
my eyes move quicker, do they? Or they flash about or something? […] And then ‘she 
has well preserved reflexes and no evidence of any sensory disturbance to suggest a 
peripheral neuropathy’ [laughs]. Do you understand that?’ 
In this extract Stella was trying to understand some complex medical terms, she read 
out sections, asking for confirmation of her sense-making but the language remained 
inaccessible without specialist interpretation. Understanding, empowerment and 
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partnership was not facilitated or developed here, Stella summarised her situation, as 
she saw it, as follows: 
Stella: ‘You know it’s very hard getting explanations from consultants isn’t it? They have 
all the knowledge but sometimes they don’t impart it to you. Whether or not they think 
you can’t understand it I don’t know. Perhaps they feel it’s not important but I think it is. If 
you understand the functions and how you work, I think that’s very important. And me 
being me, I like to know all the ins and outs, you see, and how it works.’ 
For Stella, consultants ‘have all the knowledge but sometimes don’t impart it’. As Stella 
sees it, their privileged position means that information is within their gift but they chose 
not to share in a way that was meaningful for Stella. She felt cut off from a source of 
valued information (‘I like to know all the ins and outs’) through being discharged or 
through not having the opportunity to enter into a meaningful discussion with her new 
consultant (because he was ‘very busy’) or through receiving correspondence that was 
not accessible to a lay reader. The phrase ‘me being me’ emphasised Stella’s resilience 
and her continuing effort to assert and preserve her sense of self; her attempts to 
actively participate in her healthcare, to resist the constraints of language, privilege and 
practice, and ultimately to make some sense of her situation. However, like other 
participants, she seemed to be consistently frustrated in this undertaking. Two further 
passages from Graham’s account lend support to the development of this theme:  
Graham: ‘I seem to be diagnosed with a string of adjectives describing what my 
condition is but not actually pinning it down. So for example, chronic is quite a worrying 
thing to me. But it means … it’s got a different meaning from the general chronic words. 
So that worried me for a while and I didn’t really … […] But the doctors call it idiopathic, 
which means they don’t know where it came from [laughs]. They call it genetic, well 
anything’s genetic, that’s not clearly defined either. They call it inherited. Okay are you 
covering your bases or what? Inherited, genetic … […] I go and see a neurologist and I 
get another adjective but I don’t actually get a definitive answer.’  
Graham’s experiences with his consultant seemed to reflect Stella’s; without expert 
interpretation, the words either held no meaning or carried a significance that through 
being unclear caused concern, like chronic: ‘it’s got a different meaning from the general 
chronic words. So that worried me for a while and I didn’t really…’ The way this 
sentence peters out seems to communicate a sense of disorientation, rather than 
anchoring him, each new diagnostic category seemed to threaten to set him further 
adrift. For Graham, the consultant’s explanations were troubling rather than 
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enlightening, not only because they compounded his anxiety and frustration but also 
because he seemed to have an expectation that his consultant should be able to ‘pin it 
down’. Graham was looking for answers and in response his consultant gave him what 
Graham saw as meaningless words that concealed a lack of knowledge; ‘the doctors 
call it idiopathic, which means they don’t know where it came from [laughs]’. Both 
Graham and his doctors seemed to be caught up in a traditional medical discourse that 
is unable to accommodate a condition for which diagnosis (and prognosis) is 
problematic and complex. Above all, however, Graham seemed to be looking for 
meaning, a way of understanding his condition in his own terms:  
Graham: ‘It doesn’t help that I don’t know which pigeon hole to put myself in if you like. 
It’s just, I guess, it’s more of a psychological aspect to being … have a medical 
condition. It’s not quite knowing where to pin it down, what caused it you know, who’s to 
blame if you like.’ 
In the absence of a clear diagnosis, Graham seems uncertain about his place in the 
world; not only in the sense of the present (‘which pigeon hole to put myself in’) but also 
in the sense of the past (‘what caused it you know, who’s to blame’), an oblique 
reference perhaps to the problematic and worrying adjectives, ‘inherited, genetic …’ 
appended to a growing list of diagnostic jargon. In addition to the evident frustration, 
Graham’s sense of self seemed uncertain, not knowing what was wrong or what caused 
it conveyed a kind of psychological homelessness. There are parallels here with Stella’s 
description of herself as ‘floundering about in the dark’; a sense of loss of self or 
disorientation that is psychologically hard to bear. These accounts suggested that there 
was very little intersection of meaning between the lifeworlds of the participants and the 
biomedical world of their healthcare specialists. Instead, encounters with healthcare 
professionals seem to have deepened rather than alleviated the participants’ uncertainty 
and existential anxieties.     
Graham’s and Stella’s account resonated with themes that featured in the majority of 
participants’ narratives, notably the on-going search for personally relevant information 
and a more specific diagnosis. This quest manifested itself in extensive testing which, 
for most, failed to provide them with the concrete or meaningful answers they sought 
(see Table 8.3 pp. 180).  
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Table 8.3 A Lifeworld of Testing and On-going Uncertainty (n = 9) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Bill 
‘Tested for SCA 1, 3, 4, 6, DPLA and Friedreich’s ataxia, they were 
negative’ 
2:30 
Jim ‘It’s a type of cerebellar but there’s no SCA number’ 1:16 
Susan 
‘I’ve had every test imaginable […] I’m not even sure what they’re 
testing for […] Nothing has proved positive’ 
5:33 
Susan ‘They can’t find any specific one that applies to me’  5:13 
Stella ‘They can’t diagnose which ataxia I’ve got’ 3:4 
Hugh ‘It took them over 10 years to find out what was wrong’ 1:5 
Scott 
‘It’s been a series of tests – cut that out, cut that out, so you get to a 
point where they haven’t got a clue’ 
16:26 
Scott ‘All they can do is take blood tests, check your DNA profile’ 16:28 
Graham ‘The doctors call it idiopathic […] they don’t know where it came from’ 17:6 
Joan ‘Nothing spooky came up and no diagnosis’ 6:19 
Toby 
‘I’m not sure [which type]. It’s idiopathic, which means no known 
cause’ 
1:21 
 
 
Furthermore, as a result of on-going investigations, it was not uncommon to find that 
provisional diagnoses were amended either radically by suggestions of a completely 
different condition, especially in the early stages of specialist referral, or in a minor way 
that offered very little additional information and which paradoxically rendered this new 
“information” meaningless. For example, still under the umbrella of cerebellar ataxia, 
Stella’s diagnosis had been revised over the years; she had been given two previous 
diagnoses and had just found out about the possibility of a third. Four participants 
described undergoing comparable experiences; Bill was told originally that he ‘probably 
had MS’, Joan was told, ‘normal ageing process’, ‘chronic fatigue and then motor 
disorder’, Susan was ‘diagnosed with lupus’ before undergoing orthopaedic surgery for a 
‘balance problem’ and, via further visits to physiotherapy and her GP, was eventually 
diagnosed with ‘cerebellar degeneration’. 
Graham, like Stella, was diagnosed with cerebellar ataxia and as noted above also 
found that his diagnosis was subject to frequent revision: 
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Graham: ‘I go and see the neurologist and I get another adjective, but I don’t actually get 
a definitive answer. Like ataxia [Ataxia UK] says there’s these SCAs you know 1 to 13 or 
whatever, it is – I haven’t got one of those types – I haven’t got Friedreich’s ataxia, I’ve 
just got some other form of ataxia which is as I understand it a generic term for people 
with balance problems. So it’s not clearly defined.’  
In medical terms, the diagnosis of cerebellar ataxia not only involves the exclusion of 
conditions such as MS but also other conditions with similar symptoms such as 
cerebellar tumours (Abele et al. 2002). These conditions have a widely acknowledged 
and sinister reputation, Joan referred to them collectively as ‘spooky’ and Ted as ‘nasty’. 
Once these conditions have been discounted, diagnostic refinement is undertaken via a 
process of elimination which entails multiple testing for known types of the progressive 
ataxias. Most of these tests are negative (Wardle and Robertson, 2007; Finsterer, 2009; 
Klockgether, 2011) and even though a negative test may rule out some of the known 
ataxias it still leaves a large proportion of people living with ataxia without a firm 
diagnosis. A negative test would therefore seem to carry little meaning except to deepen 
the frustration already apparent in participants’ accounts and to raise doubts about the 
specialists’ expertise; ‘you get to a point where they haven’t got a clue’ (Scott). A further 
extract from Graham’s account reinforces this point:  
Graham: ‘You just sit there and you’re waiting for someone to read your notes and they 
read your notes and they have five minutes, say ‘How are you?’ So you’re getting that 
and then you don’t get anything for 18 months or so. You think ‘Well hang on a minute 
[…] how’s that informing me, my situation?’ […]  I have to keep informing them [the 
neurologists] all the time […] people in the [local hospital] have said they might only see 
me and I might be the only person with ataxia they see, you know. Which is fine you 
know but it just seems to be a bit … I don’t know … it doesn’t feel like I’m getting much 
attention. It’s difficult to explain. I don’t really want a lot of invasive attention, but I just … 
sorry … I just think that without actually me pushing for things I won’t actually get 
anywhere and I’m not really good at being pushy.’ 
Graham seemed unsurprised that the neurologists lacked specialist knowledge about 
his condition. He also seemed annoyed at the little time he spent with the consultant and 
the process of having to continually repeat the same information, as if he was starting 
from scratch with every subsequent appointment. However, what seemed to come 
across most strongly in the above quotation was Graham’s impression that the 
consultation was not geared towards his concerns (how’s that informing me, my 
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situation?). Importantly it seemed that he felt as if he was failing to make any progress 
towards making sense of his particular circumstances (‘I won’t actually get anywhere’).  
Graham appeared almost apologetic for expecting any sort of ‘attention’ and he seemed 
to find it difficult to express exactly what it was he was looking for (‘I don’t know’, ‘it’s 
difficult to explain’). In order to have his concerns or questions addressed Graham felt 
he needed to make a kind of special effort, to be ‘pushy’, but unlike Stella (‘I went back 
to my GP and got him to [re-] refer me’) and Susan (‘I say, ‘I’m entitled to see you 
again’’), he seemed unable to assert himself in this way. As he said later, he believed he 
had to ‘justify’ his presence to the consultants (Table 8.2). Graham seemed to feel 
trapped in a circle of pointless consultations which perpetuated his sense of frustration. 
The pointlessness was reinforced by the apparent way in which the doctor’s preparation 
for the encounter (reading the notes) and the social niceties (‘How are you?’) seemed in 
his eyes to take up all the brief time of five minutes that he had been given. Furthermore 
these consultations did little to resolve his concerns, and feeling somewhat 
compromised for turning up to his appointment, even invalidated them.   
Harry’s and Hugh’s accounts suggested that even a definitive diagnosis may not confer 
certainty. Hugh, for example, was diagnosed with SCA6 but his test results did not help 
him make sense of his condition in the longer term:  
Hugh: ‘When I asked the doctor how many repeats there were on my defective gene he 
couldn’t tell me, because the people who did the DNA testing just said ‘enlarged’, it 
didn’t say how many repeats. The number of repeats can or virtually tell you how bad 
you’re affected.’ 
Hugh seemed to be referring here to the possibility that he may carry an unstable triplet 
repeat within his genetic profile. In this case, paternal transmission may lead to 
significantly reduced age of onset and a more severe clinical presentation in children 
who inherit the condition (Friedman, 2011). This might be what he was contemplating 
when he suggested that the ‘number of repeats can or virtually tell you how bad you’re 
affected.’ 
Similarly for Harry, a diagnosis of Friedreich’s ataxia was useful in terms of giving his 
condition a name; ‘it was quite good because they actually told me that I’d got 
Friedreich’s ataxia’ but it raised new concerns about associated conditions; ‘They say 
you can get a heart murmur, you can have … what’s that thing where you drop dead? 
Where you heart just stops. One doctor described it to me.’ Therefore it seems that both 
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negative test results as well as a definitive diagnosis can both, in different ways, add to 
the existential uncertainties that seem to be part of the fabric of living with a progressive 
ataxia.  
 
8.2.1 Summary 
 
These accounts support the understanding that the process of diagnosis for most 
participants was long, arduous and potentially never-ending. It often consisted of 
shuttling between consultants and GPs (who, from these accounts, seemed to operate 
entirely within the strict borders of the biomedical model) whilst trying to make sense of 
on-going uncertainty and frustration in the light of, at best, provisional diagnoses. 
Participants’ sense making seemed to be obscured by health professionals’ reliance on 
jargonistic language and disease-centric practice; a particular problem associated 
perhaps with a condition where diagnostics remain uncertain and for which there is no 
cure or treatment. Despite this dispiriting process, half the participants (n = 6) continued 
to seek out further testing. The following subtheme explores the participants’ reasons for 
either pursuing further investigations or for bringing them to an end. Almost without 
exception (n = 11) the decision involved either oblique or overt reference to the genetic, 
inheritable characteristics of the progressive ataxias. 
 
8.3 Subtheme 2 
 
‘I think my brother’s got it’ (Hugh) 
 
Description: Ataxia in the family  
 
Most participants did not dwell on the issue of inheritance in their accounts, perhaps 
reflecting that such topics were deeply personal and difficult to discuss with an 
unfamiliar person, particularly when the ground had not been prepared and some sort of 
concordance about the topic had not been agreed in advance. However, all participants, 
except Ted, made either a direct or indirect reference to genetic testing, family history or 
inheritance within their narratives. Ted was the exception possibly because, being 
relatively newly diagnosed, as well as being a new father, this may have been too 
sensitive a subject for him. Participants’ references to the possibilities of genetic 
inheritance and transmission were intricately knitted into their involvement with 
diagnostics and the medical world, as well as their efforts to make sense of the contexts 
of their lives.  
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Participants recounted highly situated and context-dependent experiences that were 
difficult to group thematically without losing the particularities of each case. Whilst there 
was some degree of overlap, no single participant’s experiences easily mapped onto 
those of another. However, careful analysis showed that the genetic component of the 
progressive ataxias could perhaps be best understood in temporal terms; participants 
projected back in time, sometimes with new insight, into their family history and/or 
projected forward in time with troubling anticipation for their children, grandchildren or 
siblings. For some participants, genetic considerations loomed large and fell within the 
immediacy of their existential concerns. For others, such concerns emerged as 
something that had been dealt with in the past but were nonetheless still powerful 
enough to surface in the context of the interview.  
This discussion starts by returning to Graham and Stella, and then addresses the 
concerns of a number of participants to demonstrate the diverse ways in which this 
issue emerged and was understood. Further brief quotations from those participants 
who provided fleeting glimpses into this aspect of their lifeworld are presented in Table 
8.4. 
 
Table 8.4 Fleeting References to Genetic or Hereditary Issues (n = 6) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Bill 
‘It would be useful […] if I could say to my children [‘It’s this’] so that 
they could be without too much anxiety about what they might be 
doing for their potential offspring’ 
1:37 
Joan ‘Of course it is worrying because it’s genetic, it’s episodic’ 1:33 
Julia 
‘I told my brother about it [the MRI] because my father had something 
that we didn’t … it wasn’t MS but it was something’ 
15:6 
Harry 
‘My sister wanted kids and she didn’t want the kids to get what I’ve got 
[so I had the gene test]. […] It was quite good because they actually 
told me I’d got Friedreich’s ataxia’ 
23:18 /24:29 
Toby 
‘I know it’s idiopathic, which means no known cause, not hereditary 
cerebellar ataxia’ 
1:21 
Scott  
‘But to be able to prove that [I’ve got this particular ataxia] you got to 
prove that you haven’t got genetic and all that’ 
17:18 
Susan 
‘Some people need to know whether to have children, or whether 
they’re passing on a faulty gene. But I’ve got children and 
grandchildren, so it’s too late for me to make those considerations’ 
6:18 
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As noted in subtheme 1, Graham seemed to be grappling with issues about his identity 
in the present (‘which pigeon hole to put myself in’) whilst also perhaps understanding 
that a piece of the puzzle might be missing from his past, ‘what caused it you know, 
who’s to blame’. Graham had been told that he had a genetic condition; ‘They call it 
genetic, well anything’s genetic, that’s not clearly defined either. They call it inherited’, 
and although he almost made light of it, he admitted that it was of ‘psychological’ 
importance to establish some sort of certainty about his diagnosis. It seemed, for 
Graham, that a firm diagnosis, by enabling him to look with clarity into his past, may 
have been able to give him some sense of who he was in the present. For Graham, the 
genetic issues were just one of a number of pressing concerns about his condition and 
ultimately his sense of self.  
In the reverse of Graham’s situation, a piece of the puzzle from Stella’s past had 
recently come to light which served to add to the confusion and uncertainty that she was 
already living through:  
Stella: ‘Just a few days ago my sister said that my mother, on the death certificate, it 
was mentioned that she had cerebellar ataxia, which was an absolute bombshell to me 
because I’d spent ten years trying to find out whether it’s hereditary or whether it’s one 
of these other […] I mean I knew she had bad balance but she always put it down to an 
inner ear problem. […] And I thought she had never been followed up.’ 
Stella’s symptoms first emerged before her mother died, and therefore her mother may 
have been in a position to tell Stella about her condition. It is not clear why Stella’s sister 
had only just told her about the death certificate, there may be many reasons. However, 
apart from the huge shock, as a daughter, reflecting back in time, Stella had to confront 
the possibility that her mother kept her diagnosis secret, whilst from that point forward, 
as a grandmother, she had to contemplate the profound implications that she could have 
known about this hereditary condition ten years earlier:  
Stella: ‘I mean the main … one of the main reasons for me following this up as well is for 
my children really […] And whether or not they’re going to be affected.’ 
Stella had perhaps hoped that her condition was not hereditary. None of her siblings 
had, it seemed, been willing to be tested, so this newly-found piece of the puzzle from 
her past had become hugely significant not just for Stella but also presumably for the 
rest of her family. This knowledge (about her mother’s condition) threw her previous 
diagnoses into question by firmly re-establishing the possibility that Stella had inherited 
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her ataxia from her mother. The uncovering of a family secret exposed Stella to a new 
set of bewildering and upsetting problems that perhaps confirmed her worst fears (‘I’ve 
spent ten years trying to find out whether it’s hereditary’). The potential implications for 
her children and grandchildren emanated from this news and seemed to intensify her 
sense of shock (‘absolute bombshell’).  
Stella and Hugh shared similar concerns about the risk of passing on a variant gene and 
feeling responsible for the lives of future generations. However, these accounts seemed 
to offer two highly situated responses towards these dilemmas. As noted above, Stella 
seemed very much orientated towards finding out what passing on an inheritable 
condition might mean for her children’s lives, whereas Hugh was very clear that given 
the choice he would have opted to have artificial insemination: 
Hugh: ‘My children, they’ve got a 50% chance of getting it, which is … if I’d have got the 
diagnosis earlier, I wouldn’t have had children, I would have had artificial insemination 
and then the children wouldn’t have had the problem.’ 
By saying that he would have chosen not to have children, Hugh perhaps revealed 
something significant about his perceptions of the quality of his own life and his 
assumptions about his children’s future lives. One interpretation that could be offered 
about the quotation above is that Hugh assumed that his children would be at risk of 
having a life as bad as his life. In this sense by not bringing children into the world, Hugh 
may have been suggesting that his own life, at this time, was not a quality life. It is 
possible to understand from this extract that, in Hugh’s eyes, his life is of such low 
quality that it was not a life he would wish on anyone else, least of all his own children.   
Unable to change the past, Hugh had decided not to tell his young children of the 
possibility that they may have inherited the same condition; ‘the children don’t know that 
they could have it, we’ve kept it quiet.’ Here, Hugh explained his decision making by re-
visiting his past choices and validating them in light of the future. He seemed reluctant to 
burden his children with the facts of his diagnosis; ‘they’re kids, it’s something they 
shouldn’t know’, he also had pragmatic concerns about the ‘insurance and mortgages 
and all the rest of it’ and he questioned the utility of genetic testing for a condition for 
which there is no direct treatment or cure: 
Hugh: ‘there isn’t treatment for it, so there’s no reason to tell them. If there was 
treatment and it could be helped then I would tell them. But there isn’t any treatment so 
it’s all a big disadvantage as soon as they know.’ 
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However, Hugh was also coming to the realisation that rather than protecting his 
children, his closely guarded secret may have stimulated some unintended 
consequences;  
Hugh (with reference to his daughter): ‘She doesn’t like what’s happened to me, she 
doesn’t understand it and she’s angry about it, it’s affecting her behaviour. […] It seems 
to be hurting her quite a bit, just seeing the way I am.’ 
Whilst Hugh freely offered this candid analysis, immediately afterwards he changed the 
subject, perhaps to put some psychological distance between him and this troubling 
portrait of his daughter’s distress. 
Hugh’s family circumstances also reflected Stella’s in one other important way; no one 
else in his family had been tested despite Hugh’s suspicions that his brother had the 
same condition: ‘I think my brother’s got it’. This certainly was not the case for the 
majority of the other participants. For example, although Jim agreed with Hugh about the 
lack of benefit from genetic testing (‘We’ve been offered genetic tests, but in simple 
terms unless they can identify the missing gene there’s no point putting the kids through 
it’), Jim’s children had grown up in the full knowledge of their father’s condition:  
Jim: ‘They’ve basically been brought up with it […] my brother and sister have both got it 
so … they’ve been brought up not just by a parent with it, but within the sort of family.’  
Jim was very clear that for him, bringing his children up knowing about the condition was 
a benefit rather than a burden:  
Jim: ‘I think that’s a positive effect of living with somebody that’s got an illness that if 
you’re just open with them they don’t see it as a problem, they just think ‘well it’s ok, just 
get on with it’.’ 
Although not articulated as directly as Jim, from the context of their accounts it would 
seem that Bill, Joan, Julia and Harry also shared Jim’s sentiment and did not hide their 
condition from either their immediate or extended family. Stella did not hide it either but, 
without reading too much into Stella’s account, it seemed that, similar to Hugh’s family, 
other members of her family were perhaps less well disposed to openly discussing the 
implications of her condition. Neither Graham nor Scott made a direct reference to 
members of their family. This might be because this was a joint interview and therefore 
too sensitive a topic for strangers to discuss with each other. Harry, on the other hand, 
was rather pressured into genetic testing because his sister wanted to start a family (see 
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Table 8.4). He dealt with this quite frankly in his interview and did not dwell on the 
implications for his potential future family. Again this may have been not only because 
he was talking to a stranger but also because Harry’s girlfriend was an almost constant 
presence during the interview.  
Susan was the only participant who seemed to be pursuing a diagnosis for purely 
altruistic reasons:  
Susan: ‘Some people need to know whether to have children, or whether they’re 
passing on a faulty gene. But I’ve got children and grandchildren, so it’s too late for me 
to make those considerations. But I just want to do it for Ataxia because I support them 
… Ataxia UK I mean.’ 
However, as with some of the other participants this almost offhand reference to her 
children and grandchildren might belie more existential concerns that Susan was 
unwilling to visit in this interview. Similarly, Bill was also interested in supporting further 
genetic research but also perhaps slightly underplayed the significance and meaning of 
finding a definite diagnosis:  
‘It would be useful […] if I could say to my children [it’s this] so that they could be without 
too much anxiety about what it is they might be doing for their potential offspring.’ 
Here, Bill seemed to understate the significance of finding out about the potentially 
hereditary nature of his ataxia (‘it would be useful’) and framed this with reference to his 
future grandchildren. However, pushing the interpretation, digging underneath this 
rhetoric by using a more questioning hermeneutic might uncover what might be hidden 
in this narrative, perhaps a deeper concern about what Bill might believe he has already 
done to his own children.    
 
8.3.1 Summary  
 
Overall, the findings reported here suggest that, concerns about genetic inheritance and 
transmission seemed to form a persistent undercurrent in the lived experience of the 
majority of participants; an on-going concern that ebbed and flowed depending on the 
particular circumstances and contexts of participants’ lives. Graham, Stella and Hugh, in 
particular, reported immediate and significant concerns, raising questions not simply 
about personal identity but also about family history and their hopes and fears for future 
generations. 
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8.4 Discussion 
 
The majority of participants’ accounts seemed to suggest that clinicians dismissed their 
search for meaning by interpreting participants’ experiences through a lens focussed 
with reference to biomedical traditions and culture. As recounted by Stella, Joan and 
Toby, a preliminary diagnostic label bestowed through expert assessment relieved some 
of the anxiety and social wounds associated with having no label at all. However, in the 
longer term, these labels (‘idiopathic’, ‘chronic’ and ‘genetic’) and the associated 
terminology (‘peripheral neuropathy’) were formulated in an exclusive language that hid 
an underlying uncertainty about what was wrong and assumed a specialist knowledge 
which, without expert interpretation, held little meaning for the majority of participants. 
Most participants also made an explicit reference to the genetic issues associated with 
the progressive ataxias. It was clear that this topic was psychologically troubling and at 
the time of the interview the existential concerns seemed to be of particular relevance 
for Stella, Graham and Hugh.  
The findings from this work support yet deepen those of Daker-White et al. (2011) who 
investigated the experiences of the diagnostic process for people living with a 
progressive ataxia. As discussed and critiqued in chapter 3 (Literature Review), this was 
a large international study which examined English language internet discussion forums 
specifically for people living with ataxia. The main themes from this data clearly 
resonated with the topics discussed by participants in the present study. The authors 
identified diagnosis as an arduous and lengthy process which commonly resulted in test 
weariness, increased frustration and the questioning of medical expertise, particularly 
when previous diagnoses were changed or withdrawn. Contributors stressed the 
importance of having a medical label but maintained that a diagnosis of idiopathic ataxia 
was a non-diagnosis because it failed to satisfy the need for concrete explanations. 
Symptoms were also commonly misunderstood and credibility was found to be a 
particular issue for people living with episodic ataxia (like Joan).  
One of the other main themes to emerge from Daker-White et al. (2011:125,126) was 
the concept of ‘diagnosis as privilege’. The basic premise underpinning this theme 
seemed to suggest that whilst all people living with a progressive ataxia had to contend 
with an incurable condition, those who had the ‘privilege’ of a firm diagnosis might be 
‘better off’ than those who had either no diagnosis or the non-diagnosis of idiopathic 
ataxia. The present study has added a more contextualised understanding to this 
argument, in that, with respect to Hugh and Harry’s accounts, a definitive diagnosis may 
bring with it new uncertainties or terrifying consequences. These consequences impress 
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themselves on the person not just in the moment of diagnosis but project to a troubling 
future, and, for some, raise questions about the past with respect to unknown family 
histories. More accurately, rather than being better off, a definitive diagnosis might be 
better understood as having complex and highly situated ramifications that may invoke 
another set of problems that have to be managed, incorporated and understood within 
the contexts of the lifeworld.  
Daker-White et al. (2011:120) also suggested that people who were unable to secure a 
diagnosis changed their priorities from ‘getting a diagnosis’ to ‘learning to live with it’. 
Conversely, the accounts of the participants in the present study suggested that learning 
to live with an idiopathic progressive ataxia was not something they did or prioritised 
when they had exhausted or had been exhausted by the diagnostic process; rather it 
was something they did alongside and in the midst of these troubling and confusing 
times. This important topic is considered in-depth in the following chapter.  
The experiences recounted by participants in this study also resonated with the findings 
of White et al. (2010) who interviewed 42 adults living with Friedreich’s ataxia (FRA) to 
explore their perceptions of transitional life events. Similar to the findings of the present 
study, the emergence of symptoms was identified as a particularly significant period 
where participants encountered self-doubt and isolation when medical practitioners were 
initially unable to identify causation. Some participants also spoke about their concerns 
about passing on the FRA gene although this did not seem to be a particular focus of 
their accounts, perhaps for similar reasons as suggested for the present study. White et 
al. (2010) also reported that participants experienced both positive and negative 
interactions with healthcare providers. Negative experiences were derived from 
perceptions that clinicians had limited knowledge of Friedreich’s ataxia. Positive 
encounters were characterised by a willingness to listen and by demonstrating a 
compassionate and genuine interest in the fullness of the participants’ lives. 
The second super-ordinate theme focussed on the complex dilemmas participants faced 
about the inheritable potential of progressive cerebellar ataxia. In the main, they did not 
dwell on these issues. However, three participants spoke at some length and hinted at 
complex psychological concerns that were not only deeply personal (‘I don’t know which 
pigeon hole to put myself in’, Graham) but also embedded in highly situated family 
contexts (‘the children don’t know that they could have it, we’ve kept it quiet’, Hugh). 
These accounts support Williamson’s (1999) view that inheritable conditions raise 
psychological issues that have a qualitatively different feel to those of non-inheritable 
disorders. This is because concerns about inheritance not only challenge or threaten an 
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individual’s sense of identity in a fundamental way but also implicate members of the 
same family. Hugh’s account showed that late on-set conditions seemed to raise 
particular issues especially when the variant gene may have already been passed on. 
Feeling responsible for the life of future generations and the likely difficulties faced by 
children, formed part of the psychological landscape of living with cerebellar ataxia. 
Feelings of guilt in this situation can be intense (Kay and Kingston, 2002).  
The present study also revealed that cerebellar ataxia raised particular issues that add a 
new perspective to the literature concerned with understanding inheritable neurological 
conditions. A sense of chronic uncertainty emerged from participants’ accounts, not only 
in terms of living with a condition that was difficult to diagnose and for which there is no 
known cure but also the uncertainty that accompanied not knowing whether or not the 
condition was hereditary and whether it could be or already had been passed on. These 
experiences differ from the still deeply troubling but starker realities and certainty faced 
by people living with a condition such as Huntington’s disease. In this condition genetic 
testing provides a definitive result, and a positive test affords unequivocal information 
about risk of inheritance thus informing reproductive decision-making (Smith et al. 
2002).   
It is perhaps significant that all but one participant directly raised or hinted towards the 
psychologically troubling implications of living with a potentially inheritable condition and 
the difficulties faced in trying to make sense of family history and handling ambiguous 
information about future generations. These new findings may have implications not only 
for GPs and neurologists but also for geneticists and health psychologists. However, it 
might be important to look more closely at the ways in which people experience living 
with these possibilities and risks, especially the chronic uncertainty that might be 
particular to this condition. IPA seems well placed to explore these deeply personal 
topics and to capture the richness and complexity of family experiences (Chapman and 
Smith, 2002). 
Attending more closely to the themes identified in this chapter, this next section explores 
the intrinsic authority of biomedical discourse and the juxtaposition of two cultures: the 
meaning-centric instincts of the participants and the apparent disease-centric focus of 
medical specialists.  
There is a long history of research into doctor-patient interactions that has consistently 
identified problems associated with oppressive and disempowering communication 
styles (Gwyn, 2002). This type of discourse depends upon medical reductionism and 
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jargonistic terminology and it is perhaps surprising that it persists long after the benefits 
of partnership-working have been established (Coulter, 1999; Epstein and Street, 2011). 
Rather than being a ‘relic of the bad old days’ (Gwyn, 2002:167) this type of 
communication still seemed to be, at least for some participants in this study, a 
contemporary feature of clinical practice. People with ‘sticky clinical problems’ such as 
on-going symptoms with repeatedly negative test results and chronic incurable 
conditions seem particularly vulnerable to these uncomfortable interactions (Richards, 
1990:1407). Unfortunately the progressive cerebellar ataxias fit this mould. This 
condition is complex, causation is often elusive, and it is uncommon in general practice. 
Furthermore, there are as yet no reliable disease modifying interventions, and there are 
no clinically valid treatments that bring symptomatic relief to the primary impairments 
(Finsterer, 2009, Klockgether, 2011).  
The sense of abandonment (through being discharged or disbelieved) and frustration 
(through on-going diagnostic uncertainty and being denied access to valued sources of 
knowledge) recounted by the participants in this study was in some ways similar to 
those expressed by people living with MS (Johnson, 2003) and chronic fatigue 
syndrome (Dickson et al. 2007). However, the progressive ataxias are not contested or 
medically unexplained in the same way that a condition like chronic fatigue syndrome is. 
Also, some of the uncertainty and anxiety of living with MS described by Johnson (2003) 
may have been relieved more recently, albeit only modestly. For example, progress has 
been made in the biomedical management of MS with the advent of improved 
diagnostics and advances in immunology, alongside this has come a deepening 
appreciation of its psychosocial context, and the development of information sources 
that support collaboration and empowerment (Simmons, 2010). The position for people 
living with the progressive ataxias would seem very different in this regard. Firstly, 
diagnosis for many people remains an uncertain and persistent concern, whilst a firm 
diagnosis raises further issues about inheritance and the value of genetic testing (where 
available). The threat posed by a serious genetic condition carries a heavy emotional 
burden (Rolim et al. 2006) and the associated anxiety and uncertainty is thought to 
cause a kind of chronic stress (Bird, 1999). Secondly, although research is on-going, as 
noted above, there is currently no cure and no intervention that can relieve the 
symptoms or alter the trajectory of progression for the majority of the progressive 
ataxias. 
 
What emerged from this study was the participants’ desire to be heard, to be respected, 
informed and understood within the particular contexts of their social worlds, not just by 
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general practitioners but also by medical specialists, such as neurologists. These needs 
are the moral foundations that underpin the concepts of patient-centred care (Epstein 
and Street, 2011). Unfortunately, incurable conditions such as the progressive ataxias 
are thought to place the ‘highest demands on doctors’ skills’ in this regard (Williams, 
1990:67). Resisting historical traditions (such as the biomedical tradition) requires 
special effort, it involves ‘rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only [one’s] 
own particularity but also that of the other’ (Gadamer, 2004 [1975]:304). For healthcare 
practitioners this means understanding what is at stake in consultations with patients 
living with a condition like progressive cerebellar ataxia. With respect to the present 
study this might mean acknowledging the patient’s powerlessness and vulnerability. 
Communicating with patients in this situation therefore demands more than giving 
information. It requires interpretation of information in a way that makes sense and does 
not add to the burden of living with chronic illness. In other words, it means moving 
towards a model described by Salmon and Young (2005:231) in which ‘communication 
is tailored to the illness, the patient and the moment’ (emphasis added). 
Healthcare practitioners (and perhaps other organisations) may need further support to 
transcend the traditions of their cultures in order to attend to the particular needs, 
anxieties and concerns of people living with rare, complex, progressive and incurable 
conditions. Fortunately, efforts to promote a better understanding of the progressive 
ataxias has been one of the priorities of Ataxia UK and recent publications for general 
practitioners, medical specialists and rehabilitation practitioners may go some way to 
filling some of the gaps (Ataxia UK, 2009 (with a contribution from this researcher); 
2010). Furthermore, research that prioritises the perspectives and experiences of people 
who live with a progressive ataxia such as the present study and the work of Box et al. 
(2005), Brook-White et al. (2010) and White et al. (2011) adds to Boutté’s (1987, 1990) 
pioneering research in this field, and through incremental accretion may establish a 
corpus of work capable of informing and changing practice.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented participants’ perceptions of their experiences of the clinic, and 
the biomedical contexts in which life with ataxia may be understood. The findings lend 
support and expand previous work (White et al. 2010; Daker-White et al. 2011) and by 
doing so deepen the understanding of issues that may be significant and troubling for 
others living under similar circumstances.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Super-ordinate Theme 4  
 
‘Whenever it gives you a problem find a way round it, or fix it, you know’ (Harry) 
 
Description: Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the ways in which participants talked about taking steps to 
understand and reinterpret their condition on their own terms. It describes their attempts 
to take control of ataxia and its impact on their sense of identity within the rich contexts 
of their everyday lives. 
Disruptions and challenges seemed to form part of the fabric of participants’ worlds and 
were intertwined with and managed alongside the more hopeful and positive aspects of 
their lives. Three subthemes examine this complex interweaving and the ways in which 
participants coped with the turmoil and upheavals of living with ataxia. The first 
subtheme attends to participants’ accounts about seeking out sources of information 
and support and the meaning these held. The second subtheme looks at the ways in 
which participants described a particular stance or philosophy towards living with ataxia. 
The different approaches seemed to help maintain a positive focus on what could be 
achieved or fought for, and helped some participants retain a sense of purpose through 
connecting with and helping others. The third subtheme explores the particular ways in 
which participants managed to preserve valued roles and interests, as well as sustain 
important relationships whilst also encountering and dealing with frustrations, sadness 
and setbacks.  
Quotations from the majority of participants (n = 11) have been used to convey this 
super-ordinate theme. Extensive extracts from some participants have been used 
because these expressed the theme most clearly. Shorter extracts have been used to 
support the main quotations and to demonstrate the extent of the shared theme. 
Divergent experiences have been indicated in the text.   
9.2 Subtheme 1 
 
‘You’re not on your own’ (Scott) 
 
Topic: Seeking out information and drawing support from informed others 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, most participants described looking to medical 
practitioners for expert advice and partnership, as trusted people with whom they could 
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share their concerns and discuss ways of managing their condition. However, most 
narratives (n = 10) communicated a deep sense of abandonment and frustration with 
what was perceived as a lack of knowledge and understanding from healthcare 
professionals. Seemingly exasperated and no further forward, participants described 
feeling obliged to find their own ways of coping with this difficult situation. This subtheme 
focuses on the participants’ search for alternative sources of information and support 
from others with ataxia and is summarised in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 Seeking Support and Information (n = 7) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Seeking Alternative Information 
Susan 
‘I take literature from Ataxia UK to the consultants that I see and show 
them you know what I should expect in the way of a diagnosis’ 
5:19 
Stella ‘[…] reading various information [in the Ataxian]’ 1:26 
Hugh ‘[Ataxia UK] they should tell you what’s available’ 6:20 
Hugh ‘Go on the foreign [internet] sites that’s where you get the information’ 6:28 
Bill ‘There’s so much on the internet which is snake oil stuff’ 4:19 
Graham ‘[the Internet] they’re not credible to me’ 17:4 
Drawing Strength from Others with Ataxia 
Graham 
‘If we all club together we’ve got more of a voice than we have 
individually […] that’s why I support the support groups’ 
18:4 
Scott ‘[…] it’s just nice to know that there’s somebody else out there’ 18:16 
Bill ‘[BBC podcast] you can get some kind of comfort from it’ 13:44 
Susan ‘They’re grateful to me for running the group’ 8:15 
Jim 
‘If I can help others, or help others help others, then that’s part of the 
reason I exist’ 
1:29 
 
Perhaps in response to what seemed to be for most participants an immensely 
frustrating experience in the world of biomedicine, the majority (n = 11) talked about 
searching for additional information and alternative sources of support. Stella and 
Susan, for example, used The Ataxian (the members’ magazine produced by Ataxia UK) 
to underpin their requests for further diagnostic tests: 
Susan: ‘I take literature from Ataxia UK to the consultants that I see and show them, you 
know, what I should expect in the way of a diagnosis.’  
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Stella: ‘After […] reading various information [in the Ataxian] which stated that you 
should never be discharged because of new things coming up, I went back to my GP 
and got him to [re-] refer me.’ 
The above quotations seemed to reinforce the impression identified in other accounts 
(chapter 8) that GPs and consultants were perceived as lacking expertise and up-to-
date information. Furthermore, there is a suggestion in these quotations that Susan and 
Stella may have found it difficult to be heard in these consultations. The Ataxian 
therefore offered them both a voice and a borrowed authority compatible with the type of 
knowledge recognised by their medical practitioners. Re-balancing the power in this 
encounter by bolstering their status, created an opportunity for Stella and Susan to gain 
some control over medical referrals and consultations. 
Ataxia UK was not regarded positively by all participants. Hugh, for example, expressed 
reservations about the value of Ataxia UK which seemed to reflect his overall distrust of 
the medical profession and his belief perhaps that there was some sort of medical 
conspiracy to keep people with ataxia ignorant and powerless: 
Hugh: ‘They [doctors] just don’t tell you what’s available. Even the Ataxian Society 
[Ataxia UK] they should tell you what’s available so you can say ‘Let’s try this’. […] But 
they don’t. They should but they don’t. The trouble is with the Ataxia Society, they’ve got 
quite a few doctors on their Board, so that’s probably why they don’t do it.’   
Hugh assumed that Ataxia UK was run by medics; in fact its Board of Trustees is 
composed of several professional groups as well as people with ataxia or those caring 
for others living with ataxia.  
Harry rejected Ataxia UK for not being helpful enough (‘the horror that I came into this 
Society [Ataxia UK] and it’s like nobody was […] there’s no serious help, help to help 
yourself’). Toby found the thought of meeting others via Ataxia UK, particularly those 
more disabled than himself, too negative. He avoided meeting those who might reveal a 
possible unwanted future self (‘you don’t want to see people in maybe in a far more 
advanced stage of the condition, yeah? Cos it might depress you’). 
In the search for reliable and meaningful information, the Internet also divided opinion, 
Graham appeared wary of internet sites; ‘they’re not credible to me’, as did Bill; ‘There’s 
so much on the internet which is snake oil stuff that by and large that’s worth ignoring’. 
Hugh, perhaps because of his distrust of traditional, especially medical, sources of 
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information seemed less suspicious of the internet; ‘Go on the foreign sites that’s where 
you get the information from’. 
Information gathering, and learning about ataxia, formed an important strand of 
managing life with ataxia for these participants, at least in part because it might be 
understood that information afforded agency and perhaps a sense of competence in a 
situation where “expert” knowledge and understanding was lacking. However, at the 
same time, some participants seemed to be seeking out others with ataxia for some sort 
of fellow feeling, mutuality and support which perhaps worked to resist feelings of 
isolation and abandonment. The following exchange between Graham and Scott 
provided a good example:  
Graham: ‘It’s beneficial to meet people like Scott that have got similar … not exactly the 
same symptoms as me but at least we’re on the same page.’  
Scott: ‘You’re not on your own’  
Graham: ‘Yeah’  
Scott: ‘You can relate to somebody else who’s got what you’ve got and you can have 
some kind of benchmark of where you are.’  
Graham: ‘That’s right, yeah.’  
Scott: ‘I suppose … it’s just nice to know that there’s somebody else out there who’s 
suffering just as much as you are I suppose. I don’t mean that nastily, it’s just …’  
Graham: ‘Yeah, that’s right’.  
The opportunity to appeal to another’s experience, to know that they are ‘on the same 
page’, also appeared to provide both Scott and Graham with reassurance and an 
important sense of connection that despite everything they were not alone; ‘there’s 
somebody else out there who’s suffering just as much’. The reference to ‘benchmark’ in 
the above extract seemed significant in this context, perhaps others in a similar situation 
offered a fixed point of reference when everything else seemed in flux and unknowable. 
Bill seemed to find a similar sort of consolation from listening to a regular online 
broadcast about people living with disability:  
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Bill: ‘Like a real club, it has its own language and kind of knowing glances, whatever, 
that you belong to it and you can get some kind of comfort from it. […] In terms of you’re 
not the only one.’  
For Bill, learning about others in a similar situation perhaps reduced his sense of 
isolation (‘you’re not the only one’) and being part of a larger group appeared to reduce 
some of his illness related suffering (‘you can get some kind of comfort from it’). Similarly 
for Jim, he said of his local support group: ‘It’s good for me because it shows I’m not 
alone’, and Joan ‘talking with other people, I would hear what symptoms they had’. 
These sorts of connections with knowledgeable others could be understood as forming a 
kind of collective strength that worked to offset the feelings of vulnerability, 
powerlessness and stigma identified by participants in previous chapters.  
 
9.2.1 Summary 
 
Participants’ lives were populated with friends, family and work colleagues, nonetheless, 
it seemed they retained strong feelings of isolation, as if living with ataxia set them apart 
from others and disrupted their sense of belonging in the world. They also struggled to 
make sense of what seemed in their experience an unknowable and uncertain condition. 
Disappointed by medical specialists, participants described looking for support and 
information from other sources. Their search was not confined to objective facts about 
ataxia, it was also relational. They described seeking out similar others, those who could 
offer not simply useful information but also a sense of inclusion, belonging and 
reassurance that was absent from their encounters with those in the biomedical world. 
Reaching out to others who shared the participants’ experiences might have offset 
feelings of isolation and helplessness whilst, at the same time, inspiring confidence in 
their ability to persevere and deal with the difficulties they encountered.  
9.3 Subtheme 2 
 
‘Focus on what you can do, not what you can’t do’ (Toby) 
 
Topic: Taking a Stand: personal philosophies for living with ataxia 
The majority of participants (n = 9) talked about adopting a particular philosophy or an 
approach to living with ataxia that seemed to enable them to live their lives in a way that 
fostered self-determination and which went some way towards resisting the 
uncertainties and disruptions that accompanied life with ataxia. Two approaches to living 
with ataxia were identified (Table 9.2) and are discussed below.  
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Table 9.2 Approaches to Living with Ataxia (n = 7) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Focus on the Positive  
Toby 
‘Know your limitations […] try to have a positive outlook and focus on 
what you can do, not what you can’t do’ 
26:19 
Susan ‘I don’t concentrate, to be honest, on the things I can’t do’ 7:8 
The “Fighting Spirit” 
Harry ‘Beat it, […]  find a way round it, fix it’ 3:7 
Julia 
‘If I wanted to stay independent I had to fight as long as I could. […] I’m 
fortunate enough and bloody minded enough to hang on as long as I 
can’ 
15:20 
Stella 
‘My biggest thing now is to try and stop the rot really ... […] I think that’s 
the only way. That’s all I can do anyway’ 
25:28 
Scott ‘You've got to have a structured plan of attack’ 16:11 
Joan 
‘I’m learning to manage it better, because in the end you have to 
manage it’ 
3:29 
 
Toby and Susan talked about prioritising what they were able to do and about putting 
activities that were no longer possible behind them: ‘focus on what you can do, not what 
you can’t do’ (Toby). This approach seemed to foster a strong positive outlook. Both 
Susan and Toby recounted experiences where they had encountered loss of or threats 
to valued roles as part of the consequences of living with ataxia. However, instead of 
dwelling on these painful episodes, and whilst not concealing the hurt involved, they 
described focusing on a more positive aspect of their lives. For example, Susan 
described looking after her grandchildren as a ‘big part’ of her life but she seemed 
worried that it was a role at risk: 
‘My daughter-in-law doesn’t leave [the grandchildren] with me very often. And I wonder if 
she thinks I can cope, although I have managed to come down the stairs with a baby on 
my lap, on my bottom!’ [Smiles] 
As discussed in chapter 7 (Identity, Stigma and Disrupted Embodiment in Public Spaces 
and Places), Susan seemed to suspect that her daughter-in-law was wary about leaving 
her with the grandchildren. However, within the same sentence, almost without drawing 
breath, she offset this troubling issue through focussing positively, declaring her 
achievement and celebrating her ingenuity. Susan’s positive approach (‘I don’t 
concentrate, to be honest, on the things I can’t do’) acknowledged but at the same time 
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countered and overcame (at least temporarily) the threat to a valued role. This 
philosophy perhaps offered Susan a sense of control, a way of showing, at least to 
herself but also to others, that she was, for the time being, capable of coping. Small 
victories and accomplishments like these, even within a bleaker context, seemed to help 
sustain Susan to maintain a positive outlook and to resist the harmful impact on identity 
discussed in chapter 7.   
It may be important to acknowledge that neither Susan’s or Toby’s life had been 
untouched by serious illness prior to developing the symptoms of progressive ataxia. 
Their experiences of these earlier difficulties may have had some bearing on their way 
of living with ataxia, particularly with reference to maintaining a positive outlook in coping 
with adversity. For example, Susan’s approach seemed to be strongly influenced by 
witnessing her mother struggle with a painful, long term condition:  
Susan: ‘her pain was excruciating and I know that what I suffer is nothing like [that]. And 
when I wake up all rigid, and then I get going, to me that is such a relief, I always think of 
my mum, what it must have been like. So um … then I don’t think about my pain any 
more, you just get through the day.’ 
In the above quotation, Susan compared her mother’s severe and unrelenting pain with 
her own. Crucially Susan described gaining some respite from her pain whereas it 
seemed for Susan that her mother never did. Perhaps by respecting what Susan may 
have understood as her mother’s courage and resilience, and whilst not underplaying 
the severity of her own pain, she used her mother’s example to develop a cognitive 
strategy that helped to endure her own pain and to persevere. As with her general 
philosophy, Susan seemed less inclined to dwell on the negative aspects of her 
condition and instead refocused on what she could achieve, even if, at times this meant 
simply surviving from day to day: ‘you just get through the day’. 
Toby had survived a life threatening condition a few years prior to the development of 
ataxia symptoms. He believed that coming through the hardships associated with this 
crisis had conferred a buffer of resilience on him that may have helped withstand some 
of the more destructive or challenging aspects of living with ataxia: 
Toby: ‘for myself I think having had the tumour that made me a really strong person 
because I had to deal with that.’  
Toby and Susan used a cognitive strategy to help manage their lives with ataxia which 
focussed specifically on what was possible and what could be accomplished. They 
 201 
 
described drawing strength from previous illness experiences which appeared to help 
sustain a positive outlook even in adversity. Within a similarly positive framework Harry, 
Julia, Stella, Scott and Joan articulated a more adversarial approach in line with the 
“fighting spirit” which helped to preserve their independence as well as their participation 
in meaningful activities and interests (Table 9.2). Harry’s account provided a valuable 
insight into this aspect of living with ataxia. Harry’s philosophy was to find ways to 
outsmart the effects of ataxia whilst cautiously acknowledging that it had, and would 
continue to have, long term consequences: 
Harry: ‘I don’t consider it to be a threatening condition. It’s not fatal, you ain’t gonna die 
from it, so you’ve just got to beat it. Well … try and beat it, you know. Whenever it gives 
you a problem find a way round it, or fix it, you know.’ 
Drawing on adversarial metaphors, Harry objectified the ataxia (‘beat it, find a way round 
it, fix it’), externalising it in this way may have given him some sense of control, a way of 
living with ataxia that despite anticipated setbacks, preserved, as best he could, his way 
of being in the world. For example, Harry seemed to admit the hurt associated with his 
inability to do some activities: ‘Can’t do it no more. And then that sort of thing, it’s like, 
bites a bit’. The reference to ‘bite’ here says something quite powerful about Harry’s 
sense of loss, as if relinquishing valued activities actually takes something out of him or 
wounds him. However, he explained that at the same time; ‘You evolve, you evolve to 
suit where you’re at. […] It’s thinking my way around these things. I mean it’d be so easy 
to just go ‘No’ and forget about it.’  For Harry, this philosophy, his way of living with 
ataxia, fighting and working hard to shape his life in a way that he valued, also seemed 
to act as a means of preserving a preferred identity. He spoke about alternative 
identities that he strongly resisted. In the following quotation Harry described what he 
might have considered the antithesis to his own approach to living with ataxia:   
 
Harry: ‘… you know people are just ‘I’ll have an electric wheelchair and I’ll have a dog 
for the disabled’, and just give in, you know. It’s just … you know it’s not a fight thing, 
[…] they think they’ve got ataxia, that’s it, you know, just give up, curl up in a ball until 
you die sort of thing.’ 
Harry described an acceptance of passivity that he had identified in others’ behaviour 
that he found almost unthinkable. For Harry, inactivity was suggestive of lack of fight, an 
easy way out of the hard work of living purposefully with ataxia, as he said later in his 
account: ‘it’s so easy to sit at home, watch telly and wondering about the next episode of 
‘EastEnders’’. It seemed that Harry would rather persevere with his way of living with 
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ataxia which perhaps sustained a positive sense of self, than give into the submissive 
behaviour he thought he saw in others:  
Harry: ‘More and more things don’t work, you know. You can’t just do a couple of pull 
ups in the morning and then think ‘Oh that’s it for a week’. You have to do it like again 
and again and again’. 
Harry had developed a philosophy, a way of living with and adapting to recurring 
difficulties that still allowed him to pursue meaningful goals, the kinds of things he was 
interested in. At the same time he acknowledged that this approach was not straight 
forward, it was demanding: ‘You have to do it like again and again and again’. The 
repetition in this sentence seemed important because it emphasised that managing life 
with ataxia was not “simply” a cognitive strategy, it had to be translated into persistent 
behaviour which might, under any circumstances, be difficult to sustain. Furthermore, 
Harry seemed to admit to himself that the future may unfold in ways that could threaten 
his preferred way of being in the world and his hard earned sense of self. For example, 
with reference to the importance of regular exercise Harry explained: ‘otherwise electric 
wheelchairs here we come, you know’. Here, it is almost possible to conjure up an 
image of Harry sliding down a hill into a wheelchair, digging his heels in all the way 
down. It powerfully captures his resistance to this possibility and how hard he is fighting 
to stay in control and to preserve his sense of self.  
Participants’ accounts suggested that ways of living with ataxia were not easily 
developed or implemented and often involved a trial and error approach; some 
strategies were found to work, whilst others were temporarily or permanently abandoned 
or adjusted as life was further disrupted and as new challenges were confronted. The 
following quotation from Hugh’s account illustrated how, at times, he experienced life as 
almost engulfed by the effects of ataxia. Hugh had lived with ataxia for many years but 
seemed to be in the middle of a period of transition or crisis:  
Hugh: ‘it takes me longer and longer to recover, so if I do too much it takes me longer to 
recover […] I’ve got some weights so I do a bit of that but even that I seem to … don’t 
know what it is, motivation gone, it seems too much, like … getting in from work, I’m so 
tired, I just want to sit down. Some days I’m good, some days I’m bad. It’s hard, it’s 
really hard.’ 
In the above quotation Hugh seemed almost consumed by the fatiguing effects of ataxia. 
Even though some days may have been better than others, at its worst the effects 
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seemed to penetrate his whole being: ‘Some days I’m good, some days I’m bad’, 
emphasis added. Hugh described everyday life as gruelling and exhausting and often 
beyond the implementation of his usual coping strategies; ‘motivation gone, it seems too 
much’. Overall, the physical and psychological effort of getting through his day seemed 
almost too much to bear; ‘It’s hard, it’s really hard’. Several of the participants seemed to 
describe sharing at least some aspect of Hugh’s experience: 
Scott: ‘it’s not much of a life at all when the symptoms come on strong […] you don’t 
have a social life as such […] I do try to get out as much as I can to stave off the 
symptoms of depression, but it’s very difficult – you go out then you do a very short 
journey, you’ll be back inside.’ 
Graham: Some days it is quite difficult to get up and go out. So that’s fine if you’ve got a 
plan, say a work plan to go to work, but then when you come to something else that’s 
not quite as important as going to work, it can be quite difficult. […] So sometimes I do 
give in […] so I don’t go out.’ 
These quotations from Graham, Scott, Hugh and Harry seemed to convey the struggle 
and effort involved in keeping going and in implementing positive strategies and ways of 
coping with ataxia. Sacrifice and compromise seemed to be a necessary part of living 
with this progressive condition. Often due to fatigue but also as a result of accumulative 
physical deterioration, adjustments had to be made; some activities were abandoned at 
least in the short term but also some were lost for good and new problems had to be 
attended to and managed. 
In addition to assertions that they maintained a positive outlook and adopted an 
adversarial approach to coping with ataxia, membership or leadership of a support 
group also seemed to confer an affirmation of the sense of self that in turn appeared to 
help these participants manage life with ataxia in a positive way. Graham, for example, 
drew strength from being part of a larger and more powerful group because he 
explained that in a situation where he felt he had no voice, the larger group offered 
perhaps a greater sense of authority and the right to be heard: 
Graham: ‘If we all club together we’ve got more of a voice than we have individually […] 
that’s why I support the support groups’. 
Jim and Susan seemed to gain a sense of purpose and possibly esteem from supporting 
other people living with ataxia. Jim for example seemed to derive satisfaction from being 
able to offer advice: ‘I got an e-mail back, it’s really helped, which is good.’ Similarly 
 204 
 
Susan seemed to find organising a support group personally rewarding: ‘they’re grateful 
to me for running the group’. 
Two participants recounted quite different experiences. Ted, being relatively newly 
diagnosed still seemed to be making sense and grappling with the effects of ataxia on a 
day to day basis and did not describe any particular strategy or way of coping with 
ataxia that he had found helpful. Bill however seemed to be in rather a different place: 
Bill: ‘You get used to it, get to the end of the week, you feel ‘that’s one more down’. So 
we survive, we’ve got by. You know we’re still around, we’re still here. So I think ‘Oh, it’s 
a relief’ […] I’m not sure how it works, I can’t explain the mechanism, but it just happens, 
you think, ‘Morning, Friday again, good’’. 
Unlike most of the other participants Bill seemed primarily to endure life with ataxia. 
Although Bill still participated in some activities that gave him comfort, taken as a whole, 
the context of his everyday life was marked by a kind of patient fortitude that differed in 
both tenor and perspective from the other participants’ stance towards their lives with 
ataxia. With echoes of Susan’s account, the above quotation seemed to suggest that Bill 
framed his life in terms of survival, an existence measured in individual weeks suffered 
through but successfully negotiated. Bill spoke both of himself and his wife. Getting 
through the week was a joint effort: ‘we survive, we’ve got by’, ‘we’re still around, we’re 
still here’. Bill seemed to suggest that the struggle was not his alone, his wife, as his 
main carer, also had to endure, and the regular Friday appraisal observed their 
combined achievement in getting through another week. This difference in attitude 
compared to other participants in the study may also have reflected a latent anxiety 
about his wife’s quality of life. By facing these difficulties together they also suffered 
them together. Bill the individual was ‘still here’ and it was perhaps a relief to be alive. 
However, at the end of another painful and effortful week not only was Bill ‘still around’ 
but so was his wife: ‘we’re still here’. Bill and his wife as a couple were still together, she 
was still with him. The repetition of ‘we’ and ‘still’ seemed to emphasise the fact that, in a 
positive way, nothing had changed, at the most fundamental level perhaps, she had not 
left him. 
 
9.3.1 Summary 
 
Most participants described a personal philosophy which acknowledged that ataxia was 
a feature of everyday life without entirely surrendering enjoyable and meaningful 
activities to it or underplaying its negative effects. Taking a positive stance might have 
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bolstered the participants’ sense of autonomy and helped them cope with some of the 
more disheartening consequences of living with this progressive but uncertain condition. 
However, maintaining a positive focus and deriving a sense of satisfaction and 
achievement required sustained effort and reappraisal in light of permanent or 
temporary setbacks and physical decline. Participants’ willingness to talk about their 
struggles as well as their successes worked to offset any scepticism that the “fighting 
spirit” philosophy could be seen as a self-presentational strategy adopted for the 
purposes of the interview or, as suggested by Radley (1993), a reflection of a cultural 
imperative to stoically accept impairment and to heroically battle against the effects of 
illness. For some participants, the effects of ataxia seemed overwhelming and, at these 
times, strategies or ways of life that usually conferred some benefit were permanently or 
temporarily abandoned or rendered ineffective. Recurring motifs about ways of 
managing and living with these disruptions could be traced through the participants’ 
accounts; these are discussed in more depth in the next subtheme.   
 
9.4 Subtheme 3 
 
‘When I do something, I do it in bite size’ (Scott) 
 
Topic: Finding a way to preserve valued roles and interests 
 
All participants recounted experiences where their natural way of being had changed 
and was changing as a result of living with ataxia. Difficulties and setbacks were 
described as part of the pattern of everyday life and were woven in amongst the 
achievements and the satisfaction associated with accomplishing, in some acceptable 
way, valued activities and sustaining important relationships. Managing therefore 
encompassed a kind of dynamic working out. Living with a progressive and 
unpredictable condition meant that strategies had to evolve. Plans and activities were 
re-evaluated in light of on-going and unpredictable disruption. Therefore managing to 
forge a meaningful life with ataxia could not be understood without referring to the ways 
in which it was always in progress and also shaped by temporal considerations. Finding 
acceptable ways to pace activities, for example, offered the opportunity to maintain 
involvement in enjoyable and rewarding occupations. The following extract from Joan’s 
account provides a useful introduction to this subtheme: 
Joan: ‘I’m daft if I allow myself to do more than half an hour in the garden, because by 
three quarters of an hour I’m struggling. But half an hour it’s such a short time and very 
trying. Although the place looks tidy, I’m not a very tidy person. Do you know what I 
mean? So I’m trying to be a bit tidier as I go along because otherwise it’s too much to 
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deal with. I thought when I came here I wouldn’t need anyone with the housework, but I 
do. And with the ironing … and the garden […] I don’t go out in the evening anymore 
which is trying. I can’t so that’s changed.’ 
The repeated use of the word ‘trying’ in this extract seemed to communicate not only a 
sense of endeavour and perseverance but also irritation. Joan seemed to feel that she 
had to almost become a different person just to cope with ataxia. In addition to 
reluctantly abandoning parts of her social life and seeking help with household activities, 
Joan also talked about the frustration she felt in having to apportion a specified time to 
her activities; measuring out how much time she could spend doing something before 
she had to stop. As demonstrated in other work (Reynolds and Prior, 2003) pacing 
seemed to confer mixed benefits. Pacing allows participation in meaningful and 
enjoyable activities but at the same time it may be perceived as giving the illness the 
upper hand, a forced choice rather than a positive lifestyle decision. However, Joan had 
managed to preserve some of her interests and seemed to derive at least some 
satisfaction from doing them in a modified way: 
Joan: ‘When I go to [my son’s] house I can actually achieve so much because I mean I 
actually can help him do some painting … because he’ll get out all the paraphernalia, 
puts the chair there, opens the paint tin, puts the brush in my hand and I can paint. And 
of course that makes me feel very good. Then he will gear it to three quarters of an hour 
and make me stop, even if I want to go on, which I generally do. And the same with 
gardening in his garden which I love doing. I can do that as well, and it feels so much 
more positive and good, because I’ve achieved something rather than not a lot.’ 
In a very practical way, it seemed important that Joan’s son set up the activity and 
imposed a completion time so that Joan could expend her energies on the most 
pleasurable and rewarding part of gardening or painting. The above quotation possibly 
suggests that Joan’s son seemed to understand his mother’s difficulties and constraints, 
and more importantly perhaps he accepted them and helped her to manage them in a 
positive way. Joan seemed to derive a firm sense of satisfaction and enjoyment from not 
only doing the activities she described but also perhaps by spending time with her son. 
This sense of satisfaction may have been enhanced because Joan had been able to do 
something for her son in return; decorating his house and doing his garden. At a deeper 
level of interpretation, what seemed important here for Joan was not simply that she 
could do an activity that she enjoyed but, as a mother helping out her son, the richer 
reciprocal social contexts underlying this activity perhaps provided deeper meaning and 
a stronger sense of well-being and contentment.  
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Graham and Scott shared Joan’s frustrations about fatigue and apportioning time to 
activities, they both spoke about trying to complete tasks whilst preserving scarce 
energy resources:  
Graham: ‘Instead of doing a day gardening or decorating or whatever, you can do an 
hour. And sometimes it takes longer to actually get set up, do something for half an 
hour, three quarters of an hour and then put everything away again …’ 
Scott: ‘I support that because when I do something I do it in bite size as I call it. I do it in 
a little section where I can spend a fairly reasonable comfortable short period of time, 
which gives me a bit of time to clean everything up and another day I do it again. So 
what would have taken me about two hours when I was healthy takes me several weeks 
now.’ 
The sense of measured time and living with a heightened awareness of time articulated 
by Joan, Scott and Graham was echoed in other accounts. Participants spoke of a loss 
of spontaneity, and of activities abandoned or curtailed, perhaps best summed up by 
Susan; 
Susan: ‘It’s slowed me down and that can be quite frustrating to have your life slowed 
down. Because apart from anything else it shortens the time that you have. All the things 
that you used to be able to do in an hour or a day, everything takes so much longer, so 
you don’t have so much time.’ 
 
For Susan, the effects of ataxia seemed to have compressed or rationed time; ‘it 
shortens the time that you have’. Time was also slowed down because, in similar ways 
to Joan, Scott and Graham, everyday tasks could take up a disproportionate amount of 
time, leaving little possibility of doing anything else. In this sense Susan felt that her 
whole life had ‘slowed down’.  
In this next extract Bill described his experiences of family mealtimes: 
Bill: ‘I mean the big frustration is not being able to eat and speak at the same time, 
because I’m used to kind of having long conversations during meals and you know you 
would like to say things and join in, argue, whatever. When you’ve got to sit quietly it’s 
quite difficult at times. Because you think of exactly the right thing you’d like to say and 
after the meal you say ‘You know when you said such and such, well how about …’ then 
it didn’t work, the moment was lost.’ 
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In the above quotation (as discussed in chapter 6, The Embodied Experience of Living 
with Progressive Cerebellar Ataxia)  Bill started with a straightforward description of the 
physical challenges of ataxia, the difficulty of combining eating with talking, however, the 
main body of the extract quickly moved towards explaining the meaning of this 
experience. A descriptive analysis of the text suggested that two physical impairments 
(difficulty eating and difficulty speaking) combined to rob Bill of a valued occupation, 
active involvement in dinner table discussions; ‘I’m used to kind of having long 
conversations during meals and you know you would like to say things and join in, 
argue’. A deeper reading might propose that sitting quietly was not Bill’s natural way of 
being in the world; it was a way of being imposed by ataxia, ‘you’ve got to sit quietly’ 
(emphasis added). The final sentence; ‘After the meal you say ‘You know when you said 
such and such, well how about …’ then it didn’t work, the moment was lost’, speaks for 
Bill’s attempts to recapture a specific opportunity but also seemed to connect with past 
attempts. Listening to him it felt as if he had tried this way of picking up lost 
conversations or lost moments many times.  
What seemed to be glimpsed in the above extract was the reiteration of the physical 
assault of ataxia on the body but also, the sense of diminished possibilities. Sitting still, 
all his effort concentrated on eating, chewing and swallowing, Bill was physically 
present, at the table with the others, but the interesting conversations that he would 
have liked to be part of were going on around him. When he tried to catch up he found 
himself temporally out of step, ready to discuss a moment in time that the others had 
long ago left behind. In this sense his social presence had been lost. 
Bill had worked out a way to counter some of these negative effects; he discussed 
‘politics and stuff’ with two volunteers, each of whom visited Bill once a week. Another 
volunteer accompanied his wife on trips which, via the photographs she took, she then 
shared and discussed with Bill. However, it would seem to be too simplistic in terms of 
interpretation to overstate the way in which these strategies may have compensated for 
what Bill and by extension his wife had lost. The volunteers provided a substitute for 
dinner table discussion but, without reading too much into Bill’s account, it would seem 
perhaps that the loss of these highly valued family debates and conversations inevitably 
and irreversibly diminished some the richness and depth of Bill’s life experience. 
Importantly for Bill, he seemed extruded from the family, unable to take part in reciprocal 
roles within the family, he had his interesting conversations elsewhere.    
Overall, the participants seemed to have a heightened awareness of time, so much so 
that important actions and activities were often carefully measured and calibrated 
 209 
 
against clock time and fragile body capacities. A dynamic working out was described 
that focussed on accomplishing meaningful activities where possible and, when 
necessary, giving into and adapting to the overwhelming effects of ataxia. Time was 
manifest in ambiguous and paradoxical ways: Bill, forced to focus on chewing and 
swallowing during mealtimes, seemingly trapped in the present moment but strangely 
out of step with from what was going on around him; Joan, clock watching as her 
physical capacities began to fail, seemingly annoyed not just at this change in herself 
but also in some sense at time itself (‘half an hour it’s such a short time and very trying’), 
and Susan with time pressing in on her, like a physical entity imposing limits on what 
she could fit into her day. Participants also spoke about the need for laborious planning 
that robbed them of spontaneity and freedom in the moment (‘I can’t just go to the 
station anymore and just travel’, Julia), as well as the everyday movements and actions 
that required careful calibration and attention (‘everything is much slower […] the 
physical act of cutting meat, or whatever and then chewing it, making sure it’s small 
enough so I don’t choke’, Jim). Harry spoke similarly, he squeezed in leisure pursuits 
and activities that were directed towards preserving bodily capacities between work 
responsibilities and whilst managing fatigue: 
Harry: ‘It’s not easy … you run out of time. You get home at like 8 o’clock at night, go out 
on my bike for like quarter of an hour and then the standing frame. Go to bed by 9 
o’clock, you know.’ 
 
As discussed in chapter 6 (The Embodied Experience of Living with Progressive 
Cerebellar Ataxia), for the majority of participants, fatigue formed an almost permanent 
backdrop against which activities were accomplished, modified or abandoned. Hugh 
seemed to be immersed in a particularly difficult phase, whilst Scott, Graham and Joan 
also demonstrated perhaps that persevering was sometimes futile, and that managing 
also involved, at times, giving in, sacrificing or adapting activities to avoid adverse and 
distressing consequences.  
Changes to the corporeal self, brought about by ataxia, altered the way in which time 
was lived and understood by the participants in this study. It seemed that the natural 
flow of time and the sense of lived time had been distorted and disturbed, it pressed in 
on meaningful activities rendering them difficult or even impossible. Quality time seemed 
to be snatched in very small chunks. However, despite these setbacks and difficulties, 
nearly all the participants derived a sense of satisfaction from the activities and interests 
they were able to pursue, albeit in the majority of cases in a modified and somewhat 
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straitened way. This is not to deny the loss and sadness many also encountered when 
some activities were abandoned for good, as discussed previously with reference to 
Harry’s account. Joan’s experience could also be considered typical in this regard. Joan 
had been a dancer since she was small child: 
Joan: ‘I’d had to stop dancing all together and that was very disastrous, cos we were … 
we are a group of people, a lot of whom are on their own. We used to dance twice in a 
week. Virtually every Saturday there was a lovely dance and we’d all dress up. Travel 
quite a long way to get there and we’d share cars, and it spun off into lovely friendships.’  
Giving up dancing felt ‘disastrous’ to Joan. Not only had she lost a part of herself, her 
long established identity as a dancer perhaps, but she also seemed to miss the 
excitement and anticipation of dressing up, planning the journey, the thrill of travelling 
and dancing with a close group of friends. It seemed that the sense of occasion as well 
as the dancing itself had been lost. The change in tense was also interesting; initially 
Joan started talking about the group in the past tense but quickly adjusted to the present 
(‘we were … we are a group of people’). Joan was no longer a dancer but met up with 
the group socially. This seemed to have preserved a sense of belonging and close 
connection with cherished friends who shared a common interest, and as such perhaps 
helped Joan to retain an important link with her previous self. However, meeting up with 
these friends was also a threatened activity that Joan was in the process of thinking 
about and adjusting to: 
 
Joan: ‘This little buggy will go in the back of the car. The problem is that […] it was okay 
for me to lift in and out, it cuts down into four bits, time has moved on and I can’t do that 
quite so easily. […] perhaps if I can get motivated … […] if I got a car that was fairly tall 
at the back I could have a hoist to put the buggy in, then I would really get back to being 
totally independent from that point of view again.’ 
The above quotation reinforced the interpretation that the pursuit of valued interests 
required on-going effort (‘perhaps if I can get motivated’) and adjustment in response to 
deteriorating physical competencies (‘time has moved on and I can’t do that quite so 
easily’).  
Similar to Joan, Julia referred to herself as a quilter in the present tense (‘I’m a quilter’). 
Even though Julia could no longer quilt she still met up with the quilters and joined in, as 
far as possible, with their social activities. She had worked out a way of maintaining her 
creative interests through working with fabric and wool in a less intricate way and this 
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perhaps retained her sense of identity as a creative person and as a quilter. 
Furthermore as Julia had remained a social member of the group, perhaps in similar 
ways to Joan, this also fostered a sense of continuity and belonging: ‘I’m part of the 
gossip’.  
 
9.4.1 Summary 
 
Participants described modifying activities and interests where necessary to 
compensate for diminished capabilities, and to continue to meaningfully engage in the 
world as best they could on their own terms. Ataxia seemed to be viewed as having the 
potential to disconnect participants from others, to loosen the social threads that 
provided companionship and a sense of belonging. Adaptations were therefore made on 
an on-going basis and with respect to temporal considerations and uncertain bodily 
capacities. Fatigue and progressive disability shaped the extent to which participants 
could contribute and derive satisfaction from the activities they were most interested in. 
Working out ways of coping seemed hugely effortful. Sometimes with the support of 
others, and although not always possible, participants accomplished activities and by 
doing so held onto a preferred and valued sense of self that also deemphasised the 
salience of ataxia in their lives. Although some participants had to give up on or 
abandon some activities, they worked to preserve the friendships that usually 
accompanied them. Shared interests and being with others, even when no longer able 
to participate in the activity itself, seemed to provide a highly valued sense of continuity 
and social inclusion.  
 
9.5 Discussion  
 
This super-ordinate theme was divided into three sub-themes. The first explored the 
ways in which participants recounted a need to secure reliable sources of information 
outside of biomedical encounters, and to gain support from others with ataxia to offset 
feelings of isolation, confusion and abandonment. The second subtheme looked at the 
ways in which participants spoke about developing a philosophy to foster self-
determination and to resist uncertainty and disruption. The final subtheme identified and 
discussed how participants saw their lives transformed as they struggled to adapt to loss 
and change whilst holding onto a sense of themselves and their connectedness to the 
things in the world (people, activities and ways of being) that were important to them. 
The experience of living with ataxia was portrayed in this theme as a struggle and an 
effort, and although participants described attempting to live with ataxia in a positive 
way, these attempts were by no means straightforward. Participants’ descriptions did not 
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hide the pain involved, the continued effort required or the sacrifices that were made in 
order to construct their lives in a way that retained some sense of satisfaction and 
fulfilment. Loss was endured and the future was viewed uncertainly, both with hope 
about what could be sustained and accomplished as well as with caution for anticipated 
hardships and disappointments.  
Running through these accounts was a common thread that involved connecting with 
others in a similar situation and retaining a sense of continued belonging to long-
standing group memberships and close personal relationships. Being with others in a 
meaningful way whilst participating in a valued role or interest seemed to offset feelings 
of vulnerability and isolation. Other people (either similarly affected by ataxia) or 
members of a valued group (joined together on the basis of a common interest such as 
quilting) appeared to enrich the meaning of a particular interest, activity or pursuit. It was 
not simply the activity in and of itself that was important, but the deeper social contexts 
of the activity and the meaning it held for a particular person in a particular situation. In 
other words, these valued groups were not all about ataxia or providing support for 
people living with ataxia. Active engagement in meaningful activities and opportunities 
for reciprocity seemed to help preserve valued identities and contributed to sustaining a 
familiar and on-going sense of self.  
These findings are not revelatory in the sense that others have identified similar issues 
with reference to the hardships people face when living with a long term condition, as 
well as the threats that are suffered to a person’s sense of identity (Bury, 1982; 
Charmaz, 1983). However, the sense of dynamic working out, the constant adjustment 
and deployment of resources to accommodate symptoms such as fatigue and issues 
such as uncertainty, whilst, at the same time, safeguarding valued roles and a positive 
outlook, mirrors more recent work (Sanders et al. 2002; Reynolds and Prior, 2003; 
Reeve et al. 2010). Taking this dynamic perspective into account, the landmark theory of 
biographical disruption as a means of encapsulating the experience of chronic illness 
(Bury, 1982) has been taken as the point of departure for this discussion. This theory will 
be critically interrogated with reference to other work and more recent developments in 
understanding the lived experience of long term illness.  
Bury’s (1982) now classic formulation of chronic illness as ‘biographical disruption’ has 
been much discussed and critiqued since its publication, nonetheless it is argued here 
that this concept retains validity with reference to the accounts of the participants in the 
present study. Bury (1982:174) identified that an incomplete medical understanding of a 
person’s illness or condition left those with such a condition dependent upon their own 
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‘stock of knowledge and biographical experience’. Furthermore, Comaroff and Maguire, 
(1981:119) proposed that those who lived with illnesses where explanations and 
solutions were not readily offered, found themselves ‘especially bereft’. Under such 
circumstances, Bury (1982) suggested that people attempt to fill gaps in their 
understanding by looking for more comprehensive explanations and sources of 
information. Critically Bury (1982:174) claimed that once such knowledge was acquired 
it was then necessary to integrate it with a person’s ‘total biography’.  
This search for and subsequent interpretation of knowledge or information in light of 
one’s own particular circumstances and contexts could be traced in the accounts of 
participants in the present study, and was perhaps most strongly identified in Graham’s 
account: ‘how’s that informing me, my situation?’ It was also a feature in others’ 
accounts. Subtheme 1 identified a need to seek out information that could be used to 
complete or at least develop the participants’ understanding of their condition and to 
reconcile this with what they understood from their own experience. In turn, as with the 
participants in Bury’s (1982) study and with reference to more recent work about coping 
successfully with multiple sclerosis (Pinson et al. 2009), knowledge that was integrated 
and thus situated within a personal context seemed, at least partially, to dispel 
uncertainty and, ultimately, provided a basis upon which meaningful lives could be lived.  
Bury (1982) also proposed that the onset of chronic illness instigated a profound re-
evaluation of a person’s future plans, hopes and expectations. Part of this reassessment 
included the anticipation of hardship and loss more usually seen as a far off possibility in 
one’s own life or, at a distance from the self, in the misfortune of others. Participants in 
the present study identified similar concerns in subtheme 2 (Taking a Stand: personal 
philosophies for living with ataxia) and 3 (Finding a way to preserve valued roles and 
interests) and, either directly or obliquely, referred to anticipated disruptions that, rather 
than being in the far future, seemed to press in on them, a source of almost constant 
worry or concern that had to be resisted and managed (‘otherwise electric wheelchairs 
here we come, you know’, Harry). In the face of these disruptions, Bury (1982) proposed 
that individuals mobilised resources (cognitive, material and social) in order to repel the 
intrusion of chronic illness upon their lives. Furthermore, Bury (1982) argued that a 
person’s outlook or ability to manage might also depend on their ability to sustain 
friendships and reciprocal relationships. Similar to the participants in the present study, 
Bury did not suggest that coping mechanisms evolved without thought or hardship: ‘The 
erstwhile taken-for-granted world of everyday life becomes a burden of conscious 
planning and expedition’ (1982:176). Again, these words resonated with the experiences 
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recounted by the participants in the present study. The meticulous and wearisome 
planning and on-going adjustments that were made to ordinary activities of daily life 
were strongly articulated in the majority of accounts.  
In his evaluation of Bury’s (1982) concept of biographical disruption, SJ Williams (2000) 
offered a revision of the view implied in Bury’s (1982) thesis that biographical disruption 
shattered taken for granted assumptions about the body, self and world. Drawing on the 
work of Pound et al (1998), Williams proposed that the concept of biographical 
disruption failed to account for the ways in which illness may already have been a 
feature of a person’s biography. Within the context of on-going hardship, the emergence 
of a new event may not be considered particularly disruptive. As discussed in chapter 2 
(Understanding the Subjective Experience of Long-term Illness), Pound et al (1998) 
found that their elderly participants, having lived through adversity in the war, seemed to 
accept their stroke as part and parcel of a life run though with suffering and hardship. It 
was argued by the authors that, in this context, a stroke had less potential to be 
biographically disruptive. In the present study several of the participants had also lived 
through adversity such as bereavement, unemployment, marriage breakdown and 
previous illnesses. However, in contrast to the accounts of elderly people living with 
stroke, none of the participants (except perhaps Harry, who had lived with ataxia since 
his late childhood) seemed to consider the disruptions they experienced in living with 
ataxia as part of their anticipated life trajectory. It does not seem to be too great a step 
therefore to suggest that for most of the participants in the present study, and only within 
their particular contexts, ataxia could be understood as imposing or at least risking some 
sort of estrangement with their sense of biographical continuity.  
 
Developing his critique and with reference to the work of Carricaburu and Pierret (1995), 
SJ Williams (2000) suggested that in some cases illness onset conferred a sense of 
biographical continuity or reinforcement rather than disruption. This was not found to be 
the case in the accounts of participants in the present study. The reason for this may lay 
in the conceptualisation of biographical reinforcement which appeared to be very 
specific to the circumstances of one group of participants. HIV-positive men who were 
infected as a result of haemophilia described already living their lives around an 
anticipated illness trajectory. It was suggested that under these particular circumstances 
a HIV-positive status confirmed or reinforced their biographies rather than disrupted 
them (Carricaburu and Pierret, 1995).  
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Finally, SJ Williams (2000:61) suggested, albeit cautiously and rather speculatively, that 
biographical uncertainty was a regular and not an unanticipated feature of late modernity 
in which there is a ‘never ending cycle of biographical appraisals, revisions and 
improvements’. Whilst this might be the case from a broadly sociological perspective, 
and although this may not be an intentional outcome of such speculation, the grouping 
of illness experience within a more general concept of late-modern existential angst, 
seems to fail to acknowledge and respect the profound disruptions described by the 
participants in the present study.  
One of SJ Williams’ central and concluding arguments lay in asking for a more cautious 
application of the concept of biographical disruption to the findings of research into the 
experience of illness. In particular he called for careful attention to be paid to ‘meaning 
and contexts’ and ‘the manner in which identities are threatened or affirmed’ (Williams, 
2000:61, 62). The present study, through the cautious application of IPA, carefully 
teased out the highly situated and context dependent ways in which participants 
described their experiences of ataxia. Steps were taken to prioritise the participants’ 
accounts over and above the theoretical constructs apparent in the literature. 
Nonetheless the critical features of Bury’s (1982) concept of biographical disruption 
resonated with the findings presented in this chapter but, as perhaps anticipated by SJ 
Williams (2000), in ways that were particular to participants’ circumstances and 
biographical history.  
G Williams’ (1984) work on narrative reconstruction could be read as a continuation of 
Bury’s 1982 thesis (Lawton, 2003). G Williams predicated his ideas upon his 
participants’ sense making about the causation of illness. However, its central message 
has resonance with the accounts of participants in the present study and pre-empted 
Bury’s (1991) calls for a shift away from focussing purely on the problems people face in 
living with long term illness. G Williams’ (1984:197) ideas about narrative reconstruction 
suggested that people living with long term illness attempted to ‘reconstitute and repair 
ruptures between body, self and world by linking up and interpreting different aspects of 
biography in order to realign present, past and self with society’. Realignment, in this 
sense, was understood as the means by which people attempted to reconstitute their 
lives in ways that were meaningful to them, such that they retained some sense of order 
and coherence with their past and present selves. Once again this idea that people 
living with long term conditions expended effort on working out ways of holding on to the 
parts of their lives that gave them a sense of continuity and order, strongly resonated in 
each of the subthemes presented in this chapter. Reflecting on this and other work, Bury 
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(1991) encouraged researchers to redress what he saw as an imbalance in the literature 
that was tipped towards understanding illness as a master status; the passive 
acceptance of a personal tragedy. Bury (1991) argued that the diversity of experience 
should be explored and, where possible, examples might be documented where a 
hopeful future, or one at least that was not wholly burdened by the impact of illness, had 
been fashioned and articulated. It is towards these considerations that this discussion 
now turns.  
A body of work, the conclusions of which resonate with the accounts of the participants 
in this study, has suggested that an uncritical application of the concept of biographical 
disruption to understanding the influence of illness experience in an individual’s life is 
problematic. For example, over time, people living with long term conditions have been 
found to construct lives that are continuous with their established biographies by 
retaining connections to valued roles and occupations, minimising the disruptive effects 
of illness, and by focusing on the parts of life that for them constitute a life of good 
quality (Pinson et al. 2009; Faircloth et al. 2004; Reynolds and Prior, 2003; Sanders at 
al, 2002; Moch, 1998; Lindsey, 1996; Lundmark and Bränholm, 1996). As discussed in 
chapter 2, Faircloth et al (2004:256) introduced the concept of ‘biographical flow’ to 
reflect the processes by which people living with long term health conditions constructed 
their lives in ways that integrated their illness within an on-going biography.  
Reynolds and Prior (2003) specifically explored experiences that were considered by 
women living with multiple sclerosis to provide them with a sense of life satisfaction. The 
women who participated in this study identified a number of positive and beneficial 
strategies that enabled them to preserve participation in valued roles which in turn 
contributed to a life that was considered as having good quality. The findings from this 
work possess a particular relevance for the findings offered from the present study. As 
with the present study (subtheme 3), it was specifically the roles, the areas of life that 
held deep meaning through their close intertwining with a person’s past, present and 
future, as well as through their connections with significant others, that, taken as a 
whole, conferred a sense of coherence, continuity and well-being. Reciprocity, rather 
than one way support, was particularly valued and meaningful. The findings from the 
present study particularly emphasised the importance of connecting and belonging to 
preserving a person’s sense of self. The need to belong is considered a fundamental 
human motivation (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). It is generally fulfilled (for people with 
and without disability) by the development and preservation of interpersonal 
relationships, such as those constituted in the roles and activities that people living with 
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ataxia seemed to work so hard to retain, including relationships not based purely on 
illness but on shared interests.  
More recently however (and as discussed in chapter 2), Reeve et al (2010) argued that 
examining illness strictly through the lens of biography provided an inadequate 
foundation for understanding individual lived and specifically embodied experience. 
These authors asserted that, whilst theoretically meaningful, the biographical concept, 
underpinned by a reflexive model of the self, assumed that identity is constructed 
through a cognitively driven narrative. Research with people living with terminal cancer 
identified narratives of both disruption and flow but stressed that the participants’ efforts 
were focussed on ‘living their daily lives’ rather than maintaining a meaningful narrative 
(Reeve et al. 2010:190). In ways that resonated with the findings of Reynolds and Prior 
(2003) and with reference to Carel (2007), it was suggested by Reeve et al (2010:190) 
that their participants emphasised a ‘functional’ and ‘embodied’ rather than a ‘reflexive’ 
account of the self in fashioning meaningful ways to live with long term illness. 
Furthermore, for Reeve et al (2010) it was the physical and emotional concerns (e.g. 
fatigue and depression) rather than a loss of meaning per se that determined an 
individual’s capacity to maintain continuity in their everyday lives. Embodied concerns 
and a focus on continued participation in meaningful activities also seemed to be a 
primary concern of participants in the present study.  
Similarly, Reynolds and Prior (2003) identified the complex ways in which participants in 
their study attempted to manage their lives in positive ways whilst coping with the 
vicissitudes of life with multiple sclerosis, findings that were also reflected in subtheme 2 
and 3 of the present study. Other authors identified similar issues in terms of living with 
multiple sclerosis (e.g. Pinson et al. 2009) but also other long term conditions such as 
chronic pain (Ong et al. 2011; Grime et al. 2010; Richardson et al. 2008; Sanders et al. 
2002). Taken as a whole, these authors’ work suggest that biographical disruption as 
well as biographical repair and continuity remain valid concepts with which to 
understand the lived experience of long term conditions such as multiple sclerosis and 
chronic pain. However, the complex co-existence of the encouraging as well as the 
more distressing aspects of living with an uncertain but progressive condition were 
powerfully revealed by Reynolds and Prior (2003) and Reeve et al (2010). Furthermore, 
the present study demonstrated, for the first time, how these concepts may resonate 
with the experiences of people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia.  
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9.6 Conclusion  
 
This new work deepens the understanding of the concept of co-existing biographies; a 
familiar biography intertwined with a disrupted biography, with reference to the lived 
experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia. It also strengthens the claims made by 
Reynolds and Prior (2003) and Reeve et al (2010) that an individual’s capacity to 
construct a valued life in the face of chronic illness, in other words their ability to 
‘manage it’ (Joan), depends upon the highly situated and contextualised identification 
and mobilisation of physical, cognitive, emotional, and social resources. In turn these 
resources, when available, help to preserve valued roles and activities, and it is this 
preservation of roles which seemed to dominate the concerns of the individual 
participants in the present study. This is not to say that retaining meaningful roles and 
activities, preserving a valued identity and trying to make sense of ataxia as a health 
condition was a straightforward process. Cognitive strategies such as reappraisal may 
be effective at least in part because they motivate action. However, for participants in 
the present study, positive life experiences and meaningful information and support 
seemed to be wrested and shaped from in amongst the more distressing aspects of life 
with ataxia. Persistent endeavour and enterprise were not always enough and at these 
times participants acknowledged that the more negative consequences of life with ataxia 
could, at least temporarily, take control and overwhelm them.  
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Chapter 10 
 
Super-ordinate Theme 5  
 
Quotation: ‘It makes me feel better that I’m actually doing something’ (Ted) 
 
Description: Exercise: a multifaceted contributor to managing life with ataxia  
 
10.1 Introduction 
Exercise and physiotherapy were specified in the research questions therefore 
participants were explicitly asked to talk about their experiences of these topics during 
the interview. This super-ordinate theme focuses on the role that exercise played in 
participants’ lives and the contribution that exercise seemed to make to managing life 
with ataxia. Participants’ experiences of physiotherapy are also considered within this 
theme. This was because it seemed that physiotherapy was partly understood in terms 
of exercise and therefore participants’ perceptions of physiotherapy and exercise were 
closely intertwined. Physiotherapy also appeared to symbolise a hoped-for resource for 
learning about and living with ataxia that went beyond straight-forward exercise 
prescription. The findings discussed in this chapter are aligned to those detailed in 
chapter 9 because they also convey participants’ attempts to gain a sense of control 
over the impact of ataxia in their lives.  
The researcher was aware that the interview and subsequent analysis of material that 
referred to physiotherapy would be conducted through a particular lens focussed by her 
clinical experience as a physiotherapist. It was apparent that this pre-understanding may 
influence the direction and focus of the research. Using the concept of hermeneutic 
reflection (Finlay, 2003a; Shaw, 2010) the researcher identified a risk that her 
professional affiliations and loyalties may blind her to negative accounts of 
physiotherapy and/or physiotherapists. This view initially led the researcher to over-
compensate by interpreting participants’ accounts in an overly negative way. Rather 
than adopting the attitude of ‘thoughtful vigilance’ (Dahlberg et al. 2008:97) described in 
chapter 1, the researcher allowed her reflection to form new prejudices that got in the 
way of the data and prevented the accounts from speaking for themselves. This 
situation was only resolved through critical questioning of the analysis driven by further 
hermeneutic reflection.    
Two subthemes convey participants’ experiences of exercise and physiotherapy. The 
first focuses on exercise and the multiple roles it played in helping participants live with 
ataxia from a physical as well as a psychosocial perspective. The second subtheme 
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examines the ways in which participants understood and experienced physiotherapy. It 
considers the variety of experience recounted by participants, the beneficial as well as 
the more negative features.  
 
10.2 Subtheme 1 
 
Quotation: ‘it does make you feel good and you’ve got an awful lot of control over 
things’ (Scott) 
 
Description: Exercise as a means of seeking control and sustaining a positive 
sense of self 
Caspersen et al. (1985:128) defined exercise as ‘physical activity that is planned, 
structured, repetitive and purposive’. Sporting and conditioning activities fall into this 
classification as do occupational tasks and other daily physical activities that are 
regularly performed in the manner described above. Whilst the first part of this definition 
remains valid the second part is contested (Sebire, 2009). This is because ‘purposive’ 
refers to exercise that aims to improve or maintain one or more components of physical 
fitness such as muscular strength and/or cardiorespiratory endurance (Caspersen et al. 
1985). It suggests that the exclusive aim of exercise is the achievement of goals 
concerned solely with improving physical performance (Sebire, 2009). However, the 
accounts discussed in this sub-theme suggest that the meaning of exercise was much 
more complex and went beyond simple inferences about improving bodily function.  
All participants had taken part in some sort of physical exercise since being diagnosed 
with progressive cerebellar ataxia (Table 10.1 pp. 221). The type of exercise was 
selected by the participant and not prescribed by a physiotherapist, except for particular 
home exercise programmes. At the time of interview, three participants had stopped 
exercising either due to pressure of work (Ted), acute illness and fatigue (Hugh) or 
through being unable to exercise independently at home (Bill). For the majority of 
participants (n = 10) exercise fulfilled multiple functions that were not simply restricted to 
attending to the impaired body. This subtheme looks at the ways in which participants 
described exercise and their reasons for taking part in exercise based activities.   
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Table 10.1 Physical Exercise Undertaken by Participants (n = 12) 
 
Activity Participants Number 
Home exercise programme – 
prescribed by a physiotherapist 
Toby, (Bill) 2 
Home exercise programme –  
self-devised or adapted 
Julia, Susan, Harry, Joan, (Hugh) 5 
Swimming Stella, Toby, (Ted), (Hugh) 4 
Gym Jim, Scott , (Ted)  3 
‘Exercise on prescription’ – gym Stella, Jim 2 
Yoga class Joan 1 
Pilates class Joan 1 
General exercise class Julia  1 
Hang-gliding   Harry 1 
Adapted cycling Harry 1 
Water sport Scott 1 
Team sport Graham 1 
(Names in brackets mean that these participants were no longer doing this activity at the time of interview) 
 
Julia’s account of the meaning of exercise has been used to introduce this subtheme. 
For Julia, exercise fulfilled an important need to maintain a valued occupation: 
Julia: ‘Every morning I walk within the building […] the walking is 500 meters but then 
there are 140 stairs as well. […] I must be getting a kick from it because I really enjoy it.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Brilliant, and why do you do it?’ 
Julia: ‘To keep my mobility. And the stairs and … if I can’t do them then I won’t be 
invited to babysit. […] It’s too much to lose.’  
Julia described undertaking a regular and purposeful exercise routine. Not only did she 
describe this activity as helping to preserve her ability to manage stairs and therefore 
look after her grandchildren, it also seemed to provide her with a sense of achievement 
(‘500 meters’, ‘140 stairs’). She knows the exact number of stairs and the exact distance 
she walked. This detail signified the effort perhaps, as well as the challenge that doing 
this sort of exercise entailed. Counting may also have acted as a sort of benchmark. It 
not only measured how far she walked and how many steps she climbed but also 
confirmed perhaps that she was still the kind of person who could walk this distance and 
climb this many stairs. Thus it seemed that although Julia focussed on maintaining her 
grand-mothering role, other factors perhaps also helped to sustain the regular practice 
required in order to hold onto this role. From a social perspective other residents looked 
out for her and acknowledged her efforts (‘Yes, I’m on my patrol they call it’) and, as she 
explained later, she seemed to gain some sort of psychological or emotional boost from 
undertaking this sort of exercise:  
 
 222 
 
Julia: ‘I think … is it adrenalin, you get when you … the walkers, the marathon runners 
… I think I might be getting a bit of … is it heroin or something …? [...] I think I’m getting 
some sort of feedback from it.’ 
In the above quotation, it is interesting to note that Julia used the example of endurance 
athletes. Perhaps this is how it felt for Julia; her exercise routine was comparable to 
completing or training for a marathon. There was also a glimpse of the effort involved 
and, because of this added strain (‘500 meters’, ‘140 stairs’), the successful completion 
of this daily task perhaps provided an additional sense of achievement and positive 
feedback. 
Julia described how she had devised her own exercise programme. It was put together 
by Julia but members of her family had helped her develop it by measuring the 
distances involved, calculating the number of steps, accessing the music Julia had 
chosen to accompany the exercise and uploading it onto an MP3 player. Julia’s exercise 
routine was therefore portrayed as a family concern and represented as an investment 
of collective time and effort. In this sense and in addition to the continued achievement 
of her goal as a marker of success, Julia also perhaps retained a sense of commitment 
to, and ownership of the programme that may also have been important in maintaining 
her perseverance.  
Julia’s physiotherapist had also prescribed some stretches which Julia had incorporated 
into her daily routine: ‘After the first corridor I can stop in private and do my stretching 
and then go on’. Again, it is interesting here that Julia does her physiotherapy ‘in 
private’. This suggested perhaps that, through being medicalised, Julia believed there 
might be something embarrassing or uncomfortable about doing these stretches in 
public. Whilst her feats of endurance seemed to be genuinely celebrated, the prescribed 
stretches were hidden away. A deeper interpretation might suggest that Julia thought of 
the stretches as in some way remedial, a clear indication that something was wrong and 
in this sense a projection of the self as in some way vulnerable or frail. Julia perhaps 
resisted this view of herself or at least preferred to hide it from others.  
Overall, and importantly for Julia, the focus of her self-devised exercise routine was the 
maintenance of a valued role as a grandmother but it also perhaps worked to preserve a 
capable and independent sense of self in the face of living with a progressive 
neurological condition. The exercise was in itself sustained by a number of emotional, 
social and psychological factors. Julia’s account therefore pointed towards an 
understanding that exercise fulfilled multiple roles and purposes that were not limited to 
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simply preserving physical capabilities. As the next section demonstrates, exercise 
contributed in several complex ways to preserving a positive sense of self for other 
participants in the study. 
Several participants spoke of the importance of exercise as a means of doing something 
and feeling good i.e. “doing something rather than nothing”. Although the benefits of 
“doing” were described in terms of feeling better in oneself or about oneself, there 
seemed to be something deeper to understand that went beyond an interpretation that 
exercise simply conferred psychological benefits and / or was only concerned with the 
management of symptoms. For example, Scott said of exercising in the gym ‘it does 
make you feel good’, and Graham; ‘it’s much better. Physically, mentally you know… 
whatever level you want to put it on,’ and Ted; ‘It makes me feel better that I’m actually 
doing something’. Whilst reflecting upon the psychological benefits of exercise, these 
participants, perhaps in response to Western social forces that value industry over 
indolence, might also have been resisting passive formulations of the self. In addition, 
these participants perhaps saw exercise as a means of standing firm against a negative 
sense of self in similar ways to Harry, as described in the previous chapter: ‘it’s so easy 
to sit at home, watch telly and wondering about the next episode of ‘EastEnders’’, and 
Toby: 
Toby: ‘Well if I hadn’t done any swimming or physio and I’d just… like some people if 
they’ve been diagnosed, […] because if I’d thought ‘Oh I’ll never work again’, sit at home 
in a chair watching television, stuffing crisps, drinking pop, putting the weight on, 
exacerbating the problems I’ve already got, and it’s a downward spiral.’ 
For these participants, exercise could be understood as a way of gaining a sense of 
agency in a situation where there is no cure or symptomatic relief. Exercise was not 
undertaken as a means of curing ataxia, it was not some naïve enterprise where 
exercise was thought to succeed where medicine had failed. Taking part in exercise, 
‘doing something’ (Ted) helped maintain a positive outlook. Jim’s account captured the 
complexity of this situation when reflecting upon his experiences of going to the gym: 
Jim: ‘it’s had a noticeable difference on my calf muscles, although they’re wasting away, 
so I can’t stop that, they do feel stronger. […] And it gives you more confidence and you 
just feel better for doing something. So I’m keeping that up. […] It makes a difference - 
one, in the way that you feel and two, your general sort of attitude. It just makes you feel 
better and your mind feel better physically. So I don’t know if it’s doing anything but just 
the fact that I can do it and I am doing it, does make a difference.’  
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In the quotation above Jim not only pointed towards the psychological benefits of 
exercise, the positive effect on his sense of well-being (‘It just makes you feel better and 
your mind feel better physically’), but it was also possible to glimpse two other important 
features of exercise. First, Jim did not seem to see exercise as a cure (‘they’re wasting 
away, so I can’t stop that’), he suggested that exercise made him feel stronger (not less 
ataxic) and that feeling gave him confidence. Secondly, there was just a hint in this text 
that exercise gave Jim a sense of competence or mastery, it was something within his 
power that he could do that was not completely overshadowed by ataxia: ‘just the fact 
that I can do it and I am doing it, does make a difference.’ The sense of achievement, 
underlined, again seemed crucial here. Scott and Toby spoke similarly:  
Scott: ‘If you’re doing it on a regular basis so you can monitor exactly how you’re going, 
your muscle strength and tone and posture all improve and it does make you feel good 
and you’ve got an awful lot of control over things. It doesn’t stop you from falling over if 
you turn around quick but it makes every other thing that’s possibly going downhill get 
back into some resemblance of being in the best condition it can to cope with what 
you’ve got.’ 
Toby: ‘It makes my legs […] the muscle tone, they’re far more rigid, your feet feel 
planted on the floor firmly. I’m not saying you still don’t veer, whatever, from side to side, 
lose your balance momentarily – you do – but you’re far more in control.’   
Again, Scott and Toby, like Jim, described feeling stronger or more stable as a result of 
exercise and this feeling seemed to give them confidence and an improved sense of 
agency. Both acknowledged that the ataxia had not improved (‘It doesn’t stop you from 
falling over’, Scott, ‘I’m not saying you still don’t veer’, Toby) but through going to the 
gym or swimming they perhaps felt better equipped to cope with its effects.  
Scott was also involved in water sports. He explained that he did these sports not to 
reverse the effects of the ataxia but ‘as the best way of managing what I’ve got […] as 
some kind of jolt to my balance mechanism, saying ‘you’ve still got to do some work, you 
can’t just sit there and be shy’, just to keep it working.’ This kind of anthropomorphism 
possibly helped Scott develop a positive relationship with the ataxia, and in this way it 
was not some abstract concept or external thing that he had no control over. Similarly, 
for the majority of participants exercise seemed to provide a sense of purpose and well-
being, not a feeling that they were able to gain complete control over their condition but 
at least some sense that they were not rendered powerless by its effects. 
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For Scott and Graham, out-of-doors activities were described as helping to reduce 
feelings of isolation and keeping depression at bay:  
Scott [with reference to water sports]: ‘The psychological effect of going outside and 
being in a different environment stopped me relapsing into depression which is another 
controller to get out.’ 
Scott also seemed to suggest that he felt stuck at home and needed strong incentives 
(‘controllers’) to get out of the house, exercise seemed to provide this sort of motivation.   
Graham: ‘I understand that’s one of the wider aspects of disability that it is very isolating. 
[…] I’m not very good at fitness regimes, I’ve tried to do the gym but it’s not for me. But 
I’ve started playing [a sport for disabled people] this year so that’s … I mean more than 
anything it’s something I have to think about, you know. It’s a social activity but it also 
has a physical aspect to it.’  
Playing a team game perhaps stopped Graham dwelling on the more negative 
experiences associated with living with ataxia (‘I mean more than anything it’s 
something I have to think about, you know’).  For Scott and Graham, in addition to the 
important social benefits of getting outside and meeting with others who shared a similar 
interest, it also seemed important to convey a sense that they were achieving something 
by doing these activities, accomplishments that the researcher would recognise and 
respect. Scott had passed his ‘one star’ and described himself as ‘gradually improving’, 
and Graham seemed quite proud of the fact that he played in a national league and was 
seen as a county player; ‘it’s a national league, a county league, so I play for [a 
particular county]’. These activities seemed rewarding in themselves but also 
contributed to a sense of self-worth which may have helped Scott and Graham cope 
with the losses that were associated with living with progressive ataxia. Furthermore, 
these activities marked a return to sports that both Scott and Graham used to do before 
they developed ataxia, and this perhaps provided a strong link with the past; a 
connection to their biographical roots that helped to sustain a familiar and valued sense 
of self. 
Finally, Harry enjoyed the feeling of flying (a type of hang-gliding) because it gave him a 
sense of freedom and equality; of being judged on his own terms:  
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Harry: ‘For me it’s the most fantastic feeling, because you’ve got full movement, you’re 
not reliant on the gravity thing. Pain in the arse. You’re equal to everybody else. When 
you’re out there nobody can see the wheelchair.’  
The above quotation might suggest that Harry valued his sport because it gave him a 
sense of embodied freedom that he was unable to achieve on land. This being so, 
Harry’s account also prefigured the main theme of chapter 7 which concerned the ways 
in which participants encountered and were, at times, able to overcome and cope with 
social discrimination as part of their experience of living with physical impairment. 
However, flying also seemed to fulfil an important part of sustaining Harry’s preferred 
sense of self as someone who was not diminished, inhibited or defined by his ataxia or 
his wheelchair use.  
 
10.2.1 Summary 
 
Participants’ accounts suggested that it would be a mistake to understand their 
engagement in physical activity in simple unitary terms, as entirely concerned with some 
inward looking project about the control of bodily impairment. Exercise seemed to be 
much more about being in the world; meaningful projects and authentic involvement with 
others; health promotion perhaps in the broadest of senses. These diverse activities, 
ostensibly concerned with the body, reduced social isolation, sustained valued 
occupations, preserved identity, countered depression, helped to overcome stigma, and 
generated a sense of well-being and control. The particular significance and importance 
of each of these phenomena varied for each participant.  
 
10.3 Subtheme 2 
 
‘You get about 6 weeks and then you’re discharged and sent home to do your 
exercises on your own’ (Stella) 
 
Description: Physiotherapy – at times overly one-dimensional and inexpertly 
focussed on the impaired body 
  
The following subtheme explores participants’ encounters with physiotherapy services 
and physiotherapists, the benefits as well as the disappointments, and the extent to 
which physiotherapy fulfilled its expected roles. With reference to the previous 
subtheme, all participants understood exercise as a potentially positive influence in their 
lives and looked to physiotherapists and physiotherapy to fulfil a similar role. Overall, 
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participants presented a rather a mixed picture of physiotherapy where positive 
experiences coincided with frustration and dissatisfaction.  
Harry’s experiences highlighted key issues raised by the majority of participants and 
several quotations from Harry’s account have therefore been used to introduce this 
subtheme. Extracts from other accounts demonstrate the extent of the shared 
experience and deepen the discussion. Unlike other participants, Harry had built up a 
very good rapport with his physiotherapist over many years:  
Harry: ‘I’ve been seeing [my physiotherapist] for years. […] I would say that I would be a 
hell of a lot worse, a hell of a hell of a lot worse without physio’.   
Physiotherapy was portrayed as the only healthcare provider that had given Harry any 
sense of continuity and commitment, as whilst other services had stopped sending 
follow up appointments, ‘physio never stopped’. Furthermore, Harry’s physiotherapist 
seemed to be able to offer a flexible service which suited Harry’s particular needs:  
‘I try to go there once every … no two or three times a year, but usually in the winter. If 
I’m not doing … they will try and have me back if I deteriorate, that’s the worst time of 
year for me. […] If I need to see her I can go to see her anytime. […] I’ve got her e-mail 
address’. 
Following a debilitating acute illness, for example, Harry looked to physiotherapy to 
support his recovery: 
‘I was really run down. […]. I would get dressed in the morning and be worn out. Then 
wheezing during the day. And I went back to physio and through the exercise they 
taught me and what they taught me, the effects of everything and what I could do, what 
extra I could do, you know, it was a new lease of life.’  
Harry seemed to suggest that by offering ‘a new lease of life’, physiotherapy not only 
addressed his physical impairments but also conferred new prospects for living. 
Physiotherapy therefore symbolised renewal and relief from the perhaps depressing 
place Harry found himself in up to that point. Harry also saw his physiotherapist as 
instrumental in making sure that he was prescribed a lighter, less tiring wheelchair (‘And 
that was fantastic, that was … that gave me … I could stay up late, you know, I wasn’t 
… […] and that made a huge difference’), and also, if necessary, she visited Harry at 
home (‘She came around to the house as well’).  
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Harry’s experiences of physiotherapy seemed uniquely situated to his particular 
circumstances and none of the other participants described a comparable level of 
connectedness and trust. He touched on aspects highlighted as important in other 
participants’ accounts, notably the high value placed on continuity of care, as well as 
flexible and responsive service provision. However, Harry was also frustrated and 
disappointed by what he perceived as limited resources and a lack of knowledge about 
effective treatments: 
‘There is no book. There’s no guide. […] There’s no … and it’s just like … loads of times 
they [physiotherapists] call us like ‘Been trying to work out exercises’. Cos see there’s 
no … there’s nothing on the web or … you know, no book of ataxia sufferers … 
exercises for ataxia. Nothing like that. […] I would say there needs to be more 
instruction. I mean me and the physios, basically it’s trial and error.’  
In saying ‘I mean me and the physios, basically it’s ‘trial and error’, Harry seemed to 
allude to the common position of partnership working, but for Harry both partners were 
working in the dark. Harry seemed horrified that there was no manual of exercises or 
stock of knowledge for physiotherapists to draw upon. In his experience, 
physiotherapists compiled untried exercises which involved as much failure as success. 
Harry’s experiences in this regard, were recounted by the majority of participants (Table 
10.2 pp. 229).  
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Table 10.2 Inexpert and Impairment Focussed Physiotherapy (n = 8) 
 
Participant Extract 
Page: line 
number 
Bill 
‘I know more about it than they [physiotherapists] do, there’s something 
wrong there.’ 
10:45 
Toby ‘If GPs aren’t aware of it, what chance have the neuro physiotherapists’  17:11 
Harry 
‘I’ve been asking different things about exercises […] and she’s been 
like ‘don’t know’’ 
18:27 
Susan 
‘I’m not sure that she [physiotherapist] wasn’t thinking more of a stroke 
victim’ 
13:33 
Julia ‘The physio couldn’t separate me from MS in her mind’ 17:6 
Toby 
‘[at the reassessment] She [physiotherapist] didn’t ask me to do those 
[home exercises] or show her what I was doing’ 
14:27 
Stella ‘I felt they had not much idea about my condition or how to deal with it’ 2:9 
Bill ‘I’ve got little kind of confidence in it [physiotherapy] really’ 7:6 
Hugh 
‘Management, they’re so much in debt, just trying to save every penny, 
they don’t care where it [physiotherapy] comes from, anybody’ll do’ 
15:11 
Jim 
‘We talked about exercises for your legs […] they basically said ‘well 
there’s nothing we can do’. And I thought well hang on, you’re a 
physiotherapist there must be something  you can do’ 
18:42 
Harry ‘The hydrotherapy pool, they’ve shut it down, turned it into an office’ 29:24 
Toby 
‘She could check my centre of balance or how I was […] but when I 
went to the physio department the machine was still broken’  
14:7 
Stella 
‘They just don’t have the staff I suppose and the knowledge of my 
particular problem’ 
18:22 
Stella 
‘Because of the pressure on their services … mind, the gym was empty 
most of the time, I could have gone in’ 
15:18 
 
 
Similar to Harry, Julia’s experiences of physiotherapy were also generally positive. She 
seemed to value physiotherapy as a resource, for suggesting practical ways of 
managing:  
Julia: ‘There were things I was doing like closing myself up, putting my hands in my 
pockets when I walked and the physio showed me that I balanced much better with my 
hands out. And with a backpack in fact because I was leaning forward, she advised me 
to get a backpack, so I wasn’t coping with a handbag or anything. And that pulled my 
shoulders back and made it better.’  
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However, also similar to Harry, Julia perceived regular reassessment as important, 
preferably with a physiotherapist whom she had met previously and therefore perhaps 
knew her circumstances and did not need to ask the “same old questions”:  
Julia: ‘I do think you need to go back every now and then just to be checked over [but] 
the physiotherapists change every six months’. 
In contrast to Harry’s experiences, half the participants perceived shortcomings in 
service provision as well as the physiotherapists’ adherence to a particular type of 
service model. Short interventions which mirrored acute services (ranging from one- off 
appointments to sessions once a week for six weeks) were followed by the prescription 
of home exercises. These were easily forgotten or put aside, and were experienced as 
doing little to address the other important roles of exercise outlined by participants in 
subtheme 1. Susan’s account exemplified the difficulties expressed by some participants 
with reference to the prescription of a home exercise programme:  
‘They tend to send me home with a list of exercises that I can’t actually do. […] I lay on 
the bed to do the exercises and I think ‘I’d rather have a little sleep. […] Being tired all 
day makes it difficult to discipline yourself to do those things [home exercises]. That’s 
why I would rather go there more often and go through them with them, cos I haven’t 
really been doing what I’ve been asked to do at home.’ 
In contrast to the positive feelings associated with participants’ accounts of exercising in 
a general sense, Susan’s experience of home exercises as prescribed by a 
physiotherapist, seemed to be overwhelmingly negative. Not only was she unable to do 
them, but they seemed to emphasise rather than diminish her physical difficulties as well 
as exacerbating her fatigue. She also described her physiotherapist as concerned with 
measuring improvement which meant very little to Susan:  
Susan: ‘She [the physiotherapists] usually has a chart that she goes through and she 
scores me. And some physios ask you to do something and then say ‘I think you could 
probably do a bit better’ and ‘try again’ and they get your score up and then they say to 
you ‘That’s was wonderful, your score’s higher.’ And I think that’s what you would do to 
a stroke victim to encourage them to make it better. In my case I want it to be true to 
what’s happening to me.’ 
Susan did not describe exercise or physiotherapy as a means of providing tangible or 
measurable improvements; she was, it seemed, just hoping to preserve her 
independence as long as possible, ‘to maintain my mobility’. Living with a progressive 
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condition she was not expecting her score to improve and in this sense it seemed that 
what Susan was looking for from physiotherapy was not aligned with the model of care 
she experienced. Susan perceived little benefit or sense of achievement from the few 
exercises she was able to manage at home which might explain why she had been 
unable to persevere. In Susan’s experience, her request to see a physiotherapist more 
regularly was met with indifference:  
Susan: ‘They give you these exercises and then they say ‘I’ll phone you and see how 
you’re getting on’. Well I would much rather that I could go there … and I’ve said that to 
them … […] And they say, ‘Well it’s not really necessary’. So I don’t feel that I’m getting 
as much as I could.’ […] ‘I’m really disappointed that there isn’t continuity there.’ […] ‘It’s 
basically the lack of continuity of one physio and the opportunity to go more frequently 
for that if I want. That’s what I’m not getting.’ 
Susan seemed to perceive that the balance of power in this situation was tilted in favour 
of the physiotherapist. It was the physiotherapist who would make contact and arrange 
follow up appointments if they felt it was necessary. The rigid application of a “one size 
fits all” model of service seemed to offer little to Susan who failed to fit the mould. Susan 
emphasised her commitment to exercise, explaining that she had brought a treadmill to 
try to strengthen her legs but also stressed that she was looking for a slightly more 
“hands on” approach. She highlighted the importance of regular and frequent visits to 
the physiotherapy department, a familiar face and some feedback and advice; 
physiotherapy that was not only tailored to her ataxia but also to her as an individual. 
Graham, Harry, Julia, Stella and Scott identified similar issues and, like Susan, they 
stressed the value they placed on establishing a rapport, or a sense of connection, with 
a physiotherapist: 
Stella: ‘I’ve requested various physiotherapies, which you get about 6 weeks and then 
you’re discharged and sent home to do your exercises on your own [laughs]. And I keep 
going back and requesting more physiotherapy and eventually I’ve got to 
neurophysiotherapy […] Again, I’ve been sent home to do my exercises. She did say 
that if I felt I needed help or I found the exercises easy and needed more to push me a 
bit, then to get back in touch with her […] So she hasn’t completely discharged me, but I 
have no more appointments.’   
Graham, who generally spoke of physiotherapy in positive terms, perhaps best summed 
it up:  
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Graham: ‘I was given quite a substantial amount … well six exercises to do. And the 
thing about that is it’s quite easy to do when someone’s asking you how you got on, but 
over time you think ah, I’m not going to do that. And so you slip back again and so it’s 
the continuity that I found useful as much as the physical improvement if you like.’  
Scott spoke similarly: ‘an assessment every now and then so you can go and bend 
somebody’s ear [laughs] and they can say ‘well try this’, that might be helpful as well.’  
Graham’s experiences of physiotherapy differed from the other participants in that he 
was offered outpatient physiotherapy over a longer period (20 weeks). Although he 
appreciated the exercise, he stressed the importance of the sessions for developing a 
lasting and supportive connection with physiotherapists because, as he explained later 
in his account: ‘you’re not dealing with ataxia on your own; somebody else is actually 
taking a bit of an interest.’ This willingness to listen and empathise seemed to be highly 
valued by the five participants who directly addressed this topic in their narratives but 
with reference to Susan’s account, it could also be suggested, with some caution, that, 
for physiotherapists, it might be an under-appreciated aspect of physiotherapy practice. 
Toby was the only participant who spoke favourably of a physiotherapy devised exercise 
plan: ‘I’ve been doing that religiously for I would say 2 years everyday’. There may be 
several reasons for Toby’s adherence. Firstly, although it was challenging, Toby could 
do all the exercises independently. Furthermore, he recalled the physiotherapist offering 
him a choice of exercises (‘she said choose which you find to be of benefit to you’) 
giving Toby a sense of control. Toby also swam three times a week and seemed to 
derive satisfaction from the routine and the sense of achievement;  
‘I swim two miles a week, I go on three occasions because to do you know a mile, it 
would be too much for me. So the swimming and the physiotherapy, I know, even 
though it’s hard, I don’t see it as a chore […] I enjoy going. […] I thought well give myself 
some targets. […] So last year I did 100 [miles] and this year I’m hoping to do 100, keep 
going as long as I can.’ 
There is also a temporal reference in the above quotation; Toby was projecting into the 
future, hoping that he would be able to achieve the same distance as he did in the 
previous year. This sort of goal setting, similar to Julia’s ‘500 meters’, ‘140 stairs’,  
perhaps provided a sense hope about the future, something positive and reassuringly 
repeatable, a sense of control amidst the uncertainty.  
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Toby believed that without the combination of swimming and physiotherapy (home 
exercises) he would have deteriorated more quickly: ‘if you do physiotherapy, swimming, 
whatever, you can’t stop the condition progressing but you can delay the progression’. 
Also as noted above, Toby understood that exercise did not diminish the ataxia but 
toning up his leg muscles helped him feel more secure on his feet which engendered 
confidence and an improved sense of control over bodily impairment. Finally, with 
perhaps a veiled reference to an underlying low mood, he said: ‘It’s giving me a reason 
to get up in the morning’. Toby emphasised the value he placed on having a sense of 
purpose and he derived benefit from the commitment to a particular routine, perhaps in 
similar ways to Julia’s daily circuit of her residential complex.  
However, Toby encountered the same difficulties as other participants with reference to 
inadequate reassessment and physiotherapists not fully understanding his condition 
(Table 10.2). It seemed that the majority of participants looked to physiotherapists as a 
resource for information and advice, but also to establish and maintain a sense of 
connection with an informed other. For most participants this sort of relationship and 
expertise seemed beyond the capacity of the physiotherapy services they encountered.  
 
10.3.1 Summary 
 
In the previous subtheme it was suggested that exercise was not described by 
participants as simply a means of attending to the body. It was proposed that exercise, 
alongside other important and meaningful activities, perhaps helped to secure and 
preserve a sense of an integrated self; physically, psychologically and emotionally. 
Moreover, it was apparent that participants had worked out their own ways of managing 
the physical consequences of ataxia and had combined an attention to the body with an 
attention to other important aspects of their lives. By comparison, physiotherapists 
seemed, for the majority of participants, to be preoccupied with the body as a material 
thing. Exercise prescription, particularly home exercises, seemed to focus on the body 
as object, and at best only partially addressed the other important benefits of exercise 
described by the participants. As most participants were unable to persevere with 
exercise prescription without help, this type of physiotherapy seemed to reinforce failure 
and perpetuate disappointment. Furthermore, most participants described a sense of 
frustration with what appeared to be an inflexible commitment to traditional service 
models. For the majority, physiotherapy was viewed as a resource, a hoped-for source 
of expert information and advice that, in theory at least, could offer support in the 
struggle to manage life with ataxia. Direct encouragement from face-to-face 
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physiotherapy was also seen to offer a valued source of motivation that could keep them 
engaged with exercise. However, most participants seemed on the whole disappointed 
with what physiotherapy and physiotherapists offered in terms of their expertise in 
relation to ataxia, and their willingness to offer a long-term therapeutic alliance. 
 
10.4 Discussion 
 
Exercise, as described by participants in the present study, fulfilled multiple functions 
which seemed at odds, in most cases, with participants’ accounts of their experience of 
physiotherapy. As discussed in the previous chapter, participants in the present study 
perceived living with ataxia as having the potential to disconnect them from others, to 
loosen the social threads that provided companionship and a sense of belonging. Being 
with others who shared similar concerns and experiences was felt to reduce or curtail 
disability-related distress. This chapter has shown that self-selected exercise helped to 
maintain authentic involvement with others and to preserve an integrated sense of self. 
Physiotherapy and prescribed home exercises, on the other hand, gave the condition 
and its symptoms, rather than the individual, more salience. Participants’ accounts 
portrayed a lack of fit between their hopes for physiotherapy and their perception of what 
physiotherapists appeared to offer. Therefore the findings discussed here cautiously 
suggest that the meaning of self-chosen exercises and activities, and physiotherapy-
prescribed exercises seemed on the whole rather different in these accounts. This 
disconnection might be considered as surprising new knowledge and is presented here 
for the first time with reference to the experiences of people living with progressive 
cerebellar ataxia.  
A significant body of research suggests that exercise and other physical activity confers 
positive psychosocial effects on people living with a variety of long term conditions. For 
example, researchers who have explored the experience of dragon boat racing with 
breast cancer survivors (e.g. Tocher, 2002; Unruh and Elvin, 2004; Sabaston et al. 
2007; McDonough et al. 2008) argued that training and competing in this sport had a 
wide range of therapeutic benefits including rebuilding self-confidence, regaining control 
over physical health and emotional well-being, as well as connecting with other women 
who had gone through similar experiences and who offered support. Similarly, physically 
and neurologically impaired participants in a qualitative study conducted by Carin-Levy 
and Jones (2006:10) described valuing their participation in scuba diving because it de-
emphasised impairment and disability: ‘I’m a human being and I’m equal to the people I 
dive with, when I go diving nobody knows [that I am] any different’. This view reflected 
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Harry’s account of hang-gliding. Others in the same study further emphasised the 
importance of undertaking an activity which also conferred social gains beyond diving 
itself. Participants described connecting with others through involvement in the “diving 
scene”, a particular context where physical impairment was not an issue or topic of 
discussion or concern, and where identity as a diver took prominence. The importance 
of reciprocal connectedness also resonated with Julia’s and Joan’s accounts where 
social involvement seemed to safeguard their identity as a quilter or dancer. In these 
situations ataxia became less of a “master status” because social activity that was not 
focussed on ataxia deemphasised the impact of ataxia on the sense of self.    
Carin-Levy and Jones (2006) also discussed the relevance of participating in scuba 
diving as a self-selected activity which, in addition to the benefits described above, 
offered an added sense of enjoyment and, through being appropriately challenging, a 
sense of achievement and satisfaction. Similar findings were reported by Mulligan et al. 
(2012). In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 19 people with a 
variety of neurological conditions, including MS and Parkinson’s disease. Those taking 
part in preferred activities described feeling empowered and fulfilled through engaging in 
the challenge of these activities and through this they described an intense feeling of 
satisfaction which became self-motivating. Parallels can be drawn with Scott’s 
participation in water sports and Graham’s team sport involvement, as well as Julia’s 
home exercise programme, all self-chosen and offering considerable physical 
challenges but also importantly rewards (‘one star’, ‘it’s a national league’, ‘500 meters, 
140 stairs’) perhaps adding to the sense of achievement and satisfaction. Conversely, 
Mulligan et al. (2012) found that participants described prescribed exercise or exercise 
undertaken in an environment not of their preference or provided in a way that did not 
match their needs (e.g. a six week on, six week off rotation) as unfulfilling, unsatisfying 
and frustrating. This view resonates with some of the views of physiotherapy described 
by participants in the present study.  
In the present study, physiotherapy seemed to be understood within a framework of the 
strict management of the symptoms of ataxia, and much less so within a context which 
preserved valued roles and activities. The present work also found that devising and 
maintaining exercise regimes entailed hard work and continued effort which was, at 
least in part, offset by the accomplishment of meaningful activities or other psychological 
and social benefits absent from most physiotherapy exercise programmes. However, 
even this understanding is not unproblematic. Toby, for example, strictly attended to 
impairment level exercises because he experienced these as offering him the sense of 
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control and routine that he valued. However, unlike Susan, he also participated in self-
chosen activities such as swimming which he found enjoyable and challenging. For 
Toby, prescribed but individually selected exercises might have contributed to his sense 
of being an active person and not just a patient. 
Rather than prioritising and engaging with a person’s preferences and interests, the 
perceptions of the majority of participants in the present study would suggest perhaps 
that, in their experience, most physiotherapists held onto biomedical or reductionist 
views of the body, and in particular a view that exercise was constituted simply as repair 
or maintenance work for an impaired body. In turn, this way of thinking left little room to 
listen to or accommodate participants’ perspectives or approaches to exercise, 
especially the particular and wide ranging benefits of exercise they experienced from 
their own self-directed activities. Nicholls and Gibson (2010) argued that physiotherapy 
should have long ago moved beyond the limits of a purely biomedically constructed 
understanding of the body. According to these authors, one of the reasons that 
physiotherapists might find this shift difficult was because their professional status has 
been, at least in part, predicated upon their expertise in defining normality from 
abnormality, a notion running entirely counter to a postmodern view of the body that, 
according to Nicholls and Gibson (2010:244), ‘values diversity, inclusiveness and 
heterogeneous understandings of what constitutes “normal”’. The home exercise 
prescriptions described by the participants in the present study seemed, at least in part, 
to retain a biomedical view of the body which was perhaps in keeping with this very 
partial understanding of impairment.  
In a situation where there is very limited evidence to guide physiotherapy practice 
(Marsden and Harris, 2011; Cassidy et al. 2009; Martin et al. 2009), a traditional, 
medicalised approach to exercise prescription, seemed, in the experience of the 
participants in the present study, to keep the impaired body away from others and 
perpetuated a dichotomised view of the body as either normal or abnormal (something 
that one participant even reflected by doing her physiotherapy stretches in private). This 
view failed to incorporate the participants’ need to live a life of quality through 
maintaining social relationships, participating in valued activities and by countering 
depression whilst simultaneously coping with bodily impairment. Nicholls and Gibson 
(2010) argued that physiotherapists needed to develop a more imaginative and 
pluralistic practice which should be based on understanding the phenomenological 
dimensions of long term illness, and only by doing so would they develop a more 
inclusive understanding of the body and embodiment. The findings from the present 
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study support this view and extend it with particular reference to the lived experience of 
ataxia.  
Adherence to physiotherapy exercise prescription was problematic for several 
participants in the present study and it is a well-recognised challenge in many areas of 
physiotherapy practice (Bassett, 2003). The issue is perhaps compounded in the case of 
ataxia by the lack of evidence available to guide practice, a source of frustration and 
concern for physiotherapists and patients alike (Cassidy et al. 2008). Even in situations 
where a home exercise programme has a sound evidence base, for example when 
regular home exercises will reduce pain, more than moderate adherence appears 
difficult to achieve (Thomas et al. 2002). Various strategies have been employed to 
improve adherence to physiotherapy home exercise programmes. Dean et al. (2005) 
described a phenomenological and demedicalised approach to improving adherence to 
exercise for low back pain that was founded on incorporating exercise into routine and 
habitual aspects of daily life; in much the same way as some of the participants in the 
present study managed exercise within, rather than separate from, the complexity of 
their own lives. Dean et al. (2005) was the first physiotherapist to look at adherence from 
a phenomenological perspective but more recent work has lent weight to the findings 
(see for example Medina-Mirapeix et al. 2009). Other authors have suggested 
instrumental as well psychosocial ways to improve adherence to exercise such as: 
providing exercise classes to supplement home based exercise (McCarthy et al. 2004), 
regular home visits every 3-4 weeks (McMurdo and Johnstone, 1995) or weekly visits for 
six weeks then telephone follow-up once a month (Ashburn et al. 2007). Taylor et al. 
(2004) used a more holistic approach that included the provision of an exercise log 
book, prescribing a small number of clearly described exercises for time efficient 
practice, developing personal autonomy, provision of information about exercise 
efficacy, working towards meaningful goals and developing the role of the 
physiotherapist as coach (monitoring and progressing exercises as well as providing 
emotional support and encouragement). None of the participants in the present study 
described any of these approaches to developing exercise adherence but they seemed 
to value the idea of the physiotherapist as coach; a person who could keep them 
motivated by face-to-face contact. The traditional method of providing six weeks of 
rehabilitation followed by the provision of a home exercise programme seemed to be the 
norm. Real world practice may not be able to mirror the kinds of support offered to 
patients within the context of the trials outlined above, however, there appears to be a 
body of evidence about effective exercise prescription that has not perhaps, as yet, 
been translated into practice.  
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Home exercises that only attend to bodily symptoms seemed to be narrowly conceived 
and inadequate in terms of conferring the benefits of exercise identified by the 
participants in the present study. In addition to the well-recognised links between 
exercise and psychological well-being for people living with mood related disorders 
(Scully et al. 1998; Lawlor and Hopker, 2001; Daley, 2008; Mead et al. 2009), work in 
other fields has also identified a consistent relationship between physical activity and 
improved quality of life for people living with other long term conditions. For example, 
Hurwitz et al. (2005) randomised 681 patients with low back pain into recreational 
physical activities or a back exercise programme. After 18 months the recreational group 
reported less back pain, less disability and less distress, whereas back exercises were 
associated with worse pain and disability. The researchers proposed that recreational 
activity was more effective partly because it alleviated depression. Motl et al. (2009) 
found that activity programmes for participants with multiple sclerosis might be 
associated with an improved quality of life if the activities were specifically directed 
towards minimising depression, fatigue or pain and maximising social support and self-
efficacy. Moreover, the same authors suggested that efforts should focus on, amongst 
other things, ‘enjoyable experiences’ (Motl et al. 2009:119). Graham et al. (2008) found 
that a six month programme of seated group exercise for people with a range of long 
term conditions helped participants manage their mood, preserve and foster self-identity, 
and to connect with others in ways that limited illness-related psychological distress. 
Borkoles et al. (2008) explored the experience of exercise for a small group of people 
living with multiple sclerosis who were described as active exercisers. The findings 
emphasised the importance of retaining a sense of control over their condition even 
when it was uncertain whether exercise was having a direct (impairment level) effect, as 
well as retaining a valued sense of self and participating in enjoyable exercise-based 
activities with others.  
The findings from the present study suggest that exercise can make a positive 
contribution to living with ataxia. This work has uncovered the ways in which exercise 
conferred multiple benefits that went beyond simple body maintenance. Physiotherapists 
were described as people who prescribed exercise but also as practitioners who could 
listen, empathise, encourage and provide practical advice and support. Unfortunately in 
the experience of the participants, it seemed that their physiotherapists were not always 
able or in a position to fulfil or sustain these roles, or to recognise and act on the level of 
expertise and resourcefulness participants had attained. Poorly managed partnership 
working and promotion of self-management strategies that are not underpinned by 
genuinely collaborative practices risk turning patients into ‘agents managing their own 
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suffering’ (Salmon and Young, 2005:228). Such practices may engender feelings of 
disempowerment and increased burden as reported by Susan but also Stella, Graham, 
Julia and Scott. 
In accordance with the literature described above, the findings from this study suggest 
that the benefits of exercise should be understood in the broadest of possible terms. 
Genuine collaboration between physiotherapists and people living with ataxia, 
underpinned by a contextualised understanding of life with ataxia, would perhaps go 
some way towards developing physiotherapy practice and service delivery in ways that 
would be valued by people living with ataxia. This type of physiotherapy and exercise 
prescription would ideally foster autonomy, ownership and control, as well as the 
achievement of goals through doing enjoyable and meaningful activities. At the same 
time, advice and on-going support could be offered in a flexible and responsive manner. 
However, this may be difficult to achieve if the lack of evidence about effective 
interventions persists.   
 
10.5 Conclusion 
 
This is the first study to explore experiential accounts about the role of exercise and 
physiotherapy for people living with ataxia. This super-ordinate theme emphasised the 
importance of understanding exercise and physiotherapy from a phenomenological 
perspective. Whilst the findings resonate with work that has explored this topic for 
people living with other long term conditions it has, at the same time, identified issues 
that would benefit from further research. These issues may not be particular to people 
living with ataxia but may mirror concerns identified by others. Nonetheless, these 
findings should perhaps provoke a re-evaluation of the ways in which physiotherapy is 
provided for people living with a progressive ataxia. Further research should also be 
undertaken which explores how physiotherapists conceptualise home exercise 
programmes and their role in working with people living with progressive neurological 
conditions.  
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Chapter 11 
 
Discussion 
 
11.1 Introduction 
This study explored how people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia made sense 
of this condition in the context of their everyday lives and how they perceived 
physiotherapy and physiotherapy services. A review of the literature identified that this 
type of enquiry had not been previously undertaken. Furthermore, there was little in the 
literature to help healthcare professionals to understand the particular issues that people 
living with progressive cerebellar ataxia faced in their day to day lives. The focus on 
physiotherapy and exercise was driven by discussions with colleagues and the 
researcher’s experiences working with people living with long-term neurological 
conditions. The following research questions were formulated to address the topics 
outlined above: 
1. What is the meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia for people who live with this 
condition?  
2. How do people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia experience healthcare, and 
physiotherapy in particular?  
3. What is the meaning of exercise and activity participation for people living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia?  
This chapter summarises the main themes derived from the analysis and offers a 
deeper analytic interpretation of the overall findings. It focuses on the findings that 
contribute new knowledge, as well as those that add to, or question, the 
comprehensiveness of existing theory. Thematic analysis, such as that undertaken with 
IPA may, by separating experiential accounts into parts or themes, fragment the 
lifeworld or dis-locate it in some way from lived experience (Joffe and Yardley, 2004). 
The following discussion therefore integrates the five super-ordinate themes presented 
and discussed in the previous five chapters (the parts) into an overarching theme, the 
gestalt (the whole). This approach illustrates the relationships between themes, and by 
doing so offers a higher level of abstraction and interpretation consistent with IPA (Smith 
et al. 2009). The intention is to bring the lifeworld to the fore without losing sight of the 
particular experiential narratives of individual participants. This chapter also reflects on 
the methods adopted to carry out this study, identifying its strengths and limitations, and 
offers a final reflexive overview.  
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11.2 Summary of the Main Findings 
 
Each of the super-ordinate themes (summarised in Table 11.1) were discussed in the 
preceding chapters with reference to the literature in the field. This section offers a 
summary of the main findings before discussing the overarching theme of this study in-
depth. As this study was the first to directly explore the subjective experience of 
progressive cerebellar ataxia, all the findings presented here are new.  
 
Table 11.1 Super-ordinate Themes 
Theme Super-ordinate Theme Description  
1 
‘I was like a pinball, I was bounced off this 
wall, went to that wall’ (Toby) 
The embodied experience of living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia 
2 
‘I don’t want to seem handicapped in any 
way’ (Stella) 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment 
in public spaces and places 
3 
‘The cerebellum should be a tight 
cauliflower and mine was two sticks of 
celery’ (Julia) 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex 
juxtaposition 
4 
‘Whenever it gives you a problem find a 
way round it, or fix it, you know.’ (Harry) 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain 
and changing forces 
5 
‘It makes me feel better that I’m actually 
doing something’ (Ted) 
Exercise: a multifaceted contributor to 
managing life with ataxia 
 
Participants’ accounts revealed novel and richly textured ways of understanding ataxia 
as an embodied phenomenon. Super-ordinate theme 1 illustrated that, for the majority of 
participants, their once comfortably familiar body had become disruptive to meaningful 
activities and projects. This was felt in more than just a physical sense. Participants 
described losing the easy and skilful interaction they had previously experienced 
between themselves and their world. Managing and accommodating a disordered body 
entailed novel ways of thinking about the body and thinking about space. As the body no 
longer buoyed the mind, cognitive resources were rapidly drained, further compromising 
participation in valued activities. Despite these changes, participants did not reject their 
body or understand it as something alien to the self. These findings are subtly different 
to those put forward by authors such as Zaner (1981), Toombs (1988, 1992) and Leder 
(1990) where alienation of the body in chronic illness is often foregrounded. These views 
are reviewed and discussed in more detail in the over-arching theme presented below. 
The findings summarised above do however, support calls put forward by authors 
writing from the perspective of disability studies that those wishing to understand the 
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subjective experience of chronic illness should not ignore the salience of physical 
impairment and the way it may shape the lives of disabled people (e.g. Crow, 1996; 
Thomas, 2007). At the same time, the findings from the present study also support those 
who have urged physiotherapists to look beyond their natural interest in the body as a 
physical entity (e.g. Marcum, 2004; Nicholls and Gibson, 2010). Only by moving beyond 
an understanding of the body as machine can it be possible to appreciate and effectively 
respond to the multiple ways in which impairment impacts on the experience of illness. 
This theme suggested that it is both possible and necessary to integrate an 
understanding of the lived body with an understanding of bodily impairment, in order to 
begin to comprehend the meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia from the perspective 
of those who live with this condition.  
Super-ordinate theme 2 cautiously pointed towards an understanding that progressive 
cerebellar ataxia involved a problematic disclosure of the self and “socially incompetent 
behaviours” that resonated with the findings of research with people living with 
Parkinson’s disease (Nijhof, 1995) and multiple sclerosis (Grytten and Måseide, 2006). 
Efforts to resist the negative consequences of stigma reduced participation in valued 
activities and were difficult to maintain in the midst of looming existential crises. These 
findings were similar to but did not perfectly resonate with Boutté’s (1987) ethnographic 
work about the experience of stigma for people living with Machado-Joseph disease 
(SCA3) in the Azores and the US. As discussed in chapter 7, the present study found 
that the forces that shaped each participant’s perceptions of stigma were not simply 
location- or culture-specific – or linked to general sociodemographic variables such as 
age or gender - but were person-specific. The majority of participants perceived that 
bodily disruption and incapacity invited critical scrutiny, but they made sense of these 
experiences and responded to them in highly situated ways. Goffman’s (1963) ideas 
about passing and covering remained valid, as did Scambler’s (1998) conceptualisation 
of felt stigma and internalised oppression. Most participants in the present study seemed 
to have unconsciously adopted the hegemony of socially constructed norms and 
customs. This is despite powerful and long-standing arguments made by those in 
disability studies about the inherent disablism underpinning perceptions about felt 
stigma and passing and covering behaviours (e.g. Thomas, 2010).  
Participants described their local world as comprising inter-subjective spaces where 
their sense of self was almost permanently at stake. Under these circumstances, 
behavioural and cognitive approaches to managing stigma and identity were difficult to 
sustain. For example, Jim’s knowledge of the social model of disability offered 
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intellectual relief from the salience of stigma but this sort of “knowing” was difficult to 
enact and preserve in the face of lived experiences that undermined the value of these 
theoretical constructs. These findings suggest that those seeking to support people 
living with ataxia might need to understand that the meaning of stigma and the salience 
ascribed to it in these accounts was not stable. Not only did individuals differ in the way 
they perceived and interpreted stigma, the meaning of stigma varied within the same 
individual depending upon the particular contexts in which it was perceived, and how it 
interacted with the multiple meanings of living with this progressive condition. For 
example, for most participants stigma was highly salient in the public domain (e.g. at 
work, in the street and at social events) but for a few participants, discrediting 
experiences in the home, effected by family members, appeared more salient and 
hurtful than those believed to be enacted by strangers. For others, physical decline 
uncovered hegemonic beliefs about the value of independent walking that challenged 
the sense of self and threatened to reduce participation in meaningful activities.  
Super-ordinate theme 3 extended the findings of Daker-White et al. (2011) by 
emphasising the arduous and uncertain process of diagnosis described in most 
accounts. Participants in the present study struggled to develop meaningful partnerships 
with healthcare professionals and they perceived, on the whole, an unbreachable gap 
between what they were looking for and what was offered. It seemed important, for 
example, to understand that living with ataxia was not simply a physical disorder but 
also involved on-going adjustment to change and existential turmoil that was rarely, if 
ever, addressed. Comparable experiences have also been reported by people living with 
FRA (White et al. 2010). In the present study, a strong sense of chronic uncertainty also 
emerged from the analysis of participants’ accounts. This stemmed from the provisional 
nature of most diagnoses of progressive cerebellar ataxia which meant that there was 
always something unknowable about living with this condition. Tied to this uncertainty 
was a persistent but ambiguous undercurrent about the inheritable nature of ataxia and 
the burden of responsibility for future generations. The lived experience of cerebellar 
ataxia differed in this sense from the kinds of psychological issues that face people living 
with known inheritable conditions such as Huntington’s disease where there is more 
certainty about both the pattern of inheritance and the illness trajectory (Smith et al. 
2002). Because participants seemed quite cautious when speaking about living with a 
potentially inheritable condition, further research which prioritises this topic is required. 
The findings of such work may further inform the practice of genetic counselling. With 
reference to Chapman and Smith (2002), IPA would seem well placed to explore these 
issues in more depth.  
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Running through the accounts, and as described and discussed in super-ordinate theme 
4, was a sense that participants were engaged in a constant process of adjusting to the 
vagaries of life with ataxia, whilst at the same time safeguarding valued roles and 
relationships. Others living with ataxia or other long-term conditions were perceived as a 
reference point, a valued source of intelligence when participants’ lives seemed for the 
most part unintelligible and in flux. The adoption of a certain stance or philosophy 
towards living with ataxia was identified in the majority of accounts. These perspectives 
were particular to each participant, but were directed towards maintaining a positive 
focus by reducing the salience of ataxia, and by focusing on activities, roles and 
relationships that conferred a sense of satisfaction, continuity and purpose. These 
activities were often tempered by living with a heightened sense of time and a loss of 
spontaneity. This way of living with ataxia was by no means straightforward. Participants 
emphasised the hardship, setbacks and on-going effort required to sustain a positive 
outlook and acknowledged the pain involved in accepting temporary or permanent loss 
of significant and meaningful features of their lives. This new work deepened the 
understanding of biographical disruption first advanced by Bury (1982), as well as G 
Williams’ (1984) conception of narrative reconstruction. It also added to newer work that 
introduced the concept of co-existing biographies where, in chronic illness, a familiar 
biography may be intertwined with a disrupted biography (Reynolds and Prior, 2003; 
Reeve et al. 2010). In these studies, people living with long-term conditions were found 
to manage the complex co-existence of positive and negative strands of their lives with 
difficulty. The present study emphasised the highly contextualised and fragile ways in 
which individuals living with progressive cerebellar ataxia also attempted to manage this 
complex interweaving, and to fashion a sense of control over their lives in the face of 
chronic uncertainty.  
Super-ordinate theme 5 emphasised the importance of understanding exercise and 
physiotherapy from a phenomenological perspective. The meaning of exercise, as 
described by participants in this study, stretched beyond a concern with the physical 
body to psychosocial domains and, by doing so, helped to secure and preserve an 
integrated sense of self. These findings supported the views of others (Tocher et al. 
2002; Carin-Levy and Jones, 2006; Borkoles et al. 2008) who suggested that, for people 
living with long-term health conditions, exercise, even if it conferred no direct 
impairment-level effects,  offered multiple benefits. These included enhancing the sense 
of self, whilst also reducing the salience of a patient-focussed identity. Furthermore, 
participants in the present study derived satisfaction from participating in self-selected 
exercise. Mulligan et al. (2012) reported similar findings. These authors found that 
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people living with progressive neurological conditions who participated in preferred 
activities experienced these as more fulfilling and empowering than exercise that did not 
match their preferences in terms of type or location. The present study also found that 
physiotherapy was seen as having a rather rigid focus on the impaired body, and as 
failing to acknowledge the value of exercise in terms of preserving valued relationships, 
sustaining meaningful activities and combatting issues such as depression and stigma. 
Physiotherapists were also viewed as being unable to, or not in a position to, appreciate 
the importance placed on their potential role as coach, and as unable to provide the face 
to face contact valued by participants in this study. In line with arguments made by 
Nicholls and Gibson (2010), the findings from this work cautiously suggest that 
physiotherapists may need to develop a more three-dimensional approach towards 
understanding and working with people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia. This 
approach would incorporate not only an understanding of the impaired body, but also a 
more pluralistic view that accommodates the psychosocial meaning of exercise and 
which respects the value participants placed on collaborative working.    
Whilst common themes were identified across the corpus of data, the detailed 
description and discussion of individual accounts exposed and emphasised individual 
variety about how progressive cerebellar ataxia was experienced and accommodated. 
This approach also worked to highlight differences in the way participants attempted to 
preserve and sustain meaning and value in their lives. The following discussion of the 
over-arching theme pulls the super-ordinate themes together, but retains the idiographic 
approach by setting out evidence from across the corpus to support the developing 
argument. 
 
11.3 Over-arching Theme: ‘Can’t do it no more. And then that sort of thing it’s like 
bites a bit, but …you evolve, you evolve to suit where you’re at’ (Harry) 
Description: Retaining a homelike way of being-in-the-world 
 
11.3.1 Illness as an Unhomelike Way of Being-in-the-World 
The findings from this study are interrogated here with reference firstly to Svenaeus’ 
(2000a, b, 2001, 2011) phenomenological theory of illness as unhomelike being-in-the-
world, and, secondly, Todres’ and Galvin’s (2010) existential theory of well-being. As 
these theories were elaborated in the literature relatively recently, an overview of each 
theory is introduced in Appendix M. In responding to Svenaeus’ call for his interpretation 
of Heidegger and his conception of illness to be challenged by empirical evidence, the 
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following section demonstrates how the present study both supports Svenaeus’ (2000a, 
b, 2001, 2011) view regarding the unhomelike experience of illness, but questions the 
contention that illness is always experienced as some sort of alienation. It is argued that 
by looking for typicality, Svenaeus has necessarily overlooked the nuance and texture of 
different illness experiences that might refine his general phenomenology of the 
experience of illness. 
It is suggested here firstly, that the experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia, as recounted by participants in this study, is close to Heidegger’s original 
meaning of unhomelike: an indefinite or uncertain, strange or disturbing being-in-the-
world. It is here where the findings from this study add empirical weight to Svenaeus’ 
(2000a, b, 2001, 2011) contention that illness may be experienced as an unhomelike 
being-in-the-world (discussed below). Secondly, this disturbance was not necessarily or 
always experienced in terms of bodily or temporal alienation. As argued in chapter 6 
(The Embodied Experience of Living with Progressive Cerebellar Ataxia), ill health that 
manifests itself abruptly and unpredictably and/or which wreaks sudden, distressing or 
humiliating experiences (e.g. Svenaeus’ examples of chronic pain and stroke, and 
Toombs’ (1992) phenomenological account of living with MS) may alienate the person 
contending with these devastations from their body. In these instances it is possible to 
see that the body may be experienced as having been invaded by some sort of alien 
and malevolent force. Chapter 6 also presented further instances from the literature 
where the body had or could be understood as alien to the self, for example, following a 
complete loss of bodily control, or when the body seems to take on a life of its own (e.g. 
as described by Sacks, 1985; Finlay, 2003b; Gallagher, 2005). In these cases, the 
etymological meaning of alien as other than the self or belonging to someone else 
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002) would seem to capture the unhomelikeness of 
this experience and lend weight to Svenaeus’ arguments that in illness the body is 
experienced as alien. However, this was not always the case in what was understood of 
the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia where a more ambiguous 
experience of the body unfolded. It is here, in the midst of this ambiguity, where the 
present study qualifies Svenaeus’ (2000a, b; 2001, 2011) arguments. Participants 
described their early experiences of ataxia as strange, disturbing and unfathomable but 
not necessarily alien. This quotation from Toby’s account conveyed this most clearly;      
 
‘… from the canteen back to our production facility they used to have a corridor about 50 
feet long. […] which would be the width of a door, 3 foot, whatever. And I could not … 
particularly if people were behind me, walking behind me, that tends to make me worse 
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… but I was like a pinball, I was bounced off this wall, went to that wall, I could not walk 
in a straight line down that corridor […] Really strange.’ 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, this quotation seemed to communicate a loss of control. It 
was argued that Toby seemed to retain a sense of ownership of his body, the repeated 
use of the first person ‘I’ emphasises this point. At the same time, it seemed that his 
sense of agency was also disrupted. This was pointed out as an important aspect to 
understanding the lived experience of ataxia. However, it was also where the ambiguity 
came to the fore. It is possible to interpret this extract as meaning that Toby felt as if his 
body had emerged as an “it-ness”, an alien thing separate from the self. However, this 
interpretation overlooks the context of the extract presented above. With reference to 
Morris (2008b:403), the corridor at work no longer appeared to Toby as a ‘meaningful 
space of choice’ (‘I could not walk in a straight line down that corridor’) and as such 
Toby experienced a reduction in the situated possibility of his being-in-the-world. ‘I was 
like a pinball’ communicates not simply a loss of agency but a more profound uncoupling 
from the world as the ground or foundation for possible action (walking down the corridor 
to get back to work). Disrupted walking, in this sense, curtailed Toby’s freedom to 
spontaneously respond to a particular spatial situation and in this sense it could be said 
that Toby experienced an inhospitable or unhomelike being-in-the-world but not 
necessarily an alienating experience.  
As described by Toby and others (see chapter 6), in ataxia it seemed that the mutual 
dependence or empathy between self and world broke down as the ability to pre-
cognitively anticipate and incorporate the environment in action failed. As a result, the 
world became observed in a newly conscious way; kerbs, corridors, doors, walls and 
passers-by held the attention and effort was expended in trying to maintain equilibrium. 
The physical environment emerged as something to contend with and thought-fully 
navigate in a way that contrasted with previous experience. It is therefore argued here 
that living with progressive cerebellar ataxia, as recounted by participants in this study, 
involved a disruption of skilful situated coping. Further examples were provided in 
chapter 6 where the body was experienced as strange and unpredictable, not simply as 
a corporeal thing but also in the sense of it being disruptive to projects and activities. 
This study revealed that it is the loss of the optimal bodily attitudes that normally provide 
the grip on the world, and from which experience is integrated and secured (Carman, 
2008), that seems particular to life with ataxia. It is here that Merleau-Ponty’s 
conceptualisation of human embodiment lends further insight.  
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According to Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1945]:87), human embodiment can only be 
understood:  
           
     
 
 
 
Here, Merleau-Ponty not only rejects the view of the body as object but also, by saying ‘I 
am a body’, he intentionally blurs the distinction between the subjective ‘I’ and the body 
as lived and involved in the world (Morris, 2008a). In this sense then, and for Merleau-
Ponty in particular, the ‘I’ and the lived body are synonymous: the body is no mere 
appendage of a separate thinking consciousness. This mind-body merger is 
underpinned by two key concepts, the body schema and habit. Under normal 
circumstances, our bodies are optimally orientated via the ‘body schema’ to maintain the 
right kind of bodily postures, attitudes and actions that are required for our practical 
engagement in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:113). The body schema therefore 
refers to the pre-theoretical ability to engage in projects and tasks without the need for 
conscious attention or close monitoring of the body (Gallagher, 2005). For Merleau-
Ponty ‘It is the body that ‘understands’ in the acquisition of habit […] To understand is to 
experience the harmony between what we aim for and what is given, between intention 
and performance’ (2002 [1945]:167). So “habit” refers to a kind of bodily intelligence that 
enables us to skilfully cope with the things we do in particular environments without 
cognitive effort (Reynolds, 2005). 
Habit then, is neither a form of knowledge understood as facts or data, something that 
can be articulated or rendered explicit, and nor is it an involuntary or reflex action. 
Rather it is body-knowledge, held in the body and ‘forthcoming only when bodily effort is 
made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 
[1945]:166). For Merleau-Ponty ‘habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the 
objective body’ but in the lived body in the world (2002 [1945]:167). Removing the body 
from the world or trying to explicate movement by putting it into words or thoughts will 
only ever achieve an approximation of what is normally achieved via habit and the body 
schema.  
Furthermore, for Merleau-Ponty, the world is a situation that is actively inhabited or 
taken up through the body;  
 
‘by abandoning the body as object, partes extra partes, and by going back 
to the body that I experience at this moment […] I cannot understand the 
function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in so far 
as I am a body which rises towards the world.’  
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It is the interpenetration that is important here, the winding together of body-projects-
world. In other words, human momentum (our tasks, projects, cares and concerns) 
propels us into a world; this world is taken up by us and incorporated through our 
intentional activity. So, in our natural way of being, not only is there a blurring of the 
distinction between mind and body but the distinction between the body and the 
environment is also blurred (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]; Gallagher, 1986). The 
intertwining of body and world is a two way process; there is an empathy between the 
lived environment and the body. The body integrates itself with the environment, 
adapting to particular conditions and circumstances. In a sense, the environment 
regulates the body; it calls for a particular bodily style, and in response to this call, by 
adopting a posture or by moving in a particular way, by working with the environment, 
the body becomes the expression of the environment. In other words the body and the 
environment ‘approach unity’ (Gallagher, 1986:163).  
The mind then is not separate from the body and nor is the body thoughtfully imposed 
on the world (Gallagher, 1986). In normal functioning, the body is open to and 
accommodates opportunities and situations as they present themselves within the world 
in a spontaneous (un-thinking like) way. When the body schema fails, as in illness (and, 
as argued here, in ataxia), Merleau-Ponty suggests that the natural equilibrium or 
rapport between body and environment is, ‘thrown out of gear’ or ‘off the rails’ (2002 
[1945]:133, 134). This disequilibrium, the disruption of habit, changes our way of being 
in the world because the body can no longer respond to the “call” of a particular situation 
or context. Rather than being at the periphery of our experience, the body emerges from 
its ‘mute and shadowy existence […] announcing itself as painful, fatigued, distorted, 
clumsy’ (Gallagher, 1986:152). At the same time the rapport or shared logic between the 
body and the environment is disturbed (Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945]; Gallagher, 1986). 
As recounted by participants in this study, the environment materialises as space to be 
reckoned with and negotiated. It is exactly Merleau-Ponty’s sense of disrupted 
equilibrium, this particular sense of embodied unhomelikeness, rather than alienation 
per se that seems to be evident in the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia as recounted 
by participants in this study. Table 11.2 offers further examples from participants’ 
accounts of experiences that could be considered as an unhomelike (but not necessarily 
alien) being-in-the-world. These have been divided into separate dimensions of the 
‘The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a 
living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify 
oneself with certain projects and to be continually committed to them.’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]:94, added emphasis) 
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lifeworld as suggested by Svenaeus (2000b, 2011), with his reference to unhomelike 
embodiment and alienation (discussed above), and unhomelike temporality and 
alienation. However, this categorisation has been expanded to include other aspects of 
the lifeworld as suggested by Todres and Galvin (2010).  
 
Table 11.2 Ataxia as an Unhomelike Being-in-the-world 
 
Lifeworld 
Dimension 
Participant Quotation (page and line number) Interpretation 
Spatial 
unhomelikeness 
Graham: ‘sometimes I do give in and think I 
don’t want to walk back, so I don’t go out […] 
you start turning things down because you know 
that’s outside your comfort zone’ (6:25)  
Loss of the freedom to 
experience a spatial 
situation as a possibility, a 
closing down of choices. 
Mooded 
unhomelikeness  
Joan: ‘I don’t like not to be busy. Some people 
are people who can relax but I’m not. […] So it’s 
a continuous battle to make myself relax. The 
future’s a bit scary and I know I’ve got to get to 
grips with relaxing’ (10:5) 
Thoughts of the future 
provoke anxiety, Joan 
struggles to accept the 
changes wrought by ataxia, 
and, not always 
succeeding, she flees from 
the inevitability of what she 
sees coming towards her. 
Intersubjective 
unhomelikeness 
Julia: ‘he [my son] would go and get me things 
but he reckons it’s best if I come … but 
whenever we cross the road he always holds me 
by the scruff of the collar […] I say to him ‘Have 
you any idea how that makes me feel?’ (11:18)  
 
Disruption of kinship and 
togetherness, mother and 
son are no longer in tune. 
Temporal 
unhomelikeness  
Susan: ‘it shortens the time that you have. All 
the things you used to be able to do in an hour 
or a day, everything takes so much longer, so 
you don’t have so much time’ (6:27) 
Susan is a hostage of time, 
there is no time to play 
with. 
 
Separating aspects of lifeworld from each other in this way helps to demonstrate how 
cerebellar ataxia could be understood as an experience of unhomelike being-in-the-
world, but it also disrupts the ways in which the lifeworld is experienced as a unified 
whole. For example, “mooded unhomelikeness” in Table 11.2 could also suggest an 
unhomelike sense of identity or personhood (Ashworth, 2003). As discussed in chapter 
9 (Wresting Control in the Face of Uncertain and Changing Forces), what emerges in 
Joan’s account is not simply her anxiety about the future but the ways in which she feels 
that her sense of identity is under threat. She foresees her usual active being-in-the-
world as coming to an end. Joan struggles to accept these changes (‘continuous battle’) 
and feels perhaps that she has to become someone else (a person who relaxes) in 
order to cope with what is ahead of her.   
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Returning to the super-ordinate themes presented in Table 11.1 (pp. 241) and with 
reference to Table 11.2 (above), and the preceding discussion of the findings, it is 
argued here that participants’ experiential accounts lend support to Svenaeus’ (2000a, 
b, 2001, 2011) theory of illness as an unhomelike being-in-the-world. Evidence for this 
proposal can be found in each of the superordinate themes presented and discussed in 
chapters 6-10, with particular reference to disrupted embodiment and spatiality 
(emphasised in theme 1 but also in theme 5 where unwelcome  salience is placed on 
the impaired body), intersubjectivity (emphasised in theme 2 and 3 in connection with 
identity, stigma and biomedicine, and also theme 5 with reference to interactions and 
relationship with physiotherapists) and temporality (theme 4, where participants reported 
living with a heightened awareness of time as slipping away or pressing in on their 
activities and projects). This view reflects the experience of participants in their ordinary 
lived experience as well as their particular experience of healthcare and physiotherapy 
(theme 3 and 5). It is further argued that participants’ accounts not only resonate with 
some of Svenaeus’ claims and add new empirical weight, but also question part of his 
theory: the inevitability of illness as experienced as an alienation from the self and the 
world. The arguments put forward here qualify the generalizability of this part of his 
theory with reference to the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia. These arguments are 
new and, as yet, have not been addressed in the literature.  
Todres and Galvin (2010) suggested that the unhomelike quality of illness experience 
could be overcome by promoting well-being. This view, that in illness it is possible to 
recover a sense of homelike being-in-the-world, was also advanced in a theoretical but 
not fully elaborated form by Svenaeus (2000a, b, 2001, 2011). The discussion that 
follows shows how participants in the present study both felt and resisted unhomelike 
being-in-the-world, and, through their efforts to regain and sustain a life worth living, they 
attempted to ‘evolve’ or progress towards a more homelike existence.  
 
11.3.2 The Possibility of Homecoming: An Existential Theory of Well-being 
  
In their interpretation of Heidegger’s later philosophy, Todres and Galvin (2010:3) 
proposed that ‘homelessness gives mobility to life as a positive potential, while 
homecoming gives peace to life as a positive potential’. According to this theory, 
existential homelessness, as experienced in illness, may firstly launch possibilities for 
‘existential mobility’. Rather than presenting a somewhat nihilistic position whereby the 
meaningless of existence has to be faced with a sort of empty stoicism, homelessness 
may be reframed within a more positive outlook. Todres and Galvin (2010:3) argued that 
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homelessness opens up a ‘creative restlessness’, a ‘calling to future possibilities’ ‘an 
energising potential’ or a ‘sense of adventure’ which motivates the pursuit of 
homecoming. This sort of homecoming does not seek refuge in what was there before (it 
is not a going-back-to; illness and suffering are not taken away) but opens up or re-
connects with possible horizons of experience. Mobility therefore should be understood 
as offering possibility and flow. The concepts of post-traumatic growth (Tedeschi and 
Calhoun, 2004) and transformational coping (Kobasa, 1979; Maddi, 2006) are certainly 
related to the ideas put forward here. However, Todres and Galvin (2010) frame their 
theory of existential homecoming within phenomenological rather than cognitive 
constructs. The practical application of this theory therefore rests on looking for 
opportunities to experience homecoming within fundamental lifeworld structures such as 
temporality, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality and mood. Galvin and Todres 
(2011) identified the experiential domains within which well-being could be emphasised 
in a literal or existential sense, as spatial mobility, temporal mobility, intersubjective 
mobility, and so on.  
Secondly, existential homelessness, as experienced in illness, may similarly launch 
possibilities for ‘existential dwelling’ (Todres and Galvin, 2010:4). Described as a ‘letting-
be-ness’, this sort of dwelling is not just a psychological state but a coming home to 
“what is”. In this sense, ill health and all that it entails, is accommodated. Making room 
for whatever “is there” is thought to constitute a form of peace. Dwelling is therefore best 
considered as ‘an acceptance of things as they are’ (op. cit.), rather than a form of 
resolute courage or fortitude. Dwelling emphasises rootedness, staying connected to 
people and experiences that hold meaning and preserving a sense of continuity. In this 
sense dwelling might be considered the opposite of Angst; it puts a check on anguish 
and torment that might otherwise be overwhelming. For Galvin and Todres (2011), well-
being may be realised through emphasising possibilities for existential dwelling via the 
experiential domains of the lifeworld such as spatial dwelling, temporal dwelling, 
intersubjective dwelling, and so on.  
The deepest possibility for well-being, according to Todres and Galvin (2010), occurs 
when dwelling and mobility come together. Bringing these terms together may seem 
paradoxical, but for these authors the intertwining of mobility (understood as possibility 
and flow) and dwelling (understood as peace and rootedness) encompass well-being. 
‘Dwelling-mobility’ embraces both a call towards possibilities, as well as acceptance of 
what has been given (Todres and Galvin, 2010:5). This capacity for both dwelling and 
mobility remains grounded in the lifeworld i.e. well-being can be realised through spatial 
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dwelling-mobility, temporal dwelling-mobility, intersubjective dwelling-mobility and so on. 
Although these structures of the lifeworld are interrelated, Galvin and Todres (2011) 
argued that it is possible in healthcare practice to consider each component as a means 
of identifying different well-being possibilities.  
Todres and Galvin (2010:5) provided the following explanation, ‘when dwelling is 
experienced in a temporal way, there is a sense of being grounded in the present 
moment, when mobility is experienced in a temporal way there is a feeling of flow’. The 
deepest possibility of well-being experienced through temporality is temporal dwelling-
mobility. Here the future is viewed as welcoming whilst the present is enjoyed in the 
moment. Todres and Galvin (2010) further argued that individuals have a tacit sense of 
dwelling-mobility and find their own ways of moving towards well-being. It is argued 
here, with reference to the experiential accounts of participants in the present study that 
living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia entailed a sense of homelessness which co-
existed with a journey towards homecoming i.e. the possibilities for well-being co-
evolved with suffering and the vicissitudes of life with ataxia. For example, participants 
spoke about their existential discomfort in terms of their uncertainty about the future, as 
well as their embodied discomfort, social discomfort, disordered movement and 
overwhelming fatigue. At the same time, participants recounted how they continued to 
participate in valued activities and relationships with others which conveyed a sense of 
moving forward, as well as a settling of existential angst, albeit temporarily. Similar 
findings were identified by Reynolds and Prior (2003) where women living with MS 
acknowledged the complex coexistence of positive and negative life experiences as an 
interweaving of sparkling and darker threads in the tapestry of their lives. However, this 
is the first time that this similarly nuanced understanding of life with ataxia has been 
presented. Furthermore, for the most part, participants in the present study found their 
own ways of working towards homecoming, often in spite of their healthcare 
experiences (as discussed in super-ordinate themes 3, biomedicine, and 5, exercise and 
physiotherapy). The following examples from the present study are used to illustrate 
how the findings from this study may add experiential weight to Todres and Galvin’s 
(2010) theory of existential well-being. Not all the possible permutations are presented 
here (i.e. not all lifeworld structures are combined with mobility and dwelling) as they did 
not all occur in participants’ accounts. The well-being dimensions used in these 
examples are taken from Galvin and Todres (2011:3-12). Several examples from Bill’s 
account are used to build a clearer picture about how these concepts might be used to 
help understand the particular experiences of one individual. Examples from other 
participants are also included.  
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Embodied Dwelling: comfort 
 
Embodied-dwelling is a well-being experience described by Galvin and Todres (2011) as 
a pre-reflective sense of bodily comfort, a body that is simply present, unannounced, 
reliably doing what needs to be done. As discussed in super-ordinate theme 1, Bill 
described living with ataxia as ‘awkward, ungainly and painful’. It was suggested that he 
had lost the sense of his comfortably familiar, taken-for-granted body and it is argued 
here that this could be further interpreted as an experience of unhomelike embodiment. 
Later in his account Bill described the way in which massage seemed to help sustain a 
bodily sense of well-being:  
‘I’ve got a good experience of massage, and I tend to have a very positive reaction to 
that […] I go every few weeks for a shoulder massage […] it works very effectively, 
particularly my right shoulder which is very important because that’s the hand you hold 
the most in.’  
Galvin and Todres (2011) argued that attending to a person’s sense of bodily comfort 
may attenuate a preoccupation with the body in the sense that something is, or could 
go, “wrong”. In the quotation above, Bill seemed particularly concerned about his right 
shoulder. So, through massage Bill may have found some relief from his bodily pain but 
also a sense of existential settling, putting to rest, at least temporarily, concerns about 
what might happen if he is no longer able to use his right hand. Massage could also be 
understood in this context as an active strategy for delaying this frightening possibility. 
Attending to Bill’s right shoulder in this way addresses his existential discomfort, but may 
not confer any measurable impairment level benefit. This may be problematic for a 
healthcare system where outcomes are measured along biomedical lines.  
Embodied Mobility: vitality 
 
Embodied mobility is a well-being experience that emphasises the body as full of vitality 
and energy. It accentuates a feeling of bodily capacity and “can do” (Galvin and Todres, 
2011). Much of the time Scott experienced his body as short of energy. He described 
feeling depleted, exhausted and lacking functional competence. For example, he found 
mealtimes sometimes very difficult: ‘You stagger over, you get what you can, cook it up, 
get it down your neck and you go and lie down and you think ‘Ugh, I’m dying’’. However, 
there were times, when he went to the gym, where he experienced a sense of bodily 
vitality:   
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Scott: ‘[I] feel an awful lot better just by having a strong work out, kind of like a cleaning 
effect, all the blood rushing to your brain … not quite sure how to put it.’ 
Exercising at the gym opened up possibilities for experiencing his body in a way that he 
valued and perhaps needed, but as with Bill it did not necessarily confer any impairment 
level effects. Embodied mobility constitutes a kind of well-being for Scott because he 
seemed to experience his body in a positive way (‘I feel an awful lot better’, ‘cleaning 
effect’) and it may have liberated him, at least temporarily and in an existential sense, 
from a body that he felt put limits on his possibilities as well as, perhaps, his pleasures.  
Identity Mobility: ‘I can’ 
 
Identity mobility is a well-being experience that emphasises the sense of ‘being able to’ 
(Galvin and Todres, 2011:8). It describes a heightened feeling of personal agency and 
confidence in the future achievement of personally meaningful goals. In the following 
quotation Harry seems to capture the idea that well-being can be realised through 
moving towards future possibilities that are consistent with his personal goals: 
Harry: I’ve always wanted a bike, fit in with the guys […] it’s only in the past couple of 
years they’ve started legalising quads, four wheeled motor bikes […] and we were like 
… went out and started harassing people to … how do we get one?’ 
At an existential level, Harry experiences himself as ‘being on the move’ (Galvin and 
Todres, 2011:8). There is the feeling here that he has capacities and potentials that are 
yet to be realised, and this provides a sense of ‘ontological security’ and ontological 
mobility (Galvin and Todres, 2011:9). Harry is unfinished, there is more to be done, his 
identity is still in the making and this contributes to his sense of well-being. Thinking and 
acting in terms of an “I can” (‘how do we get one?’) perhaps preserves a sense of “being 
able to” and for Harry, this may help him give less salience to a disabled identity that 
carries an unwelcome sense of permanence and stasis. Also, the male camaraderie 
connected to the achievement of this goal perhaps also speaks for Harry’s sense of “I 
can”. He is part of a group of male friends who want to do the same thing, who are 
moving forward in the same direction, he is a would-be biker and so are his friends.   
Joan spoke in similar terms. She used an electric scooter or buggy for long distances 
outside but found it difficult to lift in and out of the car. However, she had a plan which 
she thought would maintain her independence and mobility: 
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‘if I got a car that was fairly tall at the back, I could have a hoist to put the buggy in, then 
I would really get back to being independent again from that point of view.’  
Here Joan can be seen as making plans for her future possibilities, for moving forward in 
a positive way that may work to enhance her belief in herself as an independent person, 
an “I can”.  
 
Identity Dwelling: ‘I am’ 
 
In contrast to Harry’s account above, Bill seemed to suggest that he might have derived 
some sense of well-being from accepting “what is”. Identity dwelling refers to a feeling 
that a person is continuous with their sense of self, supported by uninterrupted contexts 
that confirm the sense of identity (Galvin and Todres, 2011). As discussed in chapter 9, 
Bill seemed to be reconciled to his life as it was lived with a sense of patient fortitude: 
‘You get used to it, get to the end of the week, you feel ‘that’s one more down’. So we 
survive, we’ve got by’. Here, Bill seemed to feel some degree of “belonging-with” in the 
sense that his life remained connected and continuous with his relationship with his wife. 
However, as discussed previously, beneath what seemed to be, at first glance, an 
untroubled sense of dwelling, ran an undercurrent of existential concern regarding the 
enduring nature of his marriage. Therefore Bill’s well-being, as defined by the continuity 
of his most meaningful relationships, his sense of dwelling, ‘I am’, was perhaps not fully 
realised.  
Temporal Mobility: future orientation 
 
Temporal mobility is a well-being experience that emphasises future possibilities and 
provides a sense of purpose to activities and projects (Galvin and Todres, 2011). Toby 
swam regularly. He believed this activity may have helped to maintain his muscle 
strength, but also understood that it probably made little if any difference to the 
underlying ataxia. However, by adding a challenge and future target, it is possible to see 
how swimming contributed to Toby’s sense of well-being: 
Toby: ‘I thought, well, give myself some targets […] So last year I [swam] 100 [miles] 
and this year I’m hoping to do 100, keep going for as long as I can.’ 
Swimming orientated Toby towards the future in a positive way through progressing a 
valued project or task. In this sense, for Toby, the future invites possibility and promotes 
existential well-being. This perhaps hidden benefit seemed to elude Toby’s neurologist 
who possibly viewed swimming from a purely biomedical perspective. Toby explained 
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that having told him about swimming, it appeared to Toby that the consultant rather 
dismissed it: ‘the neurologist said it won’t particularly do me any good.’ 
Spatial Mobility: adventurous horizons 
 
Spatial mobility is a well-being experience that stresses the value of literal or 
metaphorical movement, of ‘being on the road’, open to new adventures (Galvin and 
Todres, 2011:3). Bill was unable to leave his home without assistance and in this sense 
he had limited opportunities to experience “being on the move”, the actual exploration of 
new and interesting places. However, Bill had retained a metaphorical sense of spatial 
mobility. Bill’s wife went for walks with a local volunteer and took photographs as they 
walked along: 
‘Mary takes [the pictures] with a digital camera and puts them on the computer and we 
look at them. […] having looked at the pictures, we then look at where she’s been on the 
internet. But [until then] the route’s a mystery because the man that she walks with 
changes his mind on the way.’  
In this sense Bill retained the possibility of experiencing adventurous horizons, and this 
may have contributed to an overall sense of well-being both through these direct 
experiences, but also by reducing a sense of spatial unhomelikeness in which his 
possibilities for movement and adventure were severely restricted.  
Intersubjective Dwelling: kinship and belonging 
 
Whilst the previous example may also offer experiential evidence of intersubjective 
dwelling with regards to kinship (e.g. Bill may have perceived a feeling of well-being and 
“at homeness” through the companionship offered in undertaking this virtual journey with 
his wife), Bill also sought a sense of belonging from similar others. Intersubjective 
dwelling emphasises well-being achieved by a sense of being at home with others. It 
describes a “meeting of minds”, a compatibility with others that fosters a sense of 
familiar and comforting ‘inter-personal connection’ (Galvin and Todres, 2011:6). As 
discussed in super-ordinate theme 4, Bill seemed to find consolation from listening to a 
regular online broadcast about people living with disability: 
Bill: ‘Like a real club, it has its own language and kind of knowing glances, whatever, 
that you belong to it and you can get some kind of comfort from it. […] In terms of you’re 
not the only one.’  
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The reference to ‘knowing glances’ and ‘own language’ emphasised the importance of 
seeking others living through similar difficulties who offered a sense of at homeness or 
belonging not apparent in other relationships, a sense of inter-subjective dwelling with 
what had been given. 
These examples offered a further interpretation of participants’ accounts which extended 
the findings presented in previous chapters. This further interpretation lends weight to 
Todres’ and Galvin’s (2010) theory of existential well-being by showing the ways in 
which participants’ lived experience included aspects of homelike embodied dwelling, 
embodied mobility, identity mobility, identity dwelling, spatial mobility, temporal mobility 
and intersubjective dwelling. However, as noted above, possibilities for well-being co-
evolved with suffering and the vicissitudes of life with ataxia. The following example from 
Bill’s account serves as a reminder that for participants in this study, the possibility for 
existential homecoming was always experienced as part and parcel of unhomelike 
being-in-the-world. 
Bill: ‘I think it’s kind of … the walls are moving in as it were. […] I tend to have a low 
level routine as it were, that each day is fairly similar to the other, except for minor things 
like Wednesday is bin day, Tuesday is the breadman coming. That kind of … neither of 
which affect me in one sense because I don’t put the bin down and I don’t go out to the 
bread van. Because you know people say ‘what’s Tuesday?’ I think – breadman. That’s 
what marks it from being different to other days as it were.’ 
In terms of existential well-being, it appears here that Bill lacked a sense of temporal 
mobility. He described a deadening routine, a keenly felt closing down of possibilities 
(‘the walls are moving in’). He was aware of events that marked out one day from 
another but he felt disconnected from them (‘neither of which affect me’). Bill did not 
seem to derive a sense of comfort from the weekly routine or the passing of time, only a 
lack of forward momentum and the shrinking of possibilities. Taking the examples from 
Bill’s account as a whole it is possible to see how life with ataxia could involve both 
painful unhomelike experiences and opportunities for improving well-being through 
exploiting avenues for homelike being-in-the-world. Similar but deeply contextualised 
findings were present in the majority of accounts.  
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11.3.3 Retaining a Homelike Way of Being-in-the-world: the Lived Experience of 
Progressive Cerebellar Ataxia 
In summary, the findings from this study cautiously suggest that participants portrayed 
living with progressive cerebellar ataxia as an unhomelike way of being-in-the-world that 
affected all aspects of their lifeworld. Critically, in the midst of these strange and 
unwelcome disruptions, participants also found ways to secure homelike ways of being-
in-the-world through sustaining meaningful and valued activities and relationships. This 
co-existence of negative and positive experiences was found in all cases, and was 
perhaps best captured by Harry: ‘Can’t do it no more. And then that sort of thing it’s like 
bites a bit, but …you evolve, you evolve to suit where you’re at’. As discussed 
previously, Harry, like the majority of participants in this study, acknowledged the hurt 
involved in living with ataxia but he continued to move forward or to evolve (in terms of 
embodiment, temporality, intersubjectivity and spatiality and identity), despite setbacks, 
and to strive for an acceptable quality of life. Healthcare and physiotherapy in particular, 
in the experience of these participants, at best only partially supported their efforts to 
work towards a more homelike existence and, perhaps surprisingly, contributed to some 
of the participants’ more negative experiences, particularly at times of existential flux 
when understanding and support would have been highly valued.  
The findings reported here support other studies that identified co-existence as a critical 
feature of chronic illness. As discussed in chapter 2 (Understanding the Subjective 
Experience of Long-term Illness), Reynolds and Prior (2003) emphasised the 
interweaving of negative and positive strands of experience in the lives of women living 
with multiple sclerosis. Reeve et al. (2010) illustrated the way in which narrative flow and 
narrative fracture were intertwined in the lives of people living with terminal illness. The 
present study has illustrated how similar themes have emerged from accounts of people 
living with progressive cerebellar ataxia. This work has further emphasised that, for 
people living with ataxia, life is always in the making, it is neither fracture nor repair, 
positive or negative, but both. The good and the bad co-evolved and, in the middle of all 
of this, participants fashioned a life worth living not, on the whole, through adopting a 
“coping” strategy, a cognitive reflexive construct, but by engaging in the world, by 
saying, to paraphrase Heidegger (1966 [1955]:54-55), ‘yes’ but at the same time ‘no’.   
Dahlberg et al. (2009), Todres and Galvin (2010) and Galvin and Todres (2011) 
proposed a way of understanding and responding to chronic illness that perhaps 
advances the thinking in this field. The existential theory of well-being advanced by 
these scholars has some resonance with earlier work. For example, it is possible to see 
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parallels with sociological constructs such as biographical disruption (Bury, 1982), 
biographical repair and narrative reconstruction (G Williams, 1984), as well as post-
traumatic growth (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004) and transformational coping (Kobasa, 
1979; Maddi, 2006). However, by building this theory on the essential structures of 
human existence as articulated via the phenomenological concept of the lifeworld, 
Todres and Galvin (2010) and Galvin and Todres (2011) found a way to bring forth the 
complexity of people’s lived experiences in a new way and, at the same time, opened up 
clearer paths towards understanding how it might be possible to recover a sense of 
homecoming within existential homelessness. The work presented here, based on a 
detailed in-depth analysis of the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia, lends 
new empirical weight to the theory of existential well-being as proposed by Todres and 
Galvin (2010) and Galvin and Todres (2011). 
 
11.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
 
Yardley’s (2000, 2008) contextualised approach to the assessment of quality and rigour 
in qualitative research, and Smith’s (2011a, b) principles for assessing the quality of IPA 
were used to interrogate key quality indicators for the present study. Yardley (2000, 
2008) considered quality from the perspective of sensitivity to context, commitment and 
rigour, transparency and coherence, and impact and importance.  
Chapter 4 (Methodology) expounded the theoretical underpinnings of the study and by 
doing so attended to Yardley’s (2000) concept of sensitivity to context. Furthermore, 
sensitivity to the intellectual history of research in this field was demonstrated in chapter 
2 (Understanding the Subjective Experience of Long Term Illness) and chapter 3 
(Literature Review). Ethical sensitivity was explored in chapter 2 with respect to 
conducting research on disabled people, chapter 4 (Methodology) regarding the 
construction of a “good” as well as a respectful interpretation of another person’s life, 
and in chapter 5 (Method) with reference to ethical dilemmas encountered in the field.  
For Yardley (2000), commitment refers to thoroughness in data collection, analysis and 
reporting. With regards to data collection, this study used an appropriate sample size 
consistent with an IPA. Commitment also refers to the researcher’s responsibility for 
developing an appropriate level of competence and skill in the data collection methods 
and analysis used in the study. Developing competence in qualitative interviewing was 
described in chapter 5 (Method). The researcher also regularly attended the London IPA 
group and the annual IPA conferences in order to deepen her understanding of IPA, its 
theoretical underpinnings and the ways in which data could be analysed and presented. 
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Rigour is evaluated by the reader in terms of their assessment of the completeness of 
the data analysis and the depth of the interpretation, as considered below with specific 
reference to IPA. Transparency and coherence refer to the clarity and persuasiveness of 
the analysis and argumentation, and the extent to which the researcher has reflected 
upon, and discussed her influence on, the research. Reflexivity was addressed in 
chapter 1 (Introduction) and further examples were provided in the findings chapters. A 
final reflexive overview is offered below.  
 
Smith’s (2011a, b) principles for assessing the quality of IPA share much of Yardley’s 
(2000, 2008) views for judging qualitative health research but with specific reference to 
IPA. The reader is firstly asked to judge whether the work is underpinned by the 
theoretical principles of IPA i.e. a commitment to the idiographic approach, attention 
directed towards an experiential account of significance to the participant(s), 
interpretative as well as phenomenological analysis and caution in moving towards 
general claims. Secondly, the reader might judge analytic transparency i.e. whether not 
only the content of data but also the meaning of data is clearly articulated (Smith, 
2011a). Finally, a reader would consider whether the analysis is intelligible, credible, 
stimulating and, by way of quotations, sufficiently evidenced for each theme. Readers 
can only do this if they are able to fully connect with the analysis. Todres (1998:126) 
argued that researchers have a responsibility to help the reader ‘to “stand before” the 
concreteness of the experience’ and one way of doing this is by providing sufficient 
quotations to allow readers to judge the analysis for themselves. Specifically, extracts 
from at least three participants per theme plus an indication of overall prevalence or 
extracts from half the sample for each theme would constitute sufficient evidence for a 
study with twelve participants (Smith et al. 2011b). Noting the prevalence of a theme 
tells the reader about the extent to which a theme may be shared, but would not 
constitute good IPA unless accompanied by an interpretative narrative (Smith, 2011a). 
In addition, good IPA is thought to be characterised by having a clear focus, in-depth 
analysis, meaningful data and sound interpretation which illuminates the topic in a way 
that engages the reader (Smith, 2011b). This guidance was followed in the design and 
conduct of this study, analysing the data and presenting this thesis.  
Additionally, it should also be possible, via an audit process, to trace the path the 
researcher has taken from raw data to the presentation of the final table of themes 
(Smith et al. 2009). The purpose of an audit is not to verify the reliability of the final 
account, but to confirm that it is coherent and credible (Smith et al. 2009). The iterative 
work involved in data analysis complicates this somewhat because the path from data to 
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themes is not linear. There is in fact a network of paths; these are well trampled, 
thoroughly criss-crossed, and stopping off points may have been revisited many times. 
However, as the process might be tortuous but not random, an independent auditor 
should be able to identify the route the researcher has taken, if provided with a 
sufficiently detailed map. For the purposes of this study, all stages of the analysis have 
been reviewed by the researcher’s supervisors and all materials (from research proposal 
to final analysed account) are available for independent inspection.  
 
Yardley’s (2000) final dimension, impact and importance, refers to the ways in which the 
research opens up new ways of understanding, its utility and potential influence on 
others. The strong commitment to idiography may raise questions about the 
generalizability and clinical utility of IPA research. IPA’s idiographic, interpretative and 
inductive stance does not confer strong predictive power and therefore limits the ability 
to generalise across settings or populations. However, small n studies are of value if 
they point out what was not previously known or understood, or if they reveal something 
unexpected which then causes the researcher and the reader to reflexively re-examine 
their assumptions or previously held positions (Smith et al. 1995; Smith et al. 2009; 
Packer, 2011). Stephens’ (1982) concept of vertical generalizability is applicable in this 
context. It means that findings should be considered in terms of their ability to enhance 
understanding, enlarge insight, contribute to existing theories and the generation of new 
hypotheses (Johnson, 1997; Kearney 2001; Yardley, 2008). Thus, as with other forms of 
research, findings should be interrogated to see whether they provoke a re-evaluation of 
what was considered known or understood about the investigated phenomenon 
(Johnson, 1997). This process of comparing findings to experiential understanding is 
also consistent with IPA and its alignment with theoretical transferability (Smith et al. 
2009).  
As the first study to undertake a detailed analysis of the lived experience of progressive 
cerebellar ataxia, this research filled the gap in the literature identified in chapter 3 
(Literature Review) and as such made a unique contribution to what was previously 
understood about this phenomenon. Using IPA, the findings that emerged were 
nuanced, highly contextualised and particular to participants in this study and therefore, 
as discussed above, only cautious claims are made towards vertical or theoretical 
transferability. The findings resonated with current literature about the lived experience 
of chronic illness and, as argued above, questioned and developed existing theory. For 
the practitioner, the value of this sort of research is that the findings may be attuned to 
issues which could be usefully explored in practice (Green and Britten, 1998). 
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Practitioners may consider, for example, whether the new understandings contribute to 
clinical reasoning processes or can be used to challenge conventional discourse or 
ways of thinking. These claims are made with particular reference to what has been 
learned from participants about their experience of the diagnostic process, their 
experiences of stigma, the value of exercise in its broadest sense and the novel 
understandings that emerged about the embodied experience of cerebellar ataxia. A 
further claim was made with respect to the way in which this study contributed to and 
qualified Svenaeus’ (2000a, b, 2001, 2011) theory of illness as unhomelike being-in-the-
world and Todres’ and Galvin’s (2010) theory of existential well-being. Furthermore, this 
study, as one of only a few IPA studies carried out by a physiotherapist, has shown that 
IPA is a useful means of answering psychologically orientated research questions of 
significance to physiotherapists. This study has made a further contribution by adding to 
the range of disciplines for which IPA can be profitably used. It has also been used to 
encourage physiotherapy researchers to consider using IPA to answer research 
questions of interest to the physiotherapy profession (Cassidy et al. 2011).  
The following section considers and critiques particular aspects of the study and the 
bearing these may have had on the findings of the research. Recruitment of participants 
through membership organisations is justifiable and effective but it can raise concerns 
about the characteristics of participants. Kroll et al. (2007) argued that members of 
organisations often enjoy better connection to resources and support networks, tend to 
be knowledgeable about their condition and may show greater assertiveness in 
expressing their views and experiences. Furthermore, ethnic and social minority groups 
and people from low income backgrounds are less likely to be members of these 
organisations. The sample recruited for this study was not meant to be representative in 
terms of the UK population. However, it might be important to consider whether a 
different group of participants e.g. those from a minority ethnic background, would offer 
similar or different interpretations of living with ataxia. Also, for an IPA study, the sample 
was perhaps a little heterogeneous, for example, there was a large age range and 
impairment severity differed across the sample. Unsuccessful attempts were made to 
recruit participants from the NHS which might have allayed some of the concerns about 
recruiting only from Ataxia UK. Also, as this study investigated a rare and relatively 
unknown condition, it was not clear who, if anyone, would come forward to participate. 
The recruitment strategy was therefore intentionally broad but retained a specific focus 
directed at those who had lived with this condition for more than one year and who had 
also had some experience of physiotherapy. Having experience of physiotherapy as part 
of the inclusion criteria might also have influenced what emerged in super-ordinate 
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theme 5 (exercise and physiotherapy). As this study represents just the first step 
towards understanding what life might be like for people living with this complex 
condition, further research could be undertaken which addresses some of the limitations 
of this work with respect to the composition of the sample. New work might recruit 
participants who fulfil more stringent inclusion criteria to further explore the extent to 
which the findings offered in this study resonate with, or differ from, the experiences of 
particular groups.  
 
This study was undertaken by a novice qualitative researcher and therefore it is highly 
likely that a more experienced researcher would have conducted the interviews and data 
analysis in a more expert fashion. In acknowledging that a PhD is, at least in part, an 
apprenticeship (Phillips and Pugh, 2010) and therefore a learning experience, the 
researcher primarily focussed on doing justice to participants’ accounts and developing 
interviewing and data analysis skills. The meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia and 
participants’ experiences of healthcare and physiotherapy was developed with respect 
to the researcher’s interpretation of the participants’ interpretation of their lived 
experiences. Undoubtedly, another researcher using their own contexts would interpret 
the data differently (Packer, 2011). The findings presented in this study therefore do not 
claim to represent the truth or the meaning of the lived experience of progressive 
cerebellar ataxia. The researcher responded to the various ways in which these 
particular participants invited her to view their world as they saw it and lived it, but these 
responses were always interpreted through the researcher’s particular “lens”.  
The effects on participants of being interviewed by a physiotherapist are unknown. It is 
possible that participants might have felt obliged to report positive experiences however, 
as noted in super-ordinate theme 5 (Exercise and Physiotherapy) this was not the case. 
It is also possible that this study attracted those who had particular concerns or 
grievances about physiotherapy that they wished to air. It is impossible to say whether 
participation in this study was motivated by these sorts of issues, but the participant 
information sheet and discussions with potential participants before recruitment stressed 
that both positive and negative accounts would be welcomed, and both good and bad 
experiences of physiotherapy were reported.    
Certain aspects of this study could have been carried out differently, which might have 
improved the research process. As discussed in chapter 5 (Method) the researcher 
found conducting the interviews an initially difficult process. IPA demands a certain 
flexibility to allow participants to go “off script” to ensure the phenomenological 
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orientation of the study is followed (Eatough and Smith, 2008). However, this approach 
demands a certain confidence on the part of the researcher and the participant. Meeting 
the participant before the interview specifically to develop a good rapport and to discuss 
the purpose of the interview in more depth, rather than “parachuting in”, would have 
been difficult given the distances involved but other means of communication such as e-
mail or the telephone could have been used to develop a stronger sensitivity to 
individual context (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009).  
 
IPA has matured as an approach to undertaking phenomenological enquiry since 2007 
when this study commenced, and over this time a deeper commitment to small samples, 
including n of 1, has been encouraged (Smith et al. 2009). Given the preliminary nature 
of this particular study, a sample size of 12 seemed reasonable in that it afforded a 
useful overview of issues that might be more closely investigated in future studies. 
Furthermore, appropriate attention was paid to individual accounts which retained the 
idiographic stance of IPA. Specific issues raised in this study, e.g. the impact of felt and 
enacted stigma, could be further investigated in a more focussed study with a smaller 
sample size. However, it is argued here that IPA remains the most appropriate means of 
answering the research questions. The reasons for this are both theoretical and 
pragmatic. IPA is directed towards understanding lived experience with the focus on 
highly circumscribed personal accounts (Smith et al. 2009) and this approach, as argued 
in chapters 4 (Methodology) and 5 (Method) was consistent with the research questions 
developed for the present study. This perspective is quite different from the type of 
macro-analysis encouraged by a qualitative approach such as grounded theory with its 
adoption of theoretical sampling methods and the testing and refinement of emerging 
theoretical explanations (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). IPA researchers are not opposed to 
making more general claims but do so only through a careful step-by-step approach 
(Smith and Osborn, 2008; Smith et al. 2009). This position seemed consistent with the 
nascent situation of qualitative research in this field where the findings reported here 
represent only the first step on the long ladder towards generalizability.  
Secondly, and more pragmatically, other phenomenological approaches were not 
chosen for this study because they appeared less accessible to a novice researcher in 
this field. As discussed in chapter 4 (Methodology), whilst the differences between 
phenomenological approaches are a little fuzzy, IPA stands out because clear guidance 
is offered in a number of texts and papers (e.g. Reid et al. 2005; Smith and Osborn, 
2008; Eatough and Smith, 2008; Smith et al. 2009) and via dedicated online groups and 
face to face meetings that support researchers new to IPA. However, given the way in 
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which this study developed and the overarching theme presented in this chapter with its 
emphasis on individual structures of the lifeworld, it is possible to see how future studies 
may benefit from taking a lifeworld approach such as that proposed by Dahlberg et al. 
(2008) or Ashworth (2003). 
11.5 Final Reflexive Overview 
 
As reflexivity involves critical self-examination this section is written in the first person. 
As discussed in chapter 1, a reflexive stance was taken towards this study using the 
concept of hermeneutic reflection with respect to interpreting, understanding and 
explicating the position and influence of the researcher in the research (Finlay, 2003a; 
Shaw, 2010). Examples where reflexivity helped to identify or open up possible 
meanings were acknowledged throughout this thesis, particularly in the findings 
chapters and with reference to my initial concerns about using IPA as a physiotherapist 
who lacked formal psychology training.  
Over the course of this study, I iteratively drew upon my personal contexts, as they 
came to light, and used them as a topic as well as a resource to interrogate the data and 
to critique the emergent findings (Packer, 2011). At the same time I attempted to step 
out of or, more accurately, shake off habitual ways of thinking in order to see my taken-
for-granted understanding of ataxia in a new way. Finlay (2008) likened this complex 
process to a dance between exploiting past experience and setting it aside. In this sort 
of dance the steps evolve in an unpremeditated way, there is no routine as such, and it 
would be impossible to retrace the steps at the end of the dance. In describing 
phenomenological enquiry in this way, Finlay (2008) captured its fleeting and intangible 
qualities. The metaphor of a dance with improvised steps expressed the difficulty in 
pinpointing where insight or inspiration comes from during data analysis and why it is 
crucial to engage in critical self-analysis as a means of, at least partially, illuminating the 
influence of the researcher in the research.  
My reflexive diary, used as device to glimpse into my past self, helped to retrace my 
steps, to understand, at least in part, where I had started and how my early concerns 
may have shaped data collection and analysis. For example, reading my diary entries 
from 2006 and 2007 showed that my anxiety about being a physiotherapist and not a 
psychologist acted on the research in two ways. First, I assumed that a psychology 
background would in some way give me better or more direct access to participants’ 
experiences. I tried to be a psychologist, looking in the data for what I understood, at the 
time, as psychologically meaningful material. This sham-identity worked to undermine 
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the theoretical assumptions of phenomenological enquiry. I put imported ideas onto the 
data rather than interacting and working with the data in an authentic fashion. Second, 
as noted in chapter 1 and discussed further in chapter 6 (The Embodied Experience of 
Living with Progressive Cerebellar Ataxia), these endeavours led me to initially reject 
data that I interpreted as in any way relating to biomedicine or motor impairment. To me, 
at this early stage of data analysis, this sort of data could not be considered 
phenomenologically interesting, partly because ataxia related impairments were well 
explained in biomedical terms and also because I was unable to see how participants’ 
descriptions of these impairments would add to the understanding of the lived 
experience of cerebellar ataxia.  
My initial concerns have not changed. I still feel, as a physiotherapist doing IPA, that 
psychological and phenomenological insights are hard to come by. Good 
phenomenological work requires phenomenological sensibilities such as creativity and 
innovation, as well as having the faith and courage to take imaginative leaps in order to 
gain greater insight (Finlay, 2011). More specifically, IPA as an approach towards doing 
phenomenological research entails a particular way of thinking and seeing that cannot 
be easily encapsulated in a formal method (Smith et al. 2009). It is not surprising 
therefore that as a novice qualitative researcher, I initially sought comfort and security 
from formal structures and methods, and found the creativity and risk-taking required for 
IPA destabilising and difficult. However, writing at the final stages of this study, I can 
now recognise that rather than constraining this work, my professional background at 
least, if not my phenomenological expertise, may have allowed me to approach the 
study with a fresh perspective and to offer new insights. As a physiotherapist I am 
interested in the body. Once I had overcome my initial distrust of the signs and 
symptoms of ataxia as not being phenomenologically valid, I could allow the body to 
emerge. These perspectives and interests may partially explain the prominence of the 
embodied experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia in the findings.  
Equally significant was my lack of awareness, at the start of the study, of my immersion 
in a particular world view that stood in opposition to what I was trying to achieve with this 
research. At first, I was simply aware that I perhaps overcompensated for what I now 
consider as my obvious biases. I knew that I would look for the positive in participants’ 
accounts of their healthcare experiences, and I overcompensated for that assumption by 
initially focussing on reporting negative perceptions. These prejudices were addressed 
by going back to the data and starting again. However, what I eventually realised was 
that these preconceptions were just surface issues, relatively easy to grasp, make sense 
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of and address. In fact, these concerns represented only the tip of the reflexivity iceberg, 
much of what influenced the conduct of the study remained below the surface. It was 
only later that I understood my strongly positivist leanings and their potential for shaping 
the findings of this study. Firstly, I found it surprisingly difficult to move away from realist 
ways of thinking and interpreting the data. In adopting the persona of a qualitative 
phenomenological researcher I would experience moments of insight only to lose those 
insights and with them any sense of stability in my IPA research identity. I struggled to 
understand that what I was listening to and what participants were trying to impress 
upon me was not objective knowledge about the world as it “really is”. Staying with the 
understanding that participants were telling me something of their experience and their 
particular perceptions of the world, and accepting that what emerged was partial and 
uncertain was unsettling, and did not easily sit with what I now understand was my world 
view.  
Secondly, as part of my positivist assumptions, I found even acknowledging that the 
study might reflect something about me, and that I was in fact “in” the data, deeply 
disturbing. Looking back, I now understand why my research diary is strangely 
impersonal and why I find writing in the first person so uncomfortable. I was clinging 
onto a positivist stance. Deep down, I believed that my involvement in the research 
would in some way contaminate the data. Although I could intellectually admit that in IPA 
the researcher is inevitably “in” the research, I found it difficult to acknowledge that “the 
researcher” was “me” and that it was me who shaped this thesis. These issues were at 
play and being dealt with throughout the course of this study. However, it seems to me 
that any “dealing with” was implicit or at least was not fully or concretely acknowledged. 
Prompts from my supervisors to re-think realist interpretations were taken to imply poor 
interpretative technique. It took a while to understand that simple inferences about 
technique hid more complex issues about my philosophical perspectives. These insights 
prompted me to question my assumptions about the data in a more profound way and 
not to simply try again with a section of problematic analysis. However, I experienced, at 
best, just fleeting moments of insight in the midst of the praxis of the research. I found it 
difficult to articulate what I had momentarily understood about my role in the research 
and the impact this may have. It is only now, at this late stage of the research that I feel 
that I can begin to make sense of it. The discovery of theories that captured what I 
thought I had understood about the lived experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia felt 
like a revelation. The idea that homelike experiences could be nested within existential 
unhomelikeness made sense. These concepts fitted with what I had tentatively 
understood from participants’ accounts. The insights gained from reading Merleau-Ponty 
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(2002 [1945]), Heidegger (1962 [1927]; 1966 [1955]; 1973 [1969]; 1993 [1971]), 
Svenaeus (2000a, b, 2001, 2011), Mugerauer (2008), Todres and Galvin (2010) and 
Galvin and Todres (2011) helped crystalize what I had already partially understood but 
initially at least found difficult to trust.  
 
11.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has further discussed, synthesised and critically evaluated the overall 
findings of this study and has identified their unique contribution to knowledge. This new 
work, using fine grained idiographic analysis, has provided rich insights from a 
previously under-researched population and has potential to contribute to broader efforts 
to support people living with ataxia in the long term. The following chapter concludes this 
thesis by reflecting on what has been achieved and the implications for further research 
and practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 270 
 
Chapter 12  
 
Conclusion  
 
12.1 Overview of the Study 
Before this study was undertaken, little qualitative research aiming to understand the 
subjective experience of this complex condition had been carried out which signified an 
important gap in what was known and understood about living with a progressive ataxia. 
During the course of the present study new qualitative studies were published (e.g. 
White et al. 2010; Daker-White et al. 2011; Walshe and Miller, 2011). However, as these 
studies did not make a detailed exploration of life with ataxia and, for the most part, had 
a rather narrow focus, the findings offered just fragmentary insights and brief glimpses 
into the worlds of people living with this condition. Therefore it was argued that, given 
the underdeveloped status of research in this field, further research which undertook an 
in-depth exploration of the lived experience of people with progressive ataxia was long 
overdue. The present study was considered valuable because it could make a 
contribution to the clinical field in terms of offering insights for practice. It could also add 
to the theoretical conceptualisation of the experience of long-term illness by offering new 
empirical data worthy of deeper consideration, as well as opening up new avenues for 
further research.  
Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, this study explored the experience of 
progressive cerebellar ataxia, healthcare and physiotherapy from the perspective of 
people who live with this condition. Phenomenological enquiry offered a means of going 
beyond what was ordinarily understood about life with ataxia, not only in terms of 
exploring the lived body but also in terms of gaining an in-depth, nuanced and finely 
grained appreciation of individuals and their world, a perspective neglected in previous 
work.  
Twelve people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia were interviewed on one 
occasion. Participants lived in England (widespread locations) and were aged between 
31 and 73 years. Time since diagnosis ranged from a minimum of one year to a 
maximum 23 years. Most participants had lived with symptoms if not a definitive 
diagnosis for over ten years, some for much longer. All interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. In-depth data analysis was undertaken following published guidance 
(Eatough and Smith, 2008; Smith and Osborne, 2008; Smith et al. 2009). The findings 
are discussed below with reference to the research questions.  
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12.2 Summary of the Main Findings with Respect to the Research Questions 
1. What is the meaning of progressive cerebellar ataxia for people who live with 
this condition?  
 
The meaning of ataxia for participants in this study is best understood not simply as a 
disruption to the physical body, but as a loss of the skilful interaction between body, self 
and world. Life with ataxia, and the constant adjustments that living with ataxia entailed, 
fundamentally disturbed the participants’ sense of their being-in-the-world. They spoke 
of an on-going and at times profound sense of existential turmoil that disrupted their 
sense of who they were and what they were becoming. Participants struggled to hold 
onto the parts of their lives that they valued most; their sense of agency, personhood 
and identity. However, and often without meaningful support from healthcare 
practitioners, they worked to forge positive life experiences that not only reduced the 
salience of ataxia but also emphasised continuity, belonging, reciprocity and self-
identity; ways of staying connected to the things and people that mattered to them in the 
particular contexts of their lives. At the same time they resisted, as far as they could, the 
extreme fatigue, stigma and social distancing that accompanied life with ataxia, and 
which further added to the burden of living with this condition.  
At the highest level of abstraction, it was argued that the co-existence and co-
evolvement of positive and negative life experiences could be understood through 
Heidegger’s (1973 [1969]) conception of homelike and unhomelike existence. 
Participants’ accounts suggested that through sustained effort and in the face of 
significant loss it was possible to retain a positive sense of self. At the same time, it was 
also, but not always, possible for participants to admit the distressing and hurtful aspects 
of living with ataxia, as well as their worst fears about their future lives, without 
becoming overwhelmed or letting these feelings and experiences hold sway. Therefore, 
participants in this study seemed, in a Heideggerian sense, to be able to build homelike 
qualities into unhomelike lives and this helped them to sustain lives that, at least in part, 
remained meaningful and self-affirming. 
2. How do people living with a progressive cerebellar ataxia experience 
healthcare and physiotherapy in particular?  
 
Participants’ accounts emphasised that in their experience healthcare was primarily 
orientated towards understanding and working on the impaired body. Particular 
emphasis was placed on a gruelling and frustrating diagnostic process which extended 
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and contextualised the findings of Daker-White et al. (2011). It seemed important to 
understand that, for participants in this study, diagnosis was experienced as a long-term 
event that extended beyond the initial consultation with the neurologist. Most 
participants were given a provisional diagnosis or had lived with ataxia for many years 
before finding out what type of ataxia they had. However, even a firm diagnosis offered 
very little in terms of prognostic certainty or treatment. An “idiopathic” diagnosis was 
common amongst participants and whilst this may be a useful description for healthcare 
professionals, it seemed to add to the chronic uncertainty experienced by participants in 
this study, and, by extension, to the burden of living with this condition. Furthermore, 
follow-up appointments which offered little, if any, concrete information about diagnosis, 
prognosis and treatment, deepened the frustration and dissatisfaction that accompanied 
hospital visits. The accounts also suggested that the psychologically troubling aspects of 
living with progressive ataxia, and the importance placed by participants on meaningful 
communication, were rarely addressed by healthcare practitioners. Instead of finding a 
hoped-for source of certainty and support, participants described feeling abandoned and 
fell back on their own resources in order to understand their condition and make sense 
of their lives. 
An unexpected finding showed that physiotherapists seemed to prescribe exercise that 
also only focussed on the impaired body. Home exercises put an unwelcome salience 
on ataxia, and, because prescribed exercises were fatiguing and difficult to achieve 
independently, they seemed to further burden participants and add to their psychological 
and emotional suffering. Furthermore, rigid attachment to service models that left 
participants, for the most part, to manage exercise prescriptions independently for long 
periods of time, were generally described as unrewarding and unsustainable. 
Physiotherapists who provided long-term partnership working, responsive and flexible 
services, and individually tailored advice and support, particularly at times of physical 
and existential crisis, were singled out as offering the sort of therapeutic alliances that 
participants seemed to be looking for. Further work is needed, particularly research that 
directly explores physiotherapy in practice. In the meantime, the findings from this study 
support arguments put forward by Nicholls and Gibson (2010) and Wikström-Grotell and 
Eriksson (2012:434) that physiotherapists may need to reconsider their perhaps 
unwitting allegiance to the biomedical model, and to develop a model of physiotherapy 
that includes ‘not only physical, emotional, mental and socio-cultural but also existential 
domains’.  
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3. What is the meaning of exercise and activity participation for people living 
with progressive cerebellar ataxia?  
Participants in this study described self-selected exercise and physical activity as 
conferring multiple benefits that went beyond simple body maintenance, and 
emphasised the importance of understanding exercise and activity participation from a 
biopsychosocial perspective. Activity participation helped to sustain valued roles and 
relationships, and preserved a sense of belonging and continuity. Exercise contributed 
to well-being by combatting depression and stigma, and by helping to foster a positive 
sense of self. Participants’ accounts suggested that they derived satisfaction from doing 
self-selected exercise that offered a challenge and a sense of achievement. Group 
activities, e.g. Pilates, craft work, dancing and team sports, strengthened the connection 
and authentic involvement with others by providing companionship and a sense of 
togetherness that had nothing to do with ataxia. Self-selected exercise diminished the 
salience of ataxia in participants’ lives, and even if exercise yielded no impairment level 
benefits, participants described experiencing their body in a more positive way. Activities 
and exercise chosen by participants often contrasted sharply with physiotherapy 
prescribed exercise which emphasised the frailties of the body and an ataxia-dominant 
self-identity. 
The findings from this study are new with respect to understanding the lived experience 
of ataxia and extend those of Mulligan et al. (2012) who reported similar benefits from 
self-selected exercise and activity participation for people with neurological disability. 
However, the disconnect between the meaning of self-chosen activities and 
physiotherapy-prescribed exercise might be considered as surprising new knowledge. 
These findings may provoke a re-evaluation of the way in which physiotherapy is 
provided for people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia, and indicate a potentially 
fruitful direction for further enquiry. 
 
12.3 Translational Relevance for Healthcare Practitioners 
Radley (1997:65) suggested that the practical implication of work that discloses the lived 
experience of illness is that it ‘reveals the limitations of interventions that rest upon the 
division of body, self and society into separate spheres.’ Healthcare practitioners who 
understand how these concepts are bound together in the lives of the people concerned 
will be better placed to alleviate suffering and contribute to the maintenance of health. 
Research questions 2 and 3 focussed on physiotherapy and on healthcare practice 
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more generally, and, by doing so, identified findings that reach beyond physiotherapy to 
other healthcare fields.  
Participants in this study described a disruption to the body that could not be separated 
from disruptions to their sense of self and themselves in the world. Ataxia was 
encountered in a lifeworld; understood in a context of self, family, society, projects and 
action. The practical application of Todres and Galvin’s (2010) theory of existential well-
being, lies in facilitating possibilities for finding a more homelike way of being, at both 
existential and literal levels. Healthcare practitioners may find this concept a useful 
template for working with people living with ataxia. This is because, as argued by 
Dahlberg et al. (2009), a lifeworld approach allows due attention to be paid to the 
vicissitudes and suffering in people’s lives but also highlights a fundamental but often 
hidden potential for well-being. In this sense, both wellness and illness can be 
meaningfully addressed, because as suggested by the findings of this study they co-
evolve.  
It is argued here, with reference to theoretical generalizability, that a range of healthcare 
practitioners (GPs, neurologists, specialist nurses, occupational therapists and 
counselling psychologists, as well as physiotherapists) may, by interrogating the findings 
of this study and by adopting Todres’ and Galvin’s (2010) existential theory of well-
being, find themselves better equipped to address the concerns and priorities of people 
living with progressive cerebellar ataxia who seek their advice and support. GPs, 
neurologists and geneticists, may, for example, foster more meaningful and helpful 
relationships with their patients if they seek to deepen their understanding of the 
vulnerability, anxiety and frustration that accompanies life with ataxia, and which seems 
to be intensified through the lengthy and problematic diagnostic process. It may also 
help to openly discuss and admit the limitations of medicine whilst fostering a genuine 
sense of collaboration and alliance that prioritises patients’ perspectives. This could be 
achieved not by diminishing the significance of ataxia but by helping individuals make 
sense of what is happening to them in the context of their lives. This kind of undertaking 
may also involve appropriate referral to other healthcare practitioners such as 
occupational therapists and health psychologists. As these findings add to those of 
Daker-White et al. (2011), it may now be time for neurologists and people living with 
ataxia to work together to find better ways of supporting people as they go through what 
appears to be a lengthy and discomfiting diagnostic process.  
Healthcare practitioners (therapists, nurses and doctors) are also well placed to help 
people living with progressive ataxia to recognise and manage their own cognitions 
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about stigma, and to adopt approaches towards managing stigma that best fit their 
particular circumstances and experiences. Stigmatised people may need to try out 
several problem solving strategies before they find one that helps them achieve their 
goals and which allows them to hold onto what they value most in their lives (Miller and 
Meyers, 1998). Active problem solving and cognitive restructuring might therefore be 
best considered as skills that are acquired over time. It would be important for clinicians 
to be attentive to the variety of ways in which people living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia respond to stigma-related stress (as detailed in super-ordinate theme 2) as well 
as being sensitive to the ways in which stigma interacts with other dimensions of 
experience. For example, using a walking stick may improve gait but may also place an 
unwelcome emphasis on the impaired or deteriorating body that people living with ataxia 
may find difficult to accept. This study has shown that healthcare practitioners’ 
understanding of stigma should be grounded in and tailored to the distinctive practical 
and existential concerns of individual patients. This suggests that support and guidance 
should be responsive to fluctuations in a person’s ability to apply strategies to overcome 
stigma, for example in the face of further physical deterioration.  
12.3.1 Specific Implications for Physiotherapists 
This study illustrated the rich insights that can be gained from adopting a 
phenomenological perspective as compared to a more biomedical approach towards 
understanding the impact of cerebellar ataxia on individuals’ lives. Through combining a 
traditional orientation towards the physical body with an understanding of the ‘body-as-
lived’ (Marcum, 2004:312; Hammell, 2006), physiotherapists might re-consider the 
importance of home exercises and the potential value of supporting patients to 
participate in self-selected activities and exercise. This sort of exercise may confer 
physical benefits which also contribute more broadly to subjective well-being and a 
positive sense of self. Given the lack of evidence for physiotherapy interventions and 
understanding the negative impact of ataxia on everyday life experience, it may be 
useful for physiotherapists to think beyond impairment-level management strategies and 
to embrace exercise opportunities that have more chance of generating positive life 
experiences and positive self-image.   
Physiotherapists are in a position to both appreciate the personal significance and 
complexities of patients’ lived experiences and to offer practical support. For example, 
consistent with the views of others living with long-term neurological conditions (Bernard 
et al. 2010), it seemed important for participants in this study to develop therapeutic 
alliances with physiotherapists, to consult them on an equal footing, bringing in their 
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expertise in living with this condition whilst consulting expert others to help develop 
knowledge, to answer specific questions and to respond to and offer support at times of 
crises. These findings suggested that physiotherapists might profit from understanding 
that participants in this study were not looking for a technical fix or cure for their 
condition. Good communication skills, being listened to and understood was also central 
to what was valued in the therapeutic relationship. Therefore therapists and perhaps 
physiotherapists in particular may need to reconsider how services can be configured to 
meet these needs and whether there is an appropriate emphasis on helping people with 
ataxia flourish rather than on fixing impairments.   
These practice implications can only be considered if the findings from this work are 
disseminated to relevant audiences (practitioners, people living with ataxia, funding 
bodies and charitable organisations). Appendix L lists the various ways in which this 
work has been disseminated to date. Two papers have been published, mainly 
addressing a physiotherapy readership and further publications in peer reviewed 
journals are anticipated. 
 
12.4 Implications for Future Research  
 
Research focussing on the development of physiotherapy interventions for people living 
with progressive cerebellar ataxia is in its infancy. Researchers conducting studies 
without understanding that self-selected exercise may be a force for promoting well-
being in its broadest sense, and that prescribed home-exercises possibly add to the 
burden of life with ataxia, may naïvely pursue a prescriptive home-exercise intervention 
that risks failure for psychosocial rather than biomedical reasons. A more focussed IPA 
could be undertaken to explore the role of exercise and physical activity and the 
possible facilitators and barriers to participation. This new work could be informed by the 
findings of the present study and may also be usefully incorporated in the design of 
mixed methods research, as part of a larger study looking at the development of 
physiotherapy interventions for people living with progressive ataxia.  
IPA would also be well placed to explore family dynamics which were not the focus of 
the present study. This may be a fruitful topic for further qualitative enquiry because it 
would allow a deeper consideration of the inheritable aspects of living with a progressive 
ataxia which were only partially glimpsed in this study. Furthermore, this study showed 
that instead of being supportive, as might be expected, some participants felt discredited 
by close family members. Further qualitative enquiry with family groups may help to 
shed light on how stigma is realised and dealt within the family. Insights from this sort of 
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research may provide a more nuanced understanding of this topic and identify ways in 
which individuals and families could manage stigma and stigmatising experiences in a 
positive way, as well as how they manage anxieties associated with the genetic 
transmission of this condition.   
The findings of this study could be taken to people living with ataxia. Formal methods, 
e.g. focus groups, could be used to discuss the findings to see whether they resonate 
with the views of other people living under similar circumstances. This approach may 
lead to further elaboration of particular findings from the present study. These 
amplifications may then contribute to a corpus of evidence which in turn may speed up 
the often incremental translation of research findings into clinical practice. Further 
avenues for research may also be identified. Participatory action research takes a more 
emancipatory approach (White et al. 2004). The findings from this research could be 
discussed by people living with ataxia who could then, as co-researchers, identify and 
prioritise future projects. These projects may focus on changing aspects of participants’ 
lives that are found to be particularly distressing or disempowering. Done well, 
involvement in this type of research, rather than being burdensome can be life-
enhancing (Nelson et al. 1998) particularly when involvement results in tangible 
differences in areas where participants feel most change is needed e.g. in the 
healthcare setting. Further research, where neurologists, specialist nurses, 
psychologists and patients work together to explore possible ways of changing practice 
in ways that help patients live with uncertainty, seems timely. 
Focus groups with physiotherapists have already been undertaken by the author in 
order to explore contemporary practice and participants’ experiences of working with 
people living with progressive cerebellar ataxia. Further analytical work is required but 
this new study should provide a useful comparison between the perceptions of 
physiotherapy illustrated in the present study and the perspectives of physiotherapists. A 
progression of this study might involve an observational arm that explores the 
therapeutic relationship between physiotherapists and people living with ataxia in 
practice. Conversation analysis may be an appropriate methodology for this type of 
research (Drew, 2003). The study would focus on naturally occurring interactions i.e. 
between physiotherapists and people living with ataxia in a clinic situation. Data analysis 
would attend to the context of the conversation, looking specifically at how participants 
understand and respond to each other. This sort of work would first need to establish 
whether there is a mismatch between what physiotherapists understand as their role in 
supporting people living with ataxia, what is actually delivered, and what is perceived by 
patients, and then, secondly, untangle the reasons for any apparent incongruence.   
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12.5 Summary 
 
This study has offered new, highly detailed and contextualised insights into the lived 
experience of progressive cerebellar ataxia. The careful application of IPA suggested 
that participants made sense of their lives in a variety of ways depending on their 
personal contexts. At the highest level of abstraction it was shown that although life with 
ataxia could threaten the very being of each participant and their attachment to the 
things and people that gave their life meaning, they had also, generally without the 
support of healthcare practitioners, and with much hardship and effort, found ways to 
build self-affirming and life-affirming experiences into their everyday living. These new 
findings may have resonance for several healthcare practitioners, not only 
physiotherapists but also neurologists, occupational therapists, geneticists, counselling 
psychologists, GPs and specialist nurses. Furthermore, this study has lent empirical 
weight to Todres and Galvin’s (2010) existential theory of well-being, an emerging and 
potentially useful theoretical construct for healthcare practice. The empirical data and 
findings from the present work were also used to question and qualify Svenaeus’ 
(2000a, b, 2001, 2011) view that alienation is an inevitable part of the experience of 
long-term illness. Finally, the present study identified clear paths for further research. 
Such work might not only involve further IPA studies but also other ways of taking the 
findings of this study forward e.g. into mixed methods as well as more emancipatory 
forms of enquiry. Taken together, this work and the implications derived from it provide a 
valuable addition to research in this field.     
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ATAXIA* to capture: 
 
Progressive ataxia 
Hereditary ataxia 
Friedreich’s ataxia 
Spinocerebellar ataxia 
(SCA) 
Episodic ataxia 
Idiopathic ataxia 
Cerebellar ataxia 
Inherited ataxia 
Degenerative ataxia 
Machado-Joseph 
ataxia 
Combined with the 
Boolean operator 
NOT (to exclude the 
following specific 
syndromes or 
conditions): 
Telangiectasia 
Fragile X 
Epilepsy 
Multiple Sclerosis 
Stroke 
Angelman 
Specify where 
possible: human 
studies 
Subject specific search 
term 
Methods-based search strategy I - Qualitative: search strategy informed by the Hedges Team: Wong et al (2004), McKibbon et al (2006), Walters et al 
(2006) and Wilczynski et al (2007) and adapted to each database – ‘ataxia’ combined with:  
 
 
 
SCOPUS (EMBASE & MEDLINE) 
AND Interview 
OR qualitative 
OR exp health care organisation 
CINAHL PLUS 
AND explode study design (qualitative) 
OR exp attitude 
OR exp interviews 
PsycINFO 
AND Experience 
OR interview 
OR qualitative 
Appendix A1: Overview of the Literature Search Strategy  
SCOPUS (EMBASE & MEDLINE) 
 
ACADEMIC SEARCH COMPLETE 
AND experience 
OR interview 
OR qualitative 
OR attitude 
ZETOC 
AND qualitative  
 
Specific Journal Search 
Qualitative Health Research 
Disability and Rehabilitation 
Chronic Illness  
Contacts 
Personal knowledge  
Academic networks 
Serendipitous Findings 
e.g. Smith et al, 2004; Wilson et 
al, 2007 
Iterative exploration: 
Citation tracking 
Reference tracking 
Author tracking 
Professional and Special Interest 
Websites 
Ataxia UK 
Ataxia Foundation  
Health Talk Online  
WEB OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND experience 
OR attitude 
OR interview  
OR qualitative 
 
AMED 
AND experience 
OR attitude 
OR interview  
OR qualitative 
 
SIGLE  
(System for information on grey 
literature in Europe) 
Subject search only – ataxia 
 
THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 
AND experience 
OR attitude 
OR interview 
OR qualitative 
 DISSERTATIONS AND THESES 
(EThOS and SCIRUS) 
AND experience 
OR attitude 
OR interview  
OR qualitative 
 
Methods-based search strategy II - Mixed Methods: search terms informed by University of Washington – ‘ataxia’ combined with: ‘mixed design’ OR ‘mixed 
model’ OR ‘multiple method’ OR ‘multimethod’ OR ‘triangulation’ used in all databases where possible 
 
ADDITIONAL 
STRATEGIES 
CINAHL PLUS 
 
ACADEMIC SEARCH COMPLETE  
 
PsycINFO 
 WEB OF KNOWLEDGE  
 
AMED 
 
SIGLE 
 THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 
 
DISSERTATIONS AND THESES 
 
ZETOC 
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Appendix A2: Results of Database Searches and Number of Selected Papers from 
Each Source 
 
Data Base 
(combined qualitative and mixed 
methods searching) 
Number of Identified 
Studies 
Number of Selected 
Studies 
Academic Search Complete  73 4 
AMED 1 0 
CINHAL Plus 15 1 
Cochrane 0 0 
EThos (British Library) 0 0 
PsycINFO 57 1 
SCOPUS (EMBASE & MEDLINE) 756 1 
SCIRUS 283 0 
SIGLE 19 0 
Web of Knowledge 2086 5 
ZETOC 7 0 
Other sources  
(citation tracking, serendipity) 
 10 
Chronic Illness (2005-2012) 2 1 
Qualitative Health Research 
(1991-2012) 
3 0 
Disability and Rehabilitation 
(1978-2012) 
103 2 
Replications  7  
Total n 3405 26 
Total considered in this review  19 
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Appendix B: Location of Selected Papers from the Literature Search 
 
Paper (n = 19) Located In 
Abele and Klockgether, 
2007  
Citation tracking   
Ataxia UK 2007a, b Ataxia UK 
Box et al, 2005 Ataxia UK 
Boutté, 1987, 1990, 1992 Citation tracking 
Brown, 2010 Academic Search Complete 
Cano et al, 2009 CINHAL, Medline, Web of Knowledge 
Daker-White et al, 2011 
SCOPUS, PsycINFO, Web of Knowledge, Chronic Illness, 
Academic Search Complete 
D’Ambrosio et al, 1987 Disability and Rehabilitation (International Disability Studies) 
Drake and Guillory, 2001 Academic Search Complete 
Hess et al, 2009 Academic Search Complete, Web of Knowledge 
López -Bastida et al, 2008 Citation tracking 
Powell et al, 2010 Web of Knowledge 
Serrano-Aguilar et al, 2009 Web of Knowledge 
Walshe and Miller 2011 Disability and Rehabilitation 
Wilson et al, 2007 Serendipitous 
White et al, 2010 Serendipitous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 325 
 
   18 January 2007 
 
Proposer:  Elizabeth Cassidy 
 
Title:   An Exploration of Contemporary Physiotherapy Practice for People with Ataxia: 
  The perspectives of clients and physiotherapists 
  
 
The School Research Ethics Committee has considered the amendments recently submitted by you in 
response to the Committee’s earlier review of the above application 
 
The Chair, acting under delegated authority, is satisfied that the amendments accord with the decision of 
the Committee and has agreed that there is no objection on ethical grounds to the proposed study. 
Approval is given on the understanding that the conditions of approval set out below are followed: 
 
 The agreed protocol must be followed. Any changes to the protocol will require prior approval from the Committee. 
 
NB:   
 Research participant information sheets and (where relevant) flyers, posters and consent 
forms, should include a clear statement that research ethics approval has been obtained 
from the School of Health Sciences and Social Care Research Ethics Committee. 
 Approval to proceed with the study is granted subject to receipt by the Committee of 
satisfactory responses to any conditions that may appear above, in addition to any 
subsequent changes to the protocol. 
 
David Anderson-Ford 
Chair, Research Ethics Committee 
School of Health Sciences and Social Care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Health Sciences and 
Social Care 
 
Research Ethics Committee 
School of Health Sciences and 
Social Care 
Brunel University,  
Uxbridge 
Middlesex UB8 3PH 
Telephone: +44 (0)20 8891 0121 
Fax: +44 (0)20 8891 8247 
Web www.brunel.ac.uk 
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Proposer:  Elizabeth Cassidy 
 
Title:   An Exploration of Contemporary Physiotherapy Practice for People with Ataxia: 
  The perspectives of clients and physiotherapists 
  
The School Research Ethics Committee has considered the further amendments recently submitted by 
you in relation to the above application 
 
The Chair, acting under delegated authority, is satisfied that there is no objection on ethical grounds to 
the proposed study. Approval is given on the understanding that the conditions of approval set out 
below are followed: 
 
 The agreed protocol must be followed. Any changes to the protocol will require prior approval from the Committee. 
 
NB:   
 Research participant information sheets and (where relevant) flyers, posters and consent 
forms, should include a clear statement that research ethics approval has been obtained 
from the School of Health Sciences and Social Care Research Ethics Committee. 
 Approval to proceed with the study is granted subject to receipt by the Committee of 
satisfactory responses to any conditions that may appear above, in addition to any 
subsequent changes to the protocol. 
 
David Anderson-Ford 
Chair, Research Ethics Committee 
School of Health Sciences and Social Care 
 
School of Health Sciences and 
Social Care 
 
Research Ethics Committee 
Appendix Cb Further Approval  
   School of Health Sciences and 
   Social Care 
   Brunel University,  
   Uxbridge 
   Middlesex UB8 3PH 
   Telephone: +44 (0)20 8891 0121 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Title of Project: An exploration of contemporary physiotherapy practice for people 
with ataxia: the perspectives of clients and physiotherapists 
 
Invitation to Participate: 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you 
wish. 
 Part 1 tells you the purpose of the study and what will happen to you if you take part 
 Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Although physiotherapy is considered an important part of helping people with ataxia 
there is very little research to guide physiotherapists towards the most effective and 
useful ways of treating people with ataxia.  
We would like to ask people with ataxia about their experiences of physiotherapy, what 
they have found useful and not so useful and what it is like to live with ataxia. We hope 
that this information would help improve physiotherapy services and help others to 
understand what living with ataxia is like.  
This study will also ask physiotherapists about their experiences in treating people with 
ataxia, what ideas they base this treatment on and how they organise the services they 
provide.  
We hope that this study will also identify areas for future research that are relevant to 
physiotherapy and people with ataxia.  
 
 
Am I eligible to take part? 
 
If you are over the age of 18, have had cerebellar ataxia for more than six months, you 
do not have any other neurological condition e.g. multiple sclerosis, and you are able to 
participate in a conversation in English, you would be eligible to participate in this study. 
You may have responded to information on the Ataxia UK website or been given 
information about this project at a local branch meeting.  
 
It is anticipated that about 36 people with ataxia and 36 physiotherapists will be recruited 
to this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is up to you whether or not to take part. If you do, you will be given this information 
sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take 
part, will not affect your future treatment in the NHS or involvement with Ataxia UK in 
any way. 
Appendix D 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
1. If you are interested in this study you can contact us by e-mail or telephone (see 
below). One of the researchers will discuss the study with you and answer any 
questions you may have. The discussion would normally be over the phone. We 
would also be happy to contact you by e-mail. 
 
2. We will ask your permission to inform your GP about your potential participation 
in this study. 
 
3. We would ask you to let us know if you have any special requirements e.g. 
wheelchair access. 
 
4. There may be a wait involved of up to 3 months whilst we recruit other people to 
the study. We would keep you informed of our progress on recruitment. 
 
5. You would then be invited to attend a focus group (group discussion) with a 
minimum of 1 and a maximum of 11 other people with ataxia. This would take 
place either in the London region at the headquarters of Ataxia UK, Brunel 
University or another location in the UK acceptable to the participants and the 
researchers if more convenient.  
 
6. You would then attend one focus group. You will have the opportunity to ask 
further questions about the study and if you are happy to participate you will be 
asked to sign and complete a consent form. We would then ask you to complete 
a brief form about the type of ataxia you have, how long you have been 
diagnosed for, your age and occupational status (in work, unemployed, retired).  
The researchers would be able to help you complete the form if required.  
 
7. Two members of the research team will lead the focus group and introduce 
topics for everybody to discuss. These will be concerned with for example the 
experience of living with ataxia, as well as experiences of physiotherapy and 
recommendations to improve services. The group will be asked to summarise 
their discussion at the end of the focus group. Because of the nature of the focus 
group it is important that you are happy discussing topics in English. 
 
8. The focus group is expected to last for 1 hour and completion of the consent and 
background information forms a maximum of 30 minutes. Total time required 
being no more than an hour and a half. 
 
9. The focus group will be digitally recorded and transcribed into a typed up 
version. Digital recordings will be stored on a computer with password protection. 
Confidentiality is assured from the researchers, you will not be able to be 
identified from the recordings. The participants in the focus group will be asked 
to maintain confidentiality for each other. Only the researchers and the 
transcriber will have access to the recordings. The recorded information will be 
used to analyse the discussion.  
 
10. In the writing up of the research direct (verbatim) quotations will be used to 
illustrate what was said. Confidentiality will be maintained because you will not 
be able to be identified from the quoted passages. 
 
 
Expenses and Payments 
Travel expenses incurred due to your participation in this study will be reimbursed. 
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What if my mobility problems stop me coming to the focus group? 
If this is a problem, and if acceptable to you, one or two members of the research team 
would come to your home to conduct an interview with you. Although this approach 
would not involve the discussion element of the focus group we would conduct the 
interview after the first couple of focus groups so that we could tell you about the kind of 
things that were discussed so that you could comment on it if you wanted to.  
The procedure would be the same as above – completion of the consent form and 
background information form, recorded interview and publication of direct quotes 
(verbatim) that would be anonymised. The interview would last up to 1 hour with a 
further 15 minutes for completing the consent form and background information form. 
 
What if I have difficulty with my speech / or use an assistive device? 
If this is a problem, and if it acceptable to you, two of the research team would come to 
your home to conduct an interview with you. Although this approach would not involve 
the discussion element of the focus group we would conduct the interview after the first 
couple of focus groups so that we could tell you about the kind of things that were 
discussed so that you could comment on it if you wanted to.  
The procedure would be the same as above – completion of the consent form and 
background information form, recorded interview and publication of direct quotes 
(verbatim) that would be anonymised. The interview would last up to 1 hour with a 
further 15 minutes for completion of the consent form and background information form. 
 
What are the disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
The main risk is the potential for distress due to the nature of the experiences being 
discussed. Furthermore some participants may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed by 
the opinions they hold or their lack of opinion on topics on which they feel they are being 
expected to have opinions. 
If you become worried or distressed during the focus groups you’ll be asked whether 
you would like to continue or take a break from the discussion. Members of the research 
team, who through their profession have experience in supporting people who are 
distressed, will give you support in the first instance.  
If you prefer to be interviewed in your own home due to difficulty with mobility or 
communicating in group situations it is advisable to have a friend or relative available. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We cannot promise that the study will help you but the information we get might help 
improve the treatment of people with cerebellar ataxia in the future. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible 
harm you may suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is given in part 
2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All the information about your participation in this study will be kept confidential. 
The details are included in part 2. 
 
Who is conducting the research? 
The principle investigator of this study is Elizabeth Cassidy MCSP, MSc, Lecturer in 
Physiotherapy, Brunel University. She is undertaking this research as part of her PhD at 
Brunel University. Her supervisors are Dr Frances Reynolds and Prof. Lorraine De 
Souza. Elizabeth can be contacted on 01895 268736 or elizabeth.cassidy@brunel.ac.uk 
The other researchers are: 
Sandra Naylor Grad. Dip. Physiotherapy, MEd, Director of Physiotherapy, Brunel 
University 
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Dr Frances Reynolds, BSc, PhD, Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Brunel University 
Anbreen Khan BSc, MSc Private Practitioner in Neurorehabilitation 
For complaints please contact: 
David Anderson-Ford, Chair of the Ethics Committee, Brunel University, 01895 268 731 
david.anderson-ford@brunel.ac.uk 
 
This completes Part 1 of the Information Sheet. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please continue to read the additional information in Part 2 before 
making any decision. 
 
Part 2 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available? 
 
Sometimes during the course of a research project new information becomes available 
about the treatment that is being studied, in this case physiotherapy. If this happens the 
researcher will tell you about it but it is unlikely to affect the study. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
  
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without affecting your future 
involvement in any other research, physiotherapy or your participation in activities 
supported by Ataxia UK. If you wish to stop being involved in the focus group once it has 
started you are free to withdraw at any point. If this happens we would use your 
contribution up until the point of withdrawal. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Complaints: 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak with the 
researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (Elizabeth Cassidy, 
telephone 01895 268736). If you remain unhappy or wish to complain formally, you can 
do this through Brunel University (David Anderson-Ford, Chair of the Research Ethics 
Committee, Brunel University, telephone 01895 268 731). 
 
Harm: 
In the event that something goes wrong and you are harmed during the research there 
are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed and this is due to 
someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for legal action for compensation 
against Brunel University but you may have to pay your legal costs. 
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All information collected about you during the course of the study will be kept 
strictly confidential. Our procedures for handling, processing, storage and destruction of 
data are compliant with the Data Protection Act 1998. However, if evidence of 
malpractice came to light during the focus group, in line with research guidelines 
confidentiality would have to be broken. We would tell you at the time if we thought we 
needed to do this and let you know about what would happen next.  
You will be asked to provide us with contact details. This will most likely be your name, 
address, and telephone number, e-mail address if you have one and the name and 
address of your GP. You will also be asked to provide us with information about yourself 
on the background information form. This information will be stored securely on a 
computer within Brunel University. The files will be password protected. If you contact us 
 331 
 
by e-mail your e-mail address will be stored with your other personal data. We will delete 
your e-mails and their replies from the researcher’s e-mail application. Your name and 
address will be stored on separate files and a code used to identify you if required. The 
custodian of the data will be the Principle Investigator, Elizabeth Cassidy. The 
information will only be used to contact you about this research project. General 
information about the age range of our participants and how long they have had ataxia 
for will be used in the writing up of the study. The Principle Investigator will have access 
to this data. 
 
As explained above, the focus group discussions will be recorded and transcribed in full. 
You will not be able to be identified from the recordings. The recordings will be 
downloaded and stored securely on password-protected files as focus group 1, focus 
group 2 etc. All researchers and the transcriber will have access to this data. Our 
sponsors and regulatory bodies may also wish to view this data to check that the study 
is being carried out correctly. 
 
Your contact details will be destroyed upon completion of the study. The recorded and 
transcribed data will be retained for 15 years and will then be disposed of securely. 
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
We aim to publish the findings from the study in scientific journals, which are particularly 
relevant to physiotherapists. We also aim to feedback the findings of the study to the 
participants both in writing and through the Ataxia UK website. Please let us know if you 
would like to be sent a written summary of the findings of the study. 
 
You will not be able to be identified in any report/publication although we will be using 
direct quotes from the discussion to illustrate what was said. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
Ataxia UK is funding this research and it is being conducted under their guidance and 
that of Brunel University. 
None of the researchers or local collaborators will receive payment for your inclusion in 
this study. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The Research Ethics Committee at the School of Health Sciences and Social Care, 
Brunel University, has reviewed the study and granted ethics approval. 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research and taking the time to read this 
information sheet. 
You can keep hold of this information sheet and if you are interested in participating in 
the study we would ask that you contact the Principle Investigator Elizabeth Cassidy 
(Betty) to discuss it further: telephone: 01895 268736 or email: 
elizabeth.cassidy@brunel.ac.uk  
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Interview number: 
Participant identification number for this study: 
 
 
    CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: An exploration of contemporary physiotherapy practice for people with ataxia: 
the perspectives of clients and physiotherapists 
 
Name of Researchers: Elizabeth Cassidy, Frances Reynolds, Sandra Naylor and Anbreen Khan 
      
          Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 16.3.2007 
       (version 4a) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information,  
       ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
        without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that the interview will be recorded. 
 
4. I understand that direct quotes may be used when the research is written up and  
       published but that I will not be able to be identified by these quotes. 
 
5. I agree to take part in this study.  
 
6. I agree to my GP being informed of my participation in this study. 
 
 
 
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
 
Name of Researcher (witness)  Date   Signature  
   
 
When completed, one copy to be kept by the participant, one copy for research file. 
 
Research ethics approval has been obtained for this study from the School of Health Sciences and Social 
Care Research Ethics Committee, Brunel University.  
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We are looking for people with ataxia to participate in a discussion 
group with other people who have ataxia about topics such as 
their experience of living with ataxia, strategies used to maintain 
activity levels and experiences of physiotherapy treatment.
If you are over 18 years old, have been diagnosed with cerebellar ataxia for more than 
6 months and are interested in participating please contact Elizabeth Cassidy, Lecturer 
in Physiotherapy at Brunel University, for more information. Telephone 01895 268736 or 
e-mail elizabeth.cassidy@brunel.ac.uk
Research ethics approval has been obtained for this study from the School of Health 
Sciences and Social Care Research Ethics Committee, Brunel University.
Contemporary physiotherapy practice for people
with ataxia: the perspectives of people with ataxia and 
physiotherapists
VOLUNTEERS REQUIRED
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F Recruitment Material 
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Appendix Ga Draft Topic Guide version 1 
Draft Questioning Route 11 January 2007 
 
Introduction 
 
 Thank participants for their attendance 
 Introduce the researchers and their roles during the focus group 
 Overview of the research and further opportunity to ask questions 
 Inform participants about how the focus group is likely to run and what is expected of 
participants with particular reference to confidentiality 
 Signing of consent forms 
 Completion of background information form 
 Housekeeping information; toilets, eating and drinking, use of audio equipment, fire 
exits etc. 
 
1.  Focus Group (people with ataxia) 
Opening questions: getting people to talk and feel comfortable (not for analysis)  
For example: Tell us who you are and how you heard about this project 
 
Topic 1: Experiences of physiotherapy (interventions and service provision) 
 
Introductory Questions 
These questions will allow the participants to describe how they view physiotherapy and 
will give the facilitators clues about participants’ views. 
For example: ‘What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word 
physiotherapy?’ 
 
Transition Questions 
These questions move the topic on to the key questions that inform the study and 
participants become aware of how others view the topic. 
For example: Tell us about the process of being referred to a physiotherapist – was this 
straight forward? 
Could you tell us about how physiotherapy has been provided, for example do you get to 
see a physiotherapist very often? 
 
Key Questions: 
These are the questions that are fundamental to the study and will have more time 
allocated to them than the other questions. 
For example:  Could you describe the kinds of things you have done in physiotherapy? 
What things have you found useful about physiotherapy? 
  What things have you found less useful? 
  Could you tell us about any other sort exercise that you have found 
helpful?  
 
Ending Question: 
If you had a chance to give advice to physiotherapists about the most important things to 
consider when working with someone with ataxia what would it be?    
 
Topic 2 Experiences of living with ataxia and maintaining valued occupations 
 
Transition Questions 
For example: Moving on from physical activity and physiotherapy, could you tell us 
about other activities in your daily life that are important to you? 
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Key Questions: 
For example:  Have you needed to change the way you do these things because of 
ataxia? If so, in what ways? 
 Has anything that you’ve learnt or done been particularly useful in being 
able to continue with these? 
 Have any other groups or organisations or people been useful or 
unhelpful in supporting you doing the things that are important to you?   
 If you met someone who knew very little about ataxia how would you 
describe the experience of living with ataxia?  
 
Ending Question: 
We would like this study to reflect your experience of living with ataxia and your 
experiences of physiotherapy. Is there anything that we’ve missed? Is there anything 
that you came wanting to say that you didn’t get a chance to say?  
  
Summary 
Before bringing the group to a close, the researcher will summarise the key points made 
during the group and check with the group that these were captured accurately. 
 
Refreshments will be available and breaks taken at a convenient time during the 
discussion. 
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Appendix Gb: Draft Topic Guide v2 
 
 
Draft Annotated Topic Guide Mapped to Research  
Objectives 20 February 2007 
 
Introduction 
 
 Thank participants for their attendance 
 Introduce the researchers and their roles during the 
focus group 
 Overview of the research and further opportunity to ask  
questions 
 Inform participants about how the focus group is likely to 
run and what is expected of participants with particular  
reference to confidentiality 
 Signing of consent forms 
 Completion of background information form 
 Housekeeping information; toilets, eating and drinking, 
use of audio equipment, fire exits etc. 
 
1. Focus Group (people with ataxia) 
 
Topic: getting people to talk and feel comfortable,  
also exploring motives for participation  
 
Could you tell everyone who you are (first name only) and 
why you’re interested in being involved in this study? 
 
Topic: Experiences of living with ataxia and  
maintaining valued occupations 
 
Key Questions These are the questions that are fundamental  
to the study and will have more time allocated to them than  
the other questions. 
 
I’d like you to close your eyes and think for a moment  
about what it’s like to have ataxia; ….if you met someone  
who knew very little/nothing about ataxia think about how  
would you describe what living with ataxia is like. 
 
OK I’d like you to open your eyes and describe what it’s 
like to live with ataxia. 
 
Probes: 
Does anyone have anything else to add to the picture? 
Has ataxia affected your relationships with other people? 
How about things like aims, hopes, ambitions 
 
Can you describe (in more detail) how ataxia has  
affected your day to day activities?  
Probes e.g. the way you like to spend your time, the  
things you feel you like doing, your role at home or at  
work, the things that you feel are important for you to do? 
 
Could you tell us about any day to day activities that  
give you particular satisfaction? 
 
 
 
 
BOLD = Research aims and  
objectives 
GREY = Theoretical underpinning,  
thoughts about what the research is  
trying to uncover/elicit and the  
mechanisms used to do that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are you trying to get at here;  
more than just a loosener; underlying  
motives, start telling the researcher  
something about the context/make up  
of the group. Should be an easy opening question 
which is not normally analysed  
(according to Krueger and Casey)  
but the response to this would be quite  
interesting in describing the group. 
 
 
To explore experiences of living with  
ataxia as explained by people with  
ataxia 
…focussing on valued occupations 
…strategies used to maintain  
occupations 
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Have you needed to change the way you do these  
things because of ataxia? If so, in what ways? 
 
Has anything that you’ve learnt or done been particularly  
useful in being able to continue with these? 
 
Have you taken up any new roles or activities?  
  
Have any other groups or organisations or people been  
helpful or unhelpful in supporting you doing the things that  
are important to you?   
   
  
Transition: We’re now going to move on from activities 
in your daily life that are important to you to physical activity  
and physiotherapy. 
 
Experiences of physiotherapy (interventions and  
service provision) 
 
Theme: experience and perspectives of physiotherapy 
 
What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear  
the word physiotherapy? 
 
So how would you define physiotherapy? 
 
Transition Questions 
These questions move the topic on to the key questions  
that inform the study and participants become aware of how  
others view the topic. 
 
Tell us about the process of being referred to a physiotherapist 
 – (was this straight forward?) 
 
Could you tell us about how physiotherapy has been provided,  
for example do you get to see a physiotherapist very often? 
 
Key Questions 
Theme: Contemporary practice  
Could you describe the kinds of things you have done in  
physiotherapy? 
 
Has physiotherapy been helpful? (Probes: have you  
noticed changes in your physical ability (physical),  
ability to do the things or activities that interest you most  
(occupational), what about other benefits, how you feel  
about yourself or in yourself? (psychological))  
 
 
Did anything about physiotherapy surprise you? 
 
What is most supportive about physiotherapy? 
 
What are the barriers to receiving adequate physiotherapy? 
 
Could you tell us about any other sort exercise that  
you’ve found helpful? (Gym, stretches, swimming) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transition from the general to  
the specific experiences of  
living with ataxia to experiences of 
physiotherapy 
 
 
 
 
 
To explore experiences and  
perspectives of physiotherapy 
 
Defining physiotherapy: why use  
this question to meet this aim? 
 
 
 
...experiences and perspectives 
 
 
 
…to record the experiences of  
physiotherapy services 
 
…to record contemporary practice 
 
…strategies used to maintain valued 
occupations and activities 
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What barriers to doing your own exercise have you experienced?  
 
Ending Question: 
If you had a chance to give advice to physiotherapists about the most important things to 
consider when working with someone with ataxia what would it be? 
   
Ending Question: 
We would like this study to reflect your experience of living with ataxia and your experiences of 
physiotherapy. Is there anything that we’ve missed? Is there anything that you came wanting to 
say that you didn’t get a chance to say?   
 
Summary 
Before bringing the group to a close, the researcher will summarise the key points made during 
the group and check with the group that these were captured accurately. 
Refreshments will be available and breaks taken at a convenient time during the discussion. 
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Appendix Gc Draft Topic Guide v3  
 
Draft Topic Guide  
 
Introduction 
 
 Thank participants for their attendance 
 Introduce the researchers and their roles during the focus group 
 Overview of the research and further opportunity to ask questions 
 Inform participants about how the focus group is likely to run and what is expected of 
participants with particular reference to confidentiality 
 Signing of consent forms 
 Completion of background information form 
 Housekeeping information; toilets, eating and drinking, use of audio equipment, fire 
exits etc. 
 
1. Focus Group (people with ataxia) 
 
Topic: getting people to talk and feel comfortable, also exploring motives for 
participation  
 
Could you tell everyone who you are (first name only) and why you’re interested 
in being involved in this study? 
 
 
Topic: Experiences of living with ataxia and maintaining valued occupations 
 
Key Questions  
 
I’d like you to close your eyes and think for a moment about what it’s like to have 
ataxia; ….if you met someone who knew very little/nothing about ataxia think 
about how would you describe what living with ataxia is like. 
 
OK I’d like you to open your eyes and describe what it’s like to live with ataxia. 
 
Probes: 
Does anyone have anything else to add to the picture? 
Has ataxia affected your relationships with other people? 
How about things like aims, hopes, ambitions 
 
 
Can you describe (in more detail) how ataxia has affected your day to day 
activities?  
 
Probes e.g. the way you like to spend your time, the things you feel you like doing, your 
role at home or at work, the things that you feel are important for you to do? 
 
Probe: Could you tell us about any day to day activities that give you particular 
satisfaction? 
 
 
Have you needed to change the way you do these things because of ataxia? If so, 
in what ways? 
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Probe: Has anything that you’ve learnt or done been particularly useful in being able to 
continue with these activities? 
 
 
Have you taken up any new roles or activities?  
  
Probe: Have any other groups or organisations or people been helpful or unhelpful in 
supporting you doing the things that are important to you?   
   
  
Transition: We’re now going to move on from activities in your daily life that are 
important to you to your physical activity and physiotherapy. 
 
Topic: Experiences of physiotherapy (interventions and service provision) 
 
What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word physiotherapy? 
As opposed to personal trainer???) 
 
 (? Show of hands – who’s had physiotherapy?) 
 
So how would you define/describe physiotherapy? 
 
Transition 
Tell us about the process of being referred to a physiotherapist – (was this 
straight forward?) 
 
Probe: Could you tell us about how physiotherapy has been provided, for example do 
you get to see a physiotherapist very often?  
 
Probe: Do you think there are barriers to receiving adequate physiotherapy? 
 
 
Key Questions 
Theme: Contemporary practice  
Could you describe the kinds of things you have done in physiotherapy? 
 
Has physiotherapy been helpful? (Probes: have you noticed changes in your physical 
ability (physical), ability to do the things or activities that interest you most 
(occupational), what about other benefits, how you feel about yourself or in yourself? 
(psychological))  
 
 
Did anything about physiotherapy surprise you? 
 
 
What is most supportive about physiotherapy? 
 
 
Could you tell us about any other sort exercise that you’ve found helpful? (Gym, 
stretches, swimming) 
 
Is there anything about living with ataxia that stops you exercising or 
participating in activities that are important to you?  
 
Ending Question: 
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If you had a chance to give advice to physiotherapists about the most important things to 
consider when working with someone with ataxia what would it be?   
Ending Question: 
We would like this study to reflect your experience of living with ataxia and your 
experiences of physiotherapy. Is there anything that we’ve missed? Is there anything 
that you came wanting to say that you didn’t get a chance to say?   
 
Summary 
Before bringing the group to a close, the researcher will summarise the key points made 
during the group and check with the group that these were captured accurately. 
Refreshments will be available and breaks taken at a convenient time during the 
discussion. 
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Appendix H: Lone Working Procedures 
1. Researcher to give name, address and contact details of participant to supervisor in a 
sealed envelope. 
2. Inform supervisor of date and time of the interview. 
3. Arrange to contact supervisor at a specified time +/- 30 minutes to confirm safe exit. 
4. If no contact, supervisor to contact researcher via mobile phone. 
5. If researcher does not respond, supervisor to open envelope and contact research 
participant. 
6. If no further response, contact researcher’s next of kin +/- appropriate authorities.  
7. If no problems encountered, supervisor to confidentially dispose of unopened envelope.   
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Appendix I 
Extract from Hugh’s transcript to demonstrate improved interview technique 
Hugh With me it came on with the accident.  It seemed to affect my eyesight.  When I 
was going shopping or walking down the aisle I couldn’t focus on anything.  It 
was giving me headaches, I just couldn’t  focus,  I was driving a car still, and 
anything to the left or the right when I was driving I couldn’t … I can focus on 
things ahead, but when I first had the accident I could not focus on anything to 
the left or right.   
 
I Right.   
 
Hugh That improved quite a bit since the accident.  I still find it harder focussing on 
things when I’m moving.  The other thing with ataxia with my eyesight I can’t 
judge … when I’m walking, I can’t see things in 3D.  I don’t know how big a step 
is, up or down.  On uneven ground I can’t see the bumps or the hollows, so I 
tend to trip quite a bit.  It’s also been affecting my walking and I don’t know if it’s 
the accident or ataxia.  But when I move my legs … not even, one leg’s going 
higher than the other one which is part of the ataxia, by the time your brain sends 
a signal back to your leg to put its foot down, your leg’s up to your chest sort of 
thing.  So it affects you that way. Or sometimes when I’m really bad and I’m 
trying to pick things up I can’t judge how far away they are and I miss them.  
When I’m typing on the computer it works sometimes, but got to be fairly careful, 
I hit or miss a key totally.  Or I hit two keys, so you’ve got to be very careful on 
that.  These days the computer can put it right. But 20 years ago or 30 years ago 
the computers (inaudible)  
 
I Yeah.  
 
Hugh So you can get round it.  But that’s part of the problem, my balance and walking 
gone off quite a bit now, I find it really difficult to get up out of the chair and 
walking around, the last year or so I can only walk along the wall or if I’m pushing 
a trolley or something to hold onto which stops me from falling over, something 
that’s heavy.  I cut the grass on the lawn by holding on tight to the lawnmower.  
 
I You have what tied to the lawnmower?  
 
Hugh By holding on tight to the lawnmower.  
 
I Okay yeah.  
 
Hugh That way.  Sort of like I know where the ground is, and sort of like acts as a 
counterbalance.   
 
I Yeah.   
 
Hugh But when I first have trouble walking was with a walking stick.  (inaudible) 
walking stick, I couldn’t judge the distance to the ground but by using a stick that 
would tell me where the ground was.  
 
I Ah okay.  
 
Hugh I could get the information back to my brain  
 
 344 
 
I Yeah.  
 
Hugh That way was helpful.  That helped quite a bit with ataxia with a stick it was easy 
but cos one of the side effects is doing two things at the same time, so you’re 
trying to walk and put your stick down, it’s very difficult sort of thing.  So 
sometimes it helps and sometimes it gets in the way.  
 
I Right okay.  So sometimes a stick does act as a feedback to let you know where 
the ground is.  
 
Hugh Yeah.  
 
I  And sometimes …  
 
Hugh Sometimes just by concentrating on the stick you can’t think of two things.  So 
you’re trying to walk at the same time.  
 
I Yeah.  
 
Hugh You can’t do it.   
 
I No you can’t do it.   
 
Hugh Trying to keep the smooth walking, you can do it but you can’t do it fast, you 
can’t do it smoothly.   
 
Hugh Yeah.  
 
I So some days it’s good, some days bad.  
 
Hugh Yes.  The other thing I found is … I like photography, I’ve got quite a few 
cameras.  If I put a camera round my neck and it’s swinging that’s totally … my 
body can’t handle it any more.  So I can’t carry the thing.  I can’t put a camera 
round my neck, the swaying … my brain’s reacting to it and I end up falling over, 
I can’t walk even walk straight. 
 
I So if the camera’s swinging.   
 
Hugh Swinging yeah.  The balance with my brain trying to walk, the counterbalance.  
 
I Right.  Oh counterbalancing the swing of the camera, it’s too difficult.  Yeah 
okay.  
 
Hugh So I’ve found it very very difficult.  I can’t carry a cup (inaudible) my tea.  I’ve now 
got a cup with a lid on so …   
 
I Right.  
 
Hugh … so that helps.  I’ve got thermal cups go quite tightly down.  (?) What I have 
found that worked before thermal cups came on, I used to make a flask of tea, 
put the lid on and then carry that round and help myself.  That way it wouldn’t 
spill it but I can’t carry anything without spilling it.  
 
I Uhuh.   
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Hugh Because I get tired now I can’t do … I used to go swimming, I can’t do that now 
because of coordination, with my legs and my arms, it’s totally wrong, and I get 
very tired so …  
 
I You get tired with the swimming.   
 
Hugh If I do a length or two that’s me shattered.  
 
I Right okay.  
 
Hugh When I go walking … it’s got progressively worse in the last few years, it’s got 
harder and harder walking.  And it takes me longer and longer to recover so if I 
do too much it takes me longer to recover.  I used to do a lot of training, like I 
kept myself fit.  In the last few months I’ve reduced that as well.  
 
I Just in the last few months? 
 
Hugh Yeah it seems to be making me more and more tired so I cut down.  I’ve got 
some weights so I do a bit of that but even that I seem to … don’t know what it is, 
motivation gone, it seems … too much like … like getting in from work, I’m so 
tired, I just want to sit down. Some days I’m good, some days I’m bad.  It’s hard, 
it’s really hard.   
 
I Yeah.  And you’re working now then?  
 
Hugh I’m working … I have been working 4 days a week.  I had a meeting a couple of 
weeks back, I was supposed to start working from home, so that will have … cos 
it takes me virtually an hour and virtually an hour to get back … or more than an 
hour to get back.   
 
I Right. And how do you get to and from work?  
 
Hugh I’m still driving.  
 
I You’re still driving, okay.  
 
Hugh And I drive a manual car, and they’ve agreed to change to an automatic … we’re 
getting a new car, automatic.   
 
I Yeah.  
 
Hugh So I manage to do that.  My driving, I’m not as good as … some people are 
better than others, but I drive well within my capability.  When I was younger I 
used to drive everywhere I don’t do it any more.   
 
I No no.  
 
Hugh Drive pretty careful.  Take my time.  
 
I Yeah. And so now you’re going to start working from home more?  
 
Hugh Yeah.  We agreed that at beginning of next month I’ll start working at home.  But 
I’ve got 2 weeks holiday at the end of next month so I’ll probably start next month 
so September so I’ll probably leave … get a few things out of the way at work, a 
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few jobs, so I’ll get them out of the way.  So I think it’s probably too quick notice 
to   
 
I Sure.  
 
Hugh To react to it early.  They agreed to it, but I think it’s probably better for all of us if 
I wind down slowly at work and do it from home  
 
I Yeah.  Over the next month.  
 
Hugh Yeah.  Plus the children are off this month, so it’s probably better next month.  
 
I To start off.  And so will that mean that you’ll be permanently at home? You 
won’t have to go into the office?  
 
Hugh Well I’ll go in one day a week.  
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Appendix J: Developing super-ordinate themes a case example 
The aim of this appendix is to provide a detailed account of data analysis to illustrate (as far as is practicable) how the analysis was carried out 
in the present study. A section from Jim’s account has been used as a case example. This section focuses on the emergence of stigma in the 
account.  
 
Stage 1: a small section of the first stage of analysis from the interview with Jim   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 14, lines 37-50, I: interviewer, underlining was carried out by the researcher during analysis
Transcript 
Jim I should use a walking stick.  I’ve got one in my bag, but I’m still 
coming to terms myself with the fact that I need to use it, being seen to be 
using it … which is more about my own preconceptions and image I 
suppose.  And I’m aware I guess longer term … if it does get worse you 
could end up in a wheelchair but it’s just something personally I find it very 
difficult to consider.  I’d rather sort of stumble along and fall down.   
I Right.  So what is it about the walking stick that you think that says 
about you?  
Jim I think it did just … you’re self-conscious anyway, which can create 
its own problems … but having something so obvious as a walking 
stick, it’s just a visible sign to everybody – yes I am definitely 
different.   
I Yeah. 
 
Initial thoughts: 
Constant readjustment to 
disability; stick, 
wheelchair; never complete, 
stable 
Next challenge – using a 
stick, fear wheelchair 
Adjustment ‘coming to 
terms with’ using a stick 
Being seen with a stick is 
bad – why – signal 
difference, self-conscious 
visible, obvious 
Commentary 
The left hand margin illustrates the 
initial thoughts of the researcher during 
the first phase of data analysis of Jim’s 
account. The idea of an on-going 
readjustment to emerging or 
deteriorating impairments or the 
consequences of these impairments 
was developing and resonated with 
earlier parts of the transcript. The 
beginnings of an interpretation were 
emerging that for Jim meant that 
adjustment was never complete and 
that the next stage is always 
anticipated, the fear about “ending up” 
in a wheelchair. The analysis also 
demonstrates the beginnings of an 
understanding of the possible 
psychological issues connected to using 
a stick but the comments in the left 
hand paragraph do not move beyond 
noting the visibility Jim associates with 
using a stick. 
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Second Phase Data Analysis (Jim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transcript 11; page 14, Page 14, lines 37-50, I: interviewer, underlining = researcher during analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging themes: 
Adjustment, dynamic process - 
projecting into a feared future? 
‘You’ not ‘I’ here and then back to 
‘I’ – displacement, incongruence? 
Wheelchair; final incapacity –
rather stumble and fall than be 
in a wheelchair? Fear of what he 
might become? 
Being seen with a stick is bad; 
diminishing? Stigma? 
Why does he think he should use 
a stick? Who says so - common 
sense? He seems quite conflicted? 
Commentary 
The comments in the right-hand 
margin are at a higher level of 
abstraction. At this stage the 
comments are quite hesitant and 
provisional. The emerging themes 
seem to be concerned with the 
experience of stigma as well as 
thoughts about a feared future. 
The introduction of a walking stick 
seems to act as a catalyst; it 
alerts Jim to the threat of ataxia to 
his sense of self and reminds him 
of the way in which adjustments to 
disability have to be frequently 
revisited and incorporated into an 
acceptable way of being-in-the-
world.  
Jim I should use a walking stick.  I’ve got one in my bag, but I’m still 
coming to terms myself with the fact that I need to use it, being 
seen to be using it … which is more about my own 
preconceptions and image I suppose.  And I’m aware I guess 
longer term … if it does get worse you could end up in a 
wheelchair but it’s just something personally I find it very 
difficult to consider.  I’d rather sort of stumble along and fall 
down.   
I Right.  So what is it about the walking stick that you think that 
says about you?  
Jim I think it did just … you’re self-conscious anyway, which can 
create its own problems … but having something so obvious as 
a walking stick, it’s just a visible sign to everybody – yes I am 
definitely different.   
I Yeah. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 349 
 
Provisional Super-ordinate Themes (n = 10) 
These themes were developed from firstly collecting all the possible themes from the 
right hand margin in the order they emerged in the interview and then clustering 
common topics together. Page and line numbers indicated. 
 
Background information, signs and symptoms 
1:3   Background information son at University 
1:12-20  Background information, age type of ataxia 
2:35-50  Background; type of ataxia and genetics 
3:1-2   Background continued; type of ataxia and genetics 
3:27   Background, brother and sister have ataxia 
14:5-16  Physical difficulties, balance, co-ordination, walking 
13:10-15  Speech 
15:33-43  Symptoms, sensory only participant to describe sensory  
   symptoms 
19:27-44  Fatigue, underlying, poorly treated medically 
20:1-7   Fatigue 
 
Missionary Zeal 
1:24-20  Mission: increase knowledge of ataxia, fuelled by experience 
   of ignorance, help others; one of his ‘fervent beliefs’ 
2:1   Mission: ‘help others […] that’s part of the reason I exist’ 
2:11-12  Mission: ‘I made a conscious decision’ to help with research 
2:16-35  Mission: help self; develop own expertise and understanding 
3:7-9   Mission help children; natural or reinforced by ataxia 
3:14   Mission: just to help everybody 
3:18-19  Mission: consciousness raising 
 
Jim’s personal philosophy 
2:46-50  Philosophy: links to his mission; informed decision making 
3:20-32  Philosophy; bringing the children up knowing about the ataxia 
3:11-12  Motivations; ‘guilty social conscience’ 
4:14-17  Positivity; bringing children up with ataxia, any bad times? 
5:31-32  Philosophy changes, learn from other people, peer support? 
5:39-40  Philosophy; positive mentality 
5:48-49  Philosophy; getting a sense of perspective – over time 
6:1-6   Journey, philosophy 
6:7-9   Philosophy: live for the moment (he wouldn’t be like this  
   without the ataxia, almost his life is richer because of the  
   ataxia, he hasn’t said that but is that what is leaking through?) 
   Perhaps this is because he has been diagnosed from an early 
   age, compared to some of the other participants and he has 
   been through the struggle etc with decades in front of him. 
7:31-34  Philosophy; positive, ‘see the light’ 
8:42-43  Better person, ataxia has made him a better person? 
9:5-12   Consequences of defining moments, being more open 
9:16-17  Consequences of defining moment open not angry 
9:19-20  Consequences; spreading the word, what disability means, not 
   what ataxia is, significant demarcation? 
9:19-42  Spreading the word at work 
10:1-4   Becoming an activist or becoming active, open 
10:14   Being active; sky dive 
10:18-19  Being active; set up a support group, why pushy parent link? 
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6:6-7   Philosophy; pushy parent 
6:13-19  Pushy parent 
6:21-30  Pushy parent, son rugby – why his son particularly? 
6:34-35  Pushy parent – why. Exploit the opportunities he never had, 
   having experienced loss he is aware that his children may  
   experience similar losses, especially his son. He pushed him 
   into rugby (a sport he liked but preferred cricket) knowing that 
   he may experience the same loss, better to have lived and lost 
   than to have never lived at all? Paradox? Does he alos have 
   regrets about what he didn’t do when he was young, did  
   nobody push him? Ataxia was in the family, but   
   perhaps not understood in those terms. 
7:18-25  Pushy parent, sport, gender differences 
7:26-31  Pushy parent; going to extremes (financial extremes, physical 
   extremes) 
 
Rough Weather 
2:34-35  Ups and downs, not all rosie ‘I just felt better in myself  
   because…’  
4:44-46  Anger, fight, negativity (initially all aspects of life but telling  
   work a major milestone, bump) 
10:26-27  Negative /inkling into the on-going negatives ‘shows I’m not 
   alone’; alone in what not having the condition surely, but in 
   feeling and behaving in the way he does? 
10:29-31  Negative leaking through here? Does he still feel alone? Is  
   the positivity fragile? 
16:22-37  Meaningful occupation; humour. Jim’s meaningful occupations 
   have changed he no longer does sport but he does lots of  
   other meaningful activities. Also though ‘mentally accepting it’ 
   is an on-going issue.  
10:31-34  Negative; can he see himself in this young girl, scared? 
11:3-4   Regrets? The sooner you accept the better?  
5:16-17  Journey; coming full circle re work 
5:19-32  Journey; moving from one perspective to another 
11:13-14  Negative; fragile confidence and new found strength, would be 
   lost without his wife’s support; she’s sort of a silent resource, 
   rock throughout the account.  
11:16-18  Hint at past experience of not being open within the family? 
11:22-27  Motivation help others see the positives, is he saying that his 
   life is richer than without the ataxia? 
11:33-39  Aware of the negative side of his current thinking; passionate, 
   carried away, fanatical enthusiasm, hearty persistent  
   endeavour, intense. 
12:1   Totally relaxed with it – his ataxia or his new found   
   enthusiasms?   
12:17-25  Zealot; achieving balance with the new understanding of his 
   condition? Meaning, sense making??? 
 
Biographical Disruption 
4:23-44  Biographical disruption, anger, loss, difference 
5:1-15   Anger, loss of trust, loss, difference (felt acutely at work) 
7:1-17   Loss, ongoing losses, compromise, loss; biographical  
   disruption. Not associated with age, other participants. Is the 
   shock here more acute because of his age, or is this  
   biographical disruption the same however long you’ve lived. 
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12:31-35  Development of symptoms, physical signs; disbelief, denial 
13:1-3   Denial 
13:3-9   Trauma - giving up sport, generally in this section ‘little deaths’ 
 
 
Revelations and defining moments 
7:38-43  Trigger, defining moment, course at work: be positive 
8:1-2   Trigger, defining moment, course at work: be positive 
8:3-42   Trigger, defining moment, understanding difference from  
   another perspective 
8:48-49  Defining moments – his description (compare to 7:39-41) 
 
Ataxia in and within the Family 
6:14   Wife supportive, she would have known about the ataxia when 
   they got married 
16:11-37  Guilt, adaptation to dependency 
11:5-7   Strong family involvement, son co-ordinator of group 
4:1-9   Daughter has become politicised 
11:13-14  Negative; fragile confidence and new found strength, would be 
   lost without his wife’s support; she’s sort of a silent resource, 
   rock throughout the account.  
 
Hegemony: fighting the good fight 
13:10-15  Speech beating my self up about it 
13:15-27  Speech – experience of speech and language therapy 
13:22-46  Key bit of text about needing permission to ‘give up’ the  
   pressure to fight not accept, to conform to beliefs of others  
   about the valiant fight. 
14:1-5   Speech, continued 
17:3-27  Exercise; went a bit mad; attitude to most things, go at it full 
   on? Or obliged to be seen to fight the good fight? Attitude to 
   exercise now changed? See below. 
17:34-42  Exercise; calf muscles stronger, also confidence. 
18:3-16  Exercise; feel good, perhaps underestimated by other e.g.  
   HCPs 
 
Hegemony and Stigma 
14:5-16  Stigma Physical difficulties, balance, co-ordination, walking 
14:16-35  Stigma, ‘the stare’ 
14:37-44  Concerns about the future, look at the language I/you 
14:37-48  Stigma, the stare, still coping with it, not wanting to be  
   different, internalised hegemony but also practical problems 
   p15 
15:1-2   Stigma/hegemony ‘I’m different’, want to be like everyone else. 
15:4-9   Stigma but also practical problems using a stick 
15:14-16  Stigma – prefer to hold wife’s hand; look less out of place,  
   avoid the stare 
15:18-21  Stigma stick practical problems. 
5:1-15   Anger, loss of trust, loss, difference (felt acutely at work) 
 
Frustration with HPC 
He came to his epiphany (sudden and important manifestation or realisation) without the 
help of HPCs, although it wasn’t sudden. 
18:20-44  Physiotherapy; frustration 
19:1-8   Physiotherapy; frustrating (20 years ago) 
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19:12-23  Physiotherapy; ambivalent? 
15:24-33  Frustrated with other HPCs for different reasons, pigeon holed, 
   cerebellar ataxia accounts for all other health   
   problems e.g. restless leg syndrome 
 
At this stage, a narrative account was written for each of the provisional super-ordinate 
themes identified in Jim’s account. The following extract from Jim’s narrative account 
(Box 1) shows how each super-ordinate theme was written up in the first instance as 
part of the case by case analysis. The section is taken from a larger part of the narrative 
account under the super-ordinate theme of ‘Hegemony and Stigma’. 
 
Box 1. Extract from the narrative summary of Jim’s super-ordinate themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jim described how he coped with stigma and the effect of those experiences in the 
following extract; 
 
14:16-35 ‘It isn’t a problem for me, but I’m aware that other people because of their preconceived 
ideas about it probably think ‘Christ, he’s had too much to drink’ or ‘What is he doing?’  Which 
again I try to look on the positive side, what people think doesn’t affect me.  But it does make me 
very upset and slightly angry when you’re with your family, because people do make hurtful 
comments.  You can see people’s eyes just burning holes through your back.  But again I’ve learnt 
to deal with it and you become hard skinned and hard nosed ... but for my wife and for my kids it’s 
sometimes difficult to accept.  Although they do, so you feel … not guilty, you just get upset 
because of what they could be thinking.  So me at work um … part of my job involves working in 
big offices, going to contact centres, and when you walk about there or when you’re talking to 
somebody you can realise very simply there are loads of pairs of eyes going chu-chu-chu – looking 
at you and thinking ‘What’s wrong with him?’  I think that is probably the biggest problem that 
anybody with I suppose any disability has coming to terms with it, accepting that you are different.’  
 
In the above extract Jim describes an ongoing battle to choose what he gives meaning to; 
he feels the ‘stare’ and therefore the continual reminder of being different; ‘people’s eyes just 
burning holes through your back’ and ‘there are loads of pairs of eyes going chu-chu-chu – looking 
at you and thinking ‘What’s wrong with him?’ but he tries to be positive, he makes a decision 
not to be affected by these transgressions of his personal space and what they mean; ‘what 
people think doesn’t affect me’. But his ability to exercise choice and exert control in his life is 
always under threat; ‘I think that is probably the biggest problem that anybody with I suppose any 
disability has coming to terms with it, accepting that you are different.’ From an existential 
perspective Jim attempts to choose what he gives meaning to, he is trying to escape feeling 
different by choosing not to be affected by what people think but as in other conditions the 
stigma of the stare is a continual reminder of ‘deviance’ (Whalley Hammell, 2006).  
Also, although he can try to exert a choice over what he gives meaning to, he is unable to 
choose what his family pay attention to therefore he feels upset and angry about comments 
or being stared at in public when his family are with him. He describes being ‘upset because 
of what they [his family] could be thinking’. The meaning of this phrase is not completely clear 
because Jim does not go into any more detail however, he might be thinking that his family 
are upset by the comments or he might also be concerned that his children are thinking that 
one day they might have to deal with the same degree of stigma. It must be painful to think 
about exposing his family to something that he cannot control for them but they experience 
only as a consequence of his disability.  
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At this stage, the analysis remained provisional and unfolding and only parts of the 
original list of themes were retained in the overall master super-ordinate themes of the 
study. Confidence was developed through working with the data, the interpretation 
shifted as new questions emerged, and as a result the original text was re-visited and 
re-evaluated many times. This approach is consistent with the iterative stance and is an 
accepted component of IPA (Smith et al, 2009). As part of the pruning process, themes 
which did not work well to illuminate the phenomenon were reconsidered, reconstructed 
or subsumed within another superordinate theme. Overall five superordinate themes 
were developed from Jim’s account. Table 1 indicates the pruned superordinate themes 
and subthemes. However, the overall themes were only finalised following further 
analytic work during the cross case analyses and writing up. 
 
Table 1 Development of Superordinate Themes and Subthemes for Jim  
 
Superordinate Theme (n = 5)  
Subthemes 
Page/line 
number 
Key quotation 
Ataxia in and within the family 
Presence in the family 
Comfortable at home 
 
3:22 
4:16 
 
‘Basically been brought up with it’ 
‘They don’t see it as a problem’ 
Getting back on track / taking control 
Changing perspectives 
Affirming a sense of self 
5:32 
1:29 
 
‘Disability isn’t your problem’ 
‘If I can help others […] that’s part of the 
reason I exist’ 
Stigma 
Difference and unwanted attention 
Rejection of stigma symbols 
14:31 
14:48 
 
‘Loads of pairs of eyes going chu-chu-
chu’ 
‘Having something so obvious as a 
walking stick’ 
Lack of support at critical times 
Thwarted and frustrated 
Left high and dry 
 
19:3 
7:9 
 
‘There’s just nothing we can do’ 
‘No support, no nothing’ 
Understanding and managing 
symptoms 
Keeping physically fit 
Disordered movement 
Fatigue 
 
17:38 
14:12 
19:36 
 
‘You just feel better for doing something’ 
‘You look like you’re drunk’ 
‘You do feel tired’ 
 
Jim’s original superordinate themes were preserved in the final list of master themes but 
renamed and redistributed as the researcher’s thinking and familiarity with the data 
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deepened and changed in the process of conducting the cross case analysis and during 
writing up. Table 2 demonstrates how Jim’s themes were reconfigured.  
 
Table 2 Reconfiguration of Jim’s Superordinate Themes into the Master Super-
ordinate Themes 
 
Jim’s superordinate themes 
 
Master themes 
Ataxia in and within the family 
The embodied experience of living with 
progressive cerebellar ataxia 
Getting back on track / taking control 
Identity, stigma and disrupted 
embodiment in public places and spaces 
Stigma 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex 
juxtaposition 
Lack of support at critical times 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain 
and changing forces 
Understanding and managing 
symptoms 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to 
managing life with ataxia 
 
The individual superordinate and subthemes for each participant are presented in 
Appendix K.  
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Appendix K 
Mapping Super-ordinate Themes for Each Participant into Master Super-ordinate Themes 
Joan’s super-ordinate themes  Master super-ordinate themes 
Struggle, fight and uncertainty 
1:24 ‘he thinks there’s no such thing as ataxia wrong with 
me’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Taking control and managing health 
4:1‘I’m managing ‘it’ the ataxia … and how it behaves’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Experience of physiotherapy  
12:42 ‘particular exercises all of which I wrote down, I can’t 
remember’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Symptoms 
2:39 ‘unable to co-ordinate my limbs together’ 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Exercise is nourishing ‘with exercise the spirits are lifted’ 
(post-interview phone call) 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
 
Stella’s super-ordinate themes  Master super-ordinate themes 
Symptoms 
5:28 ‘my balance is poor and I can easily fall’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Loss of self 
3:1-2 ‘I used to be so active I find it very hard’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Uncertainty and fear 
3:4 ‘they can’t diagnose which ataxia I’ve got’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Abandonment and helplessness 
2:20 ‘you’re floundering about in the dark and you haven’t 
any contact’ 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Fighting on and fighting back 
1:29 ‘I went back to my GP and got him to refer me’ 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
Physiotherapy 
18:24 ‘they just don’t have the staff I suppose, and the 
knowledge’ 
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Harry’s super-ordinate themes  
 
 
 
 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Symptoms 
9:28 ‘That’s one thing you lose - your automatic bits’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Taking blows 
3:35 ‘I loved riding mountain bikes and now I just couldn’t’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Fighting back: taking control and managing health 
5:21 ‘When you’re out there nobody can see the 
wheelchair’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Physiotherapy 
14:28 ‘You can’t walk into a physio place and just go ‘Fix 
me’’ 
 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
 
 
Bill’s super-ordinate themes  Master super-ordinate themes 
Symptoms 
4:27 ‘kind of like everything is uncoordinated’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Loss  
6:18 ‘I feel in myself as it were, little bit inclined to be quiet’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Limited information and poor communication 
3:3 ‘some information at that kind of level would be useful’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Taking control: addressing issues 
14:10 ‘I wrote an article for the [newspaper] about ataxia’ 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Finding support 
8:38 ‘one of the people who calls who we’ve as it were 
befriended, got to know’ Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia Physiotherapy 
1:7 ‘my experience has been one of the therapists saying 
‘Oh, never heard of it’’ 
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Toby’s super-ordinate themes  
 
 
 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Symptoms 
5:19 ‘like my top half wasn’t connected to my bottom half’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Struggle and fight 
2:10 ‘that year, I went [to the GP] and I said ‘This can’t be 
normal’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Taking control and managing health 
4:40 ‘I go swimming three times a week’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Physiotherapy 
14:1 ‘physio gave me an open appointment so that if I 
needed to go I could ring’ 
 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
 
Julia’s super-ordinate themes 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Symptoms 
10:3 ‘It gets worse as I get more tired’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar ataxia 
Keeping control 
15:20 ‘If I wanted to stay independent I had to fight as long as I 
could’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Shame and Stigma 
7:28 ‘I don’t want to seem odd in public’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition Reconstructing identity 
1:18 ‘being part of research programmes makes me feel that I can 
still be useful’ 
Coping strategies and self-management 
1:22 ‘I learned that if I planned my movements I’m much more 
likely to succeed’ 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Exercise to maintain participation 
3:1 ‘the stairs … if I can’t do them then I won’t be invited to baby-
sit’ 
Valuing partnerships with physiotherapists 
18:14 ‘I do think that you need to go back every now and 
then just to be checked over’ 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with ataxia 
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Hugh’s super-ordinate themes  Master super-ordinate themes 
Secrecy 
1:13 ‘dad and mum wouldn’t tell us what was wrong’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Anger and frustration 
1:5 ‘It took them over ten years to find out what was wrong’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Uncertainty 
4:33 ‘With the type six I’m not sure if it gets earlier and 
earlier or if it just hits you at the same time’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition Struggle and fight 
16:14 ‘I suggested [about working from home] over a year 
ago to them they didn’t want to know, but they’ve changed 
their tune now’ 
Symptoms: balance, fatigue and attention 
10:30 ‘I can only walk along the wall or if I’m pushing a 
trolley or something to hold onto’ 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Managing symptoms, keeping healthy 
22:22 ‘If I can get a wheelchair for the house that might be 
better’ 
Physiotherapy 
2:41 ‘I’ve had physio from hospital and they … it’s like 
physio for someone who’s got a broken leg’ 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
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Susan’s super-ordinate themes 
 
 
 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Living with uncertainty: campaigning and persuading 
5:12 ‘I’m now trying to find out which type of ataxia I have’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Surrendering and fighting on 
7:25 ‘I don’t like to go into the social situation where I feel 
I’m being judged’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Signs and symptoms: losing time, balance and 
concentration 
4:14 ‘I’m tired all the time it’s just a way of life’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Physiotherapy: good, bad and insufficient 
13:33 ‘‘I’m not so sure that she wasn’t thinking more of a 
stroke victim’ 
 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
 
Scott’s super-ordinate themes 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Uncertainty 
16:25 ‘what I’ve now got … which is still not diagnosed’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Symptoms 
2:5 ‘my thought processes were completely disrupted as 
well’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Struggle and disempowerment 
4:42 ‘very difficult to get people to understand what you’re 
going through Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Isolation and depression 
6:9 ‘You don’t have a social life’ 
Fighting back and taking control 
10:17 ‘You’ve got to plan your day’ 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Shared experiences, collective voices 
18:12 ‘You’re not on your own’ 
Physiotherapy 
14:24 ‘keep yourself lubed up with, something that’s not 
going to be a bind’ 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
 360 
 
Graham’s super-ordinate themes 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Uncertainty 
17:20 ‘it’s difficult for me to actually say what my illness is’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Symptoms 
8:37 ‘I tend to sort of go too far or not quite far enough’ 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Struggle and disempowerment 
15:47 ‘it doesn’t feel like I’m getting much attention’ 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Isolation and depression 
6:48 ‘you start turning things down’ 
Fighting back and taking control 
19:20 ‘to actually play it again even though I’m frustrated 
[…], it’s much better Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
Shared experiences, collective voices 
18:4 ‘if we all club together we’ve got more of a voice’ 
Physiotherapy 
13:37 ‘somebody else is actually taking a bit of interest, 
which I find as important as physical aspects’ 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
 
Ted’s super-ordinate themes  
 
 
 
 
 
Master super-ordinate themes 
Uncertainty 
10:1 ‘it was almost a relief to be told that you weren’t just 
clumsy, there is a reason.’ 
The embodied experience of living with progressive cerebellar 
ataxia 
Identity, stigma and disrupted embodiment in public places and 
spaces 
Lifeworld meets biomedicine: a complex juxtaposition 
Physiotherapy 
8:28 ‘It makes me feel better that I’m actually doing 
something’ 
 
Wresting control in the face of uncertain and changing forces 
 
Exercise: a multi-faceted contributor to managing life with 
ataxia 
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Appendix L Publications and Conference Presentations 
 
Publications 
 
Cassidy, E., Reynolds, F., Naylor, S. and De Souza L. (2011) Using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis to inform physiotherapy practice: an introduction with 
reference to the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia. Physiotherapy Theory and 
Practice 27 (4), pp. 263-277. 
 
Cassidy, E., Reynolds, F., Naylor, S. and De Souza L. (2009) What is Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis and how might it inform physiotherapy practice in 
neurorehabilitation? An overview with reference to an analysis of the lived experience of 
ataxia. Syn’apse, pp5-10. 
 
 
Conference Presentations 
 
Cassidy, E. (2011) Ataxia: Understanding the lived experience. SouthWest ACPIN study 
day, Bristol. 
 
Cassidy, E. (2009) Understanding the lived experience of cerebellar ataxia. ACPIN 
study day, London.  
 
Cassidy, E., Reynolds, F., Naylor, S. and De Souza, L. (2008) Fighting Back and Taking 
Control: People with Cerebellar Ataxia Reflect on the Role of Exercise in Coping with 
their Condition. Chartered Society of Physiotherapy Congress.  
 
Cassidy E., Reynolds F., Naylor S., De Souza L. and Khan A. (2008) Shining a Light on 
Physiotherapy: the experiences of people with cerebellar ataxia. Proceedings of Society 
of Research in Rehabilitation, Abstract published in Clinical Rehabilitation (22), 860. 
 
Other Presentations and Talks: 
 
Cassidy, E. (2010) The embodied experience of living with cerebellar ataxia: an 
interpretative phenomenological analysis. PhD student conference, SHSSC, BU. 
 
Cassidy, E. (2010) Understanding Cerebellar Ataxia. Richmond and District 
Neurophysiotherapy Meeting (March 2010). 
 
Cassidy, E (2008) Living with Ataxia: people with ataxia reflect on their experiences. 
National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, Queen Square, London. Joint 
Therapy Teaching. (August 2010) 
 
Cassidy, E. (2008) Fighting Back and Taking Control: people with cerebellar ataxia 
reflect on the role of exercise in coping with their condition. Clayponds Rehabilitation 
Unit, Therapy Teaching (May 2008). 
 
Cassidy, E. (2008) Fighting Back and Taking Control: people with cerebellar ataxia 
reflect on the role of exercise in coping with their condition. Charing Cross Hospital, 
Physiotherapy Teaching (May 2008). 
 
Cassidy, E (2007) Living with ataxia: A phenomenological study. PhD student 
conference SHSSC, BU, (poster).   
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Appendix M 
Overview of Svenaeus’ (2000a, b, 2001, 2011) phenomenology of illness and 
Todres’ and Galvin’s (2010) existential theory of well-being 
Svenaeus (2000a, b, 2001, 2011) drew primarily on Heidegger (1962 [1927]) to propose 
a phenomenological theory of illness as redolent of an unhomelike being-in-the-world. 
What follows is a short synopsis of Heideggerian philosophy germane to Svenaeus’ 
proposals. The key concepts are explored and the meaning of homelike and unhomelike 
being-in-the-world is clarified. An explanation and critique of Svenaeus’ phenomenology 
of illness as unhomelike being-in-the-world is then offered with explicit reference to the 
findings of the present study.  
In Being and Time (1962 [1927]), Heidegger emphasised that human existence is 
characterised by engagement in the world. By this, Heidegger meant that our lives as 
human beings are grounded upon our implicit absorption in our activities and projects, 
and our involvements with other people. Furthermore, our world, the environment in 
which we find ourselves, is full of useful things that are meaningful to us and with which 
we become fascinated and occupied. We lose ourselves in this world and are 
‘tranquilized’ by its comfortable familiarity (op. cit. 189/234). In this sense, the world is 
homey, cosy even (Critchley, 2009). However, by being bound up with the world and 
others in this way, our lives, the shape they take up, coalesce or homogenize with the 
mass of human existence and are defined by it.  Heidegger explained; ‘The “they” 
prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees”’ (op. cit. 
170/213). The “they” stands for a collective that ‘suppresses everything unfamiliar’ (op. 
cit. 192/237). By closing down the unknown and the untested “the they” effectively 
constrain the possibilities of a person’s life (Gorner, 2007). Heidegger therefore argued 
that what he saw as our natural but myopic tendency to “follow the crowd”, and to “do 
the done thing”, our unquestioning immersion in the comfortable everydayness of life, is 
an inauthentic form of existence. This is because, in living this way, our lives are 
interpreted for us by the ‘they-self’ and this stifles any attempt to live as an individual: ‘it 
is not I’ (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]:129/167). By living a life ceded to others, a person may 
feel at home and at ease in the world, but this sort of existence is a ‘sham’ (op. cit. 
178/223).  
Heidegger (1962 [1927]) argued that Angst, or anxiety, pulls us back from our 
absorption in the world and reveals possibilities for living an authentic life. The sense of 
pulling back is important because our potential for living a different sort of life is normally 
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covered up by our inauthentic involvement in the world. Heidegger explained that ‘in 
anxiety one feels uncanny’, or ‘unhomelike’ (op. cit.189/233, original emphasis, and 
footnote 1, Macquarrie and Robinson, 1962). What was once comfortable and familiar 
now feels strange. Anxiety is therefore experienced as a particular attunement of human 
being that briefly exposes the fundamental unhomelikeness of existence, the banality of 
everyday life, its insignificance, and the inauthentic meaning we attach to living (Moran, 
2000, Critchley, 2009). This fundamental not-at-homeness is ordinarily dimmed by 
absorption in and fascination with our projects and tasks, and the chatter and bustle of 
ordinary life.  
It therefore takes an uncomfortable mood like Angst to reveal our life for what it is. Angst 
reveals that human existence has no meaning in itself. For Heidegger, unhomelikeness, 
revealed through anxiety, is at the heart of our existence but we do not grasp what we 
are anxious about in an intellectual way, by choosing to abstractly think about the nature 
of existence. The reason for this is that the subject of our anxiety is not an entity in the 
world. We are not anxious about some “thing” in the world but our existence as such 
(Gorner, 2007). Heidegger explained; ‘Anxiety is anxious in the face of the “nothing” of 
the world’ (Heidegger, 1927 [1962]:343/393). In other words, in the particular attunement 
of anxiety, our everyday life, as we normally understand it, is revealed as holding no 
meaning in and of itself. By understanding that our existence, and the meaning we 
attach to it, is based on nothing, we are seized by the meaninglessness of our lives and, 
by doing so, we become momentarily self-aware. It is in this instant that we distinguish 
ourselves from the world and from others, and realise the potential for our future 
existence (Gorner, 2007). Heidegger (1962 [1927]:343/393) suggested that, in this 
moment, the world and the things that we value sink into insignificance: ‘Anxiety 
discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity’. This 
feels uncomfortable and disrupts our sense of belonging in our everyday life. It is as if all 
the things and people with which we are interested and involved disappear down a plug 
hole and drain away. This emptying out of things and others discloses us as naked and 
alone, as individuals, free to choose, as well as to reject, possibilities for our continuing 
lives (Critchley, 2009). For Heidegger (1962 [1927]:345/395), this sense of not-being-at-
home, this existential homelessness, revealed through a mood of anxiety or Angst, 
works like a “wake up call” that liberates us from comfortable but inauthentic lives that 
‘count for nothing’. This awakening opens up other possibilities for living that offer an 
authentic mode of existence. 
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Using the arguments outlined above, Svenaeus (2000a, b, 2001) proposed that if 
unhomelike being-in-the world is fundamental to the human condition but generally 
hidden, then illness may also reveal this latent state. For Svenaeus (2001), health 
should be understood as a being-at-home that keeps the unfamiliarity of the not-being-
at-home at bay. Illness, by contrast, is like a tidal wave that carries the uncanny into our 
otherwise numbing but homelike existence: ‘the basic alienness of my being-in-the-
world, which in health is always receding into the background, breaks forth in illness to 
pervade existence’ (op. cit. 93). In illness, Svenaeus (2000a) argues, our lives become 
incomprehensible and incoherent. These uncomfortable feelings press in on us to the 
extent that the meaning and significance of everyday life blurs and falls away. Put 
simply, life can turn uncanny in illness. We do not need to be assailed by an anxious 
mood in order to understand the basic unhomelikeness of our existence in the world. By 
suggesting that unhomelikeness can be revealed by illness (some “thing” in the world) 
‘which in turn might let loose feelings and thoughts on the ultimate meaning of life’ (op. 
cit. 11), Svenaeus inverts Heidegger’s original conceit. However, he admits that this 
reading of Heidegger is unorthodox, and proposed it as an alternative view ‘to inspire 
empirical challenge and confirmation’ (Svenaeus, 2000a:4).  
Svenaeus (2000a, b, 2001, 2011) set out to produce a philosophical explication or a 
general theory of the essence of illness based on a reading of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time. Drawing on imaginary or adapted accounts of illness experience (e.g. diabetes 
and stroke), as well as phenomenological accounts of the body in health and illness 
(e.g. Zaner, 1981), and examples of particular illnesses such as MS (Toombs, 1992) 
and chronic pain (e.g. Leder, 1990), Svenaeus put forward a hypothesis that in illness 
‘the lived body takes on alien qualities’ (2011:333). The otherness of the ill body, the 
loss of mastery and the changes in outward appearance that accompany illness were 
used to support this argument, and to further his contention that ill health is experienced 
as an unhomelike being in the world. Furthermore, with reference to biography (e.g. 
Frank, 1997), fictional writing and case studies, Svenaeus suggested that in ill health the 
present becomes the focus of the person’s world such that the temporal structure of 
illness can be ‘conceptualised as an alienation of past and future’ (Svenaeus, 2011:339, 
original emphasis).  
In his later work, Heidegger (1973 [1969]:5/11) ventured that it was possible to ‘grant a 
dwelling for man in the midst of things’. In other words, he raised the possibility of 
homecoming within homelessness. Mugerauer (2008) explained that Heidegger’s later 
philosophy made it possible to feel strange and unhomelike, without being overwhelmed 
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by it or fleeing in the face of it. Building on Svenaeus’ (2001) work and guided by 
Mugerauer’s (2008) interpretation of Heidegger’s later philosophy (e.g. 1966 [1955]; 
1973 [1969]; 1993 [1971]; 2001), Todres and Galvin (2010) and Galvin and Todres 
(2011) focussed on how the phenomenon of existential homelessness, as experienced 
in illness, could be reframed to incorporate the possibility of existential homecoming. 
These authors suggested that the unhomelike qualities of illness experience could be 
overcome, or at least modified, by promoting well-being. In other words, that there were 
ways of feeling comfortable and existentially “at home” (even if only for moments at a 
time) whilst simultaneously experiencing the discomfort of unhomelike being-in-the-
world.  
Heidegger (1966 [1955]) offered two interconnected ways by which it was possible to 
accommodate unhomelikeness, firstly through a kind of dwelling and secondly via a kind 
of mobility. He argued that in contrast to homelessness, homecoming understood as 
dwelling, is possible when we accept what is, when we stay engaged with what is felt as 
strange and unhomelike without drowning, or forgetting that it is possible to be otherwise 
(Mugerauer, 2008). At the same time, dwelling also means staying connected with the 
past and preserving its continuity, when the ‘remnants of historical tradition remain 
together’, when we hold onto the parts of our lives that are meaningful (Mugerauer, 
2008:486). Homecoming, understood as mobility, is possible when we generate new 
modes of belonging. These modes may be discontinuous with the past or what might 
have been expected, but nonetheless maintain the sense that we are in some way “still 
underway” or “in the making” (Mugerauer, 2008). Homecoming through mobility might 
be better understood as happening when we take on new projects, tasks or roles; when 
we engage in things that contribute to constructing a sense of identity that is always 
moving forward. Heidegger described dwelling and mobility as a ‘comportment […] 
which expresses ‘yes’ and at the same time ‘no’’ (Heidegger, 1966 [1955]:54-55). Put 
differently, the discomfort of our fundamentally unhomelike existence is let in and 
acknowledged but it does not hold sway, dominate or tranquilize (Mugerauer, 2008).  
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Appendix N 
 
Prevalence of participants in each theme organised with respect to gender 
Participant 
Super-ordinate Theme 
1 Embodiment (n=12) 
Super-ordinate Theme 
2 Stigma (n=8) 
Super-ordinate Theme 3 
Biomedicine (n=12) 
Super-ordinate Theme 4 
Control (n=11) 
Super-ordinate Theme 5 
Exercise (n=12) 
Total 
Subthemes (3) Subthemes (4) Subthemes (2) Subthemes (3) Subthemes (2) n=14 
Bill 
      
              8 
Hugh 
      
              9 
Harry 
      
              12 
Ted 
      
              4 
Scott 
      
              10 
Toby 
      
              10 
Jim 
      
              9 
Graham 
      
              10 
Julia 
      
              11 
Joan 
      
              8 
Susan 
      
              11 
Stella  
      
              9 
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Key:      Grey box refers to super-ordinate theme,  = theme present in the account 
              Blue box refers to sub-themes,  = theme present in the account 
Prevalence of participants in each theme organised with respect to age 
Participant 
(ascending 
order of age) 
Super-ordinate Theme 
1 Embodiment (n=12) 
Super-ordinate Theme 
2 Stigma (n=8) 
Super-ordinate Theme 3 
Biomedicine (n=12) 
Super-ordinate Theme 4 
Control (n=11) 
Super-ordinate Theme 5 
Exercise (n=12) 
Total 
Subthemes (3) Subthemes (4) Subthemes (2) Subthemes (3) Subthemes (2) n=14 
Harry 30s 
      
              12 
Ted 40s 
      
              4 
Scott 40s 
      
              10 
Jim 40s 
      
              9 
Graham 
40s 
      
              10 
Toby 50s 
      
              10 
Hugh 50s 
      
              9 
Bill 50s 
      
              8 
Stella 50s 
      
              9 
Julia 60s 
      
              11 
Susan 60s 
      
              11 
Joan 70s 
      
              8 
